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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation illustrates the merits of an interdisciplinary approach to religious 
conversion by employing Lewis Rambo’s systemic stage model to illumine the process of 
St. Augustine’s conversion.  Previous studies of Augustine’s conversion have commonly 
explored his narrative of transformation from the perspective of one specific discipline, 
such as theology, history, or psychology.  In doing so, they have necessarily restricted 
attention to a limited set of questions and problems.  By bringing these disciplines into a 
structured, critical conversation, this study demonstrates how formulating and responding 
to the interplay among personal, social, cultural, and religious dimensions of Augustine’s 
conversion process may eventuate in the consideration of issues previously unarticulated 
and thus unaddressed. 
Rambo (1993) formulates a model of religious change that consists of what he calls 
context, crisis, quest, encounter, interaction, commitment, and consequences.  Change is 
  
 
x  
explained by drawing upon the research and scholarship of psychologists, sociologists, 
anthropologists, and religionists, in conjunction with the contributions of theologians. 
This study unfolds in the following chapters: I. Introduction; II. Literature review of 
scholarship about conversion, with emphasis on explication of Rambo’s model; III. A 
description of the case of Augustine, drawn from a close reading of the Confessions; IV. 
Literature review of scholarship about Augustine’s conversion; V. Interdisciplinary 
interpretation of Augustine’s conversion; and VI. Implications for scholars of conversion, 
and for pastoral caregivers, as well as recommendations for future research. 
This dissertation demonstrates how Augustine’s conversion experience was deeply 
influenced by 1) psychological distress and crisis; 2) the quest to know himself and the 
divine; 3) interactions with significant others; 4) participation in Christian communities; 
5) philosophical and cultural changes; and 6) the encounter with the divine.  As such, this 
study reveals the value of interpreting Augustine’s conversion as an evolving process 
constituted in multiple factors that can be differentiated from one another, yet clearly 
interact with one another.  It examines the implications of constructing an 
interdisciplinary approach to Augustine’s conversion narrative for both the academy and 
the Christian community, and recommends the use of Rambo’s model in studies of other 
cases of religious change. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I. Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of this dissertation is to achieve an integrated understanding of 
religious conversion process from an interdisciplinary perspective.1  More specifically, 
this study investigates how personal, social, cultural, and religious factors might have 
affected the process of Augustine’s conversion by using the lens of Rambo’s model of 
religious change.2  Augustine’s narrative of conversion illustrates well the complex and 
multi-dimensional process of human transformation.  Previous studies have tended to 
examine this dynamic process of Augustine’s conversion from the perspective of one 
theoretical discipline.  They have not integrated critically religious and social science 
perspectives for understanding Augustine’s conversion.  This study addresses this lacuna 
by exploring the interrelated impact of personal, social, cultural, and religious 
components on Augustine’s lifelong process of transformation. 
                                                
1 In this study, the term integrated refers to the coordination of a series of ideas and approaches 
when reinterpreting the lived experience (“conversion”) of Augustine.  In this sense, it is not just additive, 
juxtaposed, or multidisciplinary, but interrelated, coherent, or interdisciplinary. 
 
2 Augustine describes his conversion in a garden in Milan (386 A.D.; conf. 8.8.19, 8.11.27, 
8.12.28-30). 
 2 
Religious conversion is a complicated and multi-layered process of religious 
change, which involves the total reorientation and transformation of one’s life.3  Because 
of the complexity of the phenomenon of religious change, scholars have presented 
various understandings of conversion from different perspectives.  For example, 
psychologists have primarily focused on the individual convert’s crisis, need, and mental 
development (Conn, 1986; Fowler, 2000; Gillespie, 1991; James, 1902/1982; Ullman, 
1988, 1989; Zinnbauer & Pargament, 1998).  Sociologists have articulated conversion as 
the result of forces mobilized and shaped by social institutions (Ammerman, 1987, 2003; 
Bainbridge, 1992; Kilbourne & Richardson, 1986, 1988a, 1988b; Lofland & Stark, 1965; 
Snow & Machalek, 1983).  They have paid attention to social influence and change 
through affiliation with a religious group.  Anthropologists have examined the cultural 
factors in a specific context (Austin-Broos, 2003; Hefner, 1993; Horton, 1971, 1975; 
Norris, 2003; Robertson, 1978; Tippett, 1977, 1992).  They describe conversion as a 
process which must be intricately related to the worldview and structure of the culture.  
Theologians have primarily emphasized the dominant influence of God on the process of 
human transformation (Gaiser, 1992; Gelpi, 1976, 1998; Marquardt, 1998; McKim, 1992; 
Peace, 1999; Smith, 2001; Wells, 1989).  They assert that the consideration of one’s 
encounter with God is essential for a more accurate understanding of the Christian 
conversion phenomenon.  There is no single theoretical discipline that can encompass the 
various interpretations of the religious conversion process.  Thus, there is a need for more 
                                                
3 Conversion experience is a process that happens around a conversion event.  It is the sum of 
what happens in the life of a person before, during, and after the conversion event (Rennie, 1995, pp. 34-
35). 
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critical and integrative dialogue among theological and social scientific studies of 
conversion. 
Since the late fourth century, St. Augustine has been a great role model for 
millions of religious people in facilitating a profound spiritual journey.4  This means that 
Augustine has remained influential in the psychological and spiritual lives of people 
across a range of cultures and times.  The Confessions is both a personal prayer of honest 
self-disclosure before God and a public act in which Augustine’s need to justify the 
reality of his conversion, both his turning away from Manichaeism5 and turning toward 
Christianity, led him to confess inwardly in his heart as well as outwardly before many 
witnesses in the Christian community.6  As a student in the fields of pastoral psychology 
and spirituality, and as a pastor in the Christian community, I face the challenge of 
providing a more integrated reinterpretation of Augustine’s conversion for those scholars 
who have ignored the social scientific interpretation of Augustine’s conversion 
(especially a psychoanalytic interpretation), for academics in the social sciences whose 
disciplines have not paid attention to the impact of the transforming power of the divine 
on the process of religious change, and for theologically oriented Christian pastoral 
                                                
4 Paul Tillich (1968) insists, “His [Augustine’s] influence overshadows not only the next thousand 
years but all periods ever since” (1968, p. 103). In this way, Daniel D. Williams (1979) states, “Those who 
seek reconciliation within the divided soul of man, or between divided Christian churches, or within our 
strife-torn society, will continually turn to St. Augustine.  He does not solve every problem; but he remains 
after [sixteen] centuries one of the most alive, most richly equipped, and most penetrating of all interpreters 
of the Christian faith with its Gospel of healing and wholeness for mankind” (pp. 13-14). 
 
5 A religious philosophy taught by the Persian Mani and his followers, combining Zoroastrian, 
Gnostic Christian, and pagan elements, and based on the doctrine of the two contending principles of good 
(light, God, the soul) and evil (darkness, Satan, the body) (Coyle, 1999, pp. 520-524; Walker, 1970, pp. 98-
99). 
 
6 In this vein, Augustine writes, “This I desire to do, in my heart before you [God] in confession, 
but before many witnesses with my pen” (conf. 10.1.1). 
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caregivers of conversion who may be unaware of the influence of personal, social, and 
cultural factors on the process of human transformation. 
Lewis Rambo’s holistic model of conversion stresses the importance of 
integrating critically religious/theological and social science perspectives in order to 
understand better the complexity and richness of religious change.  Rambo argues that the 
study of conversion must include the following components: the person, society, culture, 
and religion.  As such, he carries out the perspectives of psychology, sociology, 
anthropology, and religious studies into critical dialogue and proposes a model of 
religious change which consists of context, crisis, quest, encounter, interaction, 
commitment, and consequences (1993, pp. 7-18).7  He assumes that “(a) conversion is a 
process over time, not a single event; (b) conversion is contextual and thereby influences 
and is influenced by a matrix of relationships, expectations, and situations; and (c) factors 
in the conversion process are multiple, interactive, and cumulative” (p. 5).  His model 
helps us to examine the complicated and multi-dimensional elements of human religious 
change. 
This dissertation employs Rambo’s model of conversion in order to formulate an 
interdisciplinary method for developing a more interrelated understanding of Augustine’s 
conversion narrative in his Confessions.  In other words, this study seeks to apply 
Rambo’s interdisciplinary approach to the case of Augustine’s conversion process.  In 
doing so, it presents a more coherent picture of how the multiple factors involved in 
                                                
7 Rambo’s model of conversion includes the following seven stages: 1) the conversion occurs 
within an “ecological” context, 2) the potential convert experiences a crisis, 3) the potential convert 
engages in a quest, 4) the potential convert encounters an advocate of a religion, 5) the advocate and the 
potential convert interact, 6) the potential convert develops commitment to the religion, thereby becoming a 
convert, and (7) the consequences of conversion are manifest through changes in the convert’s life. 
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Augustine’s conversion are knit together.  It attempts to identify how and why St. 
Augustine converted to Christianity and to understand what specific experiences led him 
to conversion.  Through the critical and integrative conversation of personal, social, 
cultural, and religious dimensions, this study shows that Augustine’s conversion process 
was heavily affected by 1) the experience of psychological distress and crisis (e.g., conf. 
7.7.11, 8.5.10, 8.12.28; en. Ps. 119.6), 2) the quest for knowing himself and the divine 
(e.g., conf. 7.10.16, 9.1.1; sol. 1.2.7, 2.1.1; ord. 2.18.47), 3) interactions with significant 
others, including Christians (e.g., Ambrose [conf. 5.13.23-5.14.25, 6.3.3-4, 9.6.14]; 
Simplicianus [8.2.3-5, 8.5.10]; Ponticianus [8.6.14-15, 8.7.16-17]; Alypius [8.8.19, 
8.11.27, 8.12.30]; Monica [6.2.2, 9.7.15, 9.10.23-26]; his unmarried wife [6.15.25]), 4) 
participation in Christian communities (e.g., 5.13.23-5.14.25, 9.6.14), 5) the experience 
of cultural change related to the Neoplatonic heritage and the Christian monastic 
movement (e.g., 7.9.14-17.23, 8.6.14-15; Possidius, v. Aug. 3, 5), and 6) the encounter 
with the divine (e.g., 8.12.28-29, 9.1.1). 
 
II. Significance of the Study 
A. Research Significance: The Interdisciplinary Study of 
Religious Conversion—The Case of Augustine 
 
This dissertation is significant for promoting an integrated understanding of the 
diversity and complexity of the religious conversion process through the critical 
conversation of psychological, social, cultural, and theological perspectives, by using a 
case study of Augustine’s conversion.  Scholars have provided various interpretations of 
Augustine’s conversion experience in different disciplines.  For example, in The Varieties 
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of Religious Experience, William James explores the process of interior transformation 
from the divided self to the integration of the self in relation to one’s experience with the 
divine (“a More”) from a perspective of psychology of religion.  In this vein, he describes 
Augustine’s conversion as a psychological process of unifying Augustine’s divided self 
(1902/1982, pp. 171-176).  James contributes by advancing his psychological approach to 
conversion as a conflict resolution in the profound experience of interior transformation 
(“twice born”). 
Freudian psychoanalysts have focused on the oedipal conflict and a sense of guilt 
in the interpretation of Augustine’s conversion experience (Bakan, 1965; Dittes, 1965; 
Dodds, 1927-1928/1990; Kligerman, 1957/1990; Pruyser, 1966; Rigby, 1985).8  From a 
Freudian view, Augustine’s conversion experience is in part an effort to resolve his 
oedipal conflict.  Freudian psychologists have explained Augustine’s self-reproach, his 
oedipal guilt, and his obsessive personality within Augustine’s relationships with his 
father (Patricius) and with his mother (Monica) in terms of triadic relationships between 
parents and child.  However, Freudian psychoanalytic interpretations display certain 
hermeneutic limitations.  First, because Freudian psychologists elucidate Augustine’s 
personality and his conversion in terms of a model of a person derived from the study of 
psychopathology, they risk reducing all of Augustine’s mental processes to 
psychopathological processes.  Second, because Freudian psychologists examine 
Augustine’s personality and his experiences with reference to a particular period in 
childhood (the “oedipal” period), they neglect the exploration of the influences of 
                                                
 8 Sigmund Freud (1928/1957) understood religious conversion as an attempt by the convert to 
resolve the oedipal situation by submitting to the will of the father or Father (pp. 244-245). 
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Augustine’s experiences and events that occurred before or after that time.  Third, 
Freudian psychologists customarily focus on Augustine’s experiences as more or less 
“autonomous” or “isolated” from other persons in his life.  As such, they mute 
appreciation of the ongoing interaction between Augustine and other persons. 
In addressing this weakness, post-Freudian psychologists have emphasized pre-
oedipal experiences/anxieties,9 a sense of shame, and narcissism to interpret Augustine’s 
conversion experience (Capps, 1983, 1985, 1990, 1993, 2004, 2007b; Dixon, 1999; Gay, 
1986; Nino, 1990; Paffenroth, 2003; Parsons, 1990).  From a post-Freudian view, 
Augustine’s conversion is an earnest effort to be healed through a process of self-
exposure and self-examination, to overcome pre-oedipal anxiety and a sense of shame, 
and to promote loving relationships with others and the divine.  Post-Freudian 
interpretations explain Augustine’s Confessions as a record of the process of self-
becoming through developmental and progressive maturity rather than a record of a 
pathological personality (see, for example, Capps, 1983, p. 261; Paffenroth, 2003, p. 152; 
Parsons, 1990, p. 171; Woollcott, 1966, p. 281).  These interpretations provide insights 
into the interaction between Augustine’s psychological development and his ongoing 
relationships with others/Other in the process of his conversion. 
From a social perspective, scholars have focused on the communal and 
institutional dimension of Augustine’s conversion process (Kreider, 1999; Kreidler, 
1990; Matter, 1990; O’Brien, 1978; Van Fleteren, 1990; Wills, 1999, 2004).  They have 
                                                
 9 According to Gay, whereas oedipal anxieties have symbolically to do with fear of external 
attacks on one’s body (“castration anxiety”), pre-oedipal anxieties reflect fear of internal attack, which has 
the effect of fragmenting the inner self (“fragmentation anxiety”) (1986, pp. 65-67). 
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explained the influence of others’ conversion stories on Augustine’s conversion.  In 
doing so, they have investigated how significant others had affected the transforming 
process of Augustine in light of interpersonal bonds within the Christian communities.  
From anthropological and philosophical perspectives, scholars have explained the impact 
of the Christian monastic movement, Neoplatonism, and the North African context on 
Augustine’s thought and his conversion (Carry, 1999, 2000, 2003; Chadwick, 1986; 
Harrison, 2000; Lancel, 2002; Lawless, 1987; O’Meara, 2001; Zumkeller, 1986).  The 
anthropological interpretation helps us examine Augustine’s cultural and intellectual 
changes, resulting in the reconstruction of his identity, worldview, and belief.  These 
social and cultural interpretations elucidate the impact of institutional and cultural factors 
on the complex process of Augustine’s transformation.  However, on the whole, these 
interpretations neglect to investigate Augustine’s inner division and restlessness in his 
mind as well as to articulate both the interior journey toward union with the divine and 
the unique transformation of the individual in Augustine’s own conversion in terms of 
knowing oneself and knowing the divine. 
From a theological perspective, Augustine scholars have primarily explored the 
efficacy of the transforming power of God in Augustine’s conversion in light of sin, 
God’s grace, and conversion (Burrell, 1970; Holtzen, 2000; Quinn, 2007; Russell, 1997; 
Stark, 1990; Starnes, 1990; TeSelle, 1986, 2002; Vaught, 2004).  They describe 
Augustine’s sin as his proud disobedience to God in a sense of guilt and self-exaltation.10  
In this vein, Augustine’s conversion experience involves the transformation from the 
                                                
 10 H. Richard Niebuhr (2001) describes Augustine’s sin as pride.  For Niebuhr, the sin of pride 
involves disobedience to God through one’s undue “self-exaltation” (pp. 211-212). 
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bondage of concupiscence and sin to the state of humility and continence through God’s 
grace.  The contribution of the theological interpretation is the examination of the 
interaction of Augustine’s experience of inherited concupiscence and original sin, his 
experience of the gratuity of God’s grace, and his surrender to God.  However, this 
interpretation tends to consider the personal, social, and cultural factors as subordinate to 
the theological factor (e.g., sin and God’s grace) in the process of Augustine’s 
transformation.11 
Although scholars have presented various ways to understand Augustine’s 
conversion, most of the aforementioned studies have explored Augustine’s conversion 
process from the perspective of a specific theoretical discipline.  In other words, the 
contributions of their conversion studies have tended to stand in separation from one 
another, because the perspectives are formulated independently of one another. 
Using the lens of Lewis Rambo’s model of conversion, this dissertation 
demonstrates that the understanding of Augustine’s conversion is enriched by an 
interdisciplinary approach, which pays attention to the personal and socio-cultural 
contexts of his time and the religious dimension of his conversion.  By critically 
extending the contributions of the literature, this study presents a more integrated picture 
of how personal, social, cultural, and religious/theological components interact with one 
                                                
11 Although many theologians have explored Augustine’s conversion in the light of pride and 
humility, their interpretations are inadequate for explaining Augustine’s inner connection, disconnection, 
and reconnection during his transformation process.  Whereas many scholars (e.g., H. R. Niebuhr) describe 
sin as pride, Paul Tillich (1957) considers sin as estrangement.  For Tillich, pride involves a moral quality 
(e.g., one’s exterior wrongdoing against God), the opposite of which is humility.  Estrangement involves 
one’s disconnection with oneself, others, and the divine (pp. 47-55).  Tillich encourages us to explore the 
interplay of one’s disconnection, God’s grace, and one’s conversion in the light of estrangement and “a 
new being.” 
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another in the dynamic process of Augustine’s conversion.  In doing so, it sheds light on 
the reciprocity of Augustine’s interior journey toward encounter with God and his sense 
of belonging with others within Christian communities in terms of knowing oneself, 
others, and the divine.   Further, this study looks at how Augustine gradually 
reconstructed his identity, worldview, and belief through intensive interactions with 
significant others and through affiliations with religious groups, influenced by the 
Christian monastic movement and the Neoplatonic heritage of the late fourth century. 
 
B. Practical and Pastoral Significance: The Study of the Pattern of  
the Conversion Process from the Confessions 
In addition, this dissertation is significant for providing a more holistic and multi-
dimensional pattern of the conversion process as described in the Confessions for 
experiencing and reflecting on religious change in both the academic field and the 
Christian community.  The Confessions is a pilgrim’s book that affirms solidarity with 
fellow human persons going through the common struggle to answer the same crucial 
question Augustine put to himself (see Dixon, 1999, p. 2; Gay, 1986, p. 193; Kotze, 2004, 
p. 3; McMahon, 2006, p. 129; Nino, 1990, p. 16; O’Meara, 2001, p. xxvii; TeSelle, 1986, 
p. 93; Vaught, 2004, pp. ix-x).  This critical study of Augustine’s conversion process 
gives us an insight into a need for appropriate pastoral care and ministry in the Christian 
community. 
Scholars have presented various paradigms of Augustine’s conversion process 
from the Confessions.  For example, in “Restoration of the Self: A Therapeutic Paradigm 
from Augustine’s Confessions,” by using concepts of Heinz Kohut’s self psychology, 
 11 
Andres G. Nino (1990) proposes a therapeutic paradigm of the conversion process from 
Augustine’s Confessions as follows: 1) recognition of self-fragmentation, 2) return to 
interiority, 3) recollection in dialogue with God, 4) movement beyond the boundaries of 
the self, and 5) creative responses in continuity.  Nino’s paradigm elucidates the 
therapeutic and loving relationships between the experience of the self and the experience 
of the divine in Augustine’s conversion.  Although this paradigm seeks to explain the 
process of Augustine’s self-becoming in terms of the fragmentation and restoration of the 
self, it tends to neglect the interaction of the experience of the self with the experience of 
others in light of the impact of others’ conversion experiences/stories on Augustine’s own 
conversion.12  In “Saint Augustine’s Confessions and the Use of Introspection in 
Counseling,” Timothy A. Sisemore (2001) suggests the developmental stages of the 
conversion process as follows: 1) self-examination through introspection, 2) facing 
motives, 3) seeing God’s grace, and 4) reorientation to the beauty of God.  Sisemore’s 
paradigm explores the relationship between the integration of Augustine’s self and his 
need for God’s grace.  Although this paradigm uses a psychological perspective, it is 
inadequate for explaining psychological development from early life experiences and the 
influence of parental and familial relationships on later life experiences.  In Early 
Christian Mystics, Bernard McGinn and Patricia F. McGinn (2003) propose a model of 
Augustine’s spiritual journey of the soul’s ascent to God mapped out in Neoplatonic 
                                                
12 David Hay (2001) in “The Cultural Context of Stage Models of Religious Experience,” by using 
the first three stages of Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis’ model of religious experience, accounts for 
Augustine’s conversion process in the Confessions as follows: 1) existential crisis, 2) self-surrender, and 3) 
new vision.  Hay’s pattern contributes by elucidating how Augustine’s own conversion process applies to 
make an archetypal pattern of religious conversion for others.  However, similar to Nino’s paradigm, Hay’s 
pattern tends to be located in a simple linear process and it is not sufficient to explore the interpersonal 
dimension of Augustine’s conversion in his relationships with others. 
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terms as follows: 1) an initial withdrawal from the sense world (conf. 7.17.23), 2) an 
interior movement into the depths of the soul (7.10.16), and 3) a movement above the 
soul to a vision of God (7.17.23).  McGinns’ model articulates Augustine’s interior 
journey toward God in terms of Neoplatonic and Christian spirituality.  However, it is 
inadequate for explaining the lifelong effects of conversion on Augustine’s relationships 
with himself, others, and the divine for facilitating psychological development and 
spiritual maturity.  Previous studies have not suggested an interdisciplinary and multi-
layered pattern to articulate the complex and interrelated factors of Augustine’s 
conversion process. 
Through a critical conversation with previous studies within Rambo’s 
interdisciplinary framework, this dissertation contributes by suggesting a more 
comprehensive pattern of the conversion process from the Confessions in order to look at 
the influence of personal, social, cultural, and theological components on Augustine’s 
conversion.  In doing so, this study attempts to characterize more effectively and 
practically Augustine’s conversion experience in light of “universalizing Augustine’s 
story” of conversion.  The holistic and multi-dimensional pattern includes the separate 
yet mutually-informing elements: 1) the expression of one’s restless feelings in 
psychological crisis and spiritual darkness (e.g., conf. 8.5.10); 2) entrance into one’s 
inwardness with the divine (e.g., 7.10.16); 3) the confession of one’s powerlessness to the 
divine (e.g., 1.1.1); 4) the experience of loving care and support from other people in the 
Christian community (e.g., 8.2.3-5); 5) confrontation with philosophical and cultural 
changes resulting in the reconstruction of personal and religious identity, worldview, and 
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belief (e.g., 8.6.14-15, 8.12.30); 6) the experience of the transformation of “the God 
representation”13 (e.g., 1.12.19, 10.28.39); and 7) the re-creation of one’s loving 
relationships with oneself, others, and the divine (e.g., 13.22.32).  This pattern of the 
conversion process can help both academics who have explored the complicated and 
multi-faceted phenomenon of religious conversion, and pastoral caregivers in the 
Christian community who have guided others to understand the impact of the personal, 
social, and cultural components on the process of human transformation as well as the 
influence of the transforming power of the divine on the process of religious change. 
 
III. Sources of the Study 
 The following books are important for describing Augustine’s conversion 
process, his life, and his thought within the social, cultural, historical, and religious 
contexts of his time.  The main resource of this study is the book Confessions by St. 
Augustine; this provocative work exposes Augustine’s life history, especially his 
conversion process.  The Confessions describes a process of self-becoming through 
human development and spiritual maturity.  James J. O’Donnell’s Augustine: Confessions 
(1992) elucidates the many layers of meaning in the Confessions by providing a detailed 
line-by-line commentary (Vol. II and III) based on a revised Latin text of the Confessions 
                                                
13 In this study, the God representation refers to an internal structure through which one’s 
experience of and relationship with God is mediated.  It consists of images, ideas, feelings, sensations, and 
memories that are unconscious as well as conscious.  From an interdisciplinary and integrative approach, 
the God representation evolves throughout the human life span, influenced by the complex and rich 
interaction of the person with personal, social, cultural, and religious forces (see Ana-Maria Rizzuto’s 
model of the individual’s private representations of God [1979]; Melford E. Spiro’s model of the collective 
and mental representations of God [1982]; and Moshe H. Spero’s model of interpersonal and 
religious/deocentric representations of God [1992]). 
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in Volume I.  Bishop Possidius of Calama’s The Life of Saint Augustine, Peter Brown’s 
Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (2000), Gerald Bonner’s St. Augustine of Hippo: Life 
and Controversies (2002), James J. O’Donnell’s Augustine: A New Biography (2005), 
and Carol Harrison’s Augustine: Christian Truth and Fractured Humanity (2000) help to 
explore Augustine’s life experiences based on the social, cultural, historical, and religious 
contexts of his times.  The Hunger of the Heart: Reflections on the ‘Confessions’ of 
Augustine (1990), edited by Donald Capps and James E. Dittes, provides insights for 
critically interpreting Augustine’s Confessions in the Freudian and/or post-Freudian 
perspective(s).  Sandra L. Dixon’s Augustine: The Scattered and Gathered Self (1999) 
embeds a psychological study within an inquiry into the social and cultural influences on 
Augustine’s life experiences and his works in the light of the person, society, and 
culture.14  Frederick Van Fleteren’s “St. Augustine’s Theory of Conversion” (1990), 
Phillip Cary’s Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian 
Platonist (2000), John J. O’Meara’s The Young Augustine: The Growth of St. Augustine’s 
Mind Up to His Conversion (2001), and Adolar Zumkeller’s Augustine’s Ideal of the 
Religious Life (1986) give us insights into the exploration of Augustine’s conversion 
from a social/communal, cultural, or philosophical perspective.  Colin Starnes’ 
Augustine’s Conversion (1990), John M. Quinn’s A Companion to the Confessions of St. 
Augustine (2007), and Carl G. Vaught’s Encounters with God in Augustine’s Confessions 
                                                
14 For Dixon, society refers to a pattern of human interaction.  Culture means “the accumulated 
guidance available for people’s lives.”  The person includes the psyche (the mind and emotions) and the 
body (1999, pp. 14-16).  Using the categories of the person, society, and culture, Dixon tries to understand 
Augustine’s life history.  However, she does not pay attention to the impact of the theological factor on 
Augustine’s conversion: “I, too, will undertake social, cultural, and individual analysis of Augustine’s life 
events.  I, however, will not attempt to judge where the work of God fits in his story” (p. 23). 
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(2004) help to understand Augustine’s conversion from a theological or historical 
perspective.  Henry Chadwick’s Augustine (1986), Eugene TeSelle’s Augustine the 
Theologian (2002), and Serge Lancel’s Saint Augustine (2002) provide insights into 
Augustine’s theology and his philosophy.  Mary T. Clark’s Augustine (2000) and Thomas 
F. Martin’s Our Restless Heart: The Augustinian Tradition (2003) give us an insight into 
Augustine’s spirituality, in which God, self, and community are inextricably bound 
together. 
The following resources are important for reinterpreting the diversity and 
complexity of the religious conversion process.  Lewis Rambo’s Understanding 
Religious Conversion (1993) suggests a model of conversion, which explores the impact 
of personal, social, cultural, and religious factors on the process of religious change.  
From a psychological perspective, V. Bailey Gillespie’s The Dynamics of Religious 
Conversion: Identity and Transformation (1991) shows that religious conversion is a 
profound change in the whole personality and orientation of an individual, which leads 
the person to a fundamentally new identity.  From a perspective of psychology of religion, 
William James’ The Varieties of Religious Experience leads us to recognize the inherent 
link between one’s religious conversion and one’s interior transformation, which is 
involved in the process of unifying the divided self in relation to one’s experience with 
the divine.  From a sociological perspective, William S. Bainbridge’s “The Sociology of 
Conversion” (1992) encourages us to pay attention to interpersonal influences and social 
networks in the conversion process.  It helps us examine how much the person actually 
changes depending on the nature of social influences after joining in communities, and on 
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the degree of difference between the person’s old affiliations and the new ones.  From an 
anthropological perspective, Alan R. Tippett’s “The Cultural Anthropology of 
Conversion” (1992) and Diane Austin-Broos’ “The Anthropology of Conversion” (2003) 
help us to explore conversion as a process which involves not just adopting a set of ideas, 
but also converting to and from an embodied identity and worldview in a specific cultural 
context.  From a theological perspective, Gordon T. Smith’s Beginning Well: Christian 
Conversion & Authentic Transformation (2001) reminds us that the consideration of 
one’s encounter with God is essential for a more appropriate understanding of Christian 
conversion.  It presents a theology of conversion, which emphasizes both spiritual 
transformation and mature Christian living. 
 
IV. Method of Investigation 
 This dissertation uses an interdisciplinary method for exploring the complex and 
multi-dimensional process of religious conversion.15  This study uses Lewis Rambo’s 
approach to religious conversion in order to formulate a methodological framework.  In 
Understanding Religious Conversion, Lewis Rambo suggests an interdisciplinary 
approach to describe how conversion occurs through the mediation of personal, social, 
cultural, and religious components.  Rambo highlights the idea that human beings are 
                                                
15 This dissertation is “interdisciplinary” in nature.  In Interdisciplinarity: History, Theory, & 
Practice, Julie T. Klein (1990) defines interdisciplinarity in the following four ways: “by example, to 
designate what form it assumes; by motivation, to explain why it takes place; by principles of interaction, to 
demonstrate the process of how disciplines interact; and by terminological hierarchy, to distinguish levels 
of integration by using specific labels” (p. 55).  Klein distinguishes between interdisciplinarity and 
multidisciplinarity.  For Klein, multidisciplinarity refers to the juxtaposition of disciplines: “It is essentially 
additive, not integrative” (p. 56).  By contrast, she asserts that interdisciplinarity is not simply additive, but 
integrative. 
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individuals embedded in immediate social contexts as well as in larger cultures and 
religious traditions, so that any attempt to explain conversion must be interdisciplinary: 
“Good scholarship should start with rich description of the phenomenon, and with respect 
for its integrity” (1993, p.11).16  Rambo openly states his stance as a Christian and as a 
scholar of conversion, at which point he repudiates a tendency to understand religious 
conversion within “mere” psychological, sociological, or anthropological terms.  For 
Rambo, the appreciation of the religious dimension of conversion and respect for 
personal accounts of encounters with the divine are essential for a more accurate 
perception of this complex phenomenon.  Rambo argues that psychological, sociological, 
anthropological, and theological disciplines are all equally pertinent to the study of 
religious conversion.  Following Rambo, I, as a student in the fields of pastoral 
psychology and spirituality, realize that one particular discipline alone (e.g., psychology) 
is not sufficient to understand the nature and process of religious change.  I demonstrate 
that 1) religious conversion is usually an evolving process in which many aspects of a 
person’s life may be affected, and that 2) the study of religious conversion is enriched by 
an interdisciplinary approach, which examines coherently the personal and socio-cultural 
contexts of the convert and the religious dimension of conversion. 
 Rambo’s model guides us to investigate a range of personal, social, cultural, and 
religious factors in the process of Augustine’s conversion.  In this study, the term person 
                                                
16 In “Spirituality and Social Sciences,” Claire E. Wolfteich (2005), like Rambo, emphasizes the 
interdisciplinary study of spirituality for describing the relationship between faith and context in various 
disciplines (e.g., anthropology, history, psychology, sociology, theology, etc.).  She insists, “Spirituality 
does not exist in a vacuum.  Social, cultural, economic and political contexts shape how one understands 
oneself, the world and the divine.  Indeed, context moulds the practice of faith.  The social sciences are 
vital tools for understanding the context of individuals’ and communities’ spiritual lives…they serve as 
helpful partners to theology” (p. 68). 
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refers to an individual being, which includes the psyche (the mind and emotions), the 
body, and the soul.  The term society means the system or condition of living together as 
a community in such a group, which includes “the interaction between individuals and 
their environmental matrix, and the relationships between individuals and the 
expectations of the group in which they are involved” (Rambo, p. 9; see Dixon, 1999, p. 
14).  The term culture denotes “a manifestation of human creativity and a powerful force 
in the shaping and renewal of individuals, groups, and societies” (Rambo, p. 9; see Dixon, 
p. 15).  The term religion has to do with “the human concern, both individual and 
collective, with the spiritual, transcendent, or supernatural realm of existence” (Rambo, p. 
177).  The categories of the person, society, culture, and religion help us foster a critical 
conversation between social science and theology/religion that elucidates the diversity 
and complexity of religious conversion.17  In other words, these categories help us to use 
critically and collaboratively religious/theological and social science perspectives for an 
integrated reinterpretation of Augustine’s transformational process. 
This dissertation consists of six chapters:  Following an introduction, Chapter 
Two presents a review of the literature on religious conversion within the disciplines of 
                                                
17 The idea of a critical correlational conversation within various disciplines is attributed to James 
N. Poling and Donald E. Miller as well as Chris R. Schlauch.  Poling and Miller (1985) define “critical” as 
“awareness of one’s method and presuppositions, and the definition includes the willingness to revise one’s 
perspective under certain conditions” (p. 32).  According to Poling and Miller, “a critical correlational 
method” refers to “a collaborative dialogue between the Christian tradition and secular disciplines in which 
each can challenge the other and contribute both descriptive and normative statements, coming to a deeper 
understanding through their essentially equal dialogue” (p. 31).  In a related vein, Chris R. Schlauch (2000) 
emphasizes the interdisciplinary study of religious experience/matter (“a revised correlational practice-
theory-practice approach”), which evolves in the interplay among: 1) a concrete human event, 2) religious 
and theological resources, and 3) human and social science resources (p. 211).  Schlauch’s revised 
correlational approach provides us an insight into critical conversation between traditional Christian 
resources and modern human science resources to reconstruct “experiencing” of the concrete human 
condition and to overcome a gap between practice and theory, between experience and reflection, between 
the church and the university, and between the sacred and the secular. 
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psychology, sociology, anthropology, and theology.  Then this chapter introduces Lewis 
Rambo’s model of religious change, which brings together psychological, social, cultural, 
and theological aspects and integrates them into a process model.  Chapter Three 
describes the case of Augustine’s conversion experience in order to illustrate the process 
of religious change.  Then this chapter intends to provide a sufficient account of 
Augustine’s main life history (A.D. 354-430) and some of his basic thought to create a 
better understanding of the process of his conversion. 
Chapter Four provides a critical literature review of interpretations of Augustine’s 
conversion from psychological, sociological, anthropological, and theological 
perspectives.  More specifically, while succinctly rehearing each (discipline) of the 
contributions of religious conversion as discussed in chapter two, this chapter moves 
from a multidisciplinary presentation, seriatim, of the range of interpretations of 
Augustine’s conversion to an interdisciplinary conversation between and among the 
interpretations of his conversion.  As such, it presents specific interdisciplinary questions 
that intend to extend critically the contributions of the literature by bringing together 
various disciplines: How might we investigate the interrelated influence of personal, 
social, cultural, and religious factors on the process of Augustine’s conversion?  How had 
Augustine’s psychological crises affected his earnest quests for knowing himself and the 
divine?  How were Augustine’s interior journey for union with God and his search for 
community with others knit together in the process of his conversion?  How had 
significant other people in the Christian community provided love, support, and 
belonging to fulfill Augustine’s psychological needs and to make up for his frustration 
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with his deprivations in the social and cultural conditions of his time?  How had 
Augustine reshaped his (personal and religious) identity, worldview, and belief through 
his interactions with others, and through his participation in Christian communities, and 
through his experiences of cultural change?18 
Based on the critical and integrative questions of Chapter Four, Chapter Five 
presents an integrated reinterpretation of Augustine’s conversion through the mutually-
informing conversation of the personal, social, cultural, and religious dimensions within 
Rambo’s interdisciplinary framework.  In other words, it shows a coherent and integrated 
picture of how the complicated and multi-layered components of Augustine’s conversion 
process interact with one another.  In doing so, this chapter explains how and why 
Augustine converted to Christianity and what specific experiences led him to conversion.  
Following this reinterpretation, it intends to present additionally a holistic pattern of the 
conversion process from the Confessions.  Chapter Six, as a conclusion, explores the 
implications of understanding Augustine’s conversion for scholars of religious 
conversion and pastoral caregivers in the Christian community. 
 
V. Definition of Terms 
Conversion: The key biblical words for conversion are naham and shub in 
Hebrew, and metanoia and epistrophe in Greek.  The first word in each pair, naham and 
metanoia, emphasizes repentance and specifies a “turning from” (sin), while the second 
                                                
18 In addition, this chapter asks: How were Augustine’s interpersonal relationships, his God 
representations, and his encounters with God bound together in his conversion process?  How were 
Augustine’s relationships with himself, others, and the divine related to his psychological development and 
spiritual maturity? 
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in each pair, shub and epistrophe, indicates a “turning toward” (God) (Conn, 2005, pp. 
214-215).  In classical Latin, and in Augustine’s works as well, conversio and convertere 
refer to “the act of returning or becoming, the effect of a change, whether in a spiritual or 
in a material sense” (Reta, 1999, p. 239).  From a perspective of psychology of religion, 
William James notes that “To be converted, to be regenerated, to receive grace, to 
experience religion, to gain an assurance, are so many phrases which denote the process, 
gradual or sudden, by which a self…becomes unified and consciously right superior and 
happy” (1902/1982, p. 189).  From a sociological perspective, William S. Bainbridge 
conceptualizes conversion as “the joining of a new religious fellowship” (1992, p. 187).  
From an anthropological perspective, Diane Austin-Broos explains conversion as a 
process, which involves “an encultured being arriving at a particular place” (2003, p. 2).  
From a theological perspective, Donald McKim defines conversion as “one’s turning or 
response to God’s call in Jesus Christ in faith and repentance” (1996, p. 62).  From a 
perspective that integrates psychology, sociology, anthropology, and religion, Lewis 
Rambo describes conversion as “a process of religious change that takes place in a 
dynamic force field of people, events, ideologies, institutions, expectations, and 
orientations” (1993, p. 5).  From an interdisciplinary perspective, my definition of the 
term religious conversion has to do with the complex and multi-dimensional process of 
religious change that brings about the total reorientation and transformation of one’s life, 
influenced by the interplay of personal, social, cultural, and religious components. 
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VI. Limitation of the Study 
The limitations of this dissertation are as follows: First, although this study 
locates a psychological study within an inquiry into the social, cultural, and religious 
influences on Augustine’s conversion process, it is more interpretive than historical, and 
more concerned with hidden motives, meanings, and patterns than with establishing and 
validating facts. 
Second, because this study intends to use primarily the case of Augustine and 
additionally the cases of other persons’ conversion experiences (e.g., the conversion of 
Antony) from the Confessions in order to explore the process of religious change, it helps 
us to understand the transformation of an individual in the context of the Christian 
community (“one’s journey from unbelief to faith”) as well as to recognize both the 
personal dimension and the universal dimension of religious change.  However, this study 
does not deal sufficiently with other various conversion stories within the context of 
different cultures and different times (e.g., the conversion of the modern American monk 
or the conversion of the Christian Confucianist in Korea), although it contributes by 
attempting to generalize Augustine’s conversion narrative in the Christian community in 
light of movement from the discontinuity of one’s solitary story of conversion to the 
continuity of a universal story of conversion in the community. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON  
RELIGIOUS CONVERSION 
 
 This chapter presents a review of the literature on religious conversion within the 
disciplines of psychology, sociology, anthropology, and theology.  Then it introduces 
Lewis Rambo’s theory of religious conversion, which brings together psychological, 
social, cultural, and theological perspectives and integrates them into a process model. 
Religious conversion is a complex process which involves the total reorientation 
and transformation of one’s life.  For this reason, we need to pay attention to what 
happens in the life of a person before, during, and after the conversion event.  Any single 
theoretical discipline is unable to encompass the various interpretations of the religious 
conversion process.  This means that there is a need for a mutually-informing 
conversation among theological and social scientific studies of conversion. 
 In this vein, this chapter demonstrates that religious conversion is usually “an 
ongoing complex process” in which many aspects of a person’s life may be affected.  It 
also demonstrates that the study of religious conversion is deeply enriched by an 
interdisciplinary approach, which pays attention to both the personal and socio-cultural 
contexts of the convert and the religious dimension of conversion.  While Rambo’s model 
of conversion emphasizes the value of respecting religious/theological interpretations, it 
intends to incorporate critically social scientific studies of how personal, social, and 
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cultural issues are relevant to the process of human transformation.  His model of 
conversion, therefore, shows the merits of coordinating a range of approaches in the 
study of religious change. 
 
I. Psychological Studies of Conversion: 
The Impact of Personal Factors 
 
Psychological theorists and researchers have examined the underlying 
psychological factors involved when individuals convert to various religious orientations.  
There is no common understanding and explanation of the phenomenon of religious 
change (Zinnbauer & Pargament, 1998).  In “A Psychology of Conversion: From All 
Angles,” Sara Savage (2000) describes the diverse interpretations of conversion among 
the scholars of different schools: 
sudden conversion vs gradual conversion; 
adolescent conversion vs mid-life conversion; 
conversion preceded by crisis vs no crisis; 
conversion as passive vs conversion as active; 
negative mental health outcomes vs positive mental health outcomes; 
conversion as socially constructed vs spiritually inspired; 
the individual self as a goal vs self-in-relationship as a goal. (p. 2) 
 
 Mindful of the complexity and diversity of conversion studies undertaken by 
psychologists, this section of the literature review focuses on four main themes because 
they are valid for investigating the personal dimension of the human transformation 
process and because they are helpful to establish an integrated understanding of religious 
change.  These main themes are 1) conversion and regressive psychopathology; 2) 
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conversion, crisis, and the unification of the divided self; 3) conversion, intellectual 
arousal, and cognitive satisfaction; and 4) conversion, identity, and human development.1 
 
A. Conversion and Regressive Psychopathology 
 Freudian scholars have tended to regard religious conversion as a regressive, 
disintegrative, and pathological phenomenon.  In The Future of an Illusion, Sigmund 
Freud (1927/1989), who has strongly affected the psychoanalytic study of conversion, 
describes the term illusion as the distortion of objective perception.  According to Freud, 
religion refers to an illusion, which involves the distortion of the reality of the human 
condition: “[Religion] comprises a system of wishful illusions together with a disavowal 
of reality…in a state of blissful hallucinatory confusion” (pp. 55-56).  Freud insists that 
religion is only fantasy; it is “an attempt to master the sensory world in which we are 
situated by means of the wishful world which we have developed within us as a result of 
biological and psychological necessities” (1933/1989, p. 207).  In this vein, religion is an 
anxious search for substitutes for an unpleasant reality.  For Freud, religion as an illusion 
involves human projection from the early experiences of infantile helplessness: 
Biologically speaking, religiousness is to be traced to the small human child’s 
long-drawn-out helplessness and need of help; and when at a later date he 
perceives how truly forlorn and weak he is when confronted with the great forces 
                                                
1 I am indebted to 1) Sigmund Freud’s view on religion as “a universal obsessional neurosis” of 
humankind (1907/1953) and his concept of religious conversions as a matter of surrendering to the father’s 
or Father’s will (1928/1957) to establish the theme of conversion and regressive psychopathology; 2) 
William James’ idea of the morbid-minded person (“the sick soul”) and religious experience (1902/1982) 
to formulate the theme of conversion, crisis, and the unification of the divided self; 3) Seymour Epstein’s 
emphasis on the intellectual and cognitive dimension of religious conversion (“cognitive-experiential self-
theory”) (1985) to design the theme of conversion, intellectual arousal, and cognitive satisfaction; and 4) V. 
Bailey Gillespie’s idea of personal “identity forming experience” in the dynamics of change (1991) to 
shape the theme of conversion, identity, and human development. 
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of life, he feels his condition as he did in childhood, and attempts to deny his own 
despondency by a regressive revival of the forces which protected his infancy. 
(1910/1989, pp. 83-84) 
 
 In this sense, Freud characterizes religion as a universal obsessive neurosis of 
humankind: “One might venture to regard obsessional neurosis as a pathological 
counterpart of the formation of a religion, and to describe that neurosis as an individual 
religiosity and religion as a universal obsessional neurosis” (1907/1953, pp. 126-127).  In 
New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, Freud contends that “of the three powers 
[art, philosophy, and religion] which may dispute the basic position of science, religion 
alone is to be taken seriously as an enemy” (1933/1989, p. 198).  For this reason, Freud’s 
whole purpose in regard to religion is to unmask the completely irrational, fantastic, 
illusionary nature of religion, and to overcome religion as merely human projection and a 
universal obsessive neurosis of humankind. 
 In Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Freud (1960/1989) reverses the Genesis 
text of the Bible from “God created man in His own image” to say “Man created God in 
his” (p. 33).  Freud remains interested throughout his life in the process by which 
humankind creates God in his/her own image.  Thus, in his clinical studies, Freud has 
explored the process of the formation of the “image” or idea of the divine (“the concept 
of God”) in an individual psyche.  For Freud, the image of a divine Being [God] 
originates from an imaginary enlargement of the father figure based on one’s relation 
with the natural father: “the god of each of them is formed in the likeness of his father, 
that his personal relation to God depends on his relation to his father the flesh and 
oscillates and changes along with that relation, and that at bottom God is nothing other 
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than an exalted father” (1913/1989, p. 182; see pp. 183-187).  As such, Freud’s task is to 
explain the emergence of the God idea in the history of humanity and individuals.2 
 Freud asserts that religious conversion emerges from the Oedipus complex, the 
relationship with the father.  In “A Religious Experience,” Freud (1928/1957) writes, 
It roused in him [a young boy] a longing for his mother which sprang from his 
Oedipus complex, and this was immediately completed by a feeling of indignation 
against his father...But the outcome of the struggle was displayed once again in 
the sphere of religion and it was of a kind pre-determined by the fate of the 
Oedipus complex: complete submission to the will of God the Father.  The young 
man became a believer and accepted everything he had been taught since his 
childhood about God and Jesus Christ.  He had had a religious experience and had 
undergone a conversion. (pp. 245-246) 
 
 For Freud, religious conversion is a matter of surrendering to the father’s or 
Father’s will.  As a young boy acknowledges the superior power of his father and so puts 
to rest the Oedipus complex, the convert accepts the omnipotence of God and resolves 
this Oedipus situation, which has been displaced into the sphere of religion (pp. 245-246; 
see Scroggs & Douglas, 1967, p. 210).  This means that for Freud (1927/1989, 
1928/1957), religious conversion is rooted in the oedipal complex of the person in 
childhood which is deeply related to the infantile compensation for the harshness of life, 
an illusory way of protecting oneself against one’s own helplessness.  In that sense, for 
Freud (1907/1953, 1927/1989), religious ritual has to do with pathological expression of 
infantile wishes—an irrational and obsessive action—in order to deal with one’s sense of 
helplessness, anxiety, and guilt. 
                                                
2 Ana-Maria Rizzuto (1979) writes, “Freud’s contribution to understanding how the representation 
of God is formed deals with three levels: (1) the anthropological process in history which leads to the 
creation of the God representation (2) its transmission by direct inheritance to males and by indirect 
inheritance to females; (3) the formation of the individual’s private representation of God during 
childhood” (p. 41). 
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 Following Freud, Freudian psychoanalysts tend to describe religious conversion as 
a regressive pathology.  For example, Leon Salzman (1953) regards conversion as a 
regressive defense against repressed hostility toward authority.  He identifies repressed 
resentment for authority figures as the motivating force for conversion: “the conversion 
experience has represented a method of solving the conflict arising from the hatred 
toward the father… [It] may be used for conflict with any authority figure, whether the 
father, the mother, or other significant persons” (p. 187).  In “Types of Religious 
Conversion,” Salzman (1966) analyzes specific case studies of converts who had 
manifested regressive behaviors in order to confirm the psychological characteristics of 
the pathological conversion.  He finds that sudden converts were characterized by 
“extreme dependency on strong, omnipotent figures.”  These converts tended to have 
unusually repressed hatred toward their fathers or toward authority.  As a result, Salzman 
posits six pathological characteristics of the regressive conversion as follows: 
(1) The convert has an exaggerated, irrational intensity of belief in the new 
doctrine; in many converts, however, though they may remain in the new faith the 
ardor does not continue at the same high level; (2) The convert is more concerned 
with the form and doctrine than with the greater principle of his new belief; (3) 
his attitude toward his previous belief is one of contempt, hatred and denial, and 
he rejects the possibility that there might be any truth in it; (4) he is intolerant 
toward all deviates, with frequent acting-out by denouncing and endangering 
previous friends and associates; (5) he shows crusading zeal and a need to involve 
others by seeking new conversions; and (6) he engages in masochistic and sadistic 
activities, displaying a need for martyrdom and self-punishment. (pp. 18-19) 
 
Like Salzman, Freudian psychologist John P. Kildahl considers conversion as a 
regressive psychopathology.  In The Personalities of Sudden Religious Converts, Kildahl 
(1965) administers a set of psychological tests to 20 first-year theological students who 
had experienced sudden religious conversions.  He finds that sudden converts tended to 
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be less intelligent and to score higher on the hysteria scale.  He concludes that sudden 
converts tended to be more emotional, subject to mood swings, excitable, fearful, and 
showed relatively less independence and creativity (pp. 40-44). 
 In response to the results of the psychoanalytic studies of conversion, Rambo 
(1982) notes that the psychoanalytic tradition has influenced the recognition of the 
importance of childhood, the unconscious, and the possibility of pathology in the 
conversion experience.  Rambo insists that psychoanalytic scholars have viewed 
conversion as “a coping device with the goal of guilt resolution, hostility management, 
and the identification of the person with the father figure,” and that they have guided 
readers to interpret conversion as “a regressive, disintegrative, and pathological 
phenomenon” (p. 155).  Rambo comments that most psychoanalysts have depended on 
narrow and restrictive case studies in order to demonstrate the regressive pathology of 
religious conversion.  This means that they have usually studied either small numbers of 
mentally ill patients or those persons affiliated with deviant religious organizations.  
These psychoanalysts have emphasized the person’s “guilt, terror, grief, and emotional 
deprivations, sufferings, and desires.”  Thus, for them, conversion is inherently associated 
with emotional illness and pathological regression (1982, p. 155; 1993, p. 142; 1999, p. 
266). 
 
B. Conversion, Crisis, and the Unification of the Divided Self 
Psychologists of religion have explored the correlation between one’s emotional 
crisis, the unification of the divided self, and religious change.  In doing so, they have 
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viewed religious conversion as a progressive and regenerative phenomenon (while 
assuming or preserving the presence or activity of the religious subject—the divine, the 
sacred, or God—in the process of human transformation).3  The empirical research of the 
early pioneers in the field of psychology of religion suggests that religious conversion 
often occurs during and after a period of stress, despair, even crisis.  In The Varieties of 
Religious Experience, William James (1902/1982), who has deeply influenced the study 
of conversion within the psychology of religion, describes the term religion as a personal 
experience with the divine (“a More”).  James writes, “Religion…shall mean for us the 
feeling, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they 
apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine” (p. 
31, italics in the original).  For James, experience is the core of living itself; it is also 
multifaceted.  In this vein, the varieties of religious experience are closely related to the 
varieties of human experience. 
Unlike Freud,4 James asserts that personal religious experience is rooted and 
centered in the mystical states of consciousness (p. 379).  He notes that “In [these] mystic 
                                                
3 Some psychological studies of conversion (e.g., Freud, 1928/1957; Kildahl, 1965; Salzman, 1953, 
1966) have bracketed anything about the divine, the sacred, or God as if the entirety of the conversion 
process of the person can be described and analyzed by only considering natural, psychological features 
and factors.  On the other hand, although they are not predominantly theologians but psychologists (of 
religion), some scholars tend to speak of the process of religious conversion as involving the divine, the 
sacred, or God, at which point they have investigated the transformation of the person in a (Christian) 
tradition-specific way (e.g., James, 1902/1982), in a religious and comparative way (e.g., Ullman, 1989), or 
in a religious and generalized way (e.g., Mahoney & Pargament, 2004; Zinnbauer & Pargament, 1998).  As 
such, they have contributed by speaking of the process of human change that is psychological but hints so 
deeply at something religious. 
 
4 James partially uses Freudian idea of emotional crisis/conflict in order to explain a preconversion 
state (e.g., his concept of the divided self).  In this vein, psychologically, James tends to view conversion 
“as an eruption into consciousness of subconscious needs”; he considers that “conversion occurs within the 
framework of severe emotional stress and anxiety, and attempts to deal with pressing psychological 
problems” (Salzman, pp. 179-180).  However, unlike Freud’s anti-religious view, James emphasizes the 
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states we both become one with the Absolute and we become aware of our oneness” (p. 
419).  This means that the primordial and solitary experience of the person lies in his or 
her inner union with the divine.  James delineates four characteristics that identify an 
experience as mystical: 1) Ineffability—Like states of feeling, mystical experiences 
cannot be adequately expressed in words and thus can only be known by those who have 
them; 2) Noetic quality—Mystical states are experienced as states of knowledge, as 
sources of deeply significant illuminations; 3) Transciency—Mystical experiences are 
fleeting, lasting at most an hour or two.  While tending to elude full recollection in 
normal states of mind, mystical experiences leave a lasting impression on the inner life 
and are immediately recognized when they recur; 4) Passivity—Although mystical states 
can be actively facilitated through meditation and other spiritual disciplines, the mystic 
may feel grasped by the Other beyond a sense of personal control (pp. 380-382; Wulff, 
1992, pp. 487-488). 
According to James, there are two basic styles in religious life; one is “the 
healthy-minded way” and the other is “the morbid-minded way.”  The healthy-minded 
person tends to ignore the reality of evil in the world because he or she has a view that 
life is basically good and joyous.  However, the morbid-minded person (“the sick soul”) 
vividly perceives the pervasiveness of evil in the world because he or she is preoccupied 
with suffering.  For James, whereas the healthy-minded person tends to be usually “once 
                                                                                                                                            
positive and satisfactory characteristics/results of conversion or postconversion (1902/1982, pp. 189, 380-
382, 485-486; see Scroggs & Douglas, 1967, p. 208).  Moreover, James stresses the collaboration between 
religion and human science (e.g., psychology): “Religion in the shape of mind-cure gives to some of us 
serenity, moral poise, and happiness, and prevents certain forms of disease as well as science does, or even 
better in a certain class of persons.  Evidently, then, the science and the religion are both of them genuine 
keys for unlocking the world’s treasure-house to him who can use either of them practically” (p. 122).  
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born,” the morbid-minded person tends to be “twice born” in order to be happy after 
experiencing inner transformation within mystical states (pp. 162-168, 488).  James 
defines religious conversion as follows: 
To be converted, to be regenerated, to receive grace, to experience religion, to 
gain an assurance, are so many phrases which denote the process, gradual or 
sudden, by which a self hitherto divided, and consciously wrong inferior and 
unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right superior and happy, in 
consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities. (p. 189) 
 
James employs Edwin D. Starbuck’s concept of two types of conversion: the first 
is the volitional type—a voluntary way—in which the regenerative change is usually 
gradual, and consists in the building up of a new set of moral and spiritual habits; the 
second is the self-surrender type—an involuntary way—in which the personal will must 
be given up, at which point rapid change usually happens (pp. 206-209).  Although he 
acknowledges the gradual changes of growth in the volitional type of conversion, James 
concentrates on the self-surrender type of conversion—a way of mystical experience—in 
order to explain that the discordant personality of the sick of soul tends to be transformed 
by the intervention of the divine, and that his or her divided self tends to be integrated in 
the inner communion with the Other.  In this vein, he describes conversion as “a process 
of struggling away from sin rather than of striving towards righteousness” (p. 209).  
James summarizes the characteristics of religious life which result from the religious 
conversion experience: 
1. That the visible world is part of a more spiritual universe from which it draws 
     its chief significance; 
2. That union or harmonious relation with that higher universe is our true end; 
3. That prayer or inner communion with the spirit thereof—be that spirit ‘God’ or 
    ‘law’—is a process wherein work is really done, and spiritual energy flows in 
     and produces effects, psychological or material, within the phenomenal world; 
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4. A new zest which adds itself like a gift to life, and takes the form either of  
    lyrical enchantment or of appeal to earnestness and heroism; 
5. An assurance of safety and a temper of peace, and in relation to others, a 
    preponderance of loving affection. (pp. 485-486) 
 
Like James, in The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Study of the Growth of 
Religious Consciousness, Edwin D. Starbuck (1899/1912) emphasizes the positive and 
regenerative effects of religious conversion.  During his statistical study of conversion, he 
attempts to discover “the mental and spiritual processes at work during conversion, rather 
than to establish any doctrine” (p. 21).  In the examination of 192 records of respondents, 
Starbuck finds that anxiety, fear, a feeling of incompleteness, and a sense of sin were the 
prominent characteristics of the pre-conversion state.  He also finds that during the 
“normal” conversion, the personal will of the individual was surrendered, which was 
necessary before greater harmony could be achieved.  Starbuck insists that the converts 
resolved their sense of sin, dejection, confusion, and depression through the conversion 
experience.  As a result, he asserts that religious conversion becomes a means to alleviate 
the emotional distress of the individual and plays a role in enhancing the convert’s 
religious awakening and growth.  Starbuck concludes, 
It may in countless cases be a perfectly normal psychologic[al] crisis, marking the 
transition from the child’s world to the wider world of youth, or from that of 
youth to that of maturity (p. ix)…After conversion they almost invariably set out 
with new and high resolves; their attitude towards life had been transformed; in 
the presence of the new life old habits had apparently passed away, new interests 
and enthusiasm had been awakened; motives and purposes had been purified, 
higher ideals aroused; frequently the personality seemed entirely changed. (p. 
355) 
 
Contemporary researchers have continued to examine the progressive and 
integrative aspects of religious conversion for the mental health of the person in terms of 
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the resolution of emotional crisis.5  For example, in The Transformed Self: The 
Psychology of Religious Conversion, Chana Ullman (1989) describes religious 
conversion as “the occasion of a dramatic change in a person’s life and on core elements 
of a person’s self” (p. xv).  She focuses on the significance of emotional needs and 
attachments in the process of conversion to authoritarian religious traditions: “Conversion 
is best understood in the context of the individual life.  It occurs on a background of 
emotional upheaval and promises relief by a new attachment” (p. xvii).  Ullman studies 
40 religious converts from different religious groups (Judaism, Roman Catholicism, 
Bahai, and Hare Krishna), and a group of 30 religiously affiliated non-converts (Jewish 
and Catholic) who served as a matched control group.  Ullman finds that the common 
pre-conversion state of a much larger percentage of the converts (in comparison to the 
control group) was characterized by great emotional crisis—“feelings of despair, doubts 
of self-worth, fear of rejection, and estrangement from others.”  She also finds that most 
converts had experienced stressful and broken relationships with their fathers during 
childhood, at which point they would tend to move forward the quest for a perfect figure 
of Father (the divine or God).  She demonstrates that conversion offered relief from the 
emotional struggles in which the converts found themselves, while seeking out 
connection and love within the context of religious faith and affiliation.  For Ullman, the 
converts had experienced a positive sense of self through the process of merging with an 
idealized and powerful god figure in light of the correlation between the extension of the 
                                                
5 In “Religious Conversion in Adolescence,” Carl W. Christensen (1965) insists that the 
psychoanalytic studies of conversion have contributed to the exploration of the psychopathological element 
of religious experience/belief.  For Christensen, however, psychiatrists have tended to forget that “religion 
is a normal part of man’s individual and cultural life” (p. 17). 
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self and identification with the divine.  As a result, Ullman concludes that emotional 
factors (e.g., emotional turmoil or distress) have played a prominent role in precipitating 
and establishing the psychodynamic conceptualizations of the conversion experience. 
In the same way, Joel Allison (1966) views conversion as adaptive and positive: 
“we find tentative support for viewing conversion phenomena as a means of promoting 
personality integration” (p. 32).  After conducting an empirical study of young male 
converts, Allison (1969) finds that most converts had perceived the figures of their actual 
fathers as weak, ineffective, or absent.  Consequently, he asserts that conversion 
functioned as a progressive, adaptive, and healthy process for young converts, in that 
these converts were able to move away from dependence upon and enmeshment with the 
mother and to replace the abnormal figures of their actual fathers with “a positive and 
powerful paternal figure,” namely God. 
Like Ullman and Allison, Charles W. Stewart (1966) and Kenneth I. Pargament 
(1997, 1998, 2004) regard religious conversion as positive and integrative.  They both 
consider conversion as a way of using religiosity to cope with the stress and crises of the 
person, while preserving the role of the divine or the sacred in the process of human 
transformation.  In “The Religious Experience of Two Adolescent Girls,” Stewart (1966) 
presents developmental studies of two normal adolescents who had religious experiences.  
He finds that the converts had experienced difficult relationships with others (e.g., 
parents, friends, church members, or God) before the conversion, which is understood as 
a part of their total life history.  He also finds that during the conversion experience, the 
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youth had maintained inner integration in the face of their problems and had proceeded to 
reconciliation with the external world and with the divine.  As a result, Stewart concludes, 
Religious conversion can be a means of creatively coping with, particularly, the 
interpersonal stress in one’s environment and a healthy problem-solving activity.  
It is as such not a result of motives of deprivation but of motives of mystery, 
when the youth interiorizes his problem and “waits on” a new orientation of the 
self to the environment.  The healing of alienation with his God and a 
reconciliation enabling him to cope with his external world with his God-given 
powers have been the age-long way of symbolizing the drama in religious terms. 
(p. 55) 
 
Likewise, Pargament (1997, 1998, 2004) understands conversion within a 
religious coping process of the person with respect to the role of the divine in the 
conversion process.  He defines religion as “a process, a search for significance in ways 
related to the sacred” (1997, p. 32).  For Pargament, coping refers to a process of actively 
searching for ways of solving various problems.  Religious coping involves the relief or 
resolution of the emotional turmoil or enduring stress of the person within an encounter 
with the sacred.  For Pargament, religious conversion is “an effort to re-create life, the 
individual experiences a dramatic change of the self, a change in which the self becomes 
identified with the sacred” (p. 248).  It involves the identification of the self with one of 
three types of sacred objects: “a spiritual force (spiritual conversion), a religious group 
(religious group conversion), or the whole of humanity (universal conversion)” (p. 254). 
In a more specific and extended view, Zinnbauer and Pargament (1998) define 
spiritual conversion—one type of religious conversion—“as a radical change in the self 
in response to a great deal of perceived stress through which the self became identified 
with a spiritual force” (pp. 173).  Influenced by James, Zinnbauer and Pargament argue 
that the process of spiritual conversion includes six key elements: 1) the experience of 
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life stress; 2) a divided sense of self; 3) motivation for radical change; 4) a unified sense 
of self; 5) the sacred becomes incorporated into the self; and 6) a life transformed (1998, 
p. 167).  According to Mahoney and Pargament (2004), there are two key functions of 
spiritual conversion both psychologically (i.e., changes in the search for significance) and 
spiritually (i.e., changes in the sacred’s role in one’s life).  In this vein, this spiritual 
conversion, which is related to “the interior world of religious conversion,” involves a 
two-tiered reorientation in the relationship between the self and the sacred; it stimulates a 
change of the core destination of a person’s life, and the person transforms his/her life 
pathway to reach this destination.  This transformation may bring shifts in relationships, 
habits, patterns of thought, emotional reactions, and, more generally, a new sense of 
guidance in the journey of life (p. 483). 
In order both to examine the nature and to test the definition of spiritual 
conversion, in “Spiritual Conversion: A Study of Religious Change among College 
Students,” Zinnbauer and Pargament (1998) have studied a sample of 130 Christian 
college students, including religious converts and non-converts.  They discover that in 
comparison with non-converts, most converts did experience more emotional stress and a 
greater sense of personal inadequacy/limitation before their conversions.  They also 
discover that in conversion experiences, the religious converts underwent positive life 
transformation and significant improvements in their sense of self, self-esteem, self-
confidence, and self-identity, and that in the post-conversion experiences, the converts 
had typically undertaken both greater improvement in their sense of 
adequacy/competence and higher connection between the self and the sacred.  As a result, 
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Zinnbauer and Pargament conclude and confirm that spiritual conversion plays an 
essential role in promoting a radical transformation in the self in response to emotional 
crises through which the self becomes identified with a spiritual force. 
 
C. Conversion, Intellectual Arousal, and Cognitive Satisfaction 
 Some scholars have examined the role of human intellectual arousal and cognitive 
satisfaction in the conversion process.  For example, in “The Implications of Cognitive-
Experiential Self-Theory for Research in Social Psychology and Personality,” Seymour 
Epstein (1985) focuses on the intellectual and cognitive elements of conversion that are 
the fundamental motivations for the religious change of the person, while respecting the 
affective elements of that transformation.  According to Epstein (1985, 1994, 1998), 
individuals process information and acquire memory structures (schemas about self, 
others, and the world) to adapt to their surroundings by two systems—the rational and the 
experiential—and these two systems operate by different rules.  For Epstein, information 
processing in the rational system is dispassionate, based upon analytical thinking and 
socially mediated knowledge, while information processing in the experiential system is 
driven by emotion (1994, p. 709; 1998, p. 534).  Epstein (1985) explores how a person’s 
quest for change is related to his or her motivational structures and proposes a model of 
motivation which includes four basic factors for human transformation: the need to 
experience pleasure and avoid pain, the need for a conceptual system, the need to 
enhance self-esteem, and the need to establish and maintain relationships (pp. 283-310).  
For Epstein, the force of each of these motivations varies among different persons at 
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different times and in different circumstances.  Epstein points out that intellectual arousal 
and cognitive satisfaction are rooted in the human need for a conceptual system.  
Consequently, he asserts that these intellectual arousal and cognitive satisfaction are 
fundamental motivations for the religious change of the person; that is, they play a 
prominent role in facilitating the psychodynamic conceptualizations of the human 
experience of conversion. 
 Similar to Epstein, John Lofland and Norman Skonovd (1981) emphasize the role 
of intellectual variables in conversion experiences.  For Lofland and Skonovd, the 
intellectual convert actively seeks out knowledge about religious or spiritual issues 
through books, television, articles, lectures, and other media that do not involve 
significant social contact.  This means that the person can easily access religious 
information through different media and his or her personal quest for “truth” or 
“salvation” generally occurs prior to active participation in religious rituals and 
organizations.  This intellectual type of conversion suggests that some converts may view 
conversion as a process of seeking truth rather than as a means of resolving personal 
emotional tension.  With intellectual conversion there is little or no social pressure; the 
searching and eventual conversion may happen over a moderate length of time, emotional 
arousal is tame, and the belief of the person precedes his or her participation in religious 
community.  Lofland and Skonovd assert that conversion can be a result of personal 
intellectual exploration and the intellectual convert is a person who loves knowing truth 
and searches for the meaning of life.  For Lofland and Skonovd, although it is not 
common, this intellectual mode of conversion is probably on the increase because of the 
 40 
increasingly “privatized” nature of religion and of contemporary life in western society as 
well as the ever-increasing presence of “disembodied” media of religious communication 
(e.g., magazines, specialized newspapers, movies, video, “electronic church,” etc.) (pp. 
376-377; see Rambo, 1993, pp. 14-15; Savage, 2000, p. 10). 
 Like Lofland and Skonovd, in “The Pleasure of Believing: Toward a Naturalistic 
Explanation of Religious Conversions,” Fabrice Clement (2003) articulates the 
relationship between conversion and intellectual arousal from a cognitive point of view.  
Clement regards converts as “the truth seekers” who both engage in the rational quest for 
the ultimate and search for the meaning of life in a normal mental process.  He employs 
Alison Gopnik’s theory of the knowing process of the child to explore the intellectual or 
epistemic element of the conversion experience.  According to Clement, Gopnik as a 
developmental psychologist finds that children tend to use extensively their energy to 
explain their environments: “explanation is to cognition as orgasm is to reproduction” (p. 
74, quoted in Gopnik, 1998, p. 102).  This means that children tend to enjoy finding 
problems and answers in the process of knowing, which they evolve to the understanding 
of the underlying causal structures of the world.  Gopnik views this highly positive and 
provocative force as “an explanatory orgasm,” which corresponds to the “aha” experience 
when the child understands a former unresolved problem and reaches intellectual 
satisfaction (Clement, 2003, pp. 71, 74-75, 86).  Based on the theory of Gopnik, Clement 
examines how this “aha-experience” of the person is related to the intellectual or 
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epistemic dimension of the conversion process.6  He proposes that conversion takes place 
in the “sophisticated mental apparatus” of the person.  For Clement, the convert is a 
person who was not satisfied with his or her previous worldview, which could not resolve 
his or her existential problems.  In order to seek out actively the meaning of life, the 
person engages in the rational quest for truth or the ultimate.  In experiencing conversion, 
this person finds answers to his or her existential problems.  Thus, he or she reaches 
cognitive satisfaction and gains a feeling of comprehensiveness, totality, and wholeness.  
For Clement, the intellectual or epistemic drive of the person—one of the human 
motives—leads him or her to the conversion process.  Clement stresses the use of the 
cognitive energy of the person to understand his or her conversion experience (pp. 76-
86). 
 
D. Conversion and Human Development 
Psychologists have explored the connection between religious conversion and the 
process of human development in terms of the self/person-in-relationship.  In so doing, 
scholars have paid attention to the role of the age or developmental stage of the person in 
the conversion process.   In The Dynamics of Religious Conversion: Identity and 
Transformation, V. Bailey Gillespie (1991) describes religious conversion as “a way of 
change” in the whole personality and orientation of the person, a change which involves 
his or her identity formation in the process of human development.  For Gillespie, 
                                                
6 For Clement (2003), Gopnik’s concept of the “aha” experience indicates the 
satisfaction/organism that an explanation has been reached in the cognitive procedures.  It encourages the 
explanatory effort by providing a rewarding emotion.  For this reason, this kind of experience (“cognitive 
emotion”) could explain the epistemic drive that can be observed in a child’s behavior as well as in a 
person’s conversion experience (pp. 74-75, 86). 
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religious conversion plays an essential role “in the construction of personal identity, 
pointing a life in a particular direction, giving it an aim, giving it new meaning and 
purpose” (p. 60).  Gillespie writes that religious conversion includes the following 
constituent elements: 
1) a unifying quality for self, which includes self-integration, wholeness, and 
possible reorganization and integration; 2) a positive behavior; 3) an intensity of 
commitment to an ideology, usually thought of as occurring within the Christian 
tradition as a confrontation with ultimates but may include change with any 
subjective religious quality; 4)…a decisive “change or returning to” brought on 
suddenly or gradually, seen as either instantaneous or incubational; 5) a sense of 
belonging or understanding of personal identity itself.  The “triggers of change” 
may be influenced by personality, gender differences, environment, mystical 
experience, or practical (pedagogical) influences. (pp. 64-65) 
 
 From a developmental perspective, Gillespie claims that religious conversion is a 
means by which one acquires a personal identity.  Influenced by Erik H. Erikson’s theory 
of identity formation and the life cycle,7 Gillespie regards identity formation as “the way 
to become” in which one experiences a sense of the self, integration, and continuity in the 
dynamic process of the life cycle (pp. 132-140).  For Gillespie, the person’s new identity 
forged in the dynamics of change is closely related to one’s profound relationships with 
the self, others, the environment, and the divine.  Gillespie argues that there are essential 
                                                
 7 Erik H. Erikson (1950/1963) proposes a developmental theory of the eight stages of life cycle: 
1) basic trust vs. basic mistrust, 2) autonomy vs. shame and doubt, 3) initiative vs. guilt, 4) industry vs. 
inferiority, 5) identity vs. role confusion, 6) intimacy vs. isolation, 7) generativity vs. stagnation, and 8) 
integrity vs. despair (pp. 247-274).  According to Gillespie (1991), Erikson defines personal identity as “a 
maintenance of self-continuity and at the same time an identification with something beyond oneself to 
acquire the essential characteristics of the group to which one belongs” (p. 136).  For Gillespie, Erikson’s 
theory of personal identity includes four aspects: “1) When Erikson talks of identity, he stresses the 
psychosocial forces extant in personal development which recognize the importance of society and culture 
on personality formation.  2) A second important aspect of identity is that person himself or herself.  Thus, 
Erikson stresses ego function in identity.  3) He mentions the series of conflicts that confront an individual 
as he or she copes with prescribed tasks in society.  These conflicts occur in time and age, and are resolved 
in the person.  Therefore, to understand identity one must take into account 4) the mutual interaction 
between the individuals and the society in which they finds themselves” (p. 136). 
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relationships between religious conversion experience and the identity crisis/formation 
experience of the person: (1) both experiences are means of radical personal change, 
which affects the self, ideology, behavior, and ego process at the core of a person’s being; 
(2) both experiences have common functions in areas of ego strength genesis, identity 
formation, ego processes, ideological satisfactions, and role experimentation; (3) both 
experiences exhibit dynamic similarities in the general feeling tones, construction/content 
of the crises, decisions, and resultant functions of integration and congruity; and (4) both 
experiences promote personal need satisfaction, problem-solving, and maturation during 
difficult times of questing (p. 191).  Gillespie notes that religious conversion fosters a 
deep, integrating effect and influence on personal attitudes, values, and feelings about 
oneself; likewise, personal identity formation includes feelings of wholeness and 
sameness in individuals (p. 184).  As a result, Gillespie asserts that religious conversion 
is a particular kind of “identity forming experience.” 
 Gillespie (1991) agrees with the hypothesis that religious conversion is more 
likely to occur during adolescence,8 while acknowledging that conversion can occur at 
any age in the human development process.  Gillespie emphasizes that adolescence is the 
common age for conversion resulting from the resolution of the adolescent’s identity 
crisis and the reconstruction of personal identity: “Adolescence is a time for …seeking 
                                                
 8 Some earlier scholars have hypothesized that adolescence is the time for religious conversion.  
For example, Edwin D. Starbuck (1899/1912) in The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Study of the 
Growth of Religious Consciousness regards religious conversion as an adolescent experience/phenomenon 
(usually between fourteen and seventeen) which leads the youth to the transition or change from self-
centeredness to mature generosity and universal altruism.  Likewise, William James (1902/1982) in The 
Varieties of Religious Experience asserts that adolescence is the typical age for conversion: “Conversion is 
in its essence a normal adolescent phenomenon, incidental to the passage from the child’s small universe to 
the wider intellectual and spiritual life of maturity” (p. 199). 
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answers to identity itself, a time of major identity crisis in the concluding stages of 
childhood” (p. 183).  Gillespie asserts, “Adolescence provides a search for wholeness, 
totality, and progressive continuity as well as to the answers and questions of normal 
uprootedness in the life of the youth…While adolescence is not the only time that 
religious conversion might occur, it does prepare the ground for conversional change in a 
most unique way” (p. 183).  For Gillespie, religious conversion is a primarily adolescent 
phenomenon rather than an adult phenomenon. 
  In a related vein, James W. Fowler (1981, 2000) has examined the 
interrelatedness between the conversion experience and the process of faith development 
of the person.  Fowler defines conversion as “a significant recentering of one’s previous 
conscious or unconscious images of value and power and the conscious adoption of a 
new set of master stories in the commitment to reshape one’s life in a new community of 
interpretation and action” (1981, pp. 281-282).  Fowler’s concept of faith includes two 
broad dimensions: faith as a way of relating and a way of knowing.  Faith as a way of 
relating includes the trust, loyalty, and mutuality of the person, which is related to a sense 
of the self, others and the divine.  Faith as a way of knowing is an ongoing process of 
acting and “composing” of the known through one’s life span.  Fowler proposes a theory 
of faith development which includes a pre-stage of “undifferentiated” faith and six faith 
stages—(1) intuitive-projective, (2) mythic-literal, (3) synthetic-conventional, (4) 
individuative-reflective, (5) conjunctive, and (6) universalizing (pp. 119-213).  Based on 
this theory, Fowler explores the relations between formal structural stage change and 
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conversional change in faith.9  In other words, he shows how the faith development of the 
person—the “way of interpreting and relating to the ultimate conditions of existence”—
influences his or her growth and transformation in a lifelong process. 
From a more specific and extended view, Fowler (2000) in Becoming Adult, 
Becoming Christian: Adult Development and Christian Faith understands conversion in 
light of the correlation of human psychological development with Christian faith 
development.  For Fowler, religious conversion refers not simply to a single event, but 
“an ongoing process” in the life of the transformation of the person.  Fowler writes, “By 
conversion, here, I do not mean simply some dramatic experience of conviction and 
release that occurs once, after which things have forever been made right.  Rather, by 
conversion I mean an ongoing process—with, of course, a series of important moments 
of perspective-altering convictions and illuminations—through which people (or a 
group) gradually bring the lived story of their lives into congruence with the core story of 
the Christian faith” (p. 115).  For Fowler, the term self-groundedness refers to a 
commitment to the establishment of one’s personal destiny, in which one determines the 
purpose and meaning of life by oneself.  In contrast, the term vocation indicates a process 
of divine calling for the person, in which one finds “a purpose for one’s life that is part of 
the purposes of God” (pp. vii, 87-91).  Fowler intends to combine both the conversion 
experience and human development in the movement from self-groundedness toward 
                                                
 9 Fowler (1981) suggests the following possible relations between formal structural stage change 
and conversional change in faith: 1) stage change without conversional change; 2) conversional change 
without faith stage change; 3) conversional change that precipitates a faith stage change; 4) faith stage 
change that precipitates conversional change; 5) conversional change that is correlated with, and goes hand 
in hand with, a structural stage change; and 6) conversional change that blocks or helps one avoid the pain 
of faith stage changes (pp. 285-286). 
 46 
vocation.  As a consequence, Fowler contends that religious conversion involves a release 
from the burden of the self-groundedness of the person in making his or her own destiny; 
it also involves the restructuring of the growth and virtue of the person through his or her 
partnership with God’s work in the world (pp. 113-115). 
Fowler agrees with other scholars’ hypothesis that adulthood is the common time 
for experiencing religious conversion.10  Unlike Gillespie, Fowler emphasizes the 
phenomenon of adult conversion rather than the phenomenon of adolescent conversion, 
while acknowledging that “conversion…can occur in any of the faith stages or in any of 
the transitions between them” (1981, p. 282).  Fowler claims that adulthood includes 
“certain expectable times of transition” toward vocation, in which the midlife turmoil of 
this stage leads the person to re-evaluate and modify his or her life goal, resulting from 
the reconstructive relationships with the self, others, and the divine (2000, pp. 116-120). 
 Similarly, Walter Conn (1986, 2005) has elucidated the correlation between 
religious conversion and personal development in terms of the human drive for self-
transcendence.  Conn regards conversion as a personal experience of profound change—
“the total reorientation of one’s life”—which leads one into healthy growth, quest, and 
personal autonomy in a lifelong process.  In Christian Conversion: A Developmental 
Interpretation of Autonomy and Surrender, Conn (1986) suggests a threefold strategy for 
the study of religious conversion from a developmental perspective: 1) to explore the 
connection between an adequate understanding of conscience and a normative 
                                                
10 For example, Seward Hiltner (1966) in “Toward a Theology of Conversion in the Light of 
Psychology” insists that midlife is the superior time for conversion: “Conversion to Christian faith…is 
most important, most likely, and most cultivatable in the thirties rather than being regarded primarily as an 
adolescent phenomenon” (p. 35). 
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interpretation of conversion; 2) to situate the various dimensions of conversion within a 
pattern of personal development; and 3) to present how a critical understanding of 
conversion can be grounded in a theory of self-transcendence from a developmental 
perspective (p. 1).  According to Conn, religious conversion is “a special, extraordinary 
transformation of religious consciousness” of the person within the human developmental 
process (p. 197).  Conn indicates that conscience has to do with “the radical [personal] 
drive for self-transcendence” realized in creative understanding, critical judging, 
responsible deciding, and generous loving; it is “the reality drive for understanding, truth, 
value, love” (p. 267).  Based on the work of the developmental psychologists Erik H. 
Erikson, Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, James Fowler, and Robert Kegan, Conn (1986) 
proposes a model of personal development and self-transcendence to understand one’s 
conversion process, which includes affective, cognitive, moral, and religious dimensions.  
For Conn, the person inherently has attraction to, and a need for, transcendence.  Conn 
claims that the human drive for transcendence can be a primary motivation for religious 
conversion.  In other words, this innate drive to go beyond one’s present level of 
development can be a sufficient motivating factor in the conversion experience.  Both 
religious conversion and the development of personal autonomy are commonly centered 
in self-transcendence.  Conn asserts that religious conversion fosters “the completion of 
personal development toward self-transcending autonomy,” which is related to the 
mutual interaction of justice, universalizing faith, generativity, and interindividual 
intimacy within the life of the convert (pp. 267-268; see Rambo, 1993, p. 64). 
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 Like Fowler, Conn regards religious conversion as “a specifically adult reality,” 
while recognizing the adolescent phenomenon of conversion in terms of the resolution of 
the adolescent identity crisis (p. 286).  He writes, “Adolescent religious developments are 
just the threshold to the world of genuinely adult religious possibilities.  As a key to this 
religious world, Erikson’s analysis of the older adult’s crisis of integrity vs. despair offers 
much more promise than does his consideration of the adolescent identity crisis” (p. 197). 
 In sum, from the perspective of psychology of religion, conversion has been 
regarded as regressive psychopathology, a process of unifying the divided self, an 
experience of intellectual arousal and cognitive satisfaction, or a part of the positive 
human developmental process.  On the whole, psychological studies of conversion have 
primarily emphasized the individual convert’s inner crisis, need, and mental 
development/fulfillment. 
These psychological studies of conversion contribute by elucidating the influence 
of personal factors (especially the psychological distress or crisis of the potential convert 
within specific personal and familial contexts) on the process of religious change.  In 
doing so, Freudian interpretations of conversion lead us to realize the importance of 
childhood, the unconscious, and the possibility of pathology in the conversion experience 
of the person.  Some psychologists (of religion) (e.g., James [1902/1982] or Zinnbauer & 
Pargament [1998]) provide an insight into the link of the potential covert’s healing of 
inner dividedness with his or her religious experience.  Some scholars (e.g., Clement 
[2003] or Epstein [1985]) encourage us to pay attention to the role of human intellectual 
arousal and cognitive satisfaction in the conversion process, while acknowledging the 
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emotional and affective dimension of human transformation.  Some psychologists (e.g., 
Fowler [1981, 2000] or Gillespie [1991]) compel us to explore the correlation of religious 
change with the human developmental process in terms of the self/person-in-relationships. 
In particular, some psychologists (of religion) have assumed or preserved the 
existence or participation of some religious subjects—the divine (e.g., Conn, 1986, 2005; 
Gillespie, 1991; Starbuck, 1899/1912; Stewart, 1966; Ullman, 1989), the sacred (e.g., 
Mahoney & Pargament, 2004; Zinnbauer & Pargament, 1998), or the Divine/God (e.g., 
Fowler, 1981, 2000; James, 1902/1982), while exploring the correlation of religious 
conversion with human change.  As such, they give us insights into how the potential 
convert’s psychological distress or crisis has affected him/her to reflect on his/her past 
life history as well as how it has stirred his/her quests for knowing himself/herself and 
knowing the divine in light of the interaction of the experience of the self and the 
experience of the divine. 
 
II. Sociological Studies of Conversion:  
The Impact of Social and Institutional Factors 
 
Scholars in the field of sociology of religion have explored the impact of social 
and institutional factors on the conversion experiences of persons within religious 
communities.  With respect to the complexity of the sociological studies of conversion, 
this section of the literature review pays attention to three main themes which are suitable 
for elucidating the social and communal dimensions of the human transformation process 
and which are beneficial for investigating the complexity and richness of religious change.  
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These main themes are 1) conversion, deprivation, and religious affiliation, 2) conversion 
and social influences, and 3) conversion, member recruitment, and religious institutions.11 
 
A. Conversion, Deprivation, and Religious Affiliation 
Sociologists have examined the role of the deprivation in the conversion process 
in terms of the resolution of enduring personal frustration through religious affiliation.  
From a sociological perspective, the term deprivation refers to the sense of frustration, 
tension, disadvantage, alienation, or strain of potential converts which originates from 
experiences of societal inequality.  Strain theory contends that persons engage in religious 
affiliations in order to satisfy conventional desires that unusual personal or collective 
deprivation have frustrated due to this inequality (Bainbridge, 1992, pp. 178-181).  In 
Religion and Society in Tension, Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark (1965) assert that 
pre-converts “feel” deprived as a predisposing condition for conversion.  Glock and Stark 
consider religion as a social phenomenon.  In this vein, they describe conversion as a 
means for resolving the sense of deprivation or stress of pre-converts within their difficult 
social conditions in terms of the correlation between tension and religious commitment.  
For Glock and Stark, feelings of deprivation, as incentive for change, have tended to lead 
persons to participation in religious groups.  These feelings of deprivation have also 
                                                
11 I am deeply affected by 1) William Bainbridge’s idea of the resolution of personal frustration 
through religious commitment (“strain theory”) (1992) to accomplish the theme of conversion, deprivation, 
and religious affiliation; 2) John Lofland and Rodney Stark’s emphasis on the role of affective bonds and 
intensive interactions in the conversion process (“social influence theory”) (1965) to formulate the theme of 
conversion and social influences; and 3) David A. Snow, Louis A. Zurcher, and Sheldon Ekland-Olson’s 
idea of the link of the member recruitment of the religious organization with the conversion process of the 
person (1980) as well as Nancy T. Ammerman’s emphasis on the collective activities of religious 
institutions for potential or new converts (1987) to establish the theme of conversion, member recruitment, 
and religious institutions. 
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tended to enable persons to build new religious and social movements: “a necessary 
precondition for the rise of any organized social movement, whether it be religious or 
secular, is a situation of felt deprivation” (p. 249).  This means that deprived persons tend 
both to transform their unsatisfying life-styles or conditions by accepting a new ideology 
through religious affiliation and to deal with their felt problems by making an alliance 
with a supernatural force through religious commitment.  In doing so, religious groups 
have tended to recruit these potential converts who have felt feelings of frustration, 
deprivation, tension, or grievance toward the social conditions of inequality.  Glock and 
Stark note that “religious resolutions…are likely to compensate for feelings of 
deprivation rather than to eliminate its causes” (p. 249). 
In a similar vein, John Lofland and Rodney Stark (1965) in “Becoming a World-
Saver: A Theory of Conversion to a Deviant Perspective” have examined how conversion 
experiences are related to the pre-existing strains of persons.  After studying a West 
Coast millenarian group, Lofland and Stark find that the pre-converts perceived problems 
(although these problems objectively did not appear to be overly severe), and as a result, 
they had experienced high levels of tension over a period of time leading up to their 
conversions.  Lofland and Stark report that a feeling of frustration or deprivation was an 
essential characteristic of the condition that precipitated conversion to a radical religious 
group/sect.  In other words, acutely felt tension in the converts’ circumstances—“a felt 
discrepancy between some imaginary, ideal state of affairs and the circumstances in 
which these people saw themselves caught up”—is a necessary, but not sufficient, pre-
condition for conversion (p. 864).  As a consequence, Lofland and Stark write, “For 
 52 
conversion a person must experience, within a religious problem-solving perspective, 
enduring, acutely-felt tensions that lead him [or her] to define himself [or herself] as a 
religious seeker” (p. 862).  For Lofland and Stark, persons’ participation in religious 
communities can make up for their feelings of deprivation or alienation. 
Influenced by Lofland and Stark, William Bainbridge (1992) in “The Sociology 
of Conversion” explores the link between the enduring personal frustration and the 
religious affiliation of converts in the process of transformation.  Bainbridge insists that 
strain theory would emphasize the personal needs of deprived persons to satisfy 
conventional social desires through the conversion experience (pp. 178-181).12  For 
Bainbridge, the person experiences a sense of deprivation, which comes from comparison 
with other people in the society or a comparison with his or her previous situation.  This 
means that this person is deeply frustrated with his or her life.  The person becomes a 
religious seeker on a quest to promote a more satisfactory life.  This person makes a 
strong commitment to the religious community and can assuage his or her feeling of 
deprivation or strain within a supportive religious group.  As a result, Bainbridge writes, 
“Religion offers a way to transcend and transvalue relative deprivation…In joining a 
religion, the person adopts an ideology about life that transforms deprivation into a virtue, 
or at least provides supernatural compensation for it” (p. 180). 
In a same way, Nanlai Cao (2005) agrees with other scholars’ hypothesis that 
religious conversion is a means to resolve the feelings of deprivation, alienation, or 
                                                
12 From a sociological perspective, Bainbridge agrees with the use of the strain theory in exploring 
the conversion experiences of persons, although he acknowledges that there is no evidence to prove that 
religious people in general are more deprived than irreligious people (pp. 185-186).  This means that 
“enduring personal frustrations, the key idea in strain theory, certainly may facilitate conversion, but it is 
not essential” (p. 186). 
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frustration of the pre-converts within specific social contexts through religious affiliation 
or commitment.  In “The Church as a Surrogate Family for Working Class Immigrant 
Chinese Youth: An Ethnography of Segmented Assimilation,” Cao demonstrates how 
persons’ involvement in immigrant religious communities can make up for their feelings 
of frustration, deprivation, or alienation in an unfamiliar society.  Cao regards a religious 
community (e.g., The Cantonese Church of the Lord) as “a surrogate family” for pre-
converts in order to facilitate both adaptation and upward assimilation to middleclass 
norms in newly immigrant society (e.g., New York’s Chinatown).  After studying 
Chinese youth of working class immigrants in New York, Cao finds that the feelings of 
deprivation, strain, or tension of these marginalized Chinese youth stirred them into 
conversion to Christianity.  Cao also finds that the ethnic church (“an Americanized, yet 
Chinese-led Christian church”) played a vital role in fostering successful adaptation and 
upward assimilation to middleclass norms.  It enabled the disadvantaged to overcome 
their difficulties and offers a caring environment to build up their confidence.  As a 
consequence, Cao states, “The newly adopted religion becomes central in the adaptive 
strategy of young Chinatown Chinese in the face of socioeconomic hardship.  Bound by 
the love of the intergenerational Chinese church family and driven by the strength of their 
new Christian faith, those disadvantaged immigrant youth have managed to survive the 
emotional and physical costs of immigration” (p. 198). 
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B. Conversion and Social Influences 
Many sociologists have explored the impact of social influences on the 
conversion experience in terms of interpersonal bonds and social networks.  In other 
words, many sociological interpretations of conversion demonstrate how converts mold 
and confirm the values, expectations, and beliefs of religious groups through their 
interactions with significant other people and their participation in religious communities.  
From a sociological perspective, social influence theory contends that persons participate 
in religious communities because they have formed social attachments with other 
members in these communities and because their attachments to nonmembers are weak 
(Bainbridge, pp. 178-179).  Lofland and Stark (1965) emphasize the role of affective 
bonds and intensive interactions in the process of conversion, while also elaborating the 
role of acutely felt tensions.  They describe conversion as a dynamic process of change in 
social relationships.  According to Lofland and Stark, becoming a convert is “coming to 
accept the opinions of one’s friends” (p. 871).  This means that relationships with friends 
or group members are crucial in leading the potential convert to a new perspective or way 
of life as well as to the confirmation and consolidation of the ideology of the religious 
group (pp. 871-874; see Rambo, 1993, pp. 108-109; Weininger, 1955, pp. 27-44). 
In a related vein, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966/1991) in The Social 
Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge emphasize the social 
and institutional dimension of religious conversion.  For Berger and Luckmann, the 
conversion experience is centered in the social interactions of persons within the religious 
community.  Berger and Luckmann write,  
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It is only within the religious community, the ecclesia, that the conversion can be 
effectively maintained as plausible…It provides the indispensable plausibility 
structure for the new reality…Saul may have become Paul in the aloneness of 
religious ecstasy, but he could remain Paul only in the context of the Christian 
community that recognized him as such and confirmed the ‘new being’ in which 
he now located this identity.  This relationship of conversion and community is 
not a peculiarly Christian phenomenon. (pp. 177-178) 
 
In a similar way, Roger A. Straus (1976, 1979) proposes that potential converts 
are seekers who actively conduct their search for creative transformations within the 
social and institutional context of a particular group.  Straus views religious conversion as 
“a personal and collective accomplishment,” which is rooted in interpersonal interactions 
between the potential convert and the group members (1979, p. 158).  He demonstrates 
how religious seekers act to discover and make use of a particular means of personal 
transformation offered by and institutionalized within a specific community.  For Straus, 
religious seekers actively engage in the transformation of their actions: “the way to be 
changed is act changed” (p.163).  This means that during this transforming process, new 
converts are able “to make conversion behaviorally and experientially real to self and 
others, to immerse self in the world of fellow-converts, and master the specific practices 
institutionalized by the group for the maintenance and expansion of ‘results’ (the new 
identity, conduct, forms of subjective experience and grounds of meaning ascribed to 
conversion)” (p. 163). 
Like Straus, in “The Sociology of Conversion,” David A. Snow and Richard 
Machalek (1984) elucidate the impact of social influences on the transforming 
experiences of converts.  According to Snow and Machalek, there are three broad 
categories of social influences on the conversion experience: social networks, affective 
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and intensive interaction, and role learning.  Social networks are very important in 
explaining how people are engaged in new religious movements and organizations.  
Snow and Machalek have studied religious groups (e.g., Pentecostals, Evangelicals, etc.) 
in order to investigate the connection between social networks and the conversion 
experience.  They find that the vast majority of group members/devotees—ranging from 
59% to 82%—were recruited through social networks.  The affective and intensive 
interaction of potential converts with other group members can function “as an 
information bridge, increase the credibility of appeals, and intensify the pressure to 
accept those appeals and corresponding practices.”  The process of learning roles in the 
religious community leads persons into cognitive and behavioral transformations (pp. 
182-184). 
Along the same line, Max Heirich (1977) in “Change of Heart: A Test of Some 
Widely Held Theories about Religious Conversion” examines how social interaction and 
influence deeply affects the conversion experiences of persons in light of the correlation 
between the personal transformation and the social network.  Heirich regards conversion 
as “the process of changing a sense of root reality” that provides meaning and orientation 
for understanding one’s situation and acting in relation to it.  In particular, Heirich 
intends to determine what specific factor has the greatest impact on the transformation 
experiences of converts.  Heirich has studied Roman Catholic Pentecostals who received 
baptism and a group of non-converts who served as a matched control group.  Heirich 
uses a broad array of indicators in order to test three factors common to sociology of 
conversion: stress (e.g., actively felt tension), prior socialization (e.g., the educational 
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backgrounds of respondents or the degree of religious orientation of parents), and 
immediate social influence (e.g., frequent attendance with other believers at Mass).  He 
finds that stress indicators to be no more pronounced in converts than in non-converts.  
He also finds that immediate interpersonal influences had more impact on the conversion 
experiences of respondents than personal felt tension or prior socialization.  Heirich 
asserts that social contact and influence is an essential factor for precipitating conversion 
experiences: “the process of conversion occurs through use of available social networks” 
(p. 673).  As a result, Heirich states that immediate social influences enable the potential 
convert (“a religious seeker”) to stimulate a “change of heart”, which involves a 
conscious shift in one’s sense of ultimate grounding (pp. 673-674). 
Like Heirich, William S. Bainbridge (1992) pays attention to the role of 
interpersonal influences and social networks in the conversion process, while 
acknowledging the role of acutely felt tension or deprivation.  For Bainbridge, social 
influence theory focuses on the social attachments that a person already has with one or 
more members of a religious community.  To strengthen these attachments, the person 
joins the group by accepting the norms of the group.  In this vein, Bainbridge views 
conversion as a dynamic process of “the joining of a new religious fellowship” (p. 187).  
He concentrates on a shift in the person’s attachments to others within a religious group.  
In doing so, Bainbridge shows that how much the person changes actually depends on the 
nature of social influences after joining in communities, and on the degree of difference 
between the person’s old affiliations and the new ones.  In many cases, persons have 
converted to a new religion as a result of marrying a person who already has strong faith 
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in it.  Bainbridge argues that the existing relationships/friendships of persons with other 
members encourage potential converts to actively participate in the religious community, 
to positively change their behaviors, and to (re)construct their beliefs within this 
community (pp. 182-189; see Greeley, 1981, pp. 101-126).  As a consequence, 
Bainbridge writes,  
While we have spoken of congregations, communities, and social classes, the 
emphasis has been on the conversion of single individuals.  Yet much of the 
growth of religion comes through the conversion of families and friendship 
groups…A religious movement can spread most rapidly through an extended 
network of existing family and friendship ties. (pp. 189-190) 
 
 Likewise, Brock K. Kilbourne and James T. Richardson (1986, 1988) investigate 
the impact of interpersonal attachments on the conversion experience in terms of social 
support within a particular group.  Kilbourne and Richardson conceptualize conversion as 
a communalization or socialization experience of the potential convert with other 
group/cult members, which can be meaningfully understood within a social context.  For 
Kilbourne and Richardson, the group membership or group affiliation of potential 
converts enables them to learn the appropriate roles and norms of the group, to accept the 
values and beliefs of the group, and to shape a new social identity and worldview. 
Influenced by Lofland and Stark, Arthur L. Greil and David R. Rudy (1983) agree 
with other scholars’ hypothesis that social influences are crucial in leading persons to 
conversion experiences.  In “Conversion to the World View of Alcoholics Anonymous: A 
Refinement of Conversion Theory,” Greil and Rudy suggest that studies of the 
conversion process should pay more attention to the institutional or organizational 
context in which conversion occurs, while acknowledging the religious dimension of the 
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conversion process.  They describe conversion as “a radical transformation of personal 
identity,” which is rooted in personal relationships with other members within the group 
(p. 6).  For Greil and Rudy, during the conversion process, one engages in a solution to 
problems related to drinking, but also in the reconstruction of a personal worldview by 
identifying with a new ideology of a social and religious group (e.g., Alcoholics 
Anonymous).  The central dynamic in the conversion process is rooted in one’s 
acceptance of the opinions of other members of the community.  There are similarities 
between the observed A.A. conversion process and the model generally described in the 
sociological literature on religious conversion (e.g., Lofland and Stark’s model of 
conversion [1965]): 
First, affective bonds within the group and intensive interaction with group 
members are necessary.  Second, the likelihood is reduced that the prospective 
convert will interact with reference others who do not share the group’s 
perspective.  Third, the organization stresses the homogeneity of members vis a 
vis the ideology…Fourth, concrete acts of commitment strengthen the loyalty of 
the prospective [sic] convert to the group. (1983, p. 22) 
 
Similar to Greil and Rudy, in “The Spread of Religions and Macrosocial 
Relations,” Robert L. Montgomery (1991) examines the role of the macrosocial context 
of potential converts in the spread of religions.  Montgomery insists that religion offers 
important resources for the creation, consolidation, support, and strength of a society’s 
identity.  For Montgomery, the intersocietal and intergroup relations within a specific 
context influence the acceptance, rejection, or mixed acceptance of new religions in a 
given society—“Acceptance means that the introduced religion becomes part of the 
social identity of large numbers of people in the social unit.  A rejection of the introduced 
religion means that it continues to be regarded primarily as ‘foreign’” (p. 38).  In some 
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cases, the spread of a new religion is crucial both for bringing dramatic changes among 
numerous members of a receiving group and for providing a stronger source of resistance 
to outside pressures than any other available religion, especially the traditional religion.  
Montgomery employs the case of the Christianization of Korea to illustrate this 
phenomenon.  Western Christianity became a very important religion in Korea during the 
Japanese occupation between 1910 and 1945.  Because Japan had presented an 
overwhelming threat to the identity of the Korean people by forcibly imposing Japanese 
language and religion (e.g., “Shinto shrines”), Koreans had welcomed the Christian 
message advocated by the European and American missionaries.  That means, as a new 
religion, Christianity enabled the Korean people both to resist the outside pressure of 
Japan and to preserve the values and the identity of Korean society (p. 47; see Rambo, 
1993, p. 91).  As a consequence, Montgomery argues that macrosocial contexts/relations 
are essential in the conversions of persons or a group to a specific religion. 
In a related vein, Andrew Buckser (2003) agrees with other scholars’ hypothesis 
that social and institutional factors are crucial in leading persons to conversion 
experiences.  In “Social Conversion and Group Definition in Jewish Copenhagen,” 
Buckser investigates how persons convert to a specific religion (i.e., Judaism) through 
family relationships (e.g., intermarriage with non-Jewish persons) or social interactions 
with members of the community.  Buckser views conversion as a social act or 
phenomenon in which “one enters into a set of new relationships with members of a 
religious community” (p. 69).  He emphasizes the role of larger family relationships and 
social networks in the conversion process rather than the subjective faith experiences of 
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individual converts: “In most cases, conversion is not a matter of religious insight, a 
validation of a transformation of consciousness, but a means of reckoning with the 
consequences of a particular social [inter]action” (p. 73).  According to Buckser, as a 
well established minority group, the Jewish community in Copenhagen, Denmark, 
created a substantial institutional and cultural tradition.  The Jews of this community have 
intermarried non-Jewish Danes at extremely high rates, although the Orthodox 
interpretation of Jewish law has imposed constraints on the recognition of mixed 
marriages.  In such a situation, conversion to Judaism through intermarriage is an 
unavoidably communal and religious issue for this Jewish community, which usually 
includes tension or conflict over the nature of Jewish ethnic identity, authority, and 
religiosity.  It implies not merely a change in one person’s self-identification, but also the 
ratification and recognition of that change by the wider Jewish community (pp. 70-73). 
Buckser shows how the new convert is socialized into the specific group both by 
accepting the norms and beliefs of this group and by participating in the social activities 
and religious rituals of this group.  To illustrate this process, Buckser uses the case of 
“marriage conversion” to Judaism in the Jewish community of Copenhagen.  Anna 
Jensen was a Danish woman who married a Jewish man, Oskar Goldschmidt.  In order to 
marry Oskar, Anna had attended the educational programs and rituals of this Jewish 
community to learn Jewish religion, ideology, and life-style for one year, together with 
Oskar.  After successfully completing all programs, Rabbi Bent Melchior performed a 
conversion ceremony for Anna, at which point Anna became a Jew.  The larger family 
and congregation members welcomed Anna to their community through intermarriage 
 62 
and declared her proper position in this community, even though intermarriage could be a 
transgression of Orthodox Jewish law.  Buckser insists that Anna’s marriage with Oskar 
had fostered extensive connections to Jewish identity (“Jewishness”) and religiosity, 
although that process was not easy.  Buckser concludes that extensive interpersonal 
bonds and social networks enable persons to join a specific group as well as to convert to 
a new religion. 
 
C. Conversion, Member Recruitment, and Religious Institutions 
Sociologists have examined the methods of member recruitment of religious 
organizations in the conversion process.  For example, David A. Snow, Louis A. Zurcher, 
and Sheldon Ekland-Olson (1980) suggest a microstructural approach to the recruitment 
process which emphasizes structural influences on recruitment strategies and patterns.  
Snow et al. investigate the impact of the religious organization’s networks on the 
recruitment process.  They show why and how some people are recruited into particular 
social and religious organizations.  For Snow et al., social and religious movement 
organization’s networks function as an important determinant for recruiting new 
members: “recruitment cannot occur without prior contact with a recruitment agent” (p. 
789).  According to Snow et al, there are four general engagement tactics that religious 
institutions can employ in order to recruit new members: 
(1) They [the group members/agents] can channel their promotion and recruitment 
efforts among strangers in public places by face-to-face means; (2) They can 
promote via the institutionalized, mass communication mechanisms; (3) They can 
recruit among strangers in private places by such means as door-to-door 
canvassing; (4) They can promote and recruit through members’ extramovement 
social networks. (p. 795) 
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In a related vein, Rodney Stark and William S. Bainbridge (1980) account for 
member recruitment to cults and sects in terms of networks of faith.  In the study of 
religious groups (e.g., A Doomsday Group, the Ananda Commune, and the Mormons), 
Stark and Bainbridge find that recruitment primarily occurred in interpersonal relations 
between cult members and potential recruits.  Religious organizations functioned as 
places to enable recruits to construct intensive interactions with other members.  They 
assert that the recruitment process is centered in affective relations within specialized 
religious settings.13  As a result, Stark and Bainbridge state that “human persons desire 
interpersonal bonds, and they …try to protect them from rupture” by accepting the new 
faith of the religious group (p. 1394). 
Similar to Stark and Bainbridge, in Bible Believers: Fundamentalists in the 
Modern World, Nancy T. Ammerman (1987) shows how a fundamentalist church has 
recruited new members into their community by using their own mission strategies in 
pluralistic American society.  In other words, she has examined the correlation of 
institutional factors with member recruitment in fundamentalist churches.  She describes 
conversion as a recruitment process—“bring them in”—in which one becomes a member 
in a specific congregation.  For Ammerman, the term fundamentalism includes three 
characteristics: “separation from the world, dispensational premillennialism, and biblical 
literalism” (p. 6).  Ammerman, as a participant observer, conducts an experiential and 
empirical study of the fundamentalist Southside Gospel Church in Connecticut.  She 
                                                
13 Like Snow et al., Stark and Bainbridge (1980) have focused on the role of specific group 
members’ networks in the recruitment process, rather than the role of predispositional factors (e.g., a sense 
of alienation or deprivation) in the determination of differential recruitment. 
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finds that this church emphasized separation from the world.  This means that members 
of the congregation lived disciplined lives in which they gave up some worldly pleasures 
(e.g., drinking or dancing); they constantly sought God’s will for their lives and 
maintained their religious sensibilities in everyday affairs.  She also finds that the church 
members, as a cultural minority group in American society, had extensively used their 
time and energy to maintain their institutional networks as well as to extend their 
community by recruiting new members (“prospects”).  For Ammerman, Southside 
Gospel Church employed systematic methods for new member recruitment which 
effectively motivated all church members to participate in saving souls: inviting unsaved 
persons (“the lost”) to church worship services or activities, broadcasting the Christian 
message (e.g., the radio ministry, mail, or phone calls), teaching the young (e.g., Sunday 
School, Vacation Bible School, Southside Christian Academy, etc.), the bus ministry (i.e., 
the deliverance of the gospel on buses during transportation of potential members), 
visiting prospects (i.e., a door-to-door visitation program), and encouraging the potential 
converts to publicly walk the aisle to facilitate “the moment of salvation” during the 
invitation hymn at the Sunday worship service (pp. 148-155).  Ammerman insists that in 
the recruitment process, new converts adopted the ideology of this community and 
reconstructed their religious identities,14 life-styles, and beliefs within this fundamentalist 
                                                
14 Ammerman (1994, 2003) has emphasized narrative analysis for the study of religion or religious 
identity.  For Ammerman, religious organizations are important places for religious experiences and for the 
constructing of religious identities.  She notes that religious identities are located in the religious narratives 
of the specific community: “If we are to understand religious identities,…we must begin by attending to 
episodes of social interaction (whether face-to-face or mediated) that are emplotted in a religious 
narrative—one in which ‘religious’ actors, ideas, institutions, and experiences play a role in the story of 
who we are and who I am” (2003, p. 216).  In this vein, she claims that “the study of religious identity is 
not the study of external assaults on an unchanging religious core.  Rather, it is the study of religious 
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congregation.  As a consequence, supporting Peter Berger’s view on conservative 
religion as a sacred canopy, Ammerman states, “Churches like Southside provide such 
modern wanderers a home.  They provide an all-encompassing sacred canopy in which 
belief is possible” (p. 212). 
In a similar way, Dean M. Kelley (1972/1995) in Why Conservative Churches Are 
Growing delves into the correlation of strictness with religious commitment in the 
recruitment process.  For Kelley, strictness refers to a “way to conserve social strength” 
within the religious organization (p. 120).  Kelley catalogues three traits of the ideal-
typical strict church—absolutism, conformity, and fanaticism—and contrasts them to 
three traits of the more lenient church—relativism, diversity, and dialogue (1986, pp. 78-
83).  In short, strict churches demand adherence to a distinctive faith, morality, and life-
style.  Kelley writes,  
Those who are serious [strict] about their faith: 1. Do not confuse it with other 
beliefs/loyalties/practices, or mingle them together indiscriminately…2. Make 
high demands of those admitted to the organization that bears the faith…3. Do not 
consent to, encourage, or indulge any violations of its standards of belief or 
behavior by its professed adherents.  4. Do not keep silent about it, apologize for 
it, or let it be treated as though it made no difference, or should make no 
difference, in their behavior or in their relationships with others. (p. 121) 
 
Kelley insists that the higher growth rates of the more conservative groups reflect 
their greater ability to present their members with “meaning,” an understanding of the 
ultimate goals and purposes of life.  For Kelley, strict churches have the organizational 
resources for the recruitment of potential converts and the growth of these communities.  
In other words, the high commitment of church members, translated into the giving of 
                                                                                                                                            
narratives that are themselves the product of ongoing interaction, both among the diverse human 
participants in the drama and between them and whatever unpredictable sacred experience they recognize 
in their midst” (pp. 223-224). 
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money and time, provides such groups with the material and human resources in order to 
carry out their mission, including recruitment of new members.  Kelley suggests a 
strategy of member recruitment to religious organizations based on the traditional 
heritage of the Anabaptists and Wesleyans:  
a. Be in no haste to admit members. 
b. Test the readiness and preparation of would-be members. 
c. Require continuing faithfulness. 
d. Bear one another up in small groups. 
e. Do not yield control to outsiders, nor seek to accommodate to their expectations. 
    (p. 176) 
 
Influenced by Kelley, Laurence R. Iannaccone (1994) in “Why Strict Churches 
Are Strong” demonstrates that during the recruitment process, conservative churches 
encourage committed membership and demand a high level of participation.  In other 
words, Iannaccone shows “how strictness increases commitment, raises levels of 
participation, and enables a group to offer more benefits to current and potential 
members” (p. 1181).  Iannaccone emphasizes the collective activities of religious 
institutions in order to foster both member recruitment and extended membership within 
groups in light of the remarkable structure for mutual aid and reinforcement.  He writes, 
“individual members benefit both from their own religious participation and from that of 
others…a church member who attends regularly, sings wholeheartedly, greets others 
warmly, and testifies enthusiastically enhances not just his [or her] own spiritual life but 
also those of his [or her] fellow members” (p. 1185).  Iannaccone asserts that the 
organizational strength and resources (e.g., money and time) of strict churches enable 
these communities effectively to recruit new members as well as to extend successfully 
their groups.  Likewise, Daniel V. A. Olson and Paul Perl (2001) in “Variations in 
 67 
Strictness and Religious Commitment Within and Among Five Denominations” carry out 
a multi-denominational study of the potential effects of strictness on the recruitment 
process.  Olson and Perl have studied 625 church members of five denominations 
(Assemblies of God, Southern Baptist, Catholic, Lutheran, and Presbyterian).  They find 
that most of the variation in strictness occurred between denominations.  That is, 
strictness influenced member recruitment across denominations.  Olson and Perl 
conclude that strictness is positively correlated with several important measures of 
member commitment levels across denominations. 
 In conclusion, from the perspective of sociology of religion, conversion has been 
viewed as a resolution of enduring personal frustration or deprivation through religious 
affiliation, a result of interpersonal bonds and social networks, or a product of the 
effectiveness of institutional recruitment strategies.  On the whole, sociological studies of 
conversion have described the converts as active religious seekers who establish relations 
with other persons within specialized religious settings. 
 These sociological studies of conversion have primarily contributed by showing 
the impact of social and institutional factors on the complex process of human 
transformation.  They have effectively elucidated the interaction of the experience of the 
self with the experience of others in the process of the socialization or institutionalization 
of the person.  As such, they have greatly contributed by depicting how significant other 
people in the religious communities/institutions have provided love, support, and 
belonging to make up for the potential convert’s frustration with his or her deprivations in 
the social and cultural conditions of his or her time as well as to mold and confirm the 
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values, expectations, and beliefs of religious groups.  However, these sociological 
interpretations of conversion are not sufficient to investigate the potential convert’s inner 
disconnection or struggle in his or her own mind, at which point they are inadequate to 
show both the interior journey toward union with the divine and the unique 
transformation of the individual in the process of religious conversion in terms of 
knowing oneself and knowing the divine. 
 
III. Anthropological Studies of Conversion: 
The Impact of Cultural Factors 
 
Scholars in the field of anthropology of religion have examined the role of 
cultural factors in the conversion process of persons or a group within specific contexts.  
In doing so, anthropologists have richly described the cultural context in which religious 
change takes place; they have tended to establish long-term relationships with persons or 
groups in particular cultural milieus (Rambo, 2003, pp. 212-213).  With respect to the 
complexity of the anthropological studies of conversion, this section of the literature 
review pays attention to three main themes because they are more beneficial for 
articulating the cultural dimension of the religious conversion process and for 
understanding better the complex phenomenon of religious change. These main themes 
are 1) conversion and rationality, 2) conversion and acculturation, and 3) conversion and 
cultural revitalization.15 
                                                
15 I am profoundly influenced by 1) Robert W. Hefner’s concept of the intellectual challenge of 
the encounter of the new culture (the intellectualist model of religious change) (1993) in order to formulate 
the theme of conversion and rationality; 2) Alan R. Tippett’s idea of cultural transition/adaptation from an 
old context to a new context (1977, 1992) in order to establish the theme of conversion and acculturation; 
and 3) Anthony F. C. Wallace’s emphasis on a dynamic process of cultural renewal (“revitalization 
movements”) (1952, 1956) in order to construct the theme of conversion and cultural revitalization. 
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A. Conversion and Rationality 
Anthropologists have explored the impact of rationality on the conversion process 
within specific cultural settings.  From an anthropological perspective, rationality 
theory—the intellectualist model of religious change—contends that during the transition 
from one religious group to another, persons or groups do not “simply passively 
internalize symbols and meanings but actively evaluate and adjust their understanding as 
demands and circumstances change” (Hefner, 1993, p. 119).  Based on rationality theory, 
Robin Horton (1971, 1975, 1993) has focused on the impact of the traditional African 
cosmologies on the conversion process.  For Horton, cosmology refers to “a system of 
ideas about unobservable personal beings whose activities are alleged to underpin the 
events of the ordinary, everyday world” (1971, p. 101).  Horton proposes a model of the 
African cosmology which has a two-tier structure:  
In the first tier we find the lesser spirits, which are in the main concerned with the 
affairs of the local community and its environment—i.e., with the microcosm.  In 
the second tier we find a supreme being concerned with the world as a whole—
i.e., with the macrocosm.  Just as the microcosm is part of the macrocosm, so the 
supreme being is defined as the ultimate controller and existential ground of the 
lesser spirits. (p. 101) 
 
Horton investigates how traditional African cosmologies affect the conversions of 
persons or groups to world religions (e.g., Christianity or Islam) in terms of the 
intellectual challenge of the encounter of the macrocosm.  Drawing on numerous data of 
African conversions, Horton finds that the lesser spirits in the microcosm were important 
for Africans in order to foster the smooth running of daily village affairs and social 
relations.  The religious concerns of Africans revolved around the explanation, prediction, 
and control of their concrete world (i.e., their microcosm).  This means that Africans 
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related to these lesser beings rather than the supreme being, who was not relevant to their 
daily lives.  Horton also finds that because of increasing mobility and interaction with 
people from the wider social world, the Africans sought to expand their myths, rituals, 
and symbols in order to make sense of the new cultural situation and to reconstruct their 
cosmology.  Horton argues that the crucial variables of religious change among 
indigenous peoples “are not the external influences (Islam, Christianity) but the pre-
existing thought-patterns and values, and the pre-existing socioeconomic matrix” (1975, 
p. 221).  He concludes that the indigenous groups were attracted to new religions 
according to their own needs vis-à-vis their own situation: “acceptance of Islam and 
Christianity is due as much to the development of the traditional cosmology in response 
to other features of the modern situation as it is to the activities of missionaries” (1971, p. 
103; see Aguilar, 1995, p. 530; Rambo, 1982, p. 146, 1999, pp. 264-265). 
In a related vein, Robert W. Hefner (1993) in “World Building and the Rationality 
of Conversion” agrees with Horton’s account of African conversions because it has 
delineated Africans as active seekers in the process of religious change rather than as 
passive consumers or victims.  Hefner describes conversion as a change in affiliation 
from one religious group to another, when an individual moves outside a restricted terrain 
(i.e., the microcosm) into an expanded social world (i.e., the macrocosm).  Influenced by 
Horton, Hefner challenges the Weberian characterization of traditional religions as 
intellectually non-rational.  According to Hefner, Max Weber (1956) has argued that 
traditional religions are piecemeal in their approach to problems of meaning, but world 
religions formulate comprehensive responses to the ethical, emotional, and intellectual 
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challenges of human life (Hefner, p. 7).  Influenced by Weber, Clifford Geertz (1973) 
views world religions as more rational and universalized from a perspective of cultural 
relativism.  Geertz insists that the primary difference between traditional and world 
religions is that the former are organized around a “rigidly stereotyped…cluttered arsenal 
of myth and magic,” but the latter “are more abstract, more logically coherent, and more 
generally phrased.”  In other words, world religions show “greater conceptual 
generalization, tighter formal integration, and a more explicit sense of doctrine” (Geertz, 
1973, pp. 171-172, quoted in Hefner, pp. 9-10). 
Following Horton, Hefner attempts to overcome a dichotomy within the Weberian 
heritage between traditional religions and world religions, and between the rational and 
the irrational.  He asks: Are world religions always rational?  Are traditional African 
religions always irrational?  Hefner argues that the beliefs of traditional religions can be 
rational in specific cultural contexts, while acknowledging that world religions codify 
their doctrines more abstractly and systematically.  He writes, 
Traditional [African] religions are not necessarily less rational than world 
religions, just narrower in focus…traditional religions concentrate on a smaller, 
more local array of problems…The spirits most commonly invoked in traditional 
religions—ancestors, territorial guardians, nature spirits—are similarly drawn 
from familiar terrains.  This does not mean that traditional beliefs are either 
irrational or even less rational than more encompassing canons.  They can be 
entirely rational in relation to the circumstances they engage.  Indeed, in a 
restricted social context the more universalistic dogmas of the world religions 
might well be meaningless. (p. 20) 
 
In a critically extended view, Mario I. Aguilar (1995) in “African Conversion 
from a World Religion: Religious Diversification by the Waso Boorana in Kenya” 
suggests an alternate approach to the study of the rationality of religious conversion.  In 
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doing so, Aguilar demonstrates a paradigm shift for the study of African conversion from 
‘religious affiliation from a traditional African religious group to a world religious group’ 
to ‘religious diversification in a specific context’ in terms of reconversion to traditional 
practices.  Aguilar agrees with Horton’s model of the African cosmology for the study of 
conversion because it helps Africans both to explain how certain events for changes 
happen in their social and cultural contexts and to reconstruct new religious cosmology 
based on their pre-existing thought-patterns, ideologies, norms, and beliefs.  According to 
Aguilar, Horton (1971, 1975, 1982, 1993) has focused on traditional African religious 
institutions that provide the foundation for the acceptance or rejection of Islam or 
Christianity.  These local religious institutions (i.e., micro-cosmical systems) had to adapt 
in order to cope with macro-cosmical systems as represented by Islam and Christianity.  
However, Horton does not pay attention to outside forces on African conversion to Islam 
or Christianity (e.g., the arrival of the colonial powers, or the work of missionaries in 
particular geographical areas).  Aguilar does not agree with Horton’s view on Islam and 
Christianity as only “catalysts—i.e., stimulators and accelerators of changes which were 
‘in the air’ anyway” (Horton 1971, p. 104)—and complements Horton’s perspective, by 
critically using Humphrey J. Fisher’s approach to African conversion (1973, 1985).16  In 
                                                
16 Humphrey J. Fisher (1985) does not agree with Horton’s approach to African conversion that 
“the essential patterns of religious development in black Africa, even Christian and Islamic development, 
are determined by the enduring influence of a traditional cosmology” (p. 153).  Fisher (1973, 1985) argues 
that Islam and Christianity are more than catalysts for changes.  The institutions of Islam or Christianity 
have deeply influenced on the changes of the traditional African religious cosmology in historical contexts, 
based on three religious developmental stages of quarantine, mixing, and reform.  Fisher states, “a genuine 
religious transference is possible, unleashing a new force, which is neither quite like any religious 
expression ‘outside’ before being transferred in, nor yet the same as anything already ‘inside’, and which 
then, like a juggernaut, advances under its own momentum” (1985, p. 153).  Similarly, J. D. Y. Peel (1977, 
1987) comments that Horton has neglected the external influences on African conversions to Islam or 
Christianity from an ahistorical perspective.  Likewise, Hefner (1993) also comments that “the most vexing 
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that sense Aguilar explores the political and structural influences on the process of 
African conversion within a specific historical context.  For Aguilar, Islam as an outside 
force enabled the Boorana people to change their cosmology and to be Muslims, because 
Islamic traders and clerics were present in “the markets of Isiolo, Garba Tulla, Mado 
Gashi, Merti and other Boorana settlements in the Waso area” (1995, p. 532, see pp. 530-
531).  Aguilar asserts that “[cultural and] historical processes of [African] conversion 
need to be assessed not only from the point of view of one of the world religions but also 
in terms of the adaptability of a local religious tradition” (p. 536). 
Aguilar claims that conversions in Africa during the twentieth century cannot be 
simply studied in light of changes in affiliation from traditional religious groups to world 
religious groups.  In order to illustrate a process of religious change and diversification 
within a social and cultural environment, Aguilar employs the case of the Waso Boorana.  
According to Aguilar, the Boorana people settled in the Waso area of north-eastern 
Kenya in the 1930s.  Because of the settling of colonial administrative boundaries, they 
became isolated from the rest of the Boorana in northern Kenya and Ethiopia.  Because of 
their interaction with the Somali, the Waso Boorana underwent a process of 
“somalisation” through which they replaced their indigenous Oromo ritual performances 
with Islamic practices.  That is, many Boorana people had converted to Islam during 
colonial times (1932-1962).  However, after the independence of Kenya in 1963, the 
Waso Boorana had experienced new challenges to their own cosmology and their 
                                                                                                                                            
aspect of Horton’s model is its neglect of political and structural influences on conversion” (p. 22).  Hefner 
asserts that “one cannot logically conclude from this that the institutions of Islam and Christianity were 
insignificant in the cosmological changes [of Africans] that actually took place…We must add…that the 
timing and content of [African] actual change were profoundly affected by the European presence and the 
crisis of identity and authority that presence provoked” (p. 23). 
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religious affiliation.  During post-colonial times (1963-1992), the Waso Boorana had 
gradually reconverted to their traditional religion (related to both the ayyaana—their 
lesser beings/spirits and the Wagga—their supreme being) and had participated in their 
traditional Boorana religious practices in order to reconstruct their own cosmology within 
a new social and cultural context, while rejecting and/or attending the Islamic or Roman 
Catholic rituals.  Aguilar finds that the Waso Boorana responded rationally to the cultural, 
social, and political changes of colonial and post-colonial times in light of the 
adaptability of a local religious tradition in a wider world.  Aguilar asserts that “religious 
diversification has been a sensible and rational communal response to the need to keep 
the Peace of the Boorana” in light of unity in diversity (p. 536).  As a consequence, 
Aguilar states,  
I suggest that the reasons for this process of religious diversification throughout 
their history are to be found in their own way of diversifying their herds, in order 
to face drought, famine and political changes.  Therefore, from research into the 
Waso Boorana, I argue that the study of conversion in Africa during the twentieth 
century cannot be limited to changes in religious affiliation from a local religious 
tradition to a world religion.  African processes of conversion are fluid, and they 
also include processes of reconversion to religious practices socially present in the 
eras preceding the world religions (p. 526)...Such religious change may involve a 
shift from affiliation to a world religion to a local religious tradition, a fluid 
process that means constant re-evaluation in terms of religious practices. (p. 536) 
 
B. Conversion and Acculturation 
Anthropologists have articulated the link of acculturation with the conversion 
experiences of persons or groups within particular contexts.  From an anthropological 
perspective, acculturation denotes the process of becoming adapted to a new or different 
culture with more or less advanced patterns in terms of cultural transition from the old 
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context to the new context.  The process of acculturation usually involves the mutual 
influence of different cultures through close contact.  Alan R. Tippett (1977, 1992) has 
examined the role of acculturation with the conversion experiences of persons or groups 
in specific cultural contexts.  As a Christian missionary anthropologist, Tippett brings his 
experiences in the South Pacific to a discussion of how conversion occurs in non-Western 
cultural surroundings (i.e., small island communities in New Guinea).  He describes 
conversion as “a dynamic process in Christian mission” which must be intricately related 
to the worldview, norms, and beliefs of a new cultural group in light of the result of 
lasting life-change within specific environments.  He deals with the process of the 
acculturation of particular group members or groups and carries out a question: “How are 
people (1) separated from the old context, and (2) incorporated into the new?” (1992, p. 
193).  Tippett explores the general structure of total group movements into Christianity.  
In that sense, he emphasizes group conversion which engages in “the process of multi-
individual experience and action of a group, through its competent authority, whereby the 
group changes from one conceptual and behavioral context to another, within the 
operations of its own structure and decision-making mechanisms regardless of whether or 
not the external environment changes” (p. 194).  He insists,  
When such group decision is specifically religious, if new elements are innovated, 
the group self-image may need restructuring, and a new set of norms may have to 
be fixed.  The group may demand from each individual some ocular 
demonstration of separation from the old context. (p. 194) 
 
After thoroughly reviewing his own extensive field data of the conversion process 
in the island world of the Pacific, Tippett schematizes a sequential stage model of the 
acculturation process that includes four periods and three points.  In brief, Tippett’s 
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model of acculturation can be illustrated in light of “from old context (pagan) to new 
context (Christian)” as follows: 1) the period of awareness—[a. the points of 
realization]—2) the period of decision making—[b. the point of encounter]—3) the 
period of incorporation—[c. the point of consummation/confirmation]—4) the period of 
maturity.  As the conversion experience proceeds with a mobility from left to right, it 
passes from one unit into the next through a specific point which can be identified (1977, 
pp. 206-220; 1992, pp. 195-205).  Tippett’s model focuses on the strategies of the cultural 
insiders who saw the acceptance of Christianity as advantageous.  This model provides a 
framework for understanding the dynamics of cultural transition in different and variable 
societies and for elucidating the stages a group goes through in the process of accepting a 
new religious orientation. 
Like Tippett, Charles H. Kraft (1976) in “Cultural Concomitants of Higi 
Conversion: Early Period” demonstrates the impact of cultural forces on the conversion 
process within a specific ethnographical setting.  In other words, Kraft elucidates how 
various cultural factors facilitated the Higi conversion to Christianity.  As an 
anthropologically oriented missionary, Kraft has surveyed the early period of the growth 
of Christianity among the Higi people of northeastern Nigeria.  He finds that Islam was 
brought to the Higi area early in the 19th century through the conquests of the Fulani 
tribe.  However, most of the Higi people did not convert to Islam because the Muslims in 
that same area were the Fulani people.  The Fulani, as African warriors, had previously 
captured indigenous Africans and sold them into slavery.  For this reason, they had 
traditionally become enemies of the Higi; finally, there was a strong tendency to reject 
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Islam because of its association with the Fulani.  On the other hand, within traditional 
Higi culture, there was another powerful tendency to respect white people based on one 
of their traditional proverbs—“Fear God, fear the White Man” (p. 434).  As the 
indigenous Higi worldview linked Whites with God rather than with man, the Higi people 
respected Euro-American Christian missionaries during the process of cultural and 
religious transformation.  Moreover, the Higi people gradually reconstructed their 
cosmology and accepted the Christian message about God based on their pre-existing 
religious tradition (e.g., their concepts of the High God—Hyelatamwe—and household 
gods).  Kraft asserted that the indigenous culture stimulated the Higi people to make a 
positive response to Christianity.  He concludes that various cultural factors played an 
important role in fostering and eliciting conversion among the Higi people.  
 In a related vein, Kwai Hang Ng (2002) in “Seeking the Christian Tutelage: 
Agency and Culture in Chinese Immigrants’ Conversion to Christianity” explores the role 
of cultural agency in the conversion process within a specific ethnographic setting.  Ng 
describes a Chinese immigrant church as “a culturally embedded agency in the process of 
religious conversion” (p. 212).  Ng states, “the [Chinese immigrant] church as a 
community provides the congregants with opportunities to reinvigorate their own ethnic 
cultural practices on the one hand (ethnic identification), while learning American 
cultural values and know-how on the other (assimilation)” within a new foreign context 
(p. 212). 
In a similar way, Diane Austin-Broos (2003) in “The Anthropology of 
Conversion: An Introduction” has explored the connection between cultural 
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transformation and the conversion process within distinct ethnographical settings.  In 
other words, Austin-Broos delves into how different cultural and historical settings 
influence the conversion experiences of persons or groups.  Austin-Broos regards 
conversion as “a form of passage—a ‘turning from and to’—that is neither syncretism 
nor absolute breach,” in which persons engage in cultural and religious transformation 
within various and different times and spaces (pp. 1-2).  For Austin-Broos, the dynamic 
conversion experiences of persons or groups are centered in particular cultural and 
historical milieus, which include “the shifting relations between nation-states and a global 
economy, the new forms of identity politics within and between nations, and the 
increasing importance of religion in the lives of individuals” (p. 1).  Austin-Broos insists 
that conversion, as a cultural and religious passage, occurs in specific times and places.  
This cultural and religious passage enables converts to become “encultured” beings, who 
participate in a new form of relatedness with others (i.e., “a newly inscribed communal 
self”), as well as to experience a new set of embodied worldviews, identities, and beliefs. 
In an extended view, Rebecca S. Norris (2003) explores the link of embodied 
culture and the adoption of new beliefs with the conversion experiences of persons.  
Norris describes conversion as a gradual process, which involves “not just adopting a set 
of ideas but also converting to and from an embodied worldview and identity” (p. 171).  
Norris raises a research question for the study of conversion as follows:  “To what the 
[has] convert…actually converted?” (p. 179).  In order to achieve a proper answer, Norris 
has interviewed converts at the greater Boston area in New England, who were all 
middle-class, in their forties, and came from Jewish or Christian backgrounds.  Based on 
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the analysis of her data from interviews, Norris presents three important consequences for 
achieving a better understanding of the nature of cultural and spiritual conversion in 
terms of embodied culture and the adoption of new beliefs: 
First, although a convert experiences conversion as a reorientation to a new 
religious belief system, the conversion occurs primarily because it corresponds 
with the convert’s preexisting ideas or feelings about truth or meaning.  Second, 
unless they are converting to a different branch of their old tradition, converts 
usually exhibit one of two ways of relating to the laws and rituals of their adopted 
religion: zealous adherence or selective performance.  Third, since the worldview 
of the convert exists not only as abstract ideas but also as embodied reality, 
practicing the adopted religion requires not only the gradual assimilation of the 
meaning of terms and concepts based in the language and symbols of another 
culture, but also the performance of ritual postures and gestures requiring 
retraining of deep-seated somatic responses. (p. 171) 
 
 For Norris, converts do not achieve merely a new set of beliefs, but rather a new 
set of beliefs as understood through the old.  This means that conversion occurs in a 
passage between old faiths and new faiths.  Norris emphasizes religious ritual practices 
that help converts to deeply express their inner feelings and to gradually understand the 
meaning of terms, symbols, and ideologies of their adopted spiritual traditions in light of 
both the embodied experience and a correspondence between the outer form and the inner 
state.  Consequently, Norris asserts that the conversion experience enables persons to 
participate in the process of the embodiment of culture as well as to shape a new form of 
worldviews, identities, and beliefs. 
 
C. Conversion and Cultural Revitalization 
Some anthropologists have examined the connection between the conversion 
experience and the revitalization of persons or groups within particular cultural 
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environments.  Anthony F. C. Wallace (1952, 1956, 1970) focuses on the link of the 
religious revitalization movements of persons or groups with conversion experiences 
within particular cultural environments.  Wallace views conversion as a dynamic process 
of cultural renewal and revitalization in which persons engage in visions of a new way of 
life in order to deal with extreme stresses.   For Wallace, culture, as a dynamic entity in 
process, contains internal mechanisms that enable it to renew itself and make itself more 
relevant to its current situation.  In other words, a culture, like all organisms, has a life 
history.  When a culture begins to collapse, a process occurs in which the core myths, 
symbols, and rituals are broken down and reconstructed in such a manner as to give 
people revitalized visions of themselves and new strategies by which to enhance and 
maintain life.  Wallace describes the processes of culture change in light of deliberate 
intent by members of a society: 
The persons involved in the process of revitalization must perceive their culture, 
or some major areas of it, as a system (whether accurately or not); they must feel 
that this cultural system is unsatisfactory; and they must innovate not merely 
discrete items, but a new cultural system, specifying new relationships as well as, 
in some cases; new traits. (1956, p. 265) 
 
Wallace’s theory of revitalization movements is useful for exploring the larger 
cultural and social process of renewal within specific contexts.  Wallace defines 
revitalization as “a special kind of culture change phenomenon”; in that sense, 
revitalization movements are defined as “deliberate, conscious, organized efforts by 
members of a society to create a more satisfying culture” (p. 264).  For Wallace, the 
revitalization movement occurs in the following two conditions: high stress for individual 
members of the society, and disillusionment with a distorted cultural environment/Gestalt.  
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Wallace contends that the structure of the revitalization process consists of five stages: 1) 
steady state; 2) period of individual stress; 3) period cultural distortion; 4) period of 
revitalization (in which includes a series of functional stages of mazeway reformulation, 
communication, organization, adaptation, cultural transformation, and routinization); and 
5) new steady state (p. 268). 
In “Handsome Lake and the Great Revival in the West,” Wallace (1952) claims 
that the religious revitalization movement is closely related to a prophet’s revelatory 
visions, which provide for him (or her) satisfying relationships to the supernatural being 
and outline a new way of life under divine sanction.  Followers achieve similar 
satisfaction of dependency needs in the charismatic relationship.  Wallace employs the 
case of Handsome Lake (Ganiodaio), a chief in the League of the Iroquois, to illustrate 
this phenomenon.  Handsome Lake was born in 1735 at the Seneca village of 
Canawaugus, New York.  Because of the deaths of his wife and child around 1795, he 
became an alcoholic and was destitute, depressed, and near death.  Thus, in 1799, 
Handsome Lake was very sick at the age of 54.  On June 15, 1799, Handsome Lake 
experienced a series of visions.  Eight hours of his trance was mistaken for death, and 
preparations were made for his burial.  However, he came out of the trance and reported 
his visions to the people.  Deeply stirred by this series of visions, Handsome Lake 
reformed not only his own life, but also the lives of many other persons and eventually 
the whole Iroquois nation.  Wallace asserts that the historical origin of a great proportion 
of religious phenomena has been in revitalization movements in light of visions of a new 
way of life by persons under extreme stress.  As a consequence, Wallace argues that 
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religious revitalization movements play an important role in facilitating the conversion 
experiences of persons or groups within cultural contexts (pp. 149-165; see Rambo, 1993, 
pp. 23-24). 
In a similar vein, Eldridge Cleaver (1978) in Soul on Fire describes his own 
experiences of revitalization, which can be effective in mass movements of 
transformation.  Cleaver, as a leader of the Black Panthers Party, fled the United States 
and settled in France with his family.  After spending several expatriate years, Cleaver 
realized that he was no longer able to have an influence on the Black Power movement; 
that is, he was useless to the movement of political and social transformation.  In such a 
situation, Cleaver lost his way and began to think of putting an end by committing suicide.  
One evening, he was sitting alone on the balcony of his apartment with a pistol on his lap: 
I was brooding, downcast, at the end of my rope.  I looked up at the moon and 
saw certain shadows…and the shadows became a man in the moon, and I saw a 
profile of myself…I was already upset and this scared me.  When I saw that 
image, I started trembling.  It was a shaking that came from deep inside, and it 
had a threat about it that this mood was getting worse, that I could possibly 
disintegrate on the scene and fall apart.  As I stared at this image, it changed, and I 
saw my former heroes paraded before my eyes.  Here were Fidel Castro, Mao 
Tse-tung, Karl Marx, [and] Frederick Engels, passing in review, each one 
appearing for a moment of time, and then dropping out of sight, like fallen heroes.  
Finally, at the end of the procession, in dazzling, shimmering light, the image of 
Jesus Christ appeared.  That was the last straw.  I just crumbled and started crying.  
I fell to my knees, grabbing hold of the banister; and in the midst of this shaking 
and crying the Lord’s Prayer and the 23rd Psalm came into my mind. (p. 211) 
 
Cleaver’s story of conversion shows how cultural symbols affect the revitalization 
process.  Such powerful experiences during that night enabled Cleaver to participate in 
the process of renewal and transformation within a specific context.  Cleaver describes 
that in his vision, Jesus looked like the traditional portrait that hung in his grandmother’s 
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kitchen.  In this way, Cleaver’s experience can be a good example to illustrate the 
renewing power of imprinted cultural symbols.  Cleaver’s story of conversion 
demonstrates that cultural symbols had powerfully remained in his inner state, although 
he might have explicitly ignored or rejected them.  Cleaver’s childhood image of Jesus, 
inscribed in his inner world, re-emerged at a crucial time as a symbol of healing and 
transformation (see Rambo, pp. 24-26). 
In an extended view, Mary A. Reidhead and Van A. Reidhead (2003) in “From 
Jehovah’s Witness to Benedictine Nun: The Roles of Experience and Context in a Double 
Conversion” elucidate the link of the revitalization movement of persons with the change 
of particular cultural settings.  To illustrate this connection, Reidhead and Reidhead use 
the case of Sylvia (from the American Midwest), who engaged in a passage into 
Catholicism, and ultimately Catholic monasticism, from life as a pastor among Jehovah’s 
Witnesses.  They have interviewed Sylvia from 1997 and 2000.  Sylvia was born into the 
Jehovah’s Witness culture and enculturated within its identity, worldview, and 
cosmology.  She became a fulltime minister of Jehovah’s Witness.  Sylvia, as an active 
religious questor, yearned to be rewarded with an experience of God that would proclaim 
her worthiness and reward her fidelity.  However, she felt that God was absent from her 
life; finally, this caused her much suffering (a sense of “vague restlessness”).  One day, a 
Catholic coworker invited Sylvia to her daughter’s baptism, and she participated in this 
Catholic ritual performance.  At that time, she experienced an unexpected spiritual 
transformation within a different cultural setting.  In Sylvia’s own words: 
I walked into a Catholic Church, which was taboo for me.  I had no idea what 
Eucharistic presence was or meant.  I did not know who was behind the 
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tabernacle doors, but all of a sudden I could feel God.  To this day I describe 
myself being as one of those stainless steel milkshake containers, cold and empty, 
and then being filled up with warm, fuzzy hot chocolate with marshmallows, 
because I felt like I was being filled. (p. 185) 
 
After that sacred and world-shattering event, Sylvia abandoned her cultural and 
social milieus of Jehovah’s Witness and became a Catholic (Sylvia was baptized in April 
1994).  According to Reidhead and Reidhead, Catholicism opened new horizons and 
choices for Sylvia to express her gratitude to God, and her Jehovah’s Witness upbringing 
scripted that she should do more than just become Catholic.  Sylvia became a Benedictine 
nun of St. Hildegard monastery and received a new name, Sister Margaret, after 
canonical vows in order to construct Catholic cosmology and to make further a profound 
spiritual journey (“wanting to do more”) in a new cultural and religious context.  In that 
sense, Reidhead and Reidhead note, 
Catholic culture provided her [Sylvia] with the option of identifying a spiritual 
director to guide her in the synthesizing, interpretive, meaning-making process 
after baptism.  Her spiritual director took her to a Benedictine monastery to show 
her an alternative way to serve God.  Her yearning to “do more” perhaps primed 
her for another religious experience that would clear up the uncertainty about 
what she should do. (p. 195) 
 
Sylvia’s narrative of conversions (i.e., the first conversion from Jehovah’s 
Witness to Roman Catholicism, and the second to Benedictine monasticism) 
demonstrates how the revitalization movement of persons is deeply related to the change 
of particular cultural and religious settings.  In doing so, it shows how the cosmology, 
ideologies, beliefs, embodied symbols, and ritual practices of the Catholic church and the 
Benedictine monastery played a preeminent role in stimulating Sylvia’s movement of 
revitalization.  As a result, Reidhead and Reidhead state, “The [Catholic cultural and] 
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institutional structure—ancient ritual traditions, well-formulated theology, and local faith 
community of Catholicism—provided a stable environment with tools and support for 
Sylvia to use in reconstructing her worldview and her identity” (pp. 194-195). 
In sum, from the perspective of anthropology of religion, conversion has been 
regarded as a process of rationality (i.e., the intellectual challenge of the encounter of the 
macrocosm), a passage of acculturation, and a movement of revitalization.  On the whole, 
anthropologists have explored religious conversion in variety of cultural settings.  Thus, 
they have paid attention to the contextual matrix of conversion that occurs through long-
term relationships with persons or groups. 
Importantly, the anthropological studies of conversion have contributed by 
elaborating the influence of cultural and intellectual factors on the complex process of 
human transformation.  This means that in the emphasis on the context of acculturation or 
cultural revitalization of a community and of a person, they have contributed by showing 
the interplay of two levels of conversion—individual and communal.  More specifically, 
the anthropological interpretations of conversion have effectively articulated how the new 
convert has gradually undergone cultural and intellectual changes which are related to the 
reconstruction of his or her religious identity, worldview, and belief in the specific 
cultural context.  However, on the whole, these anthropological interpretations have not 
paid attention to the influence of psychological and religious factors on the process of 
religious conversion.  This implies that they are not sufficient to explore the link of the 
potential convert’s psychological distress and crisis with his or her (specific) personal and 
familial contexts.  Moreover, they are inadequate to articulate the role of the divine, the 
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sacred, or God in the process of religious conversion in light of the relation between 
divine intervention/grace and human transformation. 
 
IV. Theological Studies of Conversion: 
The Impact of Religious Factors 
 
The study of conversion has long been a fascinating topic in the field of theology, 
especially in the context of Christian theology and tradition.  Theologians have explored 
the impact of religious factors on the conversion experiences of persons or faith 
communities.  In doing so, they have primarily emphasized the dominant influence of 
God on the process of human transformation.  In “Conversion in Evangelistic Practice,” 
Eddie Gibbs (1992) describes the diverse understandings of conversion among the 
scholars of different schools in order to identify certain theological/religious principles 
for the study of conversion. 
1. Conversion represents a divine initiative as well as a human decision.  
2. Conversion represents a long-term process as well as a one-time decision.  
3. Conversion has corporate ramifications as well as an individual focus.  
4. Conversion has cultural ramifications as well as a theological basis.  
5. Conversion has a psychological as well as a spiritual dimension.  
6. Conversion often occurs in response to invitation or even persuasion but must 
     never be induced by manipulation. (pp. 277-285) 
 
Mindful of the complexity and diversity of conversion studies undertaken by 
theologians, this section of the literature review focuses on four main themes because 
they are valuable for appreciating the religious dimension of conversion as well as for 
achieving an integrated understanding of the lived experience of transformation.  These 
main themes are 1) conversion and the encounter with God; 2) conversion and the 
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Scriptures; 3) conversion and the ritual act of baptism; and 4) conversion and the 
reciprocity of the love of God and neighbor.17 
 
A. Conversion and the Encounter with God 
Theologians have examined the impact of an encounter with God on the 
conversion experience.  For example, in “Christian Conversion: Connecting Our Lives 
with God,” Manfred Marquardt (1998) argues that Christian conversion occurs through 
connection with the living God.  Marquardt describes conversion as an essential part of 
God’s saving work which involves the renewal of human beings as images of God.  For 
Marquardt, conversion is not simply human effort to change one’s life; it is a human 
response to an encounter with God’s grace as well as human participation in the 
transforming work of God.  In that sense, Marquardt states, 
Conversion is neither purely emotional nor simply a matter of human decision.  It 
is brought forth by and grounded in God’s liberating and empowering 
work…Conversion is always in response to God’s gracious initiative.  God’s 
prevenient and justifying grace, by enabling persons to respond freely to God’s 
love, evokes a process of restitution of their being as images of God, of their 
partnership and likeness with God as loving and free agents. (p. 101) 
 
Similarly, Paul Tillich (1952/2000, 1957, 1963, 1987) has demonstrated the 
correlation of the personal encounter and communion with “the Spiritual Presence” (i.e., 
                                                
17 I am deeply moved by 1) both Paul Tillich’s idea of the interplay of one’s disconnection, God’s 
grace, and one’s conversion (“You are accepted”) (1952/2000, 1957, 1963, 1987) and Gordon T. Smith’s 
concept of the efficacy of the transforming power of God’s grace in the process of human transformation 
(“a story of Grace”) (2001) for formulating the theme of conversion and encounter with God; 2) Beverly R. 
Gaventa’s emphasis on the transforming dimension of the conversion experience in the Bible (1986, 1992) 
for designing the theme of conversion and the Scriptures; 3) George E. Morris’s idea of the impact of the 
ritual performance on the spiritual transformation of new converts (1981) for organizing the theme of 
conversion and baptism; and 4) Karl Rahner’s view on the unity of turning to God and turning to others 
(1978) for establishing the theme of conversion and the reciprocity of love of God and neighbor. 
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God’s presence) in light of estrangement, grace, and conversion.  He explores how a state 
of estrangement can be transformed into a state of new being through God’s grace.  
Tillich views conversion as “a long process which has been going on unconsciously long 
before it breaks into consciousness, giving the impression of a sudden, unexpected, and 
overwhelming crisis” (1963, p. 219).  He defines estrangement as 1) unbelief (turning 
away from the ground of being, God), 2) hubris (turning toward oneself as the center of 
one’s self and one’s world), and 3) concupiscence (“concupiscentia”—the unlimited 
desire to draw the whole of reality in one’s self).  For Tillich, sin refers to the state of 
estrangement rather than pride.  Pride involves a moral quality (e.g., one’s exterior 
wrongdoing against God), the opposite of which is humility.  However, estrangement 
involves one’s disconnection or broken relationship with oneself, with others, and with 
the divine (1957, pp. 47-55).  This estrangement is related to human ontological anxiety 
(a sense of “nonbeing”), which threatens the self-affirmation of the person.  For Tillich, 
experiencing conversion means overcoming existential anxiety and promoting a 
relationship with the self, others, and God.  In Systematic Theology, Tillich (1963) 
describes “four principles determining the New Being as process” for fostering one’s 
spiritual transformation and maturity through the personal encounter and communion 
with the Spiritual Presence: 1) the principle of awareness, 2) the principle of freedom, 3) 
the principle of relatedness in the state of reconciliation of the self, and 4) the principle of 
self-transcendence in the direction of the Ultimate with participation in the holy (pp. 231-
236). 
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Tillich emphasizes the interplay of one’s disconnection, God’s grace, and one’s 
conversion in light of a change from the state of estrangement to the state of new being.  
He insists that during the encounter and communion with the Spiritual Presence, God’s 
grace enables the person to overcome a state of estrangement and to enter into a state of 
new being.  In that sense, Tillich focuses on one’s courage for accepting the transforming 
power of God’s grace.  He writes, 
[God’s] grace strikes us when we are in great pain and restlessness.  It strikes us 
when we walk through the dark valley of a meaningless and empty life.  It strikes 
us when we feel that our separation is deeper than usual, because we have 
violated another life, a life which we loved, or from which we were estranged.  It 
strikes us when our disgust for our own being, our indifference, our weakness, our 
hostility, and our lack of direction and composure have become intolerable to us. 
(1987, p. 201) 
  
 Tillich depicts God’s grace as a wave of light breaking into the darkness of 
persons, as if a voice were saying: 
You are accepted, accepted by that which greater than you, and the name of which 
you do not know.  Do not ask for the name now; perhaps you will find it later.  Do 
not try to do anything now; perhaps later you will do much.  Do not seek for 
anything; do not perform anything; do not intend anything.  Simply accept the fact 
that you are accepted!  If that happens to us, we experience grace. (p. 201) 
 
In a related vein, from a Jewish perspective, Abraham J. Heschel (1965) in Who is 
Man? pays attention to one’s connection with God in the process of becoming a whole 
being.  In doing so, Heschel explores the impact of divine intervention on the 
transformation of the person in light of “God’s commitment” to the human being.  
Heschel points out the sense of meaninglessness of the modern human being which 
involves the feeling of “the absence of being” or “the fear of non-being” (p. 51).  For 
Heschel, this sense of meaninglessness or absence of the person inherently occurs in his 
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or her turning away from God and turning toward his or her own world: “the tragedy of 
modern man is that he thinks alone.  He broods about his own affairs rather than thinking 
for all being.  He has moved out of the realm of God’s creation into the realm of man’s 
manipulation” (p. 76).  According to Heschel, in the context of human disconnection to 
the divine, God (who is the origin of “ultimate meaning of existence”) intervenes into the 
life of the person in order to recover and re-establish the relationship with the person.  
Within this divine intervention, the person enters into the process of turning toward God 
in which he or she experiences “a feeling of absolute dependence” upon the divine 
presence.  In consideration of God’s commitment to human life, Heschel emphasizes the 
continuous life of the transformation of the person: “whereas ontology asks about being 
as being, theology asks about being as creation, about being as a divine act.  From the 
perspective of continuous creation, there is no being as being; there is only continuous 
coming-into-being.  Being is both action and event” (p. 71).  Consequently, Heschel 
states, 
God takes man seriously.  He enters a direct relationship with man, namely, a 
covenant, to which not only man but also God is committed.  In his ultimate 
confrontation and crises the biblical man knows not only God’s eternal mercy and 
justice but also God’s commitment to man.  Upon this sublime fact rests the 
meaning of history and the glory of human destiny.  Essential to biblical religion 
is the awareness of God’s interest in man, the awareness of a covenant, of a 
responsibility that lies on Him as well as on us…Life [of transformation] is a 
partnership of God and man; God is not detached from or indifferent to our joys 
and griefs…God is a partner and a partisan in man’s struggle for justice, peace, 
love, and beauty, and it is because of His being in need of man that He entered a 
covenant with him for all time, a mutual bond embracing God and man, a 
relationship to which God, not alone man, is committed. (pp. 74-75)18 
                                                
18 In the same way, Janet Aviad (1983) in Return to Judaism: Religious Renewal in Israel explores 
the religious factor—one’s experience of the “sacred” or “totally other”—in the process of the conversion 
of secular Jews to Orthodox Judaism, while acknowledging the social and institutional factor in the process 
of religious change.  According to Aviad, the term teshuvah refers to “‘turning’ whereby the relationship of 
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the individual Jew (as well as that of the group) with God is restored” (p. 13).  In that sense, this teshuvah 
involves “the process of repentance for transgressions and return to the correct observance of Jewish ethical 
and ritual law” which is a central category in Judaism (p. ix).  Jews who have converted to Orthodox 
Judaism from a secular background are considered baalei teshuvah in Hebrew, “those who return” (p. ix).  
Importantly, Aviad contends that the teshuvah process is inherently accompanied with religious experience 
in which new converts—baalei teshuvah—“have  used the words ‘sacred’ or ‘totally other’ in referring to 
something that pulled them, lured them, and demanded something of them” (p. 81).  For Aviad, many 
converts (who were interviewed into the survey of religious conversion) depicted their “overwhelming 
sense of the sacred that seemed to press in upon them, a sort of oceanic consciousness they linked with 
God” (p. 82).  For example, “I experienced the reality of a spiritual experience.  I am not a superstitious 
type but I reached the finer celestial levels where there was a clarity of perception which was both dramatic 
and overwhelming” (p. 81); “It was a good feeling of getting close to truth, close to God, which brought me 
great happiness” (p. 84); “It is a sense of elevation difficult to describe.  The happiness which comes with 
the removal of all doubts” (p. 84). 
In a related vein, from an Islamic perspective, J. Dudley Woodberry (1992) in “Conversion in 
Islam” examines the link of divine guidance (huda) with actual Islamizing process in terms of conversion 
to the Muslim faith.  In other words, Woodberry pays attention to the divine involvement in the religious 
change of the person (or the group); “humans cannot save themselves but need a divine involvement” (p. 
27).  According to Woodberry, conversion to the Muslim faith involves the process of “repentance (tawba), 
faith (iman), submission (islam), and their vocal confession (shahada)” (p. 34; see pp. 26-35).  More 
specifically, Woodberry writes, “Conversion in Islam can be an individual or a group act that involves 
knowledge, right intention, repentance, faith, and submission to God, witnessed to by verbal confession in 
God and his Apostle and by righteous deeds; but forgiveness is contingent upon the will of God” (p. 40). 
Meanwhile, Paul G. Hiebert (1992) in “Conversion in Hinduism and Buddhism” deals with the 
divine role in the conversion experiences of Hindus and Buddhists (especially Mahayana Buddhists), 
although Hinduism and Buddhism tend to emphasize less the divine intervention in the process of human 
change than Judaism, Christianity, or Islam.  According to Hiebert, the term conversion refers to “both 
personal and communal changes, and to changes both in beliefs and behavior, and in community 
affiliation” (p. 9).  Hiebert views Hinduism as a diverse religion: “Hinduism is not a fixed set of beliefs—a 
doctrinal creed.  In it are found dogmas ranging from materialistic atheism, pantheism, and polytheism, to 
monotheism and abstract monism” (p. 10).  Aware of the diversity of Hinduism, Hiebert insists that Hindu 
conversion involves “an evolutionary progression of beliefs that lead a person to self-realization” (p. 10); 
namely, “progressive enlightenment in which the ignorance and desire that keep us trapped in our human 
dilemma are expelled” (p. 11).  Hiebert contends that there are commonly three types of roads to salvation 
(moksha) which all of them lead to same place of enlightenment in light of conversion to Hindu faith or 
worldview: “The first is karma margas, or paths of duty…Conversion here is to begin performing the 
rituals prescribed by Hinduism for one’s status in society and one’s stage in life”; “the second is bhakti 
margas, or paths of devotion.  This offers immediate, unconditional salvation to those who throw 
themselves on the mercy of God”; “the third path to enlightenment is jnana marga, or way of 
wisdom…Conversion [here] is to enter a life of strict physical and mental discipline (yoga) [which is 
related to]…the direct inner experience of that oneness with the universe and God” (pp. 11-12). 
On the other hand, for Hiebert, there are various types of Buddhism (e.g., Theravada, Mahayana, 
and Tibetan Buddhism) in which each has different beliefs or dharma about the path to salvation and the 
nature of conversion in light of conversion to the Buddhist belief or living.  According to Hiebert, “the 
basic beliefs of Theravada [Buddhism] are that suffering and sorrow are inherent in life; that they can only 
be eliminated by giving up ‘desire,’ ‘ambition,’ or ‘craving’ (tanha)…and that we can achieve this by 
following the Middle Way of right understanding, resolve, speech, conduct, livelihood, effort, recollection, 
and meditation.  Salvation is not ‘from above,’ but ‘from below,’ and ‘from within’” (p. 16).  In that sense, 
in Theravada Buddhism (the “Lesser Vehicle”), the path to salvation or enlightenment is personal.  This 
implies that for Theravada Buddhists, conversion is “a process of self-discipline in a monastic community” 
in which a few people (especially the elite group) have radically struggled to achieve personal salvation 
through self-effort (jiriki) in the contest of the renunciation of the world (pp. 16-17).  For Hiebert, whereas 
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In a similar way, Emilie Griffin (1980) in Turning: Reflections on the Experience 
of Conversion deals with the link of the experience of the power of God’s grace with the 
conversion process.  For Griffin, conversion begins with a restlessness of the human heart 
which can find no resting place on earth.  In that sense, Griffin considers conversion as a 
process of “turning” which one engages in an inner change and peace in oneself.  Griffin 
insists that Christian conversion involves a “turning over of one’s life and energies to 
God”; it is a continuing revelation and a transforming force (p. 15; see Dubay, 2006, pp. 
13-14, 21).  As such, Christian conversion is a matter of becoming open to God’s 
overflowing and powerful love in light of the intrusion of God’s grace into the day-to-day 
experience of the person.  Griffin employs her own case of Christian conversion to 
illustrate this phenomenon: 
When I first began to experience the power of God in my own life, I could hardly 
believe it.  Something very real and discernible was happening to me, yet I felt it 
could not or should not be happening.  God was speaking to me; God was calling 
me… [God] spoke no louder than a whisper, but I heard [God’s voice].  And each 
time that I heard [God’s voice], and [accepted God’s intervention], a change 
occurred, the opening of a door I had not guessed was there.  Each step, each 
crossing of a doorway was made with great uncertainty, my doubts mingling with 
my faith.  But with each step, my strength and my conviction grew; I felt myself 
                                                                                                                                            
Theravada Buddhism denied that the Buddha was a god, Mahayana Buddhism (the “Great Vehicle”) 
deified him and added a great many lesser gods: “In time this belief in the Buddha as a god led to the belief 
that people can receive merit from the Buddha and the many bodhisattvas (lesser Buddhas who choose to 
remain on earth to save others rather than to enter nirvana)” (p. 17).  Indeed, Mahayana Buddhists have 
worshipped the Buddha—the Ultimate, the One Supreme Reality—in order to attain salvation and to 
engage in the process of buddhahood.  This Mahayana Buddhism widely spread the Chinese (ordinary) 
people with their belief in spirits and gods, and, through them, the Koreans and Japanese.  For Hiebert, 
conversion in Tibetan Buddhism involves a broad road as well as a narrow path (because the deeper 
teachings are beyond the capacity of the ordinary people).  Hiebert contends that for Tibetan Buddhists, 
conversion is “to venerate the monks and nuns, to worship the many gods, goddesses, spirits, ferocious 
demons, personified natural forces, and saints.  It is to use powerful magical chants, diagrams, and hand 
positions to control supernatural beings for personal ends” (p. 19).  As a result, Hiebert asserts that 
Hinduism and Buddhism have religious goals, namely release from the karmic cycles of rebirth, although 
their paths of religious change or enlightenment are different and unique.  He concludes, “In both religions, 
conversion is a process, a series of steps involving changes in belief and practice.  In both it is also a social 
matter, an entry into (or rejection of) a religious social order” (p. 21). 
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on sounder ground.  Something was happening in my life, which I could 
recognize but which I could not yet name.  It was conversion. (p. 15) 
 
For Griffin, Christian conversion is not a “once and for all event,” but a process of 
turning in which one experiences the saving power of God’s grace.  This implies that the 
experience of transformation is “ever-present in the Christian life.”  This Christian life of 
the convert occurs in the encounter with God, which can be powerful and changing for 
the person over a long lifetime (p. 24; see Gaventa, 1986, p. 151; Hindsley, 1997, p. 31; 
Lacan, 1978, pp. 79-90, 118; Peace, 1999, p. 85; Witherup, 1994, pp. 107-110). 
Similarly, Thomas C. Oden (1993) explores the impact of the transforming power 
of God’s grace on the spiritual transformation of the person.  Oden argues that God’s 
grace is the sole basis for both one’s new life and spiritual vitality.  This grace is “God’s 
way of empowering the bound will and healing the suffering spirit” (p. 15).  He notes, 
Grace is the favor shown by God to sinners.  It is the divine goodwill offered to 
those who neither inherently deserve nor can ever hope to earn it.  It is the divine 
disposition to work in our hearts, wills, and actions, so as actively to communicate 
God’s self-giving love for humanity (Rom. 3:24; 6:1; Eph. 1:7; 2:5-8). (p. 33) 
 
As recent scholars of conversion, Gordon T. Smith (2001), William J. Abraham 
(2001), and Barry L. Callen (2001) agree with that the consideration of one’s encounter 
with God is essential for a more appropriate understanding of Christian conversion.  In 
Beginning Well: Christian Conversion & Authentic Transformation, Smith (2001) 
demonstrates that conversion is essentially centered in an encounter with the living God.  
Smith views conversion as “the human response to the saving work of God through 
Christ” in which one enters into a redemptive relationship with God in terms of the unity 
of God’s salvation (p. 16).  Smith emphasizes “the priority of God’s initiative and the 
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unilateral character of God’s salvation” in the conversion experience of persons.  In that 
sense, each Christian conversion represents “a story of God’s grace” (p. 17).  For Smith, 
the conversion experience enables the person not merely to expedite a release from sinful 
predicament—guilt, bondage and alienation; it enables the person to experience spiritual 
transformation.  Smith states, “The goal of our conversion is a transformed humanity.  
We seek to be what we were created to be—fully human, transformed into the image of 
Jesus Christ.  Through conversion, the Spirit of Christ enables us to be like himself that 
we might be fully ourselves.  Christ is the head of a new humanity, true humanity infused 
with divine grace; and it is this humanity, with Christ as its head, for which we long.  
When we identify with Christ and live in gracious union with him, we become all we 
were created to be” (p. 26). 
In a related vein, Abraham (2001) in “The Epistemology of Conversion: Is There 
Something New?” explores the impact of divine action on the conversion experience.  
Abraham describes Christian conversion as “not simply some emotional exercise or 
event” but a “turning in repentance and faith to the God of Jesus Christ announced in the 
gospel” (p. 184).  Abraham asserts that “to be born again, to receive the witness of the 
Holy Spirit, to be justified, to be sanctified, and the like,” is to be subject to divine action 
in light of the experience of God’s transforming power.  This divine action is directed to 
the change and healing of the human condition.  It involves divine salvation brought 
about by the Holy Spirit which relates to matter of coming to know the truth about 
oneself and about God (p. 184). 
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Like Abraham, Callen (2001) in “A Mutuality Model of Conversion” pays 
attention to the connection between the grace of God and the experience of conversion.  
Callen writes, “Christian conversion is both a freedom-from and a freedom-to reality.  It 
is justification, the forgiveness of sin, the freedom-from-guilt release that God does for 
us; it also is spiritual rebirth, an inward renewal and freedom-to-life that God does in us” 
(p. 148).  According to Callen, the Bible reveals a God who is voluntarily open to 
suffering (Gen 6:6) and demonstrates the divine Self as loving grace.  Here, Christian 
conversion is acknowledged to be rooted in a context in which God judges human sin and 
provides God’s grace despite sin (p. 145).  Callen asserts that God’s grace, as a 
transforming power of God in human life, leads the person to move away from self-
deification and into grateful cooperation with the redeeming work of God’s Spirit; that is, 
God’s grace enables believers to experience “decisive renewal in the Spirit (conversion) 
and persistent maturation of this renewal (sanctification)” (pp. 154-158). 
 
B. Conversion and the Scriptures 
Theologians and biblical scholars have elucidated the correlation between the 
Scriptures and the conversion experience of the person or the faith community.  In doing 
so, they have studied the Bible to discover the meaning, motif, and the pattern of 
conversion experience among the diverse scriptural approaches.  For example, George E. 
Morris (1981) explores the meaning of Christian conversion from a biblical perspective. 
According to Morris, Christian understanding of conversion derives mainly from three 
biblical words: the Old Testament Hebrew word shubh, and the New Testament Greek 
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words epistrephein and metanoein.  The word shubh means “to return” or “turn back” 
which appears over one thousand times in the Old Testament.  Shubh is not merely 
turning from one thing to another or from one direction to another.  Rather, it must be 
understood in a covenantal context: conversion means “turning back” to God and the 
covenant previously established between God and Israel.  The Greek word epistrephein 
means “to turn” or “turn around”; it denotes movements, turnings, or changes of place in 
both the transitive and the intransitive senses.  The Greek word metanoein refers to 
“repent” or “change one’s mind” (pp. 32-35; see Barclay, 1975, pp. 21-25; Conn, 2005, 
pp. 214-215; Finn, 1997, pp. 21-30; Gaiser, 1992, pp. 93-94; Johnson and Malony, 1982, 
pp. 77-80; Kasdorf, 1980, pp. 41-53; Peace, 1999, pp. 346-353; Tillich, 1963, p. 219; 
Wells, 1989, pp. 30-33).  Morris summarizes the meanings of biblical conversion: 
1. Biblical conversion signifies a turning from sin and a turning to 
God…2…Biblical conversion is a fundamental reorientation of the whole person, 
a reorientation which requires concrete obedience…3. This reorientation is both 
personal and communal, and not one without the other.  The personal and social 
sides of turning to God must be held together…4. Biblical conversion is not 
viewed as a single act but a lifelong process, a participation in a historic 
movement.  It has a past, present, and future focus…5. From beginning to end 
biblical conversion is response to the initiative of God.  It is an act of the human 
being which is possible only because of a previous act of God. (p. 37) 
 
In a similar way, Ronald D. Witherup (1994) in Conversion in the New Testament 
examines how the Bible depicts the conversion experiences of persons.  According to 
Witherup, both the Hebrew shub and the Greek epistrepho basically refer to “to turn, 
return, or turn back” (p. 19).  In that sense, the basic meaning of conversion is “turning” 
in the Old and New Testament: 
As in the OT, the root idea is clearly a turning.  There is always movement in 
conversion.  There is no room for the status quo, for lack of change.  Conversion 
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always involves a turning, whether a turning from something or someone or to 
something or someone…The general NT sense of conversion is turning 
(epistrepho).  It involves turning away from sin, evil, or godlessness and turning 
toward God, Jesus, and a righteous life. (p. 21) 
 
Witherup characterizes Christian conversion in the New Testament as follows: 1) 
Christian conversion occurs through an act of God; 2) in keeping with all of God’s 
activity, conversion entails an element of mystery which is related to an intensely spiritual 
experience (beyond rational explanation); 3) because of its complexity, conversion is 
related to a variety of other biblical themes—sin, forgiveness, repentance, salvation, 
justification, baptism, faith, and the Holy Spirit.  The total picture of conversion is 
reflected in the larger process of sanctification and salvation of God’s people; 4) the root 
notion of conversion in the Bible is change, which involves turning from sin, death, and 
darkness to grace, new life, and light; 5) conversion is directly related to the revelation of 
the kingdom of God.  As such, it is an eschatological reality, a foretaste of the new life 
which is to come; 6) as a christological reality, conversion is incorporation into the body 
of Christ and an intimate personal knowledge of Jesus Christ as Risen Lord and Savior; 
7) the conversion experience is relational—it brings one into new relationships with God 
and with other human beings; 8) the message of conversion is both externally directed for 
bringing new people into the church community (evangelization) and internally directed 
to those who are already members of this community; 9) most conversions appear to be a 
process on some line of continuum, although some conversions are dramatic and single 
events which profoundly change a person’s direction in life; 10) as soil needs to be 
fertilized and watered for plants to be fruitful, persons who seek ongoing conversion in 
life need to be prepared for God’s grace; 11) ongoing Christian conversion leads one to 
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an experience of newness in which one engages in the continual revitalization of faith; 
12) conversion is the holistic action of God’s love which sanctifies the whole person—
the mind, the body, the heart, and the spirit; 13) authentic Christian conversion involves 
both attitudinal and behavioral changes in life—it is not separate from concrete actions 
which mirror the changed internal reality; 14) conversion is accompanied by concrete 
symbolic gestures (e.g., a cleaning water ritual) which symbolizes the change; and 15) 
because conversion is so often a profound existential change in life, it is natural for God’s 
people to have the urge to spread the “good news”—“to give testimony to others and 
consequently to evangelize” (pp. 107-110). 
In a related vein, Beverly R. Gaventa (1986, 1992) shows how the Bible variously 
describes the form of conversion experiences.  Gaventa suggests that there are at least 
three types of conversion (“personal change”) in the Bible: 1) Alternation is change that 
grows from an individual’s past behavior in light of the logical consequence of previous 
choices.  2) Pendulum-like conversion is a radical change that involves rejecting past 
convictions and affiliations in order to affirm new commitments and a new identity.  3) 
Transformation is also a radical change in which the past is not rejected but reinterpreted 
and reconstructed as part of a new understanding of God and the world; this 
transformation is the dominant understanding of conversion both in the Hebrew 
Scriptures and in the New Testament (1986, pp. 10-12; 1992, pp. 41-43, 53-54).  For 
Gaventa, the common denominator in all three categories of conversion is change that is 
opposed to maintaining the status quo.  In that sense, Christian conversion always 
involves movement from one dimension to another.  Gaventa uses the story of the 
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Ethiopian eunuch (Acts 8:26-39) as an example of alternation.  She points out “the 
imaginary of birth from above and new life found in the Gospel of John” as an example 
of pendulum-like conversion.  Gaventa employs Paul’s own self-description in his letters 
(e.g., Rom. 9:1-5; Gal. 1:11-12) as evidence of transformation.  Gaventa concludes that 
all of these cases demonstrate the nature of Christian conversion—the dramatic change—
which God’s power has acted in the lives of God’s people (1986, pp. 148-149; 1992, pp. 
53-54; see Witherup, 1994, pp. 5-6). 
Similar to Gaventa, Frederick J. Gaiser (1992) in “A Biblical Theology of 
Conversion” emphasizes the transforming dimension of the conversion experience in the 
Bible.  Gaiser views conversion as “life transformation” which is closely related to “a call 
to return, promising a restoration of the original intimate relationship between God and 
humanity experienced in creation” (p. 107).  For Gaiser, God’s transformation of all 
things—the heavens and the earth, humans and all creatures—is at the core of biblical 
theology.  This transforming work of God provides the framework for understanding 
biblical conversion.  The theological context of biblical conversion is rooted in God’s 
involvement in the world as creator, redeemer, as well as convicting and guiding Spirit.  
As a consequence, Gaiser writes, 
Studies show that this structure of transformation permeates the entire Old 
Testament.  Nor is it left behind in the movement to the New Testament—the title 
of which is a Christian confession that the decisive transformation or conversion 
of the world has taken place.  Jesus’ parables expound the decisive move from old 
to new.  The Johannine literature represents the work of Christ as bringing “new 
birth,” as a passing from death to life and from darkness to light.  The concept of 
a radical transformation effected by the revelation of God in Christ is the 
foundation of Pauline theology.  From the beginning of the biblical literature to 
the end it provides the theological norm and center by which the traditional 
accounts of conversion are measured and understood. (p. 95) 
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From an extended view, Gordon T. Smith (2001) shows how the New Testament 
describes human change and transformation related to the mercy and goodness of God.  
After reviewing the conversion stories of the Synoptic Gospels (i.e., Matthew, Mark, and 
Luke), Smith states, 
In the Synoptic Gospels conversion comes in response to an encounter with Jesus 
Christ…that is characterized by belief and repentance…We can follow Christ 
only when we turn from ourselves and from all that might keep us from a full and 
radical commitment to him…When we turn to Christ, we enter his “kingdom,” 
which means that we come under his reign or authority (Mk 1: 14-15).  Further, 
conversion includes accepting the call of God to serve him—to participate in his 
kingdom purposes.  And when we come to Christ we come “home.”  We find joy 
and rest for our souls, as though we were lost children being received once more 
into the arms of a father.  Finally, this act of coming to Christ is marked by 
baptism, which in some significant way symbolizes all of these components or 
conversion. (pp. 112-113) 
 
 Smith delves into four different models of conversion in the New Testament (i.e., 
the Synoptic Gospels, the book of Acts, the letters of Paul, and the Gospel of John).19  
Smith discovers that the New Testament calls for and assumes a conversion to Jesus 
Christ in terms of a human response to an encounter with Jesus Christ.  From a critical 
and integrative view of four models, Smith concludes that Christian conversion in the 
New Testament includes seven distinct but inseparable elements: 1) belief in Jesus Christ, 
2) repentance, 3) trust in Christ Jesus, 4) transfer of allegiance, 5) baptism, 6) reception 
of the gift of the Spirit, and 7) incorporation into congregational life (p. 125). 
                                                
19 For Smith, conversion in the Synoptic Gospels includes the following elements: repentance and 
belief in Jesus, renunciation, call to service, joy and consolation, and water baptism.  Conversion in Acts 
includes the following components: belief and repentance, baptism and the forgiveness of sins, reception of 
the gift of the Holy Spirit, and incorporation into congregational life.  Conversion in the Pauline Epistles 
consists of the following elements: identification with Christ, a transfer of allegiance, water baptism, faith, 
reception of the promised Holy Spirit, and incorporation into the family of God.  Conversion in the Gospel 
of John composes of the following elements: belief in Jesus, reception of new life “from above,” and born 
of the Spirit and of water (2001, pp. 108-124). 
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From a narrow and extended view, some scholars have intensively studied 
specific book(s) in the New Testament in order to establish a pattern or paradigm of 
biblical conversion.  In Conversion in the New Testament: Paul and the Twelve, Richard 
V. Peace (1999) examines the New Testament’s portrayal of conversion by illustrating 
the conversion experiences of Paul in Acts and Jesus’ disciples in Gospel of Mark.  Peace 
suggests a core pattern of Paul’s conversion which includes a three-part movement of 
insight, turning, and transformation: 
First, there was insight…[Paul] saw that in persecuting the Christian church he 
had been persecuting Jesus...In other words, Paul discovered that he was not 
working for God…but against God.  This is the personal context within which 
Paul was converted.  Second, there was the turning.  This also had two parts: a 
turning from and a turning to.  He turned from persecuting the church to joining 
the church.  He turned from opposing Jesus to following Jesus.  Third, there was 
the transformation that flowed from Paul’s response to Jesus.  Paul’s life is 
changed.  His first response is to be baptized, to align himself with the church, 
and to preach the good news about Jesus.  He also accepts his commission to be a 
witness of who Jesus is to all people.  He is, in other words, transformed from a 
zealous Pharisee into a zealous apostle.  Henceforth his life takes a radically new 
direction. (pp. 25-26) 
 
Peace uses this pattern of Paul’s conversion as the guiding criteria for analyzing 
the conversion experience of the Twelve as found in Mark, though he also contrasts 
Paul’s conversion as a dramatic/sudden change with the Twelve’s conversion as a 
nurtured/gradual change.20  Moreover, Peace hopes that this pattern will be a normative 
one in order to better understand Christian conversion experiences: 
                                                
20 Peace (1999) contends that there are two types of conversion in the New Testament: sudden and 
gradual.  For Peace, St. Paul’s conversion on the Damascus Road was sudden and dramatic event through 
which he realized Jesus as the Son of God, joined the Christian Community, and accepted new commission 
to bear the good news of Jesus to the nations (pp. 37-101).  On the other hand, the experience of the twelve 
disciples in Mark was gradual conversion in which they involved the ongoing process of response, faith, 
repentance, and discipleship for a long period of time.  That means, Jesus’ disciples realized that Jesus was 
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[Christian conversion] involves new insight into God, new turning toward God, 
and a new life lived in response to God.  It involves seeing oneself in the light of 
God’s truth, embracing a new relationship to God, and living this out within the 
community of God’s people as a servant and witness to all people. (p. 101) 
 
Similarly, in The Paradigm of Conversion in Luke, Fernando Mendez-Moratalla 
(2004) establishes a consistent and systemic account of conversion in the Gospel of Luke.  
Mendez-Moratalla insists that conversion is a major theme in Luke’s theological 
enterprise which emphasizes the work of God’s salvation.  In that sense, he studies 
different yet interrelated conversion narratives in Luke: conversion in the preaching of 
John the Baptist (Lk. 3:1-17), the conversion of Levi (5:27-32), the conversion of a 
woman of the city, a parable of conversion—the lost son (15:11-32),  the conversion of 
Zacchaueus (19:1-10), the conversion of the criminal (23:39-43), and the non-conversion 
of a ruler (18:18-30).  After analyzing these conversion stories in the Third Gospel, 
Mendez-Moratalla proposes a Lukan paradigm showing conversion as the result of (1) 
divine initiative (2) involving conflict, because (3) it is offered to sinners, (4) as involving 
repentance, (5) proper use of wealth/possessions, (6) forgiveness, (7) table-fellowship 
and joy, (8) role reversal, (9) a climactic pronouncement, and (10) Christological 
emphasis—the activity of Jesus as savior (pp. 216-222). 
 
C. Conversion and the Ritual Act of Baptism 
Scholars have examined the interconnection between baptism and conversion.  
For example, William Barclay (1975) in Turning to God: A Study of Conversion in the 
                                                                                                                                            
not just a great teacher, but the Messiah; they gradually accepted Jesus as Son of God; they finally 
participated in God’s mission for the world (pp. 157-281). 
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Book of Acts and Today elucidates the link of baptism with the conversion experience of 
the person within the early Church community.  Barclay views conversion as “a turning 
from something and a turning towards something” (p. 26).  For Barclay, the early Church 
usually demanded the new convert to be baptized through the public ritual practice.  
Barclay writes, 
Baptism was a perfectly deliberate publicizing of a far-reaching act of decision.  It 
was a deliberate action in which a man [or woman] left one religion to enter 
another, in which he [or she] said farewell to one way of life and committed 
himself [or herself] to another.  Baptism was something which marked a clean cut 
and a definite dividing-line in life.  It was the public confession of a radical 
change which a man [or woman] had deliberately chosen and to which he [or she] 
pledged himself [or herself]. (p. 51) 
 
Barclay asserts that baptism is a gift of the Holy Spirit for the new convert.  This 
baptism is consistently connected with repentance through which one experiences the 
forgiveness of sins; namely, the sacrament of baptism leads the convert to experience the 
physical and spiritual cleaning or freedom from his or her sinful conditions (pp. 51-52).21 
Influenced by Barclay, George E. Morris (1981) in The Mystery and Meaning of 
Christian Conversion probes the role of Christian baptism in the conversion process 
within the Christian community.  Morris views Christian baptism as “a kind of seal or 
symbol of the new relationship with God which comes as a gift of the Holy Spirit and 
                                                
21 From a Jewish perspective, Aharon Lichtenstein (1988) in “On Conversion” explores the 
correlation between the ritual act and conversion.  For Lichtenstein, the potential convert to Judaism 
requires to participate in the ritual procedure in the Jewish community as well as to confess the personal 
experience of God.  More specifically, there are two levels of assessment for conversion to Judaism: 1) the 
first, and most direct, is the ritual and behavioral dimension of conversion.  This means that the candidate 
needs to fulfill the ritual requirements for conversion in the context of a Jewish tradition.  At the same time, 
the candidate needs to show the evidence of male circumcision, to be present at the rabbinical court, and to 
obey the Torah; 2) the second dimension is more related to personal faith of God.  The candidate needs to 
enter into a profound spiritual quest for God.  After completing successfully the assessment, the candidate 
participates in the ritual performance for conversion to Judaism, at which point the new convert dedicates 
oneself to God and becomes a community member of Jewish faith—“The ger is born both as a servant of 
God and as a citizen of the nation [Keneset Yisrael]” (p. 8; see Rambo, 1993, pp. 159-160). 
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through which one is initiated into the fellowship of the church” (p. 6).  Morris employs 
his own case of baptism in order to illustrate an intimate connection between the 
liturgical act and the spiritual transformation of the person in light of Christian 
pilgrimage.  Morris was baptized by Rev. Herndon Shepherd of a United Methodist 
church in the southwestern mountains of Virginia, when he was in high school.  That 
means, during the sacrament of baptism, he was immersed in a small river in the hills of 
Southern Appalachia, since immersion was the most popular mode practiced in that area.  
Morris experienced something unusual that happened in the process of his baptism: 
This [baptism] was a great experience for me, and it did in fact signal the 
beginning of a new life and a new relationship.  On that same Sunday I was 
received into the membership of the church…There was a basic change of 
attitude; that is, I wanted to love people.  There were also concrete acts of 
compassion and witness.  I remember telling my mother that I was both surprised 
and somewhat confused by this new and mysterious compassion that made me 
want to reach out to people…No one had to force me to pray, study scripture, and 
attend church.  I wanted to!  In only a short time I had read the entire New 
Testament.  Though I often found the readings terribly confusing, nevertheless, at 
times glimmers came through and I learned to expect God’s divine disclosure 
through the scriptures.  My participation in the local church helped me understand 
that I was more than a solitary individual interested only in my own well-being 
that I could contribute to the well-being and enrichment of others. (p. 6) 
 
Morris characterizes Christian baptism presented in the New Testament:  
Christian baptism is the mark of incorporation within the Body of Christ—“by one Spirit 
we were all baptized into one Body.”  It is the mark of purification, cleansing from the 
old sins, and justification in the name of the Lord Jesus.  Baptism is the mark of the new 
covenant; it is initiation into the realm of the Spirit.  Moreover, it means a close union 
with Christ that the believer is a participant in His death and resurrection (p. 139).  In 
particular, Morris contends that infant baptism is valid for those who are born to 
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Christian homes and nurtured in the Christian community.  He states, “Infant baptism is a 
symbol of justification by faith.  It symbolizes the fact that faith is a response to God’s 
saving activity.  It is a powerful recognition that God has accepted us even when we are 
weak, helpless infants” (p. 140).  As a consequence, Morris affirms that Christian baptism, 
whether infant, youth, or adult, occurs through God’s initiative action; it is indispensable 
to the spiritual transformation of the person within the Christian community, in which the 
convert engages in new relationships with others and shares a common life and ministry. 
Similar to Morris, Cedric B. Johnson and H. Newton Malony (1982) explores the 
influence of baptism on one’s conversion process.  According to Johnson and Malony, 
the early Church community expected the new convert to enter into the Christian life of 
repentance, faith, baptism, and fellowship.  In the early Church, repentance (“metanoia”) 
was the first demand made of a potential convert, who involved a profound change, 
especially a turning from sin.  Faith was the second demand of a potential convert, who 
involved a turning or surrender to God.  In the life of faith, the convert engages in a total 
commitment to the will of God.  In the early Church, baptism by immersion in water was 
the third response demanded from the convert (Acts 8:38-39).  Through the sacrament of 
baptism, the person united to Jesus Christ by faith and became part of His body 
(“spiritual union”)—“For in the one Spirit we were all baptized into one body” (1 Cor 
12:13a).  This water baptism was only a part of the person’s conversion in that it pointed 
to a faith and repentance that had already occurred.  Moreover, baptism was a visible 
means that the convert identified with the body of believers, the church—that is, 
Christian baptism enabled the person both to overcome radical individualism and to 
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incorporate into Christian fellowship (pp. 80-85; see Markham, 2007, pp. 196-197; 
Nissiotis, 1967, p. 264; Wells, 1989, pp. 44-46; Witherup, 1994, p. 59). 
Likewise, Thomas M. Finn (1997) in From Death to Rebirth: Ritual and 
Conversion in Antiquity articulates the link of Christian baptism with one’s conversion 
process.  Finn considers conversion as a change or transformation which depends on the 
intersection between the divine and the human.  That is, conversion involves a change in 
the way one (1) understands and values God and God’s world, (2) lives in it according to 
God’s will, and (3) experiences repentance, return, and reconciliation in the process (pp. 
240, 253).  According to Finn, the earliest Christian baptism was performed “in the name 
of Jesus (Christ).”  The earliest Christians, especially Paul and his heirs, developed a 
telling way of expressing the relationship between death, resurrection, and baptism.  Finn 
argues that conversion is embedded in a complex and richly articulated ritual process of 
baptism.  The new life of the convert can be symbolized by the baptismal rite: 
“Conversion is seeing; seeing is the result of baptism; baptism is enlightenment” (p. 256).  
Christian baptism is a passage from death to life which could be portrayed in the image of 
the baptismal font as tomb.  The baptizand is buried in the baptismal water just as Christ 
was buried in the tomb; then is raised from the water, as Christ was risen from the tomb. 
That is, through the ritual act of baptism, the person engages in the life of rebirth and 
transformation (pp. 255-257; see Hudson, 1992, pp. 117-119; Rambo, 1993, pp. 113-118, 
127-132). 
Donald L. Gelpi (1976, 1998), as a Catholic theologian, has probed the impact of 
baptism in Christianity on the conversion experience.  Gelpi regards Christian conversion 
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as an “initial transition from unbelief to belief, from sin to the obedience of faith” (1998, 
p. 101).  Gelpi insists that the ritual act of baptism “seals” the faith of the convert in the 
twofold sense: (1) it is a public certification that the baptized person “belongs to God” 
and that he or she has nothing to fear on the last day; (2) it is a public and official sign of 
the new covenant between God and the convert (1976, p. 132).  For Gelpi, the blessing of 
the baptismal water recalls a series of water images from the Bible in order to illumine 
the meaning of the ritual within the faith community: 
The waters of creation recall that Jesus begins the new creation and that the gift of 
the Breath re-creates those who believe in him.  The waters of the flood and the 
waters of the Exodus call attention to the saving effects of baptism: it purifies 
from sin; it effects a new liberation by sealing and completing the conversion of 
the candidates; and it, like the first Exodus, seals the new covenant between them 
and God.  The waters of the Jordan remind the community that Christian baptism 
draws one into Jesus’ own baptismal experience and messianic commissioning.  
The water from the side of the crucified Christ teaches that both the passion and 
the resurrection mediate the gift of the baptismal Breath.  Finally, the command of 
the risen Christ to baptize all nations reaffirms the apostolic mission of the church, 
which the rite of baptism prolongs. (1998, p. 149) 
 
Similar to Gelpi, Peter Toon (1987) delves into the connection with Christian 
baptism and the regeneration experience of the person.  Toon (1987) views conversion as 
“born again” which emphasizes the new rebirth in terms of personal regeneration.  He 
understands sacraments as symbolic actions given to the church by its head, Jesus Christ.  
For Toon, baptism is the first sacrament: it unites a person to Christ and the church 
community.  Baptism, as a divine instrument, enables the person to enter into the change 
of life by experiencing (1) God’s forgiveness, (2) regeneration, and (3) justification to the 
soul (p. 85).  Toon surveys Christian baptism as depicted in the New Testament: 
First, the rite [of baptism] was seen as intimately related to the work of God 
within the believer in terms of forgiveness and justification.  Converts never 
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baptized themselves!  Baptism was administered to them, thereby portraying that 
God alone is the author and giver of salvation.  Second, baptism was a once-for-
all rite of entry into God’s people; it was not to be repeated at a future date.  
Thereby the once-for-all nature of the work of Christ for sinners was symbolized.  
Third, baptism signified and symbolized incorporation into Christ and into his 
body (Rom. 6:1-14; Gal. 3:26-27).  To be baptized was therefore a synonym for 
being a Christian, a justified sinner, a born-again believer, and a child of God. (p. 
65) 
 
Toon employs a doctrine of Christian baptism in the Roman Catholic Church in 
order to understand better the subject of baptism and regeneration (“The Dogmatic 
Constitution on the Church” in the Second Vatican Council): 
11. Incorporated into the Church by baptism, the faithful are appointed by their 
baptismal character to Christian religious worship; reborn as sons of God, they 
must profess before men the faith they have received from God through the 
Church.  By the sacrament of confirmation they are more perfectly bound to the 
Church and are endowed with the special strength of the Holy Spirit.  Hence they 
are, as true witnesses of Christ, more strictly obliged to spread the faith by word 
and deed. (pp. 111-112) 
 
As recent scholars of conversion, Ted A. Campbell (2001), Gordon T. Smith 
(2001), and Roger E. Olson (2004) agree with other scholars’ argument that baptism 
plays an essential role in facilitating the transforming experience of the new convert.  In 
“Conversion and Baptism in Wesleyan Spirituality,” Campbell (2001) asserts that the 
sacrament of baptism is a divinely appointed and indispensable sign of God’s grace.  This 
holy sacrament of baptism leads the person to enter into a renewed commitment to the 
divine power and grace that enables the experience of conversion.  In this sense, Christian 
spiritual tradition has consistently understood baptism as “a means by which a person is 
incorporated into Christ and the Christian community, bringing the fruits of justification 
(forgiveness of past sins) and regeneration (new birth in Christ)” (p. 161).   
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Like Campbell, Smith (2001) investigates the impact of sacramental and symbolic 
actions on the conversion experience of persons within the Christian community.  Smith 
argues that “to be human is to use symbols” (p. 180); namely, human persons use 
symbols to capture their identity, their important relationships, and even their deepest 
spiritual commitments.  These sacramental and symbolic actions are essential elements 
for the conversion experience of new believers, because these external ritual actions 
enable participants to express what is happening to them internally.  While stressing the 
formative and transforming power of the liturgy, Smith writes, 
[Sacramental and] symbolic actions …are essential means by which religious 
change is experienced and expressed.  Indeed, a formal religious rite or symbolic 
action allows sacred reality to be present and immediate.  This sacred reality is no 
longer merely a past event, but a past event that is present to us.  The [religious] 
rite enables the present to be sanctified by the past.  “Through its rites”…“faith 
reactivates the sources of salvation.” (p. 181) 
 
According to Smith (2001), the sacrament of baptism played a crucial and 
indispensable role in fostering the conversion experience of persons in the early faith 
community as portrayed in the New Testament, especially in the Synoptic Gospels, Acts, 
Paul’s letters, and the Gospel of John.  That means that baptism was an integral 
component of the experience of coming to Christ and incorporation into the early 
Christian community.  Smith argues that like the times of the early church, the 
sacramental and symbolic actions of the contemporary Christian community not only 
bring new converts to the presence of God, but also help them enter into a mature and 
dynamic Christian life as participants in the community of faith.22  Smith concludes, 
                                                
22 Scholars have examined how the whole Christian community affects the experience of 
conversion.  Mark McVann (1988) in “Conversion and Community” views conversion as “an act of the self 
made possible by the experience of such human community” (p. 77).  The experience of conversion flows 
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Baptism…is an ideal way to sacramentalize the inner reality of faith and 
repentance.  It speaks of repentance and the forgiveness of sins; it calls forth our 
faith and our resolve to live in loyal identification with Christ.  It is personal but 
also communal, indicating our personal commitments but also our common 
commitments as the community of faith. (pp. 188-189; see 2010, pp. 139-156) 
 
Likewise, Olson (2004) elucidates how baptism in Christianity is profoundly 
related to conversion in light of the transforming work of God.  Olson describes 
conversion as a “fulfillment of baptism with personal repentance and faith” (p. 162).  For 
Olson, Christian baptism is rooted in “a specific act of God in the life of a follower of 
Jesus Christ” (p. 269).  It is a visible means of God’s grace which leads the convert into a 
life of Christian discipleship to Jesus Christ as well as an act of commitment to the 
Christian community.  The rite of baptism is a symbol of entrance into the body of Christ; 
it is not salvific but an “outward sign of an inward work” through which one engages in 
the life of transformation and regeneration (pp. 153, 269).  Olson asserts that baptism is 
the universal rite of initiation into the Christian church.  The vast majority of Christian 
traditions initiate children or converts into the church by means of water—either 
                                                                                                                                            
from community and returns to it to enrich it and be enriched by it: “The shared experience of God is the 
source of conversion and creates Christian community.  This was the purpose of Jesus’ prophetic ministry: 
to share the good news that the Kingdom of God is at hand, to proclaim the good news to Israel, and to call 
us to change our hearts.  This is also the prophetic ministry of the church in which the Brothers have a 
special role: to share the good news and to invite all people into the liberation born of the recognition that 
God calls us to himself through his son and through one another, that is, through community” (pp. 76-77).  
Similarly, Darrell L. Guder (2000) in The Continuing Conversion of the Church emphasizes the joining of 
the whole Christian community to the specific missionary conditions in order to stimulate the conversion 
experiences of persons.  Scot McKnight (2002) in Turning to Jesus: The Sociology of Conversion in the 
Gospels delves into the role of the whole Christian community in the conversion process.  For McKnight, 
many people become new converts—“become Christians”—“by being nurtured under the sacred umbrella 
of a particular church” (p. 5).  Likewise, Paul N. Markham (2007) in Rewired: Exploring Religious 
Conversion elucidates the conversion experience within the Christian community.  For Markham, 
conversion takes place in the Christian community.  Markham states, “Given the view of the Christian 
community presented above, it becomes imperative to conceive of God’s action in the conversion process 
as not an individual and isolated act, but a transformative process that takes place in the context of the 
community.  To overstate the point, religious conversion is not an achievement of individual belief or 
intellectual assent; rather, it is properly understood as a process that requires intimate interaction with the 
Christian community” (p. 197). 
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immersion into water, sprinkling of water on the head, or effusion (pouring) of water over 
the person being baptized.  Most churches baptize in the name of the Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit (pp. 269-270).  In particular, most reformed evangelicals have retained that 
Christian conversion as a process begins with infant baptism; that is, “baptism initiates a 
child into the covenant between God and the church; it parallels the rite of circumcision 
in the covenant between God and Israel” (p. 162).23  
 
D. Conversion and the Reciprocity of the Love of God and Neighbor 
 Theologians and biblical scholars have explored the symbiotic relation between 
love of God and love of neighbor in the conversion process.  For example, Nikos A. 
Nissiotis (1967) in “Conversion and the Church” explores the link between the convert’s 
return to God and to the church community.  Nissiotis views conversion as “a process of 
continuous personal change and growth with and for the other members of the 
community” (p. 262).  For Nissiotis, the person is converted only by and in the 
community of the Holy Spirit through which he or she is converted to God: “Conversion 
does not mean withdrawing from the world, but rather engaging converted people and the 
whole Church in a more dynamic and creative relationship with it.  Conversion is not 
                                                
23 There is a guideline of infant baptism in the tradition of the Roman Catholic Church 
(“Instruction on Infant Baptism” in the Second Vatican Council): “Concretely, pastoral practice regarding 
infant baptism must be governed by two great principles, the second of which is subordinate to the first.  1. 
Baptism, which is necessary for salvation, is the sign and the means of God’s prevenient love, which frees 
us from original sin and communicates to us a share in the divine life.  Considered in itself, the gift of these 
blessings to infants must not be delayed.  2. Assurances must be given that the gift thus granted can grow 
by an authentic education in the faith and Christian life, in order to fulfill the true meaning of the 
sacrament” (Toon, 1987, p. 114). 
 112 
meant to be individual, but rather ecclesial in the sense that it is a cosmic event realized 
through persons who are members of a world-wide community” (p. 268).24 
Karl Rahner (1978) emphasizes both the personal and the communal dimension of 
Christian conversion.  For Rahner, Christian conversion is experienced as the gift of 
God’s grace and as human radical response to God’s calling in everyday life.  Rahner 
states, 
Conversion is hope as trusting oneself to the unexpected, uncharted way into the 
open and incalculable future in which God comes…It is love for the neighbor, 
because only in conjunction with this can God really be loved, and without that 
love no one really knows with genuine personal knowledge who God is.  It means 
standing firm and grasping the unique situation which is only found at this 
particular moment “today,” not soothing oneself with the idea that it will come 
again, that the chance of salvation is “always” available.  It is the sober realization 
that every conversion is only a beginning and that the rest of daily fidelity, the 
conversion which can only be carried out in whole lifetime, has still to come. (p. 
206) 
 
 Likewise, Gustavo Gutierrez (1978) in “A Spirituality of Liberation” deals with 
how conversion to God is related to conversion to the neighbor.  For Gutierrez, a 
spirituality of liberation is centered on both turning to God and turning to the neighbor.  
The convert’s spiritual life cannot apart from the historical and social context: 
Our conversion to the Lord implies this conversion to the neighbor…Conversion 
means a radical transformation of ourselves; it means thinking, feeling, and living 
                                                
24 From a Jewish perspective, Abraham J. Heschel (1965) focuses on one’s connection with others 
in the process of religious change, while acknowledging the importance of one’s relationship with the 
divine in the process of becoming a whole being.  Heschel examines the link of the life of the transformed 
person with the dignity or meaning of human existence within relationship with other persons.  Heschel 
contends that the person can “achieves [a sense of] fullness of being in fellowship, in care for others” (p. 
47).  More specifically, he writes, “Man in his being is derived from, attended by, and directed to the being 
of community.  For man to be means to be with other human beings.  His existence is coexistence.  He can 
never attain fulfillment, or sense meaning, unless it is shared, unless it pertains to other human 
beings…Human solidarity is not the product of being human; being human is the product of human 
solidarity” (p. 45).  In emphasizing the continuous transforming life of the convert, Heschel states, “Human 
being is both being in the world and living in the world.  Living [of religious change] involves responsible 
understanding of one’s role in relation to all other beings” (as well as in relation to the divine) (pp. 81-82). 
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as Christ—present in exploited and alienated man.  To be converted is to commit 
oneself to the process of the liberation of the poor and oppressed, to commit 
oneself lucidly, realistically, and concretely.  It means to commit oneself not only 
generously, but also with an analysis of the situation and a strategy of action. (p. 
309)25 
 
Similar to Gutierrez, George E. Morris (1981) probes an interaction between the 
new relationship with God and the new neighborly commitment in the conversion 
experience of the person (see Barth, 1978, pp. 38-40; Castro, 1966, p. 355; Dubay, 2006, 
pp. 31-32; Haring, 1978, pp. 217-218; Kamaleson, 1992, pp. 450-452; Kasdorf, 1980, p. 
96; Lonergan, 1978, p. 13; McVann, 1988, pp. 76-77; Niebuhr, 1978, p. 29).  He 
considers Christian conversion as “a dynamic, complex, ongoing process which is greatly 
impacted by particular times and places and considerably shaped by contexts” (pp. 4-5).  
According to Morris, Christian conversion involves not only a vertical relationship with 
God, but also a horizontal relationship with one’s neighbor.  That means that Christian 
conversion engages in the reorientation of one’s life in two ways: “this fundamental 
reorientation is first a reorientation toward God, the source and ultimate meaning of life, 
and second it expresses itself as a reorientation of the whole personality in relationship 
with others” (p. 35).  For Morris, conversion to God and to neighbor occurs as one and 
the same process, and both aspects are dependent upon God’s revelation in Christ: 
Awareness of one’s individual identity before God necessarily involves one in 
community.  Life in the Spirit of Christ is the life of new openness to others in a 
fellowship of reconciliation.  This new identity is found ‘in Christ.’  The risen 
                                                
25 In a related vein, McKnight (2002) explores how and why people were converted by (and to) 
Jesus in the Gospels.  In doing so, McKnight demonstrates that conversion takes place among the 
marginalized.  That is, the coverts recorded in the Gospels were predominantly drawn from “the 
marginalized villager classes”—the poor, the sick, the oppressed, and those who were discriminated against.  
Prostitutes, tax collectors, sinners, the demonized, the paralyzed, the deaf, the blind, the lame, and the 
lepers were all welcomed and served by Jesus, although Jesus was not concerned only with the 
marginalized (pp. 127-129). 
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Christ gives us a new perception of the interrelation of individuals and community.  
Individuals are related to the community by virtue of a relationship to Christ. (p. 
138) 
 
Morris asserts that Christian conversion cannot happen in a vacuum.  This 
Christian conversion takes place within the historical and social context; it causes the 
heart to throb with a compassion to put one’s life at God’s disposal (Rom. 6:12-19).  God 
is at work in the world freeing the oppressed, feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, 
visiting the sick and imprisoned, and ministering to the aged.  Christian conversion 
means entering a new communion with others as well as fulfilling a new responsibility 
for others.  Moreover, Christian conversion means participating in this God’s saving 
work for God’s all creation (pp. 133-138). 
Like Morris, Ronald D. Witherup (1994) explores the link of turning toward God 
with turning toward others in the conversion experience.  Witherup describes conversion 
as “not a single event but an ongoing process” which takes place in the context of 
relationship (pp. 17-18).  He emphasizes that Christian conversion brings one into a new 
relationship with God and with other human beings.  For Witherup, God calls people into 
a relationship with God, a relationship that also has implications for living with other 
people.  The relationality of Christian conversion is bi-directional, being both vertical and 
horizontal which enables the person into both a new spiritual journey for union with God 
and a new participation in the context of Christian community.  Witherup writes, 
Conversion involves both internal (attitudinal) and external (behavioral) changes 
in life.  Authentic Christian conversion is never divorced from concrete actions 
which mirror the changed internal reality.  Conversion thus always leads to some 
aspect of social responsibility and justice. (p. 110) 
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In a similar vein, William Barclay (1975) describes the Christian convert’s life of 
“togetherness” both with God and with other people.  Barclay argues that Christian 
conversion unites the convert to his or her community members as well as to God: 
Conversion is not only conversion towards a certain kind of [individual] life; it is 
conversion into a fellowship.  And that is precisely where the Church comes into 
the [group] picture.  The convert becomes a child of God and a member of God’s 
family, which is the Church… [Christian] conversion means entry into a life of 
togetherness, both with God and with man. (p. 71) 
 
Barclay insists that the togetherness of the converted life is exemplified in four 
directions: (1) it is exemplified by eating together.  At the early time of the Christian 
church, “the weekly Love Feast” (the Agape), as a sacrament, is not simply a symbolic 
meal but a real meal which all congregation shared it in order to closely link to one 
another in the love of Jesus Christ.  The convert entered into a life at which the meal table 
was the Lord’s Table as really as the communion table in any early Church; (2) it is 
exemplified by praying together.  The convert entered into a life of prayer in which he or 
she sought to experience the presence of God and depended on the guidance of God; (3) 
it is exemplified by the sharing of the common things of life.  The convert of the early 
Church entered into fellowship which issued in practical and sacrificial aid to those who 
were in need (e.g., the case of Barnabas, Acts 4:36-37).  It is the teaching of Jesus that the 
reality of a person’s conversion is to be tested by that person’s reaction to the needs of 
those who are in want and trouble (Mt 25: 31-46).  Christian conversion involves the 
acceptance of the obligation of the social gospel; (4) it was exemplified by worshipping 
together.  The attendance at the worship of the Church is essential for the convert in order 
to share the sense of joy with other believers within the love of God (pp. 71-78). 
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Similarly, Manfred Marquardt (1998) emphasizes the link between conversion to 
God and conversion to other human beings in the world.  Marquardt regards conversion 
as a process of transformation, which engages in the connection with God as well as the 
connection with God’s people.  According to Marquardt, the existence of Christians from 
the New Testament times until today has been marked by a polar tension between 
individual and communal, personal and social.  Christian conversion, as conversion to 
Christ (“You shall love your God”), is also conversion to our neighbor (“You shall love 
your neighbor as yourself”).  Furthermore, Christian conversion as conversion to God 
already necessarily implies a conversion to the world (“We-belief”), since it is this world 
which God’s love intends to save (p. 110).  As a consequence, Marquardt states, 
When we understand conversion as a process in which God’s Spirit and the 
believer are involved, and by which the believer’s life is being connected with 
God, it is obvious that the conversion of any individual person is as such an event 
which connects this person with all other persons who are converted to 
Christ…There is no religion but social religion, no Christian faith which does not 
connect the believers with the body of which they are members, has its 
theological foundation in this essential connectedness of Christ with the church 
and the members of the church with one another. (p. 107) 
 
In a same way, Barry L. Callen (2001) examines the new convert’s life both in 
God and in God’s people.  Callen insists that during the process of spiritual 
transformation, the convert actively responds to God’s calling and he or she participates 
with other believers in God’s mission to the world in terms of new life in Christ and in 
Christ’s community.  He notes, 
True conversion is more than turning away from sin and toward God.   It is 
turning toward a new creation that is far more than an individualistic avoidance of 
hell.  Conversion is being turned to God and God’s church, the new-creation 
community in which the Spirit dwells, through which the Spirit ministers, and into 
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which the Spirit places each new believer with Spirit-gifts designed to build up 
the body of Christ. (p. 158) 
 
In conclusion, there are various understandings of religious change in the field of 
theology of conversion.  Conversion has been understood as a result of an encounter with 
God, a turning from godlessness to God transformation portrayed in the Bible, a change 
through ritual act of baptism within the Christian community, and a consequence through 
the mutual interaction between love of God and love of neighbor.  On the whole, 
theological studies of conversion have primarily focused on the efficacy of the 
transforming power of God’s grace in the process of human transformation. 
Indeed, the theological studies of conversion have contributed by demonstrating 
the impact of religious factors on the process of religious change.  They have primarily 
elucidated how divine intervention or grace has affected the human transformation.  In 
doing so, they have contributed by showing how God is communicated with the potential 
convert by means of the authoritative word of the Scriptures as well as how the ritual 
performance of Christian baptism has affected the process of spiritual change of the 
person.  Furthermore, in the emphasis on the interplay of turning to God and turning to 
others, these theological interpretations of conversion have contributed by articulating 
how the new convert has moved into loving relationships with oneself, others, and God; 
that is, how this convert has engaged in both the service of God (i.e., Christian living in 
solitude) and the service of neighbors (i.e., Christian living in community).  However, on 
the whole, these theological interpretations of conversion have not paid attention to the 
impact of personal, social, and cultural factors on the process of human transformation.  
As such, in order to foster a better understanding of religious conversion, the theological 
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studies of conversion need to respect more human science perspectives of human 
transformation, while acknowledging the influence of the transforming power of the 
divine on the process of religious change. 
 
V. Lewis Rambo’s Model of Religious Conversion 
This section of the literature review addresses Rambo’s model of religious 
conversion mainly as described in his book, Understanding Religious Conversion (1993).  
While Rambo has extensively studied conversion within a wide variety of backgrounds, 
he insists that any single theoretical discipline (e.g., psychology) is not sufficient to 
understand the process of religious change (1989, p. 49; 1993, pp. 8-11).  From an 
interdisciplinary perspective, he argues that there is a need for a more critical and 
integrative dialogue among theological and social scientific studies of conversion.  He 
proposes a model of conversion that explores the impact of personal, social, cultural, and 
religious factors on the complex and multi-layered process of religious change (1993, pp. 
7-18). 
From a perspective that integrates psychology, sociology, anthropology, and 
religion, Rambo describes the central meaning of conversion as “change,” which refers to 
“turning from and to new religious groups, ways of life, systems of belief, and modes of 
relating to a deity or the nature of reality” (p. 3).  For Rambo, religious conversion 
involves the complicated and multi-faceted process of religious change that brings about 
a total transformation of the person in “a dynamic force field” including people, events, 
ideologies, institutions, expectations, experiences, and orientations (Rambo, 1989, p. 60, 
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1993, p. 5; Rambo & Farhadian, 1999, p. 24).  In order to comment on the limitations of 
examining conversion from the perspective of one specific discipline, he writes,  
[Most of] the published material on conversion resembled a metropolitan train 
yard crowded with separate tracks that ran parallel to each other, where each 
individual train had its own assigned track and never crossed over to 
another…only a few scholars of conversion were aware that the subject was 
traversed by more than one track, and that there could even be more than one train 
on each track.” (1993, p. xiv) 
 
For this reason, Rambo tries to describe the entire train yard to us—and to do so 
in a way that affirms the “perspective of the ‘other.’”  He explains the complexity and 
diversity of a “converting process”26 from the interdisciplinary perspective as follows:  
Conversion is paradoxical.  It is elusive.  It is inclusive.  It destroys and it saves. 
Conversion is sudden and it is gradual.  It is created totally by the action of God, 
and it is created totally by the action of humans.  Conversion is personal and 
communal, private and public.  It is both passive and active.  It is a retreat from 
the world.  It is a resolution of conflict and an empowerment to go into the world 
and to confront, if not create, conflict.  Conversion is an event and a process.  It is 
an ending and a beginning.  It is final and open-ended.  Conversion leaves us 
devastated—and transformed. (p. 176) 
 
Rambo offers six motifs of conversion, based on John Lofland and Norman 
Skonovd’s theory of “conversion motifs” as follows: 1) The intellectual motif refers to 
the person’s search for knowledge about religious or spiritual issues via books, television, 
articles, lectures, and other media, prior to active participation in religious rituals and 
organizations; 2) The mystical motif generally pertains to “a sudden and traumatic burst 
of insight, induced by visions, voices, or other paranormal experiences” (e.g., the case of 
Saul of Tarsus); 3) The experimental motif involves active exploration of religious 
                                                
26 Rambo (1993) prefers to use the progressive word converting rather than the noun word 
conversion: “Perhaps the word converting better captures the phenomenology of the process.  But, for 
readability, I employ the noun form conversion, although it implies a static phenomenon” (p. 7); 
“‘converting’ is the most appropriate term signify that religious change is an ongoing complex process 
involving many different dimensions” (Rambo & Farhadian, 1999, p. 23). 
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options.  The potential convert has a “show me” mentality, essentially saying, “I’ll pursue 
this possibility and see what spiritual benefits it may provide to me”; 4) The affectional 
motif stresses “interpersonal bonds as an important factor in the conversion process,” 
which includes the direct, personal experiences of being loved, nurtured, and affirmed by 
a group and its leaders; 5) The revivalism motif is related to “crowd conformity to induce 
behavior.”  Individuals are emotionally aroused and new behaviors and beliefs are 
promoted by the revival meetings; and 6) The coercive motif refers to a level of intense 
pressure exerted on the person to participate, conform, and confess (e.g., “brainwashing,” 
“thought reform,” or “programming”).  Deprivation of food and sleep, fear, physical 
torture, and other forms of psychological terror may render the person unable to resist the 
pressure to surrender to the group’s ideology and submissive life-style, and may also be 
deployed to gain control over the person’s life (pp. 14-16). 
Rambo highlights the study of personal, social, cultural, and religious 
dimensions of conversion to gain an integrated understanding of conversion.  While 
emphasizing an interdisciplinary approach to religious change, he presents a systemic 
stage model of conversion which includes context, crisis, quest, encounter, interaction, 
commitment, and consequences (pp. 7-18, 165-170).27  Rambo’s model of conversion is 
“not only multidimensional and historical but also process oriented” (p. 17).  This means 
that his systemic stage model is in contrast to a sequential (stepwise) stage model.  
Rambo eschews a strict step-by-step model because the process of conversion is one in 
                                                
27 Rambo’s model of conversion is deeply influenced by the work of John Lofland and Rodney 
Stark (“Becoming a World-Saver” [1965]), and the missiological model of Alan R. Tippett (“Conversion as 
a Dynamic Process in Christian Mission” [1977]). 
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which multiple factors interact simultaneously and cumulatively over time.  In other 
words, his systemic stage model is not simply linear but interconnected, and there is a 
sometimes a “spiraling effect”—a going back and forth among stages (pp. 16-18).  The 
summary of each of the seven stages is listed as follows:  
 
Stage 1: Context—The Ecology of the Conversion Process 
Context is the ecology in which conversion takes place.  More specifically, 
context, as the most comprehensive of all the stages, refers to “the dynamic force field” 
in which people, events, expectations, experiences, ideologies, and institutions operate on 
conversion.  This context includes a panorama of conflicting, confluent, and dialectical 
factors that both promote and constrain the process of conversion (1993, pp. 20, 164).  
Conversion happens within a specific context, and context affects the nature and process 
of conversion.  According to Rambo, there is not a “split,” but a strong interaction 
between the person and the environment.  Indeed, people shape their political, religious, 
economic, social, and cultural worlds.  Conversely, people are influenced by the 
socialization processes of the wider world.  The networks of relationships and the 
cumulative effects of education, training, and institutional structures all affect the 
potential convert (p. 165). 
Context includes marcrocontext and microcontext.  Macrocontext refers to “the 
total environment,” including political systems, religious organizations, relevant 
ecological considerations, transnational corporations, and economic systems.  
Microcontext is “the more immediate world of a person’s family, friends, ethnic group, 
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religious community, and neighborhood.”  These forces of the immediate world are 
essential to the creation of a sense of identity and belonging, and to the shaping a 
person’s thoughts, feelings, and actions (1989, p. 52; 1993, pp. 21-22).  According to 
Rambo, microcontext and macrocontext are knit together in numerous ways.28  While 
some elements of the microcontext confirm and facilitate the larger context (e.g., when a 
religious organization reinforces patriotic values), other elements prohibit and seek to 
change the macrocontext (e.g., when a group challenges prevailing political values).  
Rambo demonstrates that persons, communities, ethnic groups, and nations are situated 
within and shaped by various superstructures and infrastructures, which affect the content 
and form of conversion and resistance.  Congruence and conflict come together in 
fascinating ways to either foster or repress the onset of the crisis stage.  The contours of 
particular mechanisms of context and the forces within the context—personal, social, 
cultural, (historical), and religious—need to be examined (1993, pp. 22, 42-43). 
 
Stage 2: Crisis—Catalyst for Change 
Crisis refers to a disorientation or disruption in the world of the potential convert 
caused by the interaction of external and internal forces.  It involves the felt frustration of 
individuals that prepares them for conversion.  Rambo notes that preceding conversion, 
the crisis may be “religious, political, psychological, or cultural in origin” (p. 44).  Crisis 
in life may trigger the search for new religious options.  This implies that the crisis stage 
                                                
28 In some of his work, Rambo adds one more type of context, mesocontext.  This mesocontext 
includes those aspects of the context which mediate between macrocontexts and microcontexts (e.g., local 
government, regional politics and economics, and local religious institutions) (Rambo, 1989, p. 52; Rambo 
& Farhadian, pp. 24-25). 
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causes a series of disruptions to a person’s sense of self, and also undermines his or her 
fundamental orientation to life, raising deep questions about existence.  For Rambo, the 
crisis may serve as the initial trigger of conversion, and may also be a major force in an 
ongoing process of conversion.  The cumulative effect of the crises can result in fostering 
a conversion process (pp. 46-48). 
The crisis stage includes two broad sets of factors.  The first set stresses the nature 
of the crisis, which involves the intensity (degree of severity), duration (length of time), 
and scope (whether it is internal or external to the person) of the crisis (p. 46).  The 
second set is comprised of catalysts for conversion.  Rambo describes catalysts for 
conversion in terms of different categories: “mystical experience,” “near-death 
experience,” “illness and healing,” “the question, Is that all there is?” (i.e., a growing 
sense of dissatisfaction with life), “desire for transcendence,” “altered states of 
consciousness” (e.g., higher state of consciousness without the use of drugs), “protean 
selfhood” (e.g., a search for meaning and for a more stable sense of self), “pathology” 
(e.g., emotional illness), “apostasy” (i.e., leaving a religious tradition), and “externally 
stimulated” forces (e.g., colonial powers or the activity of missionaries/advocates) (pp. 
48-55). 
The degree of flexibility, resilience, and creativity of the crisis needs to be 
considered.  According to Rambo, much of the literature in the human sciences has 
emphasized “social disintegration, political oppression, or something very dramatic as 
instigating crises” (1993, p. 46; Rambo & Farhadian, pp. 25-26).  Some cultures, 
societies, persons and religions are able to withstand a severe crisis and adapt to it in a 
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productive manner, while others are more fragile, and may be rendered vulnerable to 
outside influence (1989, p. 53; 1993, pp. 46-47).  Crises of transition may give rise to 
great openness to religious options that were ignored or rejected previously.  In any case, 
the crisis will “more than likely stimulate activity to relieve the discomfort, resolve the 
discord, and remove the sense of tension.  For many [potential converts], this activity can 
be identified as a [religious] quest” (1993, p. 55). 
 
Stage 3: Quest—Active Search 
Quest refers to the “active search” of the potential convert, who seeks solutions to 
his or her problems and strives to find meaning, purpose, and transcendence in life.  The 
quest stage encompasses different ways in which persons respond to crises, and the ways 
in which persons orient themselves to life, especially the religious life (Rambo & 
Farhadian, p. 27).  The quest stage stresses the active nature of the potential convert’s 
engagement with his or her predicament.  Rambo’s discussion of the quest stage begins 
with the assumption that potential converts actively seek to maximize meaning and 
purpose in life, to erase ignorance, and to resolve inconsistency.  During the times of 
quest, this active search becomes compelling; potential converts look for resources that 
offer growth and development in order to “fill the void,” solve the problem, or enrich life 
(1993, p. 56). 
Rambo identifies three important factors in exploring the quest stage of his model: 
1) Response style describes whether a person responds actively or passively to conversion.  
Debates have been raised among scholars of conversion concerning the degree to which 
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persons are active or passive in their conversion process.  Rambo elucidates the 
importance of an alternate “contemporary” perspective in which potential converts are 
often active agents in their own conversions, but which also respects the importance of 
the passive dimension of religious conversion (1989, p. 53; 1993, p. 56); 2) Structural 
availability refers to “the freedom of a person or persons to move from previous 
emotional, intellectual, and religious institutions, commitments, and obligations into new 
options” (1993, p. 60).  Rambo notes that the various networks in the life of the potential 
convert—family, job, friendship, religious organizations, etc—are often very powerful in 
discouraging or even preventing his or her change and development.  The degree of the 
potential convert’s engagement with previous orientations may affect his or her possible 
move to new options (1989, p. 53; 1993, p. 60); 3) Assessing motivational structures 
emphasizes the following question: What motivated a person to convert?  Typically, 
human motivations are complex, involving emotional, intellectual and religious features 
(Rambo & Farhadian, p. 27).  For Rambo, assessing motivational structures is another 
way of examining the degree of a person’s active quest for religious change or passive 
vulnerability to religious advocates.  Based on the motivation model of Seymour Epstein 
(1985), the work of James A. Beckford (1983), and the conversion theory of Walter Conn 
(1986),29 Rambo offers six basic motivations that may stimulate an individual or group to 
                                                
29 In “The Implications of Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory for Research in Social Psychology 
and Personality,” Seymour Epstein (1985) proposes a model of motivation which includes four basic 
motivations: the need to experience pleasure and avoid pain, the need for a conceptual system, the need to 
enhance self-esteem, and the need to establish and maintain relationships.  In “The Restoration of ‘Power’ 
to the Sociology of Religion,” James A. Beckford (1983) argues that power is an explicit component in 
religious experience, ideology, and institutions.  In Christian Conversion: A Developmental Interpretation 
of Autonomy and Surrender, Water Conn (1986) demonstrates “the centrality of a yearning for 
transcendence as a primary motivation for conversion” (Rambo, 1993, p. 64.). 
 126 
seek religious change: the need to experience pleasure and avoid pain; the need for a 
conceptual system; the need to enhance self-esteem; and the need to establish and 
maintain relationships; the need to obtain a sense of power; the need to experience 
transcendence (1993, pp. 63-64; Rambo & Farhadian, p. 28).  For Rambo, the order and 
intensity of these motivations will vary among people as well as within an individual at 
different times and in different circumstances.  Thus, “availability” for conversion may 
be shaped, to some degree, by the motivational system of a person at a particular time and 
place (1989, p. 54; 1993, p. 63).  These motivations operative in the quest stage extend 
also throughout the next encounter and interaction stages as sources of attraction to a new 
religious orientation, and ultimately into the commitment stage as reasons to solidify 
one’s commitment (1993, p. 65). 
The potential convert continually engages “in the process of world construction 
and reconstruction in order to generate meaning and purpose in life, to maintain psychic 
equilibrium, and to assure continuity” (p. 56).  For Rambo, the quest stage/motif 
highlights the potential convert as actively seeking something “more” in religious life.  
This questing for something more or something better than one’s present situation may 
involve seeking new ways of coping with life’s problems, seeking new beliefs to 
transform the potential convert, and seeking new emotional experiences in a connection 
to the divine and other persons (1993, p. 166; Kahn & Greene, 2004, p. 235). 
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Stage 4: Encounter—Advocate and Potential Convert in Contact 
Encounter refers to the contact between the advocate (proselytizer) and the 
potential convert (active seeker), who relate dialectically to one another.  This encounter 
stage brings potential converts who are in crisis and searching for new (religious) options 
together with advocates (e.g., missionaries) who are seeking to provide the questors with 
a new orientation (1993, p. 167).  This initial contact can precipitate the converting 
process, triggering a crisis, and fostering a quest for new solutions.  According to Rambo, 
in every encounter between the advocate and the potential convert, the real details of their 
interplay are extraordinarily mutual and dynamic.  The encounter stage might be seen as 
“the vortex of the dynamic force field” in which conversion takes place (1993, p. 87; 
1998, p. 28). 
Rambo argues that the dialectic contact between the advocate and the potential 
convert needs to be more fully examined, while many studies of conversion have tended 
to focus exclusively on the convert (e.g., the intrapsychic dimension of conversion) (1989, 
p. 54; 1993, p. 66).  For Rambo, there are three major components of the encounter stage: 
the advocate, the potential convert, and the setting of the encounter.  During this 
encounter stage, advocates and potential converts mutually influence one another in 
specific contexts.  The outcome of the encounter can range from total rejection at one end 
of the spectrum to complete acceptance at the other.  The constellation of events that may 
transpire between the two poles of rejection and acceptance is ferociously complex in 
specific conditions (1993, p. 100). 
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Rambo notes that the advocate is often persistent and creative (p. 167).  The 
personal, social, cultural, and theological characteristics of the advocate contribute deeply 
to the potential convert’s changes (Kahn & Greene, p. 235).  For Rambo, the advocate’s 
strategy is important in that the scope, goals, and methods of conversion necessarily 
shape both the advocate’s tactics and the potential convert’s experiences.  The advocate’s 
missionary strategy includes four main elements: the degree of proselytizing, the strategic 
style, the mode of contact, and the benefits of conversion.  The degree of proselytizing 
refers to the extent to which a religious organization is seeking to reach out and 
incorporate new members.  Some religious groups (e.g., The Southern Baptist 
Convention) have emphasized activities geared to the intentional and systematic 
recruitment, training, and retention of new members, whereas some other religious 
groups (e.g., The Syrian Orthodox Church) have had little interests in potential converts.  
There are two different strategic styles.  In diffuse (systems-oriented) strategy, the 
advocate tends to circulate widely within a community, seeks to persuade large numbers 
of persons (especially community leaders), and thus transforms a whole village.  In 
Concentrated (personalistic) strategy, the advocate tends to focus upon particular 
individuals who are marginal to their community.  The advocate’s actual mode of contact 
with potential converts stresses the following questions: Is the contact public (e.g., “mass 
rallies” or “revival meetings”) or private (e.g., direct-mail contact)?  Is it personal (i.e., 
“face-to-face forms of contact”) or impersonal (e.g., media such as television radio, or 
etc)?  The religious community can usually provide the benefits of conversion to the 
potential convert: a system of meaning (e.g., a comprehensive, coherent, and compelling 
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cognitive framework), emotional gratifications (e.g., a sense of belonging, relief of guilt, 
or development of new relationships), new techniques for living, charismatic leadership, 
and (access to) power (e.g., experiencing the external and/or internal influence of the 
divine; experiencing a healing power of the divine) (1989, pp. 54-56, 1993, pp. 76-86; 
Kahn & Greene, pp. 235-236; Rambo & Farhadian, pp. 28-29). 
Rambo asserts that the motivations and adaptations of both religious advocates 
(missionaries) and potential converts (active agents) for conversion are not 
“unidirectional,” but “dialectic” for engaging new options.  In this encounter stage, for 
example, the missionary as an advocate wants to be effective, and therefore assesses the 
situation and modifies strategies and tactics in order to be more successful in particular 
settings.  This missionary makes specific changes in order to adapt himself or herself to a 
specific context (e.g., tolerance, translation, assimilation, Christianization, acculturation, 
and/or incorporation).  Simultaneously, the receptive potential convert confronts the new 
belief, practice, or religious group or tradition.  This potential convert as an active agent 
seeks out what it is that he or she wants and rejecting what he or she does not desire.  
Like the missionary, the potential convert undergoes specific transformations in order to 
adapt himself or herself to a specific condition (e.g., cultural oscillation, scrutinization, 
combination, indigenization, and/or retroversion) (1993, pp. 97-101).  
Rambo notes that the setting of the encounter between the advocate and the 
potential convert provides important background for facilitating religious conversion.  
Religious group members try to gather at public locations in order to seek encounters 
with potential converts in a public setting (e.g., the university campus meeting).  The use 
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of huge public gatherings, by charismatic persons (e.g., Billy Graham), may affect the 
potential to create a sense of transcendence and may also help the person feel a part of 
someone/Someone (e.g., the divine) much greater than himself or herself.  On the other 
hand, personal one-on-one encounters may provide private intimacy in a personal setting 
that facilitates the conversion process (e.g., Mormons’ mission strategy—“going door-to-
door”) (Rambo & Farhadian, p. 29). 
 
Stage 5: Interaction—The Matrix of Change 
Interaction has to do with a more intensive and extended exchange/interchange 
between the advocate and the potential convert in the religious community.  In this 
interaction stage, the potential convert chooses to continue the contact with the advocate 
and become more involved in a specific religious group, while the advocate works to 
sustain the interplay with the goal of persuading the person to convert (1989, p. 56; 1993, 
pp. 102).  If the potential convert continues with the religious group after the initial 
encounter, the interaction intensifies.  Here he or she learns more about the teachings, 
life-style, and expectations of the religious community, and is provided with 
opportunities, both formal and informal, to become more fully incorporated into it (1993, 
p. 102; Rambo & Farhadian, p. 29). 
For Rambo, the key conceptual element of the interaction stage is encapsulation.  
Encapsulation refers to “the creation of an environment in which communication and 
social interaction are controlled in order to allow the potential convert to experience the 
new religious ideas” (Kahn & Greene, p. 236).  Based on Arthur L. Greil and David R. 
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Rudy’s encapsulation theory (1984), Rambo describes three types of encapsulation in the 
interaction stage: physical, social, and ideological.  These three varieties of encapsulation 
overlap and reinforce one another.  Physical encapsulation may be achieved by taking 
people into remote areas where communications can be monitored, so that no sources of 
information are available to the potential convert.  Social encapsulation means “directing 
the potential convert into life-style patterns that limit significant contact with ‘outsiders.’”  
Ideological encapsulation involves the use of a worldview and belief system that 
“inoculates” the adherent against alternative or competitive systems of belief (1989, p. 
57; 1993, pp. 105-106). 
Rambo notes that when a sphere of influence has been established by 
encapsulation, the four dimensions of interaction—relationships, rituals, rhetoric, and 
roles—are deployed in the conversion process.  These four dimensions interact and 
reinforce one another in the conversion process.  Relationships create and consolidate 
emotional bonds to the religious community.  In many cases, establishing a new kinship 
and friendship networks forms the foundation upon which a new perspective or way of 
life is built.  Rituals enable the potential convert to experience the religious dimension of 
the conversion process (e.g., something “more”).  Through singing, recitation of 
scriptures, and prayer in religious communities, ritual actions consolidate persons and 
groups and instill “a deeper sense of belonging.”  Rhetoric provides the potential convert 
with a new system of interpretation (“the language of transformation”) relevant not only 
to the religious sphere of life but also, in some cases, to be totality of a person’s life.  It 
helps the converting person utilize new language and metaphors in a specific religious 
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group that serve as “a vehicle for the transformation of consciousness” (e.g., for 
Christians, “sinner” and “God’s grace”).  Roles provide new expectations of behaviors 
consonant with the potential convert’s ascribed status within the group.  Playing a role in 
a public religious setting enables the potential convert to experience and act out a new 
way of life, frequently with a sense of mission.  A new sense of self often emerges 
through the internalization of a new role as a convert (1993, pp. 107-123, 167-168; Kahn 
& Greene, p. 236; Rambo & Farhadian, pp. 30-31). 
 
Stage 6: Commitment—The Consummation and  
Consolidation of Transformation 
 
Commitment is the consummation of the conversion process.  In this commitment 
stage, the potential convert decides to affiliate with the new religious community.  He or 
she undertakes a series of actions which solidify a new spiritual orientation and 
incorporate its meaning into daily life (1993, pp. 124, 168). 
Rambo identifies five common elements of the commitment stage: decision 
making, rituals, surrender, testimony, and motivational reformulation.  Decision making 
usually involves an intense reflection and confrontation with the self.  This commitment 
decision, as a specific turning point, is often dramatized and commemorated with a public 
demonstration of the convert’s choice to be a valid member of a faith community (1993, 
p. 124; Kahn & Greene, p. 236).  Rituals are important for their symbolic enactment of 
the commitment decision, and typically involve a symbolic repudiation of the old self and 
an embracing of a new identity (“bridge burning events”).  Commitment rituals (e.g., 
baptism) consolidate and confirm the person’s status as a participant in a new religious 
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community.  These commitment rituals are powerful in that they not only provide a kind 
of ultimate transformation for a person’s experience of the conversion process, but also 
provide a means by which to consolidate his or her beliefs and involvement in a faith 
group (1993, pp. 124, 170; Kahn & Greene, p. 236; Rambo & Farhadian, p. 32).  The 
experience of surrender is, for many converts, “the turning point away from the old life 
and the beginning of a new life, produced not by one’s own controlling volition but by 
the power of God’s grace” (1993, p. 132).  This experience of surrender empowers the 
convert with a sense of connection with the divine and the religious community.  During 
surrender, the convert accepts the authority of the leader, group, or tradition, which 
enables the person to devote himself or herself completely to the group (pp. 132, 168-
169).  Testimony is the narrative witness of a person’s life before and after conversion.  
This testimony employs the particular rhetoric or language system of the faith community 
in a process of active reconstruction and reinterpretation of personal history.  Its public 
aspect consolidates the person’s commitment to the group, serves as a potent reminder of 
the community’s basic values and goals, and links “the convert’s personal story with the 
group’s story” (1992, p. 173; Kahn & Greene, p. 237; Rambo & Farhadian, pp. 31, 137).  
Motivational reformulation means that the initial motivations of the convert for 
interacting with the group are further transformed both in the process of his or her public 
testimony, manifested in language transformation and biographical reconstruction, and in 
the process of his or her personal development and spiritual growth in the faith 
community (1993, pp. 139-141). 
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Stage 7: Consequences—The Effects of Converting Process 
Consequences refer to the cumulative effects of the converting process over time 
when experiences, identities, and commitments are consolidated.  In this stage, the 
convert is constantly assessing the effects of the new religious option and deciding 
whether the new religion is relevant and viable.  For Rambo, the consequences of 
conversion are determined “in part by the nature, intensity, and duration of the 
conversion and the response to conversion in a person’s or a group’s context” (p. 144).  
Rambo agrees with many contemporary scholars’ argument that authentic conversion 
means “an ongoing process of transformation” through life.  Rambo suggests five 
elements to the exploration of consequences: the role of personal/social bias in 
assessment (e.g., the particular religious community’s or academic discipline’s criteria 
for evaluating conversion), general observations, socio-cultural and historical 
consequences, psychological consequences, and theological consequences of conversion 
(p. 142).  This means that to make a careful assessment of the consequences of 
conversion is to transcend “parochial denominational perspectives” that have dominated 
past scholarship, and to offer a way of bringing the human sciences and religious studies 
together. 
Influenced by Donald J. Gelpi’s theory of conversion, Rambo notes that the 
nature of the consequences of conversion includes affective, intellectual, ethical, 
sociopolitical, historical, and religious dimensions (pp. 146-154).  After having met about 
two hundred religious converts over twelve years, he especially clarifies the theological 
consequences that have been reported by these converts as follows: a sense of 
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relationship with God, a sense of relief from guilt/sin, a sense of mission and a reason for 
living, a sense of belonging in a new community, a new sense of meaning and order in 
life, a sense of wholeness and peace, and a sense of God’s presence in a spiritual journey 
to transformation (pp. 160-162).  For Rambo, the initial change of the converting person 
is the first step in a long process and pilgrimage.  More profound changes may continue 
for months, and even years, after the initial conversion takes place (p. 146). 
 
In summary, due to the diversity and complexity of the phenomenon of religious 
conversion, scholars have provided diverse accounts of the conversion experience.  
Psychologists have viewed conversion as a regressive and pathological phenomenon, a 
movement of transition from the divided self to the integrated self, an experience of 
epistemic exploration and cognitive satisfaction, or a process of the positive human 
development.  Sociologists have regarded conversion as the resolution of the potential 
convert’s frustration or deprivation by way of religious affiliation, the result of social 
attachments or interactions with other members within religious communities, or a 
product of the effectiveness of member recruitment strategies of particular social and 
religious organizations.  Anthropologists have considered conversion as a process of the 
intellectual challenge of the encounter within specific cultural settings (i.e., rationality), a 
passage of cultural transition from the old context to the new context (i.e., acculturation), 
or a movement of cultural renewal and revitalization.  Theologians have understood 
conversion as a result of the personal encounter or communion with God, a turning 
toward the work of God’s salvation depicted in the Scriptures, an experience of the new 
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rebirth or regeneration through ritual performance of baptism within the faith community, 
and a continuous transformation through Christian life in prayer in God and Christian life 
in action for others.  Significantly, there is no common theoretical definition of 
conversion.  This means that previous studies have tended to lead the reader to a one-
dimensional interpretation of religious conversion and have examined this dynamic 
process from the perspective of one theoretical discipline.  They have not critically 
integrated religious and social science perspectives for understanding religious 
conversion.  Thus, there is a great demand for more critical and mutually-informing 
conversation among theological and social scientific studies of conversion. 
In order to understand the complexity and richness of the phenomenon of 
religious change, Rambo invites the perspectives of psychology, sociology, anthropology, 
and religious studies into critical and mutually-informing conversation and presents a 
model of religious conversion that is composed of context, crisis, quest, encounter, 
interaction, commitment, and consequences.  His model helps us explore the complicated 
and multi-faceted elements of human religious change, and thus demonstrate the benefits 
of constructing an interdisciplinary approach to the process of human transformation.  
This dissertation will now move forward to depict the case of Augustine’s conversion 
experience and to account for his main life history and thought—in order to understand 
the impact of personal, social, cultural, and religious factors on the process of religious 
conversion. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CASE ILLUSTRATION OF ST. AUGUSTINE 
 
This chapter describes the case of St. Augustine’s conversion experience in order 
to illustrate the process of religious change.  More specifically, it presents a sufficient 
account of Augustine’s main life history (354-430 A.D.) and some of his basic thought to 
create a better understanding of the process of his conversion.  This account helps us to 
appreciate that Augustine’s conversion experience occurred in his lifelong process of 
transformation. 
Over the past 1,600 years, Augustine has been influential for religious people in 
stimulating a deep spiritual pilgrimage.  In Augustine, Henry Chadwick (1986) 
summarizes the pervasive influence of Augustine—“the first modern man”—not only on 
contemporaries, but also on the West: 
1. The theology and philosophy of the medieval schoolmen and of the creators of 
medieval universities were rooted in Augustinian ideas of the relation between 
faith and reason…2. The aspirations of all western mystics have never escaped his 
influence, above all because of the centrality of the love of God in his 
thinking…3. The Reformation found its mainspring in criticizing medieval 
Catholic piety as resting more on human effort than on divine grace.  The 
Counter-Reformation replied that one can affirm the sovereignty of God’s grace 
without also denying the freedom of the will and the moral value (‘merit’) of good 
conduct.  Both sides in the controversy appealed on a huge scale to texts of 
Augustine.  4. The eighteenth century found itself passionately divided between 
those who asserted the perfectibility of man and those who saw human nature as 
held down by a dead weight of personal and collective egotism; in other words by 
what Augustine called ‘original sin’.  The men of the Enlightenment thought the 
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actual perfecting of man hindered by belief in original sin…[whereas] the 
philosopher Kant…decisively assented to the belief that human nature is distorted 
by a pervasive radical evil.  5. In reaction against the Enlightenment the Romantic 
movement identified the heart of religion with feeling rather than with the 
conclusions of intellectual arguments…[Augustine] pioneered a highly positive 
evaluation of human feelings…6. He was the most acute of Christian Platonists 
and did much to lay the foundations for the synthesis between Christianity and 
classical theism stemming from Plato and Aristotle…7. He saw…that issues of 
supreme importance are raised by the problem of the relation of words to the 
reality…He was a pioneer in the critical study of non-verbal communication. (pp. 
1-3) 
 
This study portrays Augustine’s specific life events based on the changes of 
localities and the chronological order of his lifetime, consisting of the following three 
sections: 1) before his conversion to Christianity, 2) his conversion to Christianity in the 
summer of 386, and 3) after his conversion to Christianity.1  In conjunction with this 
description of Augustine’s life history, this study intends to articulate some aspects of 
Augustine’s thought in order to establish a more accurate understanding of the process of 
his conversion.  Broadly, Augustine had shifted from Manichaeism to skepticism, from 
skepticism to Neoplatonism, and from Neoplatonism to Christianity.  The main themes of 
his thought, which are deeply related to Augustinian spirituality, are 1) God and the soul, 
2) sin and God’s grace, 3) creation, time, and eternity, 4) the unity of the love of God and 
love of neighbor—contemplation and action, and 5) the Christian church and baptism. 
 
                                                
1 For Rambo, attention to historical particulars may complement theoretical models, providing a 
substantive and detailed data base of information about conversion, and may also help to trace the nature of 
conversion over time (1993, p. 12).  Following Rambo, I agree with some historians’ statement that the 
conversion process is different under different times and particular historical contexts (see Rambo, pp. 11-
12; MacMullen, 1984) while I also agree that the conversion process includes the universal dimension of 
change—the common ground of human transformation.  In this dissertation, I depict Augustine’s 
substantive life-changing events related to his conversion.  This depiction of his main life history helps us 
to understand the process of his conversion as well as the nature of religious conversion over time. 
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I. Before Augustine’s Conversion to Christianity 
 This section of the chapter provides an account of Augustine’s life history before 
his conversion to Christianity (354-386).  The exploration of Augustine’s first thirty-two 
years of his life helps us to establish a better understanding of his conversion experience 
in the Milanese garden in the summer of 386.  This section includes the following mains 
themes: 1) Thagaste: the early years (354-370), 2) Carthage: Manichaeism and 
common/unlawful marriage (concubinage) (371-374), 3) From Carthage to home and 
back (375-383), and 4) Rome and Milan: skepticism and Neoplatonism (383-386). 
 
A. Thagaste: The Early Years (354-370) 
 Augustine (who was a bishop of Hippo, saint, and doctor of the Church) was born 
at Thagaste, a Roman provincial town in North Africa (modern Souk Ahras in Algeria), 
on November 13, 354 (b. vita. 1.6; ep. 126.7; Possidius, v. Aug. 1).2  According to 
Augustine, his Father, Patricius, was an African pagan, but was baptized on his deathbed, 
when Augustine was about seventeen (conf. 2.3.6, 3.4.7, 9.9.22).  Although his father was 
not wealthy, Patricius owned some property and was a town councilor of modest means 
(2.3.5; Possidius, v. Aug. 1).  He was an affective man, but hot-tempered (conf. 9.9.19).  
In Augustine’s words, his mother, Monica, was an ardent Christian whose devotion to 
Augustine would play a critical role in his later spiritual life (9.8.17).  She was a mild and 
patient woman, but strong-willed (9.9.19-21).  Augustine had a brother (Navigius), a 
sister (Perpetua, who later became superior of a monastery of women at Hippo), and 
                                                
2 Thagaste (or Tagaste) was a small town in the eastern part of Numidia about fifty miles southeast 
of Hippo Regius and about a hundred and fifty miles southwest of Carthage. 
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perhaps other siblings (Bonner, 2002, pp. 38-41; Bourke, 1945, pp. 1-3).  Like many 
other fourth-century converts (e.g., Bishop Ambrose), Augustine started life as a 
catechumen (1.11.17).3  His mother tried to raise him as an attentive Christian: Augustine 
drank in the name of Christ with his mother’s milk (1.6.7; Brown, 2000, pp. 17-18).  He 
grew up a devout Christian, though his mother delayed his baptism.  More specifically, 
when Augustine suffered from serious illness—“pressure on the chest suddenly made hot 
with fever and almost at death’s door”—in his childhood, his mother Monica hastily 
made arrangements for her son to be baptized in the sacrament of salvation before his 
death.  However, this sacrament of baptism was postponed because Augustine suddenly 
recovered his physical health.  Later Augustine expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
decision of his mother for postponing his baptism and for her potential permissiveness 
regarding his youthful sensuality (1.11.17-18; Clark, 2000, pp. 1-2).4  
 In school, Augustine was a brilliant student who rapidly advanced to the highest 
levels of academic success, although his recollection of early boyhood was closely 
related to the painful memory of his schooling: “I was beaten…[and] compelled to follow 
[the laborious courses] by an increase of the toil and sorrow” (1.9.14).  Both Patricius and 
Monica were eagerly ambitious for their son.  They recognized Augustine’s superior gifts 
and sought to give him an opportunity to develop them.  After completing Augustine’s 
elementary training in Thagaste, they sent their son, at fifteen, to school at a neighboring 
                                                
 3 According to Henry Chadwick (1991a), “Catechumens [within the Christian tradition] were 
sanctified by the sign of the cross, prayer invoking the protection of God and the child’s guardian angel, 
laying on the hands, and salt placed on the tongue as an act of exorcism” (p. 13; see Bourke, 1945, p. 3). 
  
 4 In the time of Augustine, Christians were often baptized after adolescence so that the sins of their 
youth might be forgiven by baptism (Clark, 2000, pp. 1-2). 
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town, Madauros, in order to learn literature and oratory (369-370; see O’Donnell, 2005, p. 
119; Wills, 1999, pp. 5-10).  At the age of sixteen, Augustine’s study was interrupted, 
and he was called home because of his family’s lack of funds (2.3.5-6): “Augustine was 
back again at Thagaste…This was a miserable year, marked by a disquieting act of 
vandalism, and overshadowed by the sudden onslaught on an ambitious boy, who had 
hitherto been under constant pressure to succeed at school, of a belated adolescence’’ 
(Brown, p. 26). 
 During his adolescence, Augustine’s life was extremely turbulent.  He amused 
himself by delving into sensual pleasures of all kinds, despite his parents’ efforts to 
occupy him with schooling.  For example, the sixteen year-old Augustine and some 
friends stole “a huge load of pears” and then, instead of eating these pears, they threw 
them to the pigs (2.4.9).  Upon later describing this pear-theft event, Augustine severely 
reproached himself for what he considered a senseless and vicious act—“my pleasure 
was not in the pears; it was in the crime itself, done in association with a sinful group”—
in terms of sin, wickedness, and inappropriate human friendship of a peer group (2.5.10-
2.9.17). 
 
B. Carthage: Manichaeism and Common/Unlawful Marriage 
(Concubinage) (371-374) 
 
 In 371, Augustine (who was seventeen years old) went to Carthage in order to 
continue his study, especially rhetoric, with the financial support of his friends and 
relatives (e.g., Romanianus).  Carthage was the biggest city in North Africa (the second 
greatest city of the Western Roman Empire) which was an important place of politics, 
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education, and culture in the Roman world.  Augustine described this city as “a cauldron 
of illicit loves” which leapt and boiled around him (conf. 3.1.1; Brown, pp. 26-27; 
O’Donnell, 1992, I, p. 23).  He sought “an object for [his] love” and was captivated by 
theatrical shows (3.1.1-3.2.2).  However, his ingrained habit of religious practice 
prompted Augustine to attend the Mass of the Catechumens in the Christian community, 
where it seems, he met and fell in love with a young (freedwoman or lower-class) woman.  
He lived with this woman (whose name was not known for certain) for fifteen years5; his 
son, Adeodatus (“Given by God,” perhaps a common name in North Africa), whom he 
dearly loved, was born in 371 (conf. 4.2.2; Bourke, pp. 15-16; Finn, 1997, p. 216; 
O’Donnell, 2005, pp. 38-39, 58; Wills, pp. 16-18).6 
 During his study of rhetoric, the young Augustine was quiet, but was the top 
student in his class (3.3.6).  At the age of eighteen/nineteen, as part of his rhetoric 
                                                
 5 Peter Brown (2000) writes, “In all probability [Augustine’s unnamed woman] had been a good 
Catholic throughout her life” (p. 80).  Likewise, Garry Wills (1999) suggests that the name of Augustine’s 
wife would be called “Una,” although her name was literally and publicly unknown.  Wills insists that this 
woman was a Christian: “Una was a Catholic” (p. 16; see pp. 41-42).  Similar to Wills, Thomas M. Finn 
(1997) depicts Augustine’s unmarried wife as a Christian (p. 216). 
 
6 In the milieu of Augustine’s age, marriage was strictly regulated under Roman law, which was 
concerned with controlling citizenship rights.  It was forbidden between certain classes, and some groups of 
people were not permitted to marry at all.  As such, concubinage (concubinatus) was regarded as an 
alternate form for monogamous/stable relationship and as a respectable solution for conflicts within 
concrete human conditions (Power, 1999, p. 222).  It was common that bishops in late antiquity decided it 
would be impossible to forbid Communion to anyone faithful to one partner in such a relationship (see 
Hippolytus, apost. const. 16.23; Leo I, ep. 167).  In both church and state law, concubinage constituted a 
gray area and was very often assimilated to marriage in practical situations (Power, 1996, p. 104; 1999, p. 
222).  The earlier scholarly tradition tended to take Augustine at his own evaluation when writing on his 
sexual relationships as merely a prison of lust and habit (conf. 4.2.2, 6.12.21-22).  In light of Roman social 
history, more recent scholarship has emphasized the blurred boundary between legal marriage and long-
term concubinage, taking seriously Augustine’s perception of his partnership as a marriage (6.12.22).  
Therefore, these scholars understand Augustine’s relationship with his concubine to be equivalent to de 
facto marriage (O’Connell, 1993, pp. 78-81; O’Donnell, 1992, II, p. 377; Power, 1999, p. 223). 
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curriculum, Augustine read Cicero’s Hortensius7 (now lost work), which led him into an 
arduous quest for truth and philosophy: “the one thing that delighted me in Cicero’s 
exhortation was the advice not to study one particular sect but to love and seek and 
pursue and hold fast and strongly embrace wisdom itself, wherever found” (conf. 3.4.8; 
see sol. 1.10.17).  However, Hortensius failed to grip him entirely, because this book did 
not contain the Christian belief or message (which was related to “the name of Christ”) 
(conf. 3.4.7-8).  For this reason, Augustine (re)turned his attention from Hortensius to the 
Christian Scriptures but was disappointed with the Bible; that is, the literary quality of the 
early Latin version of the Bible appeared to him unsophisticated and “unworthy in 
comparison with the dignity of Cicero” (conf. 3.5.9; Bonner, p. 58; Chadwick, p. 11; 
O’Donnell, 1992, II, p. 170). 
 In order to find spiritual and intellectual comfort, he gave his allegiance to 
Manichaeism which was basically composed by the syncretistic and dualistic system (e.g., 
Light and Darkness or Good and Evil).  Mani, the founder of Manichaeism, was born in 
Persia in 216, began his teaching in Babylon in 242, and was martyred in 277.  Mani’s 
aim was to found a world religion and community which would overcome the special 
limitations of previous religious traditions.  Manichaeism incorporated elements from 
Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Judaism, and Christianity because each was recognized as a 
preparatory step in the universal message that Mani proclaimed.  Based on Persian 
                                                
 7 Cicero wrote Hortensius in 45 B.C. near the end of his life which is lost except for quotations 
(many in Augustine’s works).  In this book, Cicero rebutted Hortensius’ opinion that philosophical study 
has no social utility and does not contribute to human happiness.  Cicero depended much on Aristotle’s 
Protreptikos, notably for the argument that only a philosopher can judge the truth of Hortensius’ opinion, 
which is itself a philosophical statement.  As book ten of Confessions points out, Augustine was affected by 
Cicero’s analysis of the sources of happiness (Chadwick, 1991a, p. 39). 
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dualism, Mani’s conception of the relation between spirit and matter, and of salvation, in 
many ways resembled those of Gnosticism (Walker, 1970, pp. 98-99).  Thus, the 
Manichean mythology was a radically dualistic cosmology denigrating the material 
world.  The Manicheans explained the existence of evil by positing a conflict between 
God, the cause of all good, and matter, the source of evil.  The origin of the material 
world was attributed to an evil creator, whose power was perpetually at war with that of a 
good creator who was not responsible for the evil in the world.  Human beings were 
viewed as caught up in this inter-cosmic conflict between the power of the good creator 
and the power of the evil creator; as such, human persons were not responsible for their 
evil deeds.  The Manichees identified human salvation as the liberation of light trapped 
within their material bodies, which was achieved by extreme ascetic rejection of all that 
belongs to the material sphere, especially the physical appetites and desires.  In this vein, 
the Manichees repudiated parts of the Bible, especially the books of the Old Testament 
because they conceived the God of the Old Testament as a corporeal or material 
substance; they also considered the Old Testament as the story of the evil power’s reign 
over this world.  The membership of the Manichean party was in two classes: the “Elect” 
practiced their full austerities; and the “Hearers” accepted Manichean teachings, but with 
much less strictness of practice.  Manichaeism was widespread in the Roman Empire, 
especially in the fourth and fifth centuries when it grew rapidly.  Its influence lasted until 
the late Middle Ages.  As such, Augustine became a Manichee (i.e., a hearer) and 
adhered to the religious and philosophical sect with much emphasis on magic and 
numerology for nine years.  He took cover within Manichaean dualism in order to explain 
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conveniently both the origin of evil and the utter goodness of God.  He viewed God as an 
extended, and infinitely diffused, material substance (conf. 3.6.10-3.7.14, 7.5.7; Bonner, 
pp. 157-192; Bourke, pp. 17-23; Brown, pp. 35-49; Markus, 1999, p. 503; McGinn & 
McGinn, 2003, p. 153; Walker, pp. 98-99). 
 
C. From Carthage to Home and Back (375-383) 
 After finishing his study in Carthage, Augustine, as an ardent Manichee and a 
newly minded rhetorician, returned to his home town, Thagaste, with his unmarried wife 
and his son in order to open a school of grammar and rhetoric in 375.  He then proceeded 
to attempt to convert his Christian friends to Manichaeism (conf. 3.11.19; see Bourke, pp. 
23-24).  At that time, after the death of his father Patricius in 371, his mother Monica 
turned all of her attention to Augustine: “As mothers do, she [Monica] loved to have me 
[Augustine] with her, but much more than most mothers” (5.8.15).  However, Monica 
was deeply disappointed that her son made an unlawful marriage and embraced 
Manichaeism against traditional Christian belief.  She expelled him from home.  She had 
bitterly wept and had prayed daily for her son’s salvation that he might become again a 
Christian (3.11.19).  Eventually, Monica had a vision that she should take her son back; 
her vision was based on both the inspiration of her own dream about the future of 
Augustine—“Her vision was of herself standing on a rule made of wood…When she 
looked, she saw me standing beside her on the same rule” (3.11.19)—and the advice of a 
provincial bishop to whom she had tearfully lamented her wayward son—“Go away from 
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me: as you live, it cannot be that the son of these tears should perish” (3.12.21; see 
Bourke, pp. 23-24; Brown, p. 43). 
In the meantime, Augustine, the young Manichee, met his Christian friend in 376.  
He realized that this unnamed friend was arranged to be baptized before death because 
his friend suffered from a serious illness.  Augustine met his friend and mocked him, who 
did faithfully receive the sacrament of Christian baptism.  As such his friend was upset; a 
few days later, his friend died when Augustine was absent (conf. 4.4.8; Brown, p. 53; 
Wills, pp. 30-32).8  When he heard of the death of his unnamed friend, Augustine was 
very shocked and shameful, and decided to leave his town: 
My home town became a torture to me; my father’s house a strange world of 
unhappiness; all that I had shared with him was without him transformed into a 
cruel torment.  My eyes looked for him everywhere, and he was not there.  I hated 
everything because they did not have him, nor could they now tell me ‘look, he is 
on the way’, as used to be the case when he was alive and absent from me 
(4.4.9)…I fled from my home town, for my eyes sought for him less in a place 
where they were not accompanied to see him.  And so from the town of Thagaste 
I came to Carthage. (4.7.12) 
 
 In the same year, 376, Augustine (who was twenty-two years old) returned to 
Carthage and, as a great scholar, he taught rhetoric until age twenty-nine.  He made many 
friends in the process of striking success of study and teaching, including Vindicianus (a 
current proconsul of Africa), Nebridius (who later became a crucial member of the lay 
monastery), Flaccianus (a future proconsul of Africa), and Alypius (who was a student of 
Augustine and later became a closest friend) (Clark, p. 3).  He participated in the 
                                                
 8 At the time of Augustine, the Manichees rejected any sacrament of baptism as a superfluous and 
useless external act.  However, the North African Churches accepted to baptize an unconscious person in 
the midst of the fatal condition of the body and mind (if he or she was a catechumen).  Augustine’s 
unnamed friend wanted to stay in the tradition of a Christian family or Christian churches; so he was 
evidently responsible for his baptism against Augustine’s criticism (Chadwick, 1991a, p. 57). 
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oratorical contest of Carthage and was crowned for a theatrical poem (conf. 4.2.3, 4.3.5).  
Augustine published a well-received book, On the Beautiful and the Fitting (380/381), 
which was dedicated to Hierius the Syrian, a contemporary orator in Rome.  Augustine 
admired him for his reputation and wanted to be known by him (4.13.20-4.14.21).  
However, the Manichean dogma gradually ceased to satisfy Augustine’s sharp intellect 
and the deep religious issues which were tormenting him.  His Manichean associates 
urged him to meet the highly respected Manichaean bishop, Faustus (who was a leading 
thinker and apologist in their religious sect), when their bishop arrived in Carthage.  In 
their meeting, Faustus could not answer the questions Augustine posed, and he lacked the 
wide-ranging quality of liberal learning that the young intellectual expected.  With this 
feeling of disenchantment, Augustine lost all respect for Manichaeism: “After he 
[Faustus] had clearly showed his lack of training in liberal arts in which I had supposed 
him to be highly qualified, I began to lose all hope that he would be able to analyze and 
resolve the difficulties which disturbed me” (5.7.12).  The inadequacy of Faustus’ 
answers to Augustine’s questions led a young Augustine to remain outwardly a Manichee 
but to become now inwardly a skeptic (conf. 5.3.3-5.7.13; see Bourke, pp. 35-38).  In 
addition to his intellectual and religious frustration within the Manichaean sect, the 
rowdyism of Augustine’s students in Carthage led this young teacher of the liberal arts 
into a more unendurably feeling of disenchantment: “At Carthage the license of the 
students is foul and uncontrolled…They commit many acts of vandalism with an 
astonishing mindlessness…Thereby their wretched self-delusion is shown up” (5.8.14).  
Augustine became despondent, restless, and decided to move to Rome.  His mother, 
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Monica, vehemently opposed her son’s departure to a far-away, remote place.  But in fall 
383, Augustine was able to set sail for Rome after deceiving his mother in a rather 
heartless fashion, by declaring that his intention was only to take leave of a friend.  While 
Monica returned to a little oratory, dedicated to St. Cyprian, to pray, Augustine escaped 
by ship in the night, leaving his mother to her lamentations: 
When morning came, she [Monica] was crazed with grief, and with 
recriminations and groans….These agonies proved that there survived in her the 
remnants of Eve, seeking with groaning for the child she had brought forth in 
sorrow (Gen. 3: 16).  And yet after accusing me of deception and cruelty, she 
turned again to pray for me and to go back to her usual home.  Meanwhile I came 
to Rome. (conf. 5.8.15; see Bonner, pp. 69-70; Bourke, pp. 39-40; O’Donnell, 
1992, I, p. 52) 
 
 
D. Rome and Milan: Skepticism and Neoplatonism (383-386) 
In the same year, 383, Augustine arrived in Rome within the hospitality of his 
Manichaean patrons, although he had no enthusiasm in his mind for Manichaeism.  He 
fell gravely ill on arrival but he did not arrange to receive any Christian rite of baptism 
(conf. 5.9.16; see Bonner, p. 70).  After recovering his health, he became a professor of 
rhetoric in Rome.  Augustine realized that his students committed no acts of vandalism, 
but they did intend to avoid paying their tuition: they clubbed together and transferred to 
another teacher just as the fee came due (5.12.22).  In early autumn 384, Augustine 
moved to Milan, the Western capital of the Roman Empire, by the aid of his Manichean 
friends.  Symmachus especially, as a prominent Manichee and a powerful prefect of 
Rome, helped Augustine to acquire a government appointment as the municipal chair of 
rhetoric in Milan (conf. 5.13.23; see Bourke, pp. 41-42; Brown, pp. 55-61). 
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 Through the circle of intellectuals of Milan, Augustine found the books of 
Neoplatonists (e.g., Plotinus and Porphyry), which disabused him of his Manichaean 
materialism (Brown, pp. 82-95; Harrison, 2006, pp. 27-31; O’Donnell, 2005, pp. 122-
123; O’Meara, 2001, pp. 139-153).9  He was inspired by these Neoplatonic books that 
God, as spirit, is the incorruptible, infinite, and eternal creator of all that exists, and that 
evil, far from being a substance, is the absence or privation of being.  In addition, 
Augustine learned from these books that the Divine was buried deep within him, awaiting 
only discovery that he sought by introspection (conf. 7.10.16; O’Donnell, 1992, I, pp. 89-
90).  However, Augustine later realized and recalled that the books of Neoplatonists did 
not include the name of Jesus Christ, that is, the Platonic philosophers had no knowledge 
of the Word’s taking flesh and dying for human sin (7.21.27). 
 While living in Milan, Augustine was significantly influenced by Bishop Ambrose, 
who was a Roman aristocrat.10  Along with his readings of the Neoplatonic books, he 
                                                
9 Neoplatonism was a pantheistic and mystical interpretation of Platonic thoughts.  It was founded 
by Ammonius Saccas in Alexandria and was developed by Plotinus (205-270), who settled in Rome about 
244; the leadership of Neoplatonism was passed from Plotinus to Porphyry (233-304).  For Neoplatonists, 
God is simple, all-perfect, and absolute existence, from whom the lower existences come.  God is the One, 
above the duality implied in thought, and from God the Nous emanates.  From the Nous the world-soul 
derives being, and from that individual souls.  From the world-soul the realm of matter comes.  Each stage 
is inferior in the amount of being it possesses to the one above reaching in gradations from God to matter.  
Neoplatonists viewed salvation as “a rising of the soul to God in mystic contemplation, the end of which 
was union with the divine”; the morals of Neoplatonism, like those of later Greek philosophy generally, 
were ascetic (Walker, 1970, p. 98; see Chadwick, 1986, pp.17-24; Harrison, 2006, pp. 77-79). 
  
 10 Ambrose was born and raised in a Christian household and had long been initiated into the 
catechumenate with traditional Christian rites in Gaul: a priest had imposed his hand on his forehead, traced 
the sign of the cross on it, and given him salt to taste.  In the fourth century, there was doctrinal turmoil that 
embroiled not only Cyril of Jerusalem—he was exiled three times—but also Christian emperors, leaders, 
thinkers, and lay people from west Gaul all the way to East Syria.  The cause of this turmoil was a divisive 
question in a religious controversy:  “In what sense is Christ, the son of God, divine?” There was an answer 
at the Council of Nicaea in 325: “as son of God, Christ is what his Father is, divine in nature; Son and 
Father are consubstantial”  However, this answer provoked more tumult than the question had, pitting anti-
Nicene Christians, customarily called Arians, and Nicene Christians against each other (Finn, 1999, pp. 
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listened to the preaching of Bishop Ambrose.  Based on his own exegetical rule of “the 
letter kills, but the Spirit gives life” (2 Cor 3:6), Bishop Ambrose allegorically explained 
many sections of the Bible, instead of interpreting its texts merely literally.  Augustine 
gradually found himself becoming interested in the content as well as the rhetoric 
technique of his sermons (conf. 5.13.23-5.14.24; see Bourke, pp. 50-51; Brown, pp. 74-
77; O’Donnell, 2005, pp. 54-55; O’Meara, pp. 109-124).  In particular, through 
Ambrose’s gifted interpretation of the Bible, Augustine began to recognize a greater 
depth and wisdom in Christian doctrine or belief than he had previously supposed 
(5.13.23).  Ambrose, as a Christian and a Neoplatonist mentor, had affected Augustine to 
turn away from Manichaeism and toward Christianity.  However, in line with the 
teaching of the Academics, Augustine remained skeptical about the possibility of finding 
any truth.  As such he decided to become again a catechumen and to just remain in the 
status of catechumen within the Christian community of Milan (5.14.25). 
 About this time, Augustine’s mother, Monica, came to Milan.  She was happy 
because her son was no longer a Manichean, although Augustine was not yet a baptized 
Christian believer (6.1.1).  She regularly attended the Mass of the church and sincerely 
followed Bishop Ambrose’s spiritual guidance about the African religious practices: “In 
accordance with my mother’s custom in Africa, she had taken to the memorial shrines of 
                                                                                                                                            
213-215).  In 374, the death of the Arian bishop, Auxentius, led the Milanese into seeking a successor of 
the New Basilica (Milan’s cathedral).  The two factions, the Arians and Nicene Christians, were soon in 
bitter struggle as to the theological complexion of the successor.  As such Ambrose, the young governor of 
the province, entered the New Basilica to quiet the throng.  The cry of a child was raised, “Ambrose for 
Bishop,” at which point the congregation regarded this voice as a divine command.  Ambrose was elected 
bishop of Milan, although he was a just catechumen.  Shortly after, Ambrose was baptized by Simplicianus, 
his father and spiritual mentor, on November 30, 374.  Strongly attached to the Nicene faith, Ambrose 
made no compromise with the Arians, and resisted all their attempts to secure places of worship in Milan.  
At that time, the Arians were aided by the Empress Justina, mother of the youthful Valentinian II (Bourke, 
1945, pp. 44, 83; McLynn, 1999, pp. 17-19; Sun, 1998, p. 228; Walker, pp. 128-129). 
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the saints cakes and bread and wine, and was forbidden by the janitor.  When she knew 
that the bishop was responsible for the prohibition, she accepted it in so devout and docile 
a manner” (conf. 6.2.2; see Bourke, p. 45; O’Donnell, p. 150).  In particular, Monica 
helped her bishop, when he had defended the church against the Roman army during the 
time of religious controversy against the Arians (9.7.15). 
 Meanwhile, Monica found that Augustine was still living with his unmarried wife 
and his son, Adeodatus.  Monica persuaded Augustine to dismiss his “unlawful” wife 
because she was a hindrance both to her son’s lawful marriage with a woman of a higher 
class and to her son’s ambitions for pubic office: “In a small provincial town in Africa, 
the only alternative to a career that took him far away from his background, was poverty 
and boredom; and the only chance of permanent success, an alliance with those great 
families, who, in distant Rome and Milan, controlled the destinies of men of talent from 
the provinces” (Brown, p. 52).  Augustine discharged his unmarried wife, whereby she 
returned to North Africa and vowed herself to continence (conf. 6.15.25; Chadwick, 1986, 
pp. 15-16; O’Donnell, 1992, II, pp. 383-385).  Her departure plunged Augustine to the 
depths of misery, although his son Adeodatus remained with him in Milan: “My heart 
which was deeply attached was cut and wounded, and left a trail of blood” (6.15.25).11  
                                                
11 There are diverse opinions about Augustine’s dismissal of his unmarried wife.  A strong 
tradition has argued that Monica must take the blame for engineering this dismissal in her motherly project 
to get Augustine married and baptized, but the snobbery of the Milanese has also been blamed (Brown, pp. 
51-52, 79-81).  More recently Augustine has been held responsible for his own decisions (Power, 1996, p. 
104).  Some scholars do not even perceive it as a problem, understanding his action simply as the natural 
decision of an elite man within the milieu of his age, when a permanent marriage with a lower-class woman 
would prevent the attainment of his ambitions for public office: “We must think of fourth-century Africa, 
where some women, whatever were their personal attractions and qualities, could not, because of their low 
condition—even if they were Christians—expect marriage with a man of Augustine’s position.  Women did 
not claim equality of opportunity among themselves and still less equality of rights with men.  Some 
women could expect to marry Augustine; others—and Augustine’s mistress was clearly one of these—
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Augustine was engaged to a young Milanese heiress—who was twelve years old—and, 
by Roman law, had to wait two years to marry her.  Because Augustine was unable to 
maintain continence, he procured another woman (conf. 6.15.25; Bonner, pp. 78-79; 
Bourke, pp. 51-52; Plumer, 2003, pp. 104-105; Vaught, 2003, pp. 152-153). 
 Although Augustine was intellectually convinced of the truth of Christianity, he 
still held back from seeking baptism.  During the period of his existential despair (the 
summer of 386), Augustine, as Ambrose once had done, put himself in the hands of 
Simplicianus, who was a convert from Paganism and now a celebrated priest,12 in order 
to consult with his spiritual mentor about his troubles.  Simplicianus recounted for 
Augustine the conversion story of Marius Victorinus, who was born in Africa and 
became a famous orator in Rome.  Although Victorinus was an ardent and venerable 
Neoplatonist philosopher, he publicly confessed his Christian faith and received the 
sacrament of baptism within the Christian community in 355.  Consequently, he resigned 
his professorship in Rome because of the edict of the emperor Julian:13 “Later on, he 
                                                                                                                                            
never” (O’Meara, 2001, p. 123; see E. A. Clark, 1999, p. 68; Quinn, 2007, p. 326).  Certainly, many 
bishops and ascetic teachers would have seen the dismissal of a concubine and a legitimate betrothal as a 
moral as well as a political step upward: “To abandon one’s concubine, in order to take a wife in legitimate 
matrimony, was ‘not bigamy, but a sign of moral improvement’” (Brown, p. 79; see Hippolytus, apost. 
const. 16.23; Leo I, ep. 167; Power, 1999, p. 222).  In his own later sermons, Augustine, as Bishop of 
Hippo, was against concubines for the married, or for those who took them cynically as a stopgap before 
marriage (s. 224.3). 
  
12 Simplicianus, as a senior priest, moved from Rome to Milan in order to baptize Ambrose, who 
was a governor but was unpredictably appointed as a bishop of Milan in 374.  “In Rome Simplicianus knew 
Marius Victorinus, a rhetorician of African origin, who embodied the ideal of high culture, writing (extant) 
books on grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic, translating some of Aristotle’s logic, and presenting to Latin 
readers works by Porphyry and Plotinus.  Victorinus read Neoplatonism into the prologue to St John’s 
gospel, and could count himself a Christian fellow-traveller” (Chadwick, 1991a, p. 134).  Simplicianus 
became a successor of Ambrose as bishop of Milan in 397 and died in 400 (p. 133). (152) 
 
 13 Julian’s edict of June 17, 362 was based on the presupposition that pagan literature and pagan 
religion are indissoluble.  Many Christians (e.g., Gregory of Nazianzus) resented it.  In City of God, 
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added, in the time of the emperor Julian when a law was promulgated forbidding 
Christians to teach literature and rhetoric, Victorinus welcomed the law and preferred to 
abandon the school of loquacious chattering” (8.5.10).  Augustine knew Victorinus’ work 
and could not miss the parallels in his own life (conf. 8.1.1-8.5.10; see Bourke, pp. 59-61; 
O’Donnell, 2005, p. 59; Wills, pp. 44-45).  Shortly thereafter, Augustine (and Alypius) 
received a surprise visit of Ponticianus who was an African and did hold high office in 
the court.  By chance Ponticianus found a book of the letters of the apostle Paul on the 
table which Augustine had been reading.14  As a baptized Christian believer, Ponticianus 
encouraged Augustine in his study of the Bible.  Augustine (and Alypius) heard several 
more conversion stories from Ponticianus, including the story of Antony the Egyptian 
monk who was a pioneer of desert monasticism, and the stories of two friends of the 
Emperor who immediately adopted the ascetic life (conf. 8.6.14-15; see Bourke, pp. 62-
63; Brown, p. 99; Finn, 1999, p. 220).  These conversion stories led Augustine into the 
depths of the restlessness of his heart: “The arguments were exhausted and all had been 
refuted.  The only thing left to it was a mute trembling, and as if it were facing death it 
was terrified of being restrained from the treadmill of habit by which it suffered ‘sickness 
unto death’” (8.7.18; see 8.8.19). 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Augustine regarded this edict as “an act of persecuting intolerance” (civ. Dei 18.52) (Chadwick, 1991a, pp. 
139-140). 
 
14 While writing book eight of his Confessions, Augustine cited the letters of the Apostle Paul, 
especially Romans.  The identifiable citations of Romans in book eight make a pattern as follows: 1) conf. 
8.1.2—Rom 1:21-22; 2) conf. 8.5.11—Rom 7:17; 3) conf. 8.5.12—Rom 7:22-25; 4) conf. 8.10.22—Rom 
7:17, 20; 5) conf. 8.12. 29—Rom 13:13-14; and 6) conf. 8.12.30—Rom.14:1 (see O’Donnell, 1992, III, p. 
3). 
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 II. Augustine’s Conversion to Christianity in the Summer of 386 
 This section of the chapter presents an account of Augustine’s conversion to 
Christianity in the summer of 386.  Augustine himself portrayed his own conversion 
experience in a garden of Milan (8.8.19, 8.11.27, 8.12.28-30).  In the agony of his 
internal warfare, he had painfully experienced a cleft between his ideals and his conduct 
(8.5.10).15  One day in the late summer of 386, he rushed into the garden and threw 
himself down under a certain tree because his self-condemnation and internal tension 
became unendurable.  Here Augustine prayed to God, “Grant me chastity and continence, 
but not yet” (8.7.17).  In the midst of his violent turmoil in which his divided will 
struggled against itself, Augustine heard a divine voice and command—“Pick up and 
read, pick up and read”—through the chanting of a neighboring child and read the letter 
of the apostle Paul—“Let us live honorably as in the day…Put on the Lord Jesus Christ, 
and make no provision for the flesh, to gratify its desires” (Rom 13:13-14).  While 
reading the Bible, Augustine had experienced the intervention and revelation of the 
divine in his mind and his life.  This garden experience transformed him.  A light of 
confidence shone in his heart and the darkness of uncertainty vanished (8.12.28-29).  
Shortly after, like Augustine, Alypius read the letter of Paul (i.e., Rom 14:1) and also 
converted to God (8.12.30).  From the garden Augustine and Alypius came to Monica 
and told her what had happened to them.  She was filled with joy (8.12.30). 
                                                
15 Augustine used Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians 5:17 in order to portray his conflict between two 
wills: “For what the flesh desires is opposed to the Spirit, and what the Spirit desires is opposed to the 
flesh; for these are opposed to each other, to prevent you from doing what you want.” 
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 This garden experience at Milan enabled Augustine to make a new decision for 
reorganizing the rest of his lifetime.  Augustine made up his mind both to give up his 
ambition for success in this world and to stand firmly upon the rule of Christian faith.  
Thus, Augustine resigned his professorship of rhetoric, renounced his legal betrothal with 
a young rich heiress for acquiring a higher status in Roman society (e.g., a governor of a 
province), and engaged in the life of asceticism and celibacy in the Christian community 
(conf. 8.12.30; see Bonner, pp. 87-92; Bourke, pp. 63-67; Brown, pp. 96-102; Harrison, p. 
20; Lancel, 2002, pp. 95-98; O’Donnell, 1992, III, pp. 55-71; Wills, pp. 45-47). 
 Augustine’s description of his garden experience at Milan in the summer of 386 
is essential for understanding his conversion to God—“You converted me to yourself” 
(convertisti enim me ad te) (8.12.30; O’Donnell, 1992, I, p. 102).  About a decade later, 
Augustine wrote the Confessions (397-401 A.D.) which was a spiritual autobiography of 
his ongoing-progress of transformation.  This book lays out the narrative of his 
conversion—from birth to baptism.  Augustine’s garden experience at Milan represents 
the moment of decision for his new life.  The preceding thirty-two years of his life had 
led up to this garden experience.  Along with his conversion to Christianity, Augustine 
became a great converting person16 and had engaged in other decisive events for his 
remaining forty-four years (e.g., his baptism in 387) (see Finn, p. 221). 
 
 
                                                
16 In this dissertation, I emphasize conversion as “a process, not a specific event” as noted in 
chapter one and two.  Presented by Lewis R. Rambo (1993), the word converting refers to a process of 
conversion (p. 7). 
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III. After Augustine’s Conversion to Christianity 
 This section of the chapter describes Augustine’s life history after his conversion 
to Christianity (386-430).  His garden experience enabled the convert Augustine to find a 
new way of Christian living in solitude and community for the rest of his life.  This 
section consists of three main themes: 1) Cassiciacum, Milan, Ostia, and Rome: the 
communal life, Christian baptism, and the mystical vision (386-388), 2) Carthage and 
Thagaste: the monastic life as a layperson (388-391), and 3) Hippo Regius: the monastic 
life and church ministry as a monk and a priest/bishop (391-430).  While describing his 
main life changes after his conversion, this study attempts to articulate some of his main 
thought (e.g., 1) God and the soul, 2) sin and God’s grace, 3) creation, time, and eternity, 
4) the unity of the love of God and love of neighbor—contemplation and action, and 5) 
the Christian church and baptism) which were deeply related to his debates with the 
Manichees, Donatists, Arians, and Pelagians. 
 
A. Cassiciacum, Milan, Ostia, and Rome: The Communal Life, 
Christian Baptism, and the Mystical Vision (386-388) 
  
 After his conversion to Christianity, Augustine retreated to the country estate of 
his fellow professor, Verecundus, at Cassiciacum (now Casago Brianza), while 
accompanied by his mother, son, brother, two cousins, his closest friend Alypius, and 
other friends (conf. 9.2.2-3; Bourke, pp. 69-70; Sun, 1998, p. 239).17  During his stay at 
                                                
 17 According to Vernon J. Bourke (1945), Augustine lived together at Cassiciacum with at least 
eight others: “his mother, Monnica; his son, Adeodatus; his brother, Navigius; two cousins, Lastidianus and 
Rusticus; two pupils, Licentius and Trygetius; and Alypius” (p. 70). 
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Cassiciacum, Augustine suffered from a serious infection in his lungs, and now he 
resigned his professorship of rhetoric: 
During that summer in consequence of too heavy a teaching load in literary 
studies, my lungs had begun to weaken.  Breathing became difficult.  Pains on the 
chest were symptoms of the lesion, and deprived me of power to speak clearly or 
for any length of time…it was virtually enforcing the necessity of resigning the 
burden of my teaching responsibility. (9.2.4) 
 
 After recovering his health, Augustine, as a Christianized Neoplatonist, earnestly 
participated in philosophical discussions with his friends.  More specifically, he held 
extended discussions with his circle of intelligent colleagues about the possibility of 
arriving at truth, the happy life and the knowledge of God, providence and the problem of 
evil, the quest for God, and the immortality of the soul.  Based on these philosophical and 
religious discussions, Augustine wrote some of his early works: Against the Skeptics 
(386); On the Happy Life (386) in which he contended that wisdom is a certain spiritual 
“measure” that corresponds exactly to the soul’s needs, and that the true knowledge of 
God is wisdom and happiness—the human soul desires happiness which can be attained 
only in the possession of God; On Order (386), his first written struggle with the problem 
of evil, in which Augustine insisted that the divine order is achieved through the spiritual 
and intellectual discipline which leads to the knowledge of self and of the spiritual world, 
and that 1) nothing can exist outside the divine order, 2) evil does not have its source 
within this order, and 3) divine justice does not permit evil to escape order, but calls it to 
a proper ordering; The Soliloquies (386-387), a personal dialogic monologue, in which he 
earnestly sought for knowing both God and the soul; On the Immortality of the Soul (386-
387) in which he argued that the soul is unchangeable and immortal.  (Augustine’s 
 158 
concept of the immortality of the soul was later linked to his concept of Christian faith in 
the resurrection of the body.)  Besides these works, Augustine began to write On Music 
(387-391) and later completed it in Africa.  In this work, Augustine understood music as 
a discipline which is related to the preparation for describing and understanding the 
nature of the unseen; this work is formulated by the discussion of 1) particularity within 
sound material, 2) motion, and 3) mind-cognition (see Bourke, pp. 70-78; Brown, pp. 
108-116; Clark, p. 8; Markus, p. 498; Sun, pp. 239-240).  As such, here Augustine had 
gradually developed his statement of the twofold object of philosophy, which emphasized 
the interaction between God and human soul: 
To philosophy pertains a twofold question: the first treats of the soul; the second, 
of God.  The first makes us know ourselves; the second, our origin. The former is 
the more delightful to us; the latter, more precious. The former makes us fit for a 
happy life; the latter renders us happy…This is the order of wisdom’s branches of 
study by which one becomes competent to grasp the order of things and to discern 
two worlds and the very Author of the universe, of whom the soul has no 
knowledge save to know how it knows Him not. (ord. 2.18.47; see sol. 1.2.7, 
2.1.1; Plotinus, enn. 1.6.9) 
 
 Consistent with (his conversion experience in Milan) and his healing experience in 
Cassiciacum, Augustine was strongly determined to receive Christian baptism.  He wrote 
a letter to Bishop Ambrose of Milan about his baptism and asked which specific part of 
the Bible was appropriate for preparing his baptism.  Ambrose encouraged him to 
become a baptized Christian and recommended him to read the prophet Isaiah.  Several 
months later, Augustine, as a catechumen, returned to Milan to participate in the 
Milanese baptismal liturgy (conf. 9.5.13; see Bonner, pp. 94-95).  On the night of April 
24-25, 387 (at the Easter Vigil), Augustine was baptized, along with Adeodatus and 
Alypius, by Bishop Ambrose at the baptistery of the Milanese cathedral (9.6.14).  As later 
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Possidius (who was Augustine’s biographer) notes, “Straightway, established in the 
Catholic faith, an ardent desire was awakened in [Augustine] to perfect himself in 
religion, and so with the coming of the holy days of Easter he received the water of 
baptism.  And thus it happened that by divine grace he received through the great and 
illustrious prelate Ambrose the salutary doctrine of the Catholic Church and the divine 
Sacraments” (Possidius, v. Aug. 1).  Augustine rejoiced in the presence of God and 
celebrated his sacrament of baptism with his mother, his friends, and church members 
(see Bourke, pp. 81-83; Brown, pp. 117-118; Finn, pp. 221-231; O’Donnell, 2005, pp. 
59-61). 
 Not long after his baptism, Augustine made up his mind to go back to North 
Africa with his mother, Adeodatus, Navigius, Alypius, and his other faithful friends (e.g., 
Evodius) in order to establish a new monastic lay community (9.8.17).  When they 
arrived at Ostia on the Tiber (which was far removed from crowds), they rested 
themselves to rehabilitate their strength for a long voyage to North Africa.  On a beautiful 
day, Augustine and his mother, Monica, were standing, leaning out of a window of the 
house overlooking a garden; then they profoundly and honestly talked about spiritual 
pilgrimage in this world, related to issues of Christian lives of past, present, and future.  
During this conversation, they were deeply immersed into themselves; they felt the 
intervention of the divine within themselves and experienced the steadfast love of God.  
This means that Augustine and his mother shared a mystic/ecstatic experience of union 
with God at Ostia (9.10.23-26). 
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 However, a few days later, Monica fell sick of fever.  Monica realized that she 
would not recover from her serious illness and requested that her sons (Augustine and 
Navigius) bury her body at Ostia, although she previously intended to be entombed next 
to her husband’s tomb in her hometown (9.11.27-28).  Monica died: “On the ninth day of 
her illness, when she was aged 56, and I was 33, this religious and devout soul was 
released from the body” (9.11.28).  Augustine deeply lamented his mother’s death 
(9.12.29).  Monica was buried at Ostia (9.12.32-9.13.37).18  Around this time, the plan of 
Augustine and his friends for returning to North Africa was delayed for a year.  Although 
the precise reason for this delay was not clear, it was related to the unexpected death of 
Monica (Bourke, p. 90) and a blockade of the Mediterranean: 
Monica’s death seems to have altered his plans and delayed his return for a 
year…from certain words of Augustine, it seems to have been due to the unsettled 
conditions brought about by the rebellion of Maximus, the military governor of 
Britain, who had been raised to the purple by his soldiery in the spring of 385 and 
had established himself in Gaul after the assassination of the Emperor Gratian on 
25 August of the same year.  In 387 Maximus’ armies drove the young emperor 
Valentinian from Italy; his fleet controlled the sea, while Gildo, the Count of 
Africa, was on friendly terms with him.  In these circumstances, Augustine may 
well have deemed it prudent to remain in Italy until the political situation should 
become more settled, or at least a little clearer. (Bonner, pp. 104-105) 
 
 Augustine and his followers went to Rome and lived together.  During this period, 
Augustine held philosophical and religious conversations with his friends and recovered 
his strength.  As a newly baptized Christian, Augustine met church leaders of Rome and 
                                                
18 Augustine describes Monica’s life, especially the story of her death, as found in Confessions 
9.8.17-9.13.37.  This story of the death of Monica is one of the noblest monuments of ancient Christian 
literature.  Medieval pilgrims recorded the epitaph on Monica’s tomb at Ostia which was placed early in the 
fifth century by Anicius Aucherius Bassus, consul in 431.  In the summer of 1945, the tomb of Monica was 
discovered when some young people were digging a hole in a small courtyard beside the church of S. 
Aurea at Ostia in order to plant a post for their basketball game (Brown, 2000, pp. 121-124; Chadwick, 
1991a, p. 174; Lancel, 2002, p. 119; Sun, 1998, p. 241). 
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learned the main doctrines of Christianity and the sacraments of the Roman churches.  At 
the same time, he also contacted his former Manichean friends and patrons of Rome in 
order to refute their claims of Manichaeism and to encourage them to be converted 
toward Christianity: 
Augustine felt that there was no hurry about starting the journey.  He hardly knew 
the Rome of the Christians.  During his earlier period of teaching there, he had 
lived and worked with his fellow Manicheans.  Now he had an opportunity to 
learn the doctrines and practices of the Church of Christ in the Eternal City.  At 
this time, Augustine looked forward to a quiet life of monastic retirement and 
study. (Bourke, p. 90) 
 
 During his stay in Rome, as a newly baptized Christian, Augustine continuously 
repudiated Manichean teachings about God and the human person and wrote some of his 
early works: The Greatness of the Soul (387-388), proposed as the record of a dialogue 
between Augustine and his friend Evodius, in which Augustine demonstrated the soul’s 
greatness which culminates in the three levels of moral purification, of the soul’s gazing 
upon the truth, and of its contemplative vision of the truth; On the Catholic and the 
Manichean Ways of Life (387-389), his first response undertaken directly against 
Manichaeism, in which he had attempted to defend the Old Testament, to show the 
superiority of Christian asceticism than Manichean asceticism, and to attack the high 
claims made by the Manichees for continence.  Besides these works, Augustine began to 
write On Genesis against the Manichees (388-389/390), the first of many works of 
scriptural exegesis, in which Augustine rejected the Manichean negative attitude on the 
Old Testament and achieved his literal interpretation of the words of Genesis consonant 
with Christian faith.  He also began to write On Free Will (388-395), which he later 
completed in Africa (Bonner, pp. 105, 135; Bourke, pp. 91-105; Clark, pp. 9-10; Sun, p. 
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242).  After the defeat of Maximus’ armies on August 28, 388, Augustine finally set sail 
for North Africa with his son, brother, and friends with the hope of pursuing a monastic 
life (Bonner, pp. 105-106; Bourke, p. 105). 
 
B. Carthage and Thagaste: The Monastic Life as a Layperson (388-391) 
 Circa the autumn of 388, Augustine (now a mature middle-aged adult) arrived at 
Carthage, North Africa, after having lived in Italy for five years.  During his stay in 
Carthage, Augustine met his former pupils and devout Christian leaders of Carthage (e. 
g., Aurelius, deacon and future bishop of Carthage).  In particular, Augustine encountered 
Eulogius, his former student and now a teacher of rhetoric; Eulogius shared his unusual 
dream which was related to a vision for Augustine—Augustine’s role in and his impact 
on the churches of North Africa in the future.  When Eulogius was preparing a portion of 
Cicero to read with his pupils on the following day, he was baffled by a difficult passage.  
In the same night, during his sleep, Eulogius dreamed that Augustine, his former teacher, 
appeared to him and extraordinarily instructed him on how to understand the difficult part 
(Bonner, p. 106; Bourke, pp. 106-107). 
 Not long after his arrival at Carthage, Augustine went to his hometown, Thagaste, 
with his son Adeodatus, his friend Alypius, Evodius, and other friends.  Augustine sold 
most of the family property to help the poor, but held his former house at Thagaste in 
order to found a lay Christian monastery (Possidius, v. Aug. 3; see ep. 126.7; s. 355.2).  
At that time, Augustine knew two forms of monastic life: “the solitary hermitage of the 
desert anchorites and the community life of the cenobites whom he had visited in Milan 
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and Rome” (Bourke, p. 108); he chose the latter.  Within this little monastic community, 
Augustine kept a form of shared life with other members and continued his studies and 
meditation (much as at Cassiciacum) with the circle of intelligent, resourceful, and 
devoted colleagues.  He wrote some of his early works: On the Teacher (389) in which he 
insisted that human persons need to use signs in order to teach any reality to other 
persons, and that the reality to which the sign refers is known not through the sign itself 
but through consulting the “inner teacher,” Christ; On the True Religion (389-390), 
Augustine’s last work prior to his priestly ordination, which was dedicated to his friend 
and former patron, Romanianus.  From a perspective of Christian Neoplatonism, it was 
apparently intended to wean Romanianus from the Manichaeism toward a contemplative 
mode of Christianity.  Besides these works, Augustine finished On Genesis against the 
Manichees (388-389/390) (Bonner, pp. 106-109; Bourke, pp. 107-122; Brown, pp. 125-
127; Clark, p. 10; Markus, p. 499; Sun, pp. 242-243). 
 Meanwhile, Augustine lost his son, Adeodatus, who was born in Carthage in 372 
and was baptized with his father, Augustine, and Alypius by bishop Ambrose of Milan in 
387.  Adeodatus had participated in the philosophical conversations at Cassiciacum; he 
returned to Thagaste with Augustine and was superbly educated both in the Scriptures 
and in Virgil, and had some knowledge of Punic.  Augustine’s On the Teacher (389) was 
proposed as the record of a conversation between Adeodatus and Augustine.  Because 
Adeodatus was so brilliant, Augustine was greatly satisfied; but the youthful Adeodatus 
died around 389 (conf. 9.6.14; see Chadwick, 1991a, p. 164; Fitzgerald, 1999a, p. 7; 
Lancel, pp. 140-143).  Augustine later recalled his son as follows: 
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[Adeodatus’] intelligence surpassed that of many serious and well-educated men.  
I praise you, for your gifts, my Lord God…There Adeodatus is in dialogue with 
me…he was responsible for all the ideas there attributed to him in the role of my 
partner in the conversation.  He was 16 at the time.  I learnt many other 
remarkable things about him.  His intelligence left me awestruck.  Who but you 
could be the Maker of such wonders? (9.6.14) 
 
 Augustine also lost his close and valued friend, Nebridius, who was born near 
Carthage and had “enthusiasm for the truth and for wisdom” (6.10.17).  Nebridius, as a 
Manichee, followed Augustine to Milan (6.10.17, 7.2.3.) but became a baptized Christian 
soon after Augustine.  He returned to Africa with Augustine and sincerely served God 
and God’s people—“He [Nebridius] was serving you in perfect chastity and continence 
among his own people in Africa, and through him his entire household became Christian” 
(9.3.6).  Nebridius died around 390 (9.3.6-9.4.7).  Such deaths of Adeodatus and 
Nebridius led Augustine into the depths of sorrow and agony; Augustine was no longer 
content to “live sweetly with the mind” (ep.10.1, quoted in Brown, p. 128).  During the 
past several years, Augustine had experienced tremendous and tragic losses, including 
those of his loving family members (e.g., separation with his unmarried wife, the deaths 
of Monica and Adeodatus) and his faithful friends (e.g., the deaths of Nebridius and 
Verecundus).  That meant that he needed both to reestablish his monastic community in a 
new locality (with an established rule) and to find new members for his religious group.  
Thus, Augustine went to Hippo Regius (near modern Bone in Algeria) in early 391 (see 
Brown, pp. 129-130; Walker, p. 162). 
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C. Hippo Regius: The Monastic Life and Church Ministry 
as a Monk and Priest/Bishop (391-430) 
 
 At the age of 37, Augustine arrived at Hippo Regius, a coastal town some 50 miles 
from Thagaste, in order to extend his project of the Christian monastery.  A long time 
later, Augustine recalled the goal of his visit during his preaching: “I, whom by God’s 
grace you see before you as your bishop, came to this city as a young man; many of you 
know that.  I was looking for a place to establish a monastery, and live there with my 
brothers” (s. 355.2).  By chance he participated in the worship service of the cathedral of 
Hippo.  Surprisingly, Augustine was appointed as a priest under pressure of Bishop 
Valerius and his congregation, although he vehemently resisted against this appointment: 
“I was caught, I was made a priest” (s. 355.2).  That means that Augustine forcibly 
became an assistant for the aged and Greek-speaking bishop, Valerius; this bishop had 
long desired to have a priest who could preach to the people in fluent Latin.  Now 
Valerius had secured Augustine and encouraged him to do so (Bonner, p. 114; Brown, pp. 
131-132; Lancel, pp. 150-152; O’Donnell, 2005, pp. 24-25; Walker, p. 162).  Later 
Possidius, Augustine’s biographer, described this scene which Augustine was seized for 
the office of presbyter: 
Now at this time the holy Valerius was bishop in the Catholic church at Hippo.  
But owing to the increasing demands of ecclesiastical duty, he addressed the 
people of God and exhorted them to provide and ordain a presbyter for the 
city…So they laid hands on him [Augustine] and, as is the custom in such cases, 
brought him to the bishop to be ordained, for all with common consent desired 
that this should be done and accomplished; and they demanded it with great zeal 
and clamor, while he [Augustine] wept freely. (Possidius, v. Aug. 4) 
 
 Augustine realized that he had no way to avoid the command of God’s church.  
Accordingly, he received his ordination as priest of the church of Hippo.  Augustine 
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requested of Valerius 1) that he needed to leave the church of Hippo for six months in 
order to acquire more meditation and study of the Scriptures to enable his task of 
ministering to God’s people (ep. 21.1-6), and 2) that he needed to reconstruct a monastic 
community at a new place, Hippo.  Augustine’s requests were permitted by Bishop 
Valerius; Valerius provided a garden (close to the cathedral) to Augustine and his friends 
for building a monastery (s. 355.2; see Bourke, pp. 123-125; Brown, p. 133; Clark, p. 10; 
Markus, p. 499). 
 Augustine gradually became a priest of profound convictions, who put his 
experience and idea at the service of the church of Hippo.  Bishop Valerius strongly 
supported Augustine to be an able priest.  He gave opportunities to Augustine (the 
‘priest’) for preaching to the congregation in the cathedral of Hippo, although these 
practices were unusual in the tradition of the African Church: “It was not the custom in 
Africa for bishops to allow presbyters to preach before them” (Bonner, p. 114).19  Not a 
long time after, Augustine became a famous preacher and an influential church leader in 
Africa, at which point he was invited to deliver a sermon in the presence of the assembled 
bishops in the African Council at Hippo in 393.  Based on this sermon, he published On 
the Faith and the Creed (Bonner, p. 115; Bourke, p. 126; Brown, pp. 133-135; Clark, p. 
11; Sun, p. 246).20 
                                                
19 Possidius states, “He [Bishop Valerius] gave his presbyter [Augustine] the right of preaching the 
Gospel in his presence in the church and very frequently of holding public discussions—contrary to the 
practice and custom of the African churches” (v. Aug. 5). 
 
 20 Augustine was one of great preachers in the Latin West who rivaled St. John Chrysostom in the 
Greek East.  His sermons were delivered not only at Hippo, but also in other African cities (e.g., the 
metropolis of Carthage).  Augustine’s sermons were characterized by profundity and spontaneity.  
Augustine did not read his sermons from a prepared script but delivered extempore whatever the Lord put 
 167 
 During the time of his priesthood, Augustine had primarily struggled against the 
Manichean heresy.  He was involved in public disputation with the Manichee, Fortunatus 
in 392 at the baths of Sossius, which resulted in the ruin of Fortunatus’ reputation and his 
departure from the city to hide his humiliation.  As such, Augustine produced Debate 
with Fortunatus the Manichee (392).  At that time, Augustine completed one of his anti-
Manichean works, On Free Will.  In this essay, Augustine repudiated the Manichean 
doctrine that evil (malum) has a real existence, independent of good; then he argued that 
evil had no origin other than the freely exercised choice of the will.  He wrote another 
anti-Manichean work, On the Usefulness of Belief (391-392) which was addressed to his 
friend, Honoratus, whom Augustine had himself persuaded to become a Manichee, and 
whom he now wished to lead back from Manichean error to Christian truth.  Besides 
these works, Augustine produced On Two Souls, against the Manicheans (391-392/3).  In 
this book, he rejected the Manichaean belief that there were two warring souls in every 
human being—one emanating from the principle of good (or light) and the other from 
evil (or matter), and that wrongdoing was not the responsibility of the individual, but the 
action of the evil soul.  Augustine also began to work The Literal Meaning of Genesis 
(393-426), which was not completed. 
In 395, Augustine became a coadjutor bishop of Hippo Regius with the strong 
demand and support of Bishop Valerius, although his nomination of the coadjutor bishop 
was not quite in conformity with ecclesiastical norms of the Council of Nicaea in 325 
                                                                                                                                            
into his mouth—quod Dominus donaverit (s. 151.1.1).  Professional stenographers took accurately down 
his unprepared sermons.  Various collections of his sermons grew and multiplied; these sermons have 
influenced millions of Christian believers across a range of cultures and times (Bonner, 2002, p. 145). 
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(Possidius, v. Aug. 8; Bonner, pp. 119-120; Bourke, pp. 136-137; Clark, p. 11; Lancel, pp. 
182-185).21  After the death of Valerius, Augustine, who was forty-two years old, 
succeeded Valerius as bishop of Hippo in 396 (see ep. 31.1-9; v. Aug. 8).  However, 
Bishop Megalius of Calama, along with some others, was more aware of Augustine the 
Manichee than of Augustine the (Catholic) Christian, although Bishop Aurelius of 
Carthage, the episcopal primate, was affirmative.  In fact, some were not convinced of the 
sincerity of Augustine’s conversion (Clark, p. 11).  For this reason, Augustine, as a 
bishop, wrote Confessions (397-401) to demonstrate the truth of his conversion to God 
and the church community as well as to guide God’s people into the proper Christian 
living before God (see retr. 2.6.1).22  He noted, “This I desire to do, in my heart before 
you [God] in confession, but before many witnesses with my pen” (conf. 10.1.1).  About 
this time, Augustine also wrote Miscellany of Eighty-Three Questions (388-396), which 
was a collection of answers to questions that had been submitted to him by his 
congregation concerning Christian living and church ministry. 
 In the earlier part of his episcopate, up to about 405 A.D., Bishop Augustine had 
continuously engaged in public disputation with the Manichean scholars and had written 
some polemical works.  More specifically, Augustine wrote On Continence (395-396) in 
                                                
 21 The eight canon of the Council of Nicaea in 325 forbade that two bishops were simultaneously 
appointed in one diocese.  Later Bishop Augustine regretted his ordination as auxiliary bishop of Hippo 
against the edict of the Council of Nicaea; so he supported this edict in his ministry of the church.  Further, 
Augustine endeavored to have decreed the prohibition of the Council of Nicaea by the councils of the 
bishops, especially the Third Council of Carthage in 397, that “the rules governing all the priests should be 
made known by the ordaining bishops to those about to be ordained and to those already ordained” 
(Possidius, v. Aug. 8; see Bonner, p. 120; Sun, p. 247). 
 
 22 Clark (2000) argues that the controversy over Augustine’s sincerity of conversion could be a 
deciding factor to write the Confessions: “a prose-poem of penitence for his past and of praise for God’s 
loving providence…it is an apologia for his present sincerity” (p. 11). 
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which he refuted the Manichean notion of the human person as composed of two 
antagonistic substances—the flesh and the spirit; he argued that both the flesh (the body) 
and the spirit (the soul) are created by a good God and are therefore good in themselves, 
and that the human person is the “whole” unity of the body and soul.  He also published 
Against the Epistle of Manichaeus Called Fundamental (396-397) in which he began by 
recalling his nine years with Mani’s followers and then explained why he turned to 
Christianity.  Augustine produced On the Nature of the Good (396-398/399) in which he 
described God as supreme good and all other beings as hierarchically arranged according 
to their own innate goodness; this God is the author of all those goods.  At that time, 
Augustine had a public controversy with the Manichean bishop Faustus (who seriously 
failed to settle Augustine’s intellectual difficulties in Carthage around the end of 382 
[5.3.3-5.7.13]), who only accepted parts of Christian Scriptures (e.g., the New Testament), 
and who viewed the deity of the Old Testament as a wicked and corporeal substance.  As 
such, Augustine wrote Reply to Faustus the Manichean (397/398-400) in which he 
primarily defended the unity of the two Testaments, the Old Testament fulfilled in the 
New Testament (and of belief in Jesus as both divine and human).  In 404, Augustine 
held another public debate with Felix, the Manichaean leader (an “Elect”) who eventually 
agreed to become a Christian at the close of the debate.  As such he produced Against 
Felix, a Manichee. 
 Indeed, Augustine had further developed his understanding of the nature of God 
and nature of good and evil during his debates with the Manichees and his polemical 
writings.  Influenced by Christian Neoplatonism, Augustine discovered the most 
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fundamental problem of the Manichean account of God, namely, God’s materiality must 
imply God’s divisibility.  Augustine described his mystical experience of union with God 
on the basis of Neoplatonic three-stage pattern: the first stage is an initial withdrawal 
from the sense world; the second is an interior movement into the depths of the soul; the 
third is a movement above the soul to a vision of God (conf. 7.10.16; see Clark, pp. 108-
119; Harrison, pp. 27-31; MacDonald, 2006, pp. 85-96; McGinn & McGinn, pp. 154-
155; O’Meara, pp. 125-153).  Importantly, this experience of his soul’s journey to God 
enabled Augustine to establish a new account of God—the Spirit—as indivisible, 
immaterial, infinite, invisibly present, and the source of all existence in contrast to the 
Manichaean materialistic dualism.  It also enabled Augustine to realize that the Divine 
could be found in his inner self (conf. 7.1.1-2, 7.5.7, 7.10.16, 7.20.26; c. ep. Man. 15.20; 
Ayres & Barnes, 1999, pp. 384-386; Markus, p. 503).  As such, Augustine firmly rejected 
Manichaean teaching that there were two creators: an evil god who was the source of 
material reality and a good god who created the spiritual world.  For Augustine, God was 
the sole author and creator of all that exists and all that exists must be, in so far as it is of 
divine creation, good (conf. 13.20.28, 13.28.43; see Bonner, p. 135; McGinn & McGinn, 
p. 153). 
 While repudiating the Manichaean doctrine that evil has a real existence, 
Augustine demonstrated that evil has no “substance,” but is merely a privation of Good 
(privatio boni) (conf. 7.5.7; civ. Dei 14.11; c. Jul. imp. 3.206; retr. 1.8.1; Bonner, pp. 115, 
135; Gilson, 1960, p. 144; Gonzalez, 1987, pp. 41-42; Harrison, pp. 32, 49).  Evil results 
from the distortion of the power given by the creator; it is a subversion or corruption of 
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the good created order.  For Augustine, the Manichaean negative view of matter and the 
body is wholly mistaken.  Augustine insisted that both matter and the body are God’s 
creations and therefore good (see conf. 13.28.43); they only become evil when the human 
soul chooses (by his or her free will) what God has forbidden (Bonner, p. 136).  In doing 
so, Augustine refuted the Manichaean view that the human person has two opposed 
souls—one good and the other evil, and that the person is not responsible for his or her 
evil deeds (see duab. an. 1.1).  Further, he argued that the Manichaean habit of only 
accepting those parts of Scripture (e.g., the New Testament), which suited them, was 
wrong and unsatisfactory (Bonner, pp. 116, 193-236). 
 Along with his understanding of the nature of the divine as well as the nature of 
good and evil, Augustine had formulated his concept of the human person.  For 
Augustine, a human being is seen to be not primarily a “natural” creature but a being 
created in the image of God (div. qu. 51.1-4; Trin. 14.16.22, 14.19.25).  The human being 
is originally made good and upright, possessed of free will, endowed with the possibility 
of not sinning and of immortality (corrept. 33).23  Augustine insisted that a human being 
is “a rational soul having a body” (Jo. ev. tr. 19.5.15).  In this vein, he described human 
nature as a substantial unity of soul and body, the inner and outer aspects of the person, 
respectively: “If, again, we were so to define man as to say, Man is a rational substance 
consisting of mind and body, then without doubt man has a soul that is not body, and a 
body that is not soul” (Trin. 15.7.11; see b. vita 2.7; ep. 116.2.4; Trin. 11.5.8, 15.11.20; 
                                                
23 Augustine wrote, “Every creature of God is good, and every human being, insofar as he is a 
human being and not insofar as he is a sinner, is a creature.  God, therefore, is the creator of the human 
body and soul” (Simpl. 1.2.18). 
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Teske, 2001, p. 116).24  There was no discord in human nature.  The human being was 
happy and in communion with God (civ. Dei 14.26). 
Augustine asserted that the soul is a creature of God.  The unitary human soul is 
not divine but created “out of nothing” (ex nihilo) (conf. 12.7.7; civ. Dei 14.11; Gn. litt. 
7.1.1-7.4.6, 10.2.3).  The human soul is neither an emanation from God, nor is the soul 
co-eternal with God.  Against the Manichees, he argued that the human soul only has its 
total existence from God who is the source of all life (duab. an. 1.1).  For Augustine, the 
human soul is “a certain kind of substance, sharing in reason, fitted to rule the body” 
(quant. 13.22).  The soul is not like bodily being; it does not have length, breadth, or 
depth.  Nor is there more in larger parts and less in smaller parts, but rather the soul is 
whole wherever it is.  In other words, the soul is immaterial/incorporeal and “above” the 
material reality of the body.  This soul serves as a pointer to the nature of God.  Yet, it is 
still mutable and serves only to reveal the incomparable and infinitely surpassing reality 
and “light” of the divine (see ep. 166.2.4; conf. 12.17.24; Teske, pp. 117-122). 
 Augustine emphasized the mediating position of the soul between God and the 
body as found in his conception of the vertical order of being.  He elaborated that the 
incorruptible, inviolable, and immutable was better than the corruptible, violable, and 
mutable, and that God cannot be changed in any way (conf. 7.1.1).  For Augustine, 
everything other than God is subject to change, with bodies changing in place and time 
and souls changing only in time.  Therefore, the absolutely immutable God stands at the 
top and bodies that change in time and place are at the bottom, but souls which change 
                                                
24 According to Augustine, the nature of the human being is “good”; this human nature “may 
spring either a good or an evil will” (ench.15). 
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only in time occupy the middle position so that they can either turn to God for their 
happiness or to bodies in sin (ep. 18.2; see Trin. 11.5.8; Teske, pp. 116-117).  In this 
sense, Augustine stated, “The soul…is more excellent than the body, but God, the author 
and creator of each, is more excellent than both soul and body” (Simpl. 1.2.18); “the soul 
therefore derives life from God, when its life is good…while the body derives life from 
the soul when the soul is alive in the body” (civ. Dei 13.2).  In Augustine’s view of 
existence and reality, there is nothing closer to God than the human rational soul, which 
is the image of God (civ. Dei 11.26; see Clark, pp. 30-33; Gilson, pp. 217-219). 
Augustine contended that the human soul was originally made in the image of the 
triune God as found in Genesis 1:26: “God said, ‘Let us make humankind in our image, 
according to our likeness.’”  He portrayed the partial image of the Trinity in human 
nature: 
We do indeed recognize in ourselves an image of God, that is of the Supreme 
Trinity. It is not an adequate image, but a very distant parallel.  It is not co-eternal 
and, in brief, it is not of the same substance as God.  For all that, there is nothing 
in the whole of God’s creation so near to him in nature; but the image now needs 
to be refashioned and brought to perfection, so to become close to him in 
resemblance.  We resemble the divine Trinity in that we exist; we know that we 
exist, and we are glad of this existence and this knowledge (civ. Dei 11.26). 
 
 Following this image of the triune God in human nature, Augustine presented a 
relationship between God and the soul.  For Augustine, God is the creative ground of the 
world in terms of love.  As such, this God is Being itself (“Truth itself”) who is identical 
with the source of all existence and reality.  God is for the existence of the soul; that is, 
God is life to the soul as the soul is life to the body (see civ. Dei 10.1, 13.2).  Augustine 
realized that the human soul exists only by participation in Being itself; the soul enters 
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into the divine—loving ground of Being: “If I do not abide in [God], I can do nothing” 
(conf. 7.11.17; see 10.1.1; ord. 2.19.51; Gn. litt. 12.26.53-12.28.56; ep. 92.3; Ayres & 
Barnes, p. 384; Tillich, 1968, pp. 109, 119). 
 For Augustine, the human search for God—the ascent of the soul to God—is 
essential for true happiness.25  True happiness is found in the enjoyment of the presence 
of God who is the Truth itself.  A happy life rejoices in God and for God (conf. 10. 1.1, 
10.22.32): “The happy life is joy based on the truth.  This is joy grounded in you, O God, 
who are the truth, ‘my illumination, the salvation of my face, my God’” (10.23.33).  
According to Augustine, “to possess God” (capax Dei) means “not to be without God” 
(b. vita. 3.21; see Babcock, 1993, pp. 17-26).  The great dignity of the human soul is that 
it is able to possess God—the highest nature—by worshiping God who has made the soul 
in God’s image (Trin. 14.4.6, 14.8.11, 14.12.15; civ. Dei 10.1-3).  The human being who 
is happy is the human being who attains (i.e., knows) God.  Consequently, Augustine 
stated, 
The peace of the body…is a tempering of the component parts in duly ordered 
proportion…the peace of the rational soul is the duly ordered agreement of 
cognition and action.  The peace of the body and soul is the duly ordered life and 
health of a living creature; peace between mortal man and God is an ordered 
obedience, in faith, in subjection to an everlasting law. (civ. Dei 19.13) 
 
                                                
25 Augustine held that every soul desires happiness and that its happiness can be attained only in 
the possession of God (b. vita 2.11-12, 3.17-22; see Plotinus, enn. 1.4.1-16, 6.7.1-42; Clark, 2000, pp. 26-
30; Gilson, 1960, pp. 7-11).  For Augustine, the soul is the place where God appears to the human being.  
Augustine wanted to know the soul because only there can he know God, and in no other place.  This 
implies that God is not an object beside other objects.  God is seen in the soul (sol. 1.2.7, 1.13.22).  In terms 
of the immediacy of the presence of God in the human soul, Augustine suggested that you go into your 
inner reality and there you will find truth.  This Augustine’s idea of the ascent of the soul to God sounds 
much very like Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” (cogito ergo sum) (see Tillich, 1968, pp. 112-113).  
However, “the difference is that in Descartes the self-certainty of the ego is the principle of mathematical 
evidence—he drives from this his rational system of nature—whereas for Augustine the inner evidence is 
the immediacy having God” (Tillich, p. 113). 
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 Consistent with his conceiving of the relationship between God and the soul, 
Augustine had also developed his idea of creation, time, and eternity during his 
controversies with Manichees and his polemical writings against Manichaeism.  While 
acknowledging that God’s creations are inherently good, Augustine believed that “in the 
beginning God made heaven and earth” (conf. 12.13.16; see Gen 1:1).  He clearly 
proclaimed God as “Creator of all things”—Deus Creator omnium (conf. 11.27.35; see 
11.12.14; Clark, pp. 34-35; Gonzalez, pp. 38-39; Harrison, pp. 74-77, 94).  Augustine 
formulated the doctrine of creation “out of nothing” (ex nihilo), when he explored the 
relation of God to the world.  Nothing precedes creation not even matter or what the 
Greeks called hyle; this creation is made without aid of an independent substance (Gn. litt. 
1.1.1-1.15.29; civ. Dei 12.1; Knuuttila, 2001, p. 103).  He noted, 
Your works praise you that we may love you, and we love you that your works 
may praise you.  They have a beginning and an end in time, a rise and a fall, a 
start and a finish, beauty and the loss of it…They are made out of nothing by you, 
not from you, not from some matter not of your making or previously existing, 
but from matter created by you together with its form—that is simultaneously. 
(conf. 12.33.48) 
 
Augustine regarded time as a creature of God: “There was…no time when you 
had not made something, because you made time itself” (conf. 11.14.17; see 11.13.16, 
11.30.40; Gn. litt. 5.5.12; Clark, p. 35; Gilson, pp. 145, 189).  The question how time was 
before creation is meaningless, because time is created with the world.  Time is not 
coeternal with God since God is permanent (conf. 11.14.17; see 11.10.12).  For 
Augustine, time has a beginning and an end (see 11.11.13, 12.33.48); that is, it is the 
form of the finitude of things, as space is also.  Time is mutable and temporal (conf. 
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11.14.17; Knuuttila, pp. 103-104); it is not an objective reality in the sense in which a 
thing is (see Tillich, p. 117). 
Augustine insisted that there is only one world process.  That means that there is a 
definite beginning and a definite end; only eternity is before and after this beginning and 
end.  Augustine rejected the Greek concept, held by Aristotle and the Stoics, which 
asserts that the world is cyclical—there are cycles of birth and rebirth which repeat 
themselves infinitely (see conf. 11.11.13, 11.13.16, 11.14.17; Tillich, p. 118).  For 
Augustine, the Greek view of cyclicism threatens the unique particularity of Christ’s 
absolutely efficacious death and resurrection, because it lumps the repetition of 
particulars with the recurrence of types: “For ‘Christ died once for all for our sins’; and in 
rising from the dead he is never to die again: he is no longer under the sway of death.  
And after the resurrection ‘we shall be with the Lord for ever’” (civ. Dei 12.14). 
 Augustine repudiated the definition that identifies time with the bodily or 
celestial motions more generally: such motions take place in time, but are not time itself 
(conf. 11.23.30, 11.24.31, 11.26.33).  Time is not dependent on physical movement (e.g., 
the story of Joshua [Josh 10:12-13] about the movement of heavenly/celestial bodies—
“the sun stopped but time went on” [conf. 11.23.30]).  Augustine also discarded the 
notion that we normally measure time by time itself—a longer time by comparison with 
shorter ones (11.15.18, 11.26.33).  Moreover, he disagreed with the customary way of 
speaking of time that there are “three times,” past, present, and future (11.17.22).  He 
stated, 
I confidently affirm myself to know that if nothing passes away, there is no past 
time, and if nothing arrives, there is no future time, and if nothing existed there 
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would be no present time…How can they ‘be’ when the past is not now present 
and the future is not yet present? (11.14.17) 
 
Augustine portrayed time as distension in the mind (distentio animi).  Augustine’s 
account of time is affected by the Neoplatonist Plotinus.  The term “distension” 
(distentio) literally means a spreading out.  In that sense, Plotinus viewed time as a 
spreading out (diastasis) of life, which is implied that the life of the soul in a movement 
of passage from one way of life to another (Plotinus, enn. 3.7.11-13).  Augustine’s 
famous remark of time as an extension in the mind (e.g., conf. 11.20.26) has its parallel in 
Plotinus’ account of it as the life of the soul (Chadwick, p. 240; Gonzalez, p. 40-41; 
Knuuttila, pp. 109-113; O’Connell, 1969, pp. 139-42; Sorabji, 2006, pp. 218, 232).  
Augustine held that time itself is neither a corollary nor an antecedent measure of 
external regularities, but an internal regulation which the mind itself imposes on 
phenomena (conf. 11.28.37-38).  While he paid attention to the present state of time 
(11.15.20-11.21.27), Augustine emphasized that time is nothing more than an extension 
of mind/the soul (11.26.33, 11.21.27); past, present, and future are simply three states of 
mind—these three mental states could all exist at once as distentio in the mind (11.20.26, 
11.26.33, 11.27.36, 11.28.37-38; see Gilson, pp. 194-195; O’Connell, pp. 140-141; 
Sorabji, pp, 212-215; Sun, pp. 73-88; Vaught, 2005, pp. 135-136).26  Augustine wrote, 
My confession to you is surely truthful when my soul declares that times are 
measured by me…That is why I have come to think that time is a simply a 
distention.  But of what is it a distention?  I do not know, but it would be 
surprising if it is not that of the mind itself (conf. 11.26.33)… 
What is by now evident and clear is that neither future nor past exists, and it is 
inexact language to speak of three times—past, present, and future.  Perhaps it 
                                                
 26 Augustine’s account of time as a dimension of the mind implies that time—“being a mental 
entity”—is real and that time might be shed with sufficient mental progress (Sorabji, 2006, p. 214). 
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would be exact to say: there are three times, a present of things past, a present of 
things present, a present of things to come.  In the soul there are these three 
aspects of time, and I do not see them anywhere else.  The present considering the 
past is the memory, the present considering the present is immediate awareness, 
the present considering the future is expectation (11.20.26)…Therefore, wherever 
they are, whatever they are, they do not exist except in the present…when I am 
recollecting and telling my story, I am looking on its image in present 
time…when we have embarked on the action and what we were premeditating 
begins to be put into effect, then that action will have existence, since then it will 
be not future but present. (11.18.23) 
 
 Augustine had further developed his concept of time in his meditation and studies 
of the Bible, especially Paul’s letters.  Augustine’s remark of time in conf. 11.29.39 is 
affected by St. Paul’s language of “being stretched” (Phil 3:12-14), which is linked with 
the thought of Plotinus that “multiplicity is a falling away from The Unity [the One]” and 
is extended in a scattering—“there is nothing to bind part to part” (enn. 6.6.1; see 6.7.1-
42; Chadwick, 1991a, p. 240).  For Augustine, the experience of the spreading out of the 
soul in successiveness and in diverse directions is a painful and anxious experience.  This 
implies that the soul’s existence in time, its immersion in “action,” is evidence of its 
“fallen” state.  For this reason, Augustine spoke of the salvation of the soul as deliverance 
from the time of the fallen state to God’s eternity (Chadwick, p. 240; O’Connell, p. 142). 
 For Augustine, the term eternal signifies what is without beginning or end; it is 
properly predicated of God.27  Augustine insisted that eternity is before and after a 
definite beginning and a definite end (en. Ps. 134.6), whereas time has this beginning and 
end.  Eternity involves timelessness and changelessness; it is something beyond all the 
categories (conf. 11.13.36; see Knuuttila, p. 106; Tillich, pp. 118-119).  For Augustine, 
                                                
27 For Augustine, God’s eternal name—“the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of 
Jacob”— indicated no more than God’s temporal name.  Augustine insisted that God is true Being and that 
God “has no beginning and no end” (en. Ps. 134.6). 
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the eternal is always immutable and unchangeable (11.14.17; see MacDonald, 2006, pp. 
96-101).  The eternal, as an indivisible whole, is only present: 
In the eternal, nothing is transient, but the whole is present.  But no time is wholly 
present.  It will see that all past time is driven backwards by the future, and all 
future time is the consequent of the past, and all past and future are created and 
set on their course by that which is always present.  Who will lay hold on the 
human heart to make it still, so that it can see how eternity, in which there is 
neither future nor past, stands still and dictates future and past times? (11.11.13) 
 
 Augustine emphasized that eternity is simultaneously copresent with the whole of 
time, measuring every interval, departed, eventuating, and projected.  All temporal 
intervals take their origin from an eternity; this non-successive eternity sets and sustains 
them on their successive course of time (11.11.13).  The intuition of eternity does not 
retro-see the past or foresee the future, but strictly sees the whole expanse of time: 
“Things which happen under the condition of time are in the future, not yet in being, or in 
the present, already existing, or in the past, no longer in being.  But God comprehends all 
these in a stable and eternal present” (civ. Dei 11.21; see Quinn, 1999, p. 318). 
As such, God’s eternity involves a wholly all-at-once duration, without temporal 
parts or variation (conf. 11.13.16; en. Ps. 101.2.8).  This God’s ever-standing eternity is 
complete in itself, needing no temporal augmentation (see s. 225.2; Quinn, p. 318).  
Augustine noted, 
In the sublimity of an eternity…you are before all things past and transcend all 
things future, because they are still to come, and when they have come they are 
past…Your ‘years’ neither go nor come.  Ours come and go so that all may come 
in succession.  All your ‘years’ subsist in simultaneity, because they do not 
change; those going away are not thrust out by those coming in.  But the years 
which are ours will not all be until all years have ceased to be.  Your ‘years’ are 
‘one day’ (Ps. 89: 4; 2 Pet.3:8), and your ‘day’ is not any and every day but Today, 
because your Today does not yield to a tomorrow, nor  did it follow on a 
yesterday.  Your Today is eternity. (conf. 11.13.16) 
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Significantly, Augustine paid attention to the linkage between eternity and time.  
He focused on Christ the mediator, who has bridged a gap between the eternal and the 
temporal, and who has liberated human beings from the time of the fallen state (conf. 
11.29.39).  The sacrifice of Jesus Christ on Calvary put death to death (s. 125.6; en. Ps. 
148.8); in this Jesus Christ, the human beings are lifted up to the changeless years of 
eternity (en. Ps. 101.1.12-14, 101.2.14; see Sun, pp. 94-98). 
Through Jesus Christ, malign temporality is conquered, empowering the new 
person to overcome the manyness of time—the soul’s being “stretched out” in time to its 
endless and restless desire—through union with the eternal One (conf. 11.29.39).  In 
other words, through his death, this mediator has enabled the human soul to enter into the 
way of salvation from the distraction, dissipation, dispersion of time to a contemplative 
eternity.28  As Augustine and Monica rose to a mystical encounter with God in the 
beatific vision at Ostia (9.10.23-26), a participant of God’s eternity becomes union with 
Wisdom and is enrapt in divine joy (see Quinn, 1999, p. 320).29  Consequently, 
Augustine confessed, 
‘Because your mercy is more than lives’ (Ps. 62: 4), see how my life is a 
distension in several directions.  ‘Your right hand upheld me’ (Ps. 17: 36; 62:9) in 
my Lord, the Son of man who is mediator between you the One and us the many, 
                                                
28 Augustine wrote, “What has God promised you, mortal creature?  That you are to live 
forever…What God has done already is greater than what he has promised.  What has he done?  He has 
died for you…If God has died for the sake of human beings, is it so hard to believe that human beings will 
live with God?” (en. Ps. 148.8). 
 
 29 For Augustine, the finitude of time is necessary if time is to have an ultimate meaning, although 
the endlessly recurring times of nature are meaningless.  Meaningful time is historical time; this historical 
time is not a matter of quantity.  The measure of time is not clock time.  Clock time is physical time which 
tends to repeat itself.  However, the meaning of time is the kairos which involves the historical moment; it 
is the qualitative characteristic of time; divine revelation unveils the meaning of sacred history in terms of 
the link of time with eternity (Tillich, p. 118; see Quinn, 1999, pp. 689-691, 837) 
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who live in a multiplicity of distractions by many things; so ‘I might apprehend 
him in whom also I am apprehended’ (Phil. 3: 12-14), and leaving behind the old 
days I might be gathered to follow the One, ‘forgetting the past’ and moving not 
towards those future things which are transitory but to ‘the things which are 
before’ me, not stretched out in distraction but extended in reach, not by being 
pulled apart but by concentration.  So I ‘pursue the prize of the high calling’ 
where I ‘may hear the voice of praise’ and ‘contemplate your delight’ (Ps. 25:7; 
26:4) which neither comes nor goes…You are my eternal Father, but I am 
scattered in times whose order I do not understand.  The storms of incoherent 
events tear to pieces my thoughts, the inmost entails of my soul, until that day, 
when, purified and molten by the fire of your love, I flow together to merge into 
you. (11.29.39) 
 
 Although Augustine was primarily involved in his disputation with the Manichees 
at the period of his priesthood and his early episcopate, he had also engaged in his 
vehement controversy with the Donatists.  Augustine was confronted with Donatism not 
long after his ordination to the priesthood in the cathedral church of Hippo Regius in 391.  
At that time, Donatism was widespread in northern Africa; Hippo was within an area in 
which Donatists were in the majority and Catholics in a position of weakness.  Two 
major issues between Augustine and the Donatists were ecclesiology and the nature of 
baptism (Markus, p. 503).  These two issues were deeply rooted in the conditions of 
Diocletian persecution against Christians in the Roman Empire: 
Diocletian moved slowly…A cautious effort to rid the army and the imperial 
palace service of Christians was followed, beginning in February, 303, by three 
great edicts of persecution in rapid succession.  Churches were ordered destroyed, 
sacred books confiscated, clergy imprisoned and forced to sacrifice by torture.  In 
304 a fourth edict required all Christians to offer sacrifices.  It was a time of 
fearful persecution.  As in the days of Decius there were many martyrs, and many 
who ‘lapsed’…The severity of the persecution varied with the attitude of the 
magistrates by whom its penalties were enforced.  Cruel in Italy, North Africa, 
and the Orient, the friendly ‘Caesar,’ Constantius Chlorus, made apparent 
compliance in Gaul and Britain by destroying church edifices. (Walker, p. 100) 
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 This Diocletian persecution had led to a schism in Christianity; so the unity of the 
church was threatened.  In particular, the African churches were divided.  There were 
more and less rigorous factions, fanatics and prudent compromisers, in many churches.  
Clergy who handed over copies of the Scriptures to the authorities were generally 
regarded as apostates.  However, there was a wide range of attitudes toward 
“collaborators,” or those who had failed to make a sufficiently determined stand in 
resistance.  A disputed election of a bishop at Carthage formally culminated the schism 
between the two factions.  The Donatist party charged that the ordination of Caecilian, 
the new bishop of Carthage in 311, was invalid because he had surrendered copies of the 
Scriptures in the recent persecution.  As such this party chose a counter-bishop, 
Majorinus in 316.  Majorinus was able to be a successor of the bishop Donatus, from 
whom the schismatics received the name Donatists.  The Donatist churches grew rapidly, 
claiming to be the only true church possessed of a clergy free from deadly sins—
apostasy—and of the only valid sacraments.  For Donatists, if the priest was guilty of sin 
which was related to handing over the Scriptures to be burnt, he could not administer a 
sacrament, for his sin had destroyed his sacerdotal character—he had lost the Holy Spirit 
and, hence, the ability to baptize.  Consequently, those whom he baptized had to be 
rebaptized; Donatists routinely rebaptized converts from Catholic churches (Bonner, p. 
137; Chadwick, 1986, pp. 75-77; Clark, pp. 80-81; O’Donnell, 2001, pp. 13-15; Walker, 
p. 106). 
 In the context of the serious division between Catholic and Donatist parties, as a 
priest and a bishop, Augustine was involved in the conciliatory action to deal with the 
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African Church’s troubles.  In doings so, Augustine wrote Psalm against the Donatists 
(393-394) in which he accounted for the origin and progress of the schism within the 
African Church, disagreed with the Donatist practice of rebaptizing Catholics who came 
over to their party, and charged the Donatist party because they were the ones who lacked 
charity and broke church unity.  Augustine also produced On Baptism, against the 
Donatists (400-401).  In this work, he dealt with two major issues: ecclesiology and the 
nature of baptism.  Whereas the Donatist party described the church as a community of 
the sanctified or the pure, Augustine depicted the church as a mixed community of saints 
and sinners—the mixture of good and evil—and advocated an invisible church as an area 
of God’s action in the world (the city of God) which was not always conterminous with 
the institutional church.  As such, he refuted the Donatist argument that a cleric (who 
separated himself from the church through apostasy) lost the Holy Spirit and, hence, the 
ability to baptize; consequently, those (who were baptized by this cleric) had to be 
rebaptized.  While emphasizing baptism as the sacrament of the remission of sins, 
Augustine argued that the sins of the minister could not be an impediment to the grace of 
God because this grace did not belong to him or even to the church but to God—
(Christian baptism through the grace of God was valid and effective; that is, it was 
unnecessary for rebaptizing, although it was performed by the sinful minister).  
Augustine published The Unity of the Church (401-405) in which he charged the 
sectarianism and exclusivism of the Donatists, who did not maintain communion with 
overseas churches; he characterized the Christian church as the body of Christ united in 
love to its head and emphasized the universal church based on ecclesial unity.  In addition, 
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Augustine continuously wrote anti-Donatist works, including To the Letters of Petilian, 
the Donatist (401-405) in which he repudiated the Donatist belief that only their baptism 
was valid, that is, Catholic baptism was invalid because Catholics were heretics; To 
Cresconius, a Donatist Grammarian (405-406) in which he carefully argued against 
Donatist rebaptism and defended Catholic baptism; he insisted that the minister, pious or 
sinful, was only an instrument by which Christ forgave sins; Against the Donatists (411-
412) in which he argued that the Donatist bishops had misinterpreted the Scriptures by 
ignoring verses about the universal spread of the church; then he invited them to return to 
the true Christian church in unity and peace.  In 411, Augustine took a leading part in the 
conference at Carthage in the hope of healing the division between Catholics and 
Donatists: “Our Lord and God may be able, through the respect due to councils and to 
yourself, to bring healing to the many carnal blemishes and disorders which the African 
Church is suffering in the conduct of many, and is bewailing in the sorrow of a few of her 
members” (ep. 22.1.2).  In 418, Augustine had a public disputation with Emeritus, the 
Donatist bishop of Caesarea (the modern Cherchel, in Algeria) which he had visited on 
behalf of the bishop of Rome.  As such, he produced Proceedings with Emeritus (418) in 
which he challenged Emeritus’ obduracy in remaining in the Donatist party and appealed 
to Emeritus to imitate Christ most humble. 
 Indeed, Augustine had developed his concept of the sacrament of Christian 
baptism during the anti-Donatist controversy.  Augustine continuously argued that 
sacraments are the work of God, not of human persons.  That means that the true 
administrator of the sacraments is not the priest but Christ.  The priest is only an agent or 
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instrument through whom Christ chooses to work; thus the validity of the sacraments 
cannot be destroyed by the character of the priest.  Augustine insisted that the purity of 
the minister was irrelevant; it was the purity and power of Christ that made baptism 
effective.  Like water passing through a stone irrigation channel, the power of Christ 
passes through a sinful minister unpolluted and bears fruit in the recipient (Jo. ev. tr. 
5.15; bapt. 3.10.15).  Therefore, baptism does not need to be repeated for (re)entering the 
Christian Church (bapt. 1.4.5; Jo. ev. tr. 6.15; see Bonner, pp. 138, 237-275; Bourke, pp. 
138-174; Lancel, pp. 271-286; Markus, p. 504; Tillich, p. 131; Walker, p. 106). 
 In Augustine’s view, Christian baptism is interrelated to the communion of the 
church.  Augustine emphasized the centrality of the presence of the Spirit of holiness in 
the community of the baptized.  The Holy Spirit enters with his gift of caritas into the 
baptized soul, thus making the soul a dwelling of the Trinity (Rom. 5:5).  For Augustine, 
baptism is an indelible seal by which a person is marked as belonging to the flock of 
Christ: “You…are sheep belonging to Christ, [and] you bear the Lord’s mark in the 
sacrament which you have received” (ep. 173.3).  Augustine considered baptism both the 
sacrament of the remission of sins and the rebirth for the newness of life: 
If the forgiveness of sins were not to be had in the Church, there would be no 
hope of a future life and eternal liberation.  We thank God, who gave his Church 
such a gift.  Here you are; you are going to come to the holy font, you will be 
washed in saving baptism, you will be renewed in the bath of rebirth (Ti 3:5), you 
will be without any sin at all as you come up from that bath.  All the things that 
were plaguing you in the past will there be blotted out. (s. 213.9)30 
                                                
30 In a same way, Augustine wrote, “[This] is the procedure we must follow in our instructions, 
namely, that all who are to be baptized are to believe in God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as is 
prescribed in the Creed; that they are to do penance for their sins; and that they are not to doubt that all 
their past sins will be forgiven them when they receive baptism.  They must be told that this forgiveness is 
not a license to commit sin, but a release from sin; that it is a remission of sin, not a permission to sin” (f. et 
op. 20.36). 
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 In the time of Augustine, while candidates would receive baptism, it was normally 
administered at Easter because “the greater joy of the feast attracts them” (s. 210.2).  
Easter not only celebrated the passing over of Christ from death to life (s. 103.6); it also 
implied that 
this passing from death to life is…wrought in us by faith, which we have for the 
pardon of our sins and the hope of eternal life, when we love God and our 
neighbour…According to this faith and hope and love, by which we have begun 
to be “under grace,” we are already dead together with Christ, and buried together 
with Him by baptism into death; as the apostle hath said, “Our old man is 
crucified with Him.” (ep. 55.2.3)31 
 
 During the rite of baptism, the water of the font was sanctified by the name of 
Christ and the sign of the cross (Jo. ev. tr. 118.5; s. 229A.1).  Candidates stripped off 
their clothes and entered the font one by one; that is, they had to step down into the font 
because “the Lord’s Passion demands the humble person” (s. 125.6).  There they would 
stand waist-deep in the water.  They were “consecrated in the words of the gospel” in the 
name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit (bapt. 3.14.19, 6.25.46; ep. 
23.4).  After these rites, the newly baptized donned new robes made of white linen: “By 
these shining white garments, as by a visible word, there is inscribed in your memories at 
this fresh beginning of your new life, a seedling of light” (s. 260C.7; see 120, 223).  Then 
they offered each other the kiss of peace—“Peace be with you” (s. 227, 229.3).  Finally, 
the newly baptized were invited to Communion—the sacrament of the Lord’s Table: “So 
if it’s you that are the body of Christ and its members, it’s the mystery meaning you that 
has been placed on the Lord’s table; what you receive is the mystery that means you” (s. 
                                                
 31 Based on the interpretation of Romans 6:4, Augustine emphasized that “baptism had, or has, 
the same value as being buried with Christ” (s. 229A.1). 
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272; see 227, 229.1-3, 229A.1-3).  For Augustine, the baptized person who partakes of 
communion really receives the body and the blood of Christ, not in the sense of 
physically eating them, but rather in the sense that, by eating the elements of bread and 
wine, one becomes a partaker of the body and blood of Christ (see s. 227, 229.2, 229A.1-
3, 272; Clark, pp. 71, 73-79, 100; Gonzalez, pp. 51-53; Harmless, 1999, pp. 85-87; Lohse, 
1985, pp. 136-141).  Augustine stated, 
That bread which you can see on the altar, sanctified by the word of God, is the 
body of Christ.  That cup, or rather what the cup contains, sanctified by the word 
of God, is the blood of Christ.  It was by means of these things that the Lord 
Christ wished to present us with his body and blood, which he shed for our sake 
for the forgiveness of sins.  If you receive them well, you are yourselves what you 
receive.  You see, the apostle says, We, being many, are one loaf, one body (1 Cor 
10:17).  That’s how he explained the sacrament of the Lord’s table; one loaf, one 
body, is what we all are, many though we be. (s. 227) 
 
For Augustine, sacraments include all the holy usages and rites of the church. 
They are the visible signs of the sacred things which they signify.  Baptism and the 
Lord’s Supper are pre-eminently sacraments.  By the sacraments the church is knit 
together. “There can be no religious society, whether the religion be true or false, without 
some sacrament or visible symbol to serve as a bond of union” (Walker, p. 166).  
Furthermore, the sacraments are necessary for salvation: “The churches of Christ 
maintain it to be an inherent principle, that without baptism and partaking of the Supper 
of the Lord it is impossible for any man to attain either to the kingdom of God or to 
salvation and everlasting life” (pecc. mer. 1.34). 
 Along with his formulation of view on Christian communion through the practice 
of the sacrament of baptism, Augustine had also developed his concept of ecclesiology 
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during the anti-Donatist controversy.32  He strongly emphasized the unity and 
universality of the church, animated by the Holy Spirit, against all separatist movements, 
especially the sectarianism of the Donatist party.  For Augustine, the activity of the Holy 
Spirit unites the church (ex. Gal. 13; Van Bavel, 1999, p. 171).  The church as a whole, 
the church in heaven and on earth, is the temple of God.  He noted, 
God…dwells in His temple: not the Holy Spirit only, but the Father also, and the 
Son, who says of His own body, through which He was made Head of the Church 
upon earth (‘that in all things He might have the pre-eminence’): ‘Destroy this 
temple, and in three days I will raise it up.’  The temple of God, then, that is, of 
the Supreme Trinity as a whole, is the Holy church, embracing in its full extent 
both heaven and earth. (ench. 56) 
 
 This expression of the church as the temple of God indicates a relationship 
between God and the community of the faithful, thus referring to the presence of God in 
human beings.  There is no perfect identity between the church on earth and the 
community of saints, but the saints reign already now with Christ.  In this sense, the 
church is already the reign of Christ, the heavenly kingdom or the body of Christ (civ. 
Dei 20.9). 
 For Augustine, all the members have to be united with the universal body of the 
church: “You are the body of Christ and members” (1 Cor 12:27).  These members 
cannot live outside this body of the church, because whoever is an enemy of unity is an 
enemy of love.  Love is a gift of the Holy Spirit, and the Spirit is present only in this love.  
                                                
 32 Augustine’s concept of the church (ecclesia) is very complex but coherent.  It is not a static, but 
an interconnected and dynamic; so it includes many meanings and levels without coinciding completely.  
The most important distinctions are “the terrestrial church and the celestial church; the church in time and 
space and the church as city of God, reign of God, or kingdom of heaven; the pilgrim church and its 
eschatological fulfillment; the church as institution and as body of Christ; the church as sociological entity 
and as lived relationship with Christ and the Holy Spirit; the holy church and the sinful church” (Van 
Bavel, 1999, p. 169). 
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As such the members of the church possess Christ (Christum habere) only by love; this 
does not imply that prayers, baptism, Eucharist, forgiveness of sins, fasting, and special 
charisms are without value, but they are not decisive for possessing Christ (see s. 90.5-6; 
ep. Jo. 3.3-5; Van Bavel, pp. 171-174).  
 In this sense, Augustine affirmed that love is the principle which unites the 
church.  The spirit of love is embodied in the church as the unity of peace—the re-
establishment of the original divine unity that is disrupted in the sinful state of existence; 
it is something that can be found only in the church.  For this reason, Augustine adopted 
the view of Cyprian that “salvation…is not without the Church,” namely, there is no 
“salvation outside the Church” (nulla salus extra ecclesiam) (bapt. 4.17.25; see 3.16.21).  
Salvation is impossible without the inpouring of agape, that grace given like a fluid into 
the hearts of human persons (see Tillich, p. 132). 
Augustine’s doctrine of the church is deeply rooted in a notion that the body of 
Christ is constituted by communion.  The unity of the church depends on one’s 
understanding of the nature of membership in the church.  Augustine insisted that 
sacraments are essential for communion of the church.  The church is primarily the active 
gathering of new humankind into communion with Christ, who is “Head of the Church.”  
God did not wish the only Son to remain alone; God adopted us as children in order to be 
brothers and sisters for the Son: “Be not ungrateful for His so great grace, who, though 
He had one Only Son; would not that He should be alone a Son; but, that He might have 
brethren, adopted unto Him those who should with Him possess life eternal” (ep. Jo. 
8.14; see en. Ps. 49.2).  Christ, as the head of the church, acts in the sacraments of the 
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church; all sacraments are his property.  “The church may not consider itself superior to 
Christ, thinking that it itself can baptize, though Christ is baptizing by the ministry of the 
church” (Van Bavel, p. 170; see Cresc. 2.21.26).  From the moment that human persons 
follow Jesus in faith, hope, and love, communion with Christ comes into existence. 
 Consistent with his debates with the Manichees and the Donatists, Augustine had 
engaged in another difficult controversy with the Arians.  There was a long disputation 
about the issue of the divine Trinity within Christian Churches.  More specifically, in the 
East, Origen’s theological influence was dominant.  Origen had presented opposing 
senses of God’s trinitarian nature in the eastern churches.  That means that he had taught 
the eternal generation of the Son; but at the same time he identified the Son as a second 
God and a creature.  About 320, these Origen’s teachings caused an actual controversy 
between Arius and his bishop Alexander in Alexandria.  Arius, a follower of Origen, 
contended that Christ was a created being.  For Arius, the Son was not of the substance of 
God, but was made like other creatures of “nothing.”  Thus, the Son was not eternal, 
although He was both the first-born of creatures and the agent in fashioning the world.  
Arius contended that Christ was God in a certain sense, but a lower God, in no way one 
with the Father in essence or eternity.  In the Incarnation, this Logos entered a human 
body, taking the place of the human reasoning spirit.  From Arius’ view, Christ was 
neither fully God nor fully man, but a third reality (tertium quid) between.  On the other 
hand, Bishop Alexander was influenced by the other side of Origen’s teaching.  For 
Alexander, the Son was eternal, like in essence to the Father, and wholly uncreated.  
Meanwhile, in order to promote the unity of the church, the Council of Nicaea was held 
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in May, 325; it rejected the presentation of the Arians.  This Council of Nicaea 
emphasized the unity of substance between Christ and the Father; it confirmed that the 
Son was eternal, “begotten, not made”, and “of one essence (homoousion) with the 
Father” (Walker, pp. 76, 107-111). 
 In the context of the conflict of Nicene Christians and Arians, Bishop Augustine 
(who had followed Athanasius, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzen, 
Hilary of Poitiers, and Ambrose of Milan) supported the Creed of the Council of Nicaea 
and repudiated the Arian account of the Trinity that limits simplicity or Godhead to one 
of the three persons.  As such, he wrote On Faith and the Creed (393) in which he was 
concerned with issues of trinitarian doctrine and refuted the Arian idea of the inferiority 
of Christ to the Father; as such, he employed certain images of the Trinitarian plurality 
(spring and river, root, trunk and branches of a tree) found in early writers like Tertullian.  
Augustine also produced On the Holy Trinity (399-419/422) in which he paid attention to 
both the divine unity and the full equality of the “persons,” whereas Origen and Arius 
taught the subordination of the Son and Spirit to the Father.  More specifically, Augustine 
articulated that there is so great an equality in the Trinity, that not only the Father is not 
greater than the Son, but neither are the Father and the Son together greater than the Holy 
Spirit.  He refuted Eastern remains of subordinationism that the Father is the sole source 
of all and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone.  Along with his polemical 
works, Augustine was involved in an actual debate with the veteran anti-Nicene 
campaigner Maximinus in Hippo who arrived in Africa with the army under the 
command of the Goth, Count Sigiswulf (although he was not a Goth himself).  Based on 
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this disputation, Augustine published Debate with Maximinus, an Arian Bishop (427/428) 
in which he rejected Maximinus’ statement that the Father alone is the true, the “great” 
God because only the Father is “incomparable, immense, infinite, unborn, and invisible”; 
he argued that the Son is as invisible as the Father is.  Besides these works, the aged 
Augustine produced Against Maximinus, an Arian (428) in which he replied to 
Maximinus’ lengthy speech because Augustine did not have enough opportunity to 
answer to Maximinus’ questions during their former debate; here Augustine was better 
able to articulate the nature of God’s trinity. 
 Indeed, Augustine had developed his understanding of God, especially God’s 
trinitarian nature, during his anti-Arian controversies and writings.  This means that he 
had fully formulated his concept of the Trinity—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.  
Augustine emphasized the same unity of substance and the same quality of the Trinity 
(Trin. 6.3.4-6.7.9).  For Augustine, God is simple, absolute being, as distinguished from 
all created things, which are manifold and variable.  God is the basis and source of all 
that exists.  This conception led Augustine to pay attention to the divine unity, when he 
formulated his doctrine of the Trinity (Trin. 6.6.8-6.7.9).  Augustine argued that “the 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, of one and the same substance, God the creator, the 
Omnipotent Trinity, work indivisibly” (Trin. 4.21) and that “the Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit, one God, alone, great, omnipotent, good, just, merciful, Creator of all things 
visible and invisible” (Trin. 7.6.12).  For Augustine, the Father and Son and Spirit are not 
separate things, although they are distinct and “other” to each other.  He described the 
three trinitarian Persons as equally simple and as all being life itself: yet they are neither 
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three Gods, nor three Goods, but one God because of the generative order that links them 
together.  Augustine noted, 
It baffles thought to inquire whether these three functions are the ground which 
constitutes the divine Trinity, or whether the three components are present in each 
Person has all three, or whether both these alternatives are true, in the sense that, 
in ways beyond finite understanding, the ultimate Being exists in both simplicity 
and multiplicity, the Persons being defined by relation to each other, yet infinite 
in themselves.  So the divine being is and knows itself and is immutably sufficient 
to itself, because of the overflowing greatness of the unity. (conf. 13.11.12; see 
Trin. 9.1.1) 
 
 This means that the divine Trinity could be depicted as “God one in three and 
three in one” (Una trinitas et trina unitas) (conf. 12.7.7).  For Augustine, this God, or this 
Good, is simple, and what is begotten (not “created”) by the Good is equally simple.  
Thus, the Father begets the Son, but this is the generation of a simple being by a simple 
being, and thus the two are co-eternal, simple, and immutable.  The Spirit is also simple, 
begotten of the other two, and together these three are one God (see div. qu. 50; Trin. 
6.5.7).33  The triune God is the “one eternal and true reality,” from who “flows” all good; 
this triune God is “eternal, immortal, incorruptible, unchangeable, living, wise, powerful, 
beautiful, just, good, blessed, spirit” (Trin. 15.5.8; see Ayres & Barnes, pp. 385, 389; 
Gilson, pp. 223-224; Lancel, pp. 377-387; Walker, p. 163). 
 In his doctrine of the Trinity Augustine emphasized not only the oneness of the 
divine essence but also the union of the divine persons in love (Mt. 22:37-40; Trin. 6.5.7).  
Love is the essence of the Godhead, and accounts for both the unity of substance and the 
                                                
 33 Augustine wrote, “The Father has begotten the Word, that is, the Wisdom by which all things 
have been made, his only-begotten Son, one begotten of one, eternal of eternal, Supreme Good of Supreme 
Good…the Holy Sprit is at the same time the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, himself consubstantial and 
co-eternal with both, and that this totality is a Trinity in respect of the distinctive character of the persons, 
and is also one God in respect of the inseparable divinity, just as it is one Omnipotent in respect of the 
inseparable omnipotence” (civ. Dei 11. 24). 
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Trinity of persons.  The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are bound together by—“are 
found in”—this love (Trin. 9.2.2).  Augustine gives his preference to a triad in which the 
Father is represented by memory (memoria), the Son by understanding/intelligence 
(intelligentia), and the Spirit by will (voluntas) (Trin. 10.11.17); “these three, memory, 
understanding, will, are not three lives, but one life; nor three minds, but one mind; it 
follows certainly that neither are they three substances, but one substance” 
(Trin.10.11.18).  Later, the Council of Constantinople (381) condemned Arianism.  
Augustine’s concept of tribune God, the unity and equality of the persons, was 
acknowledged at the Third Council of Toledo (589) in Spain , as a part of the so-called 
Nicene creed; it has spread over the West.  To this day, there is a dividing issue of the 
understanding of Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit between the Greek and Latin Churches 
(Bonner, p. 141; Walker, pp. 163-164). 
 In the later part of his episcopate, especially after 411, Bishop Augustine had 
primarily engaged in vehement controversies with the Pelagians (although he was 
involved in the disputation with the Donatists and Arians).  Pelagius was a British (or 
Irish) monk of high learning and great moral earnestness, who had settled in Rome about 
400.  Pelagius and his disciples practiced extreme ascetic living and sought stricter ethical 
standards in Rome.  After the sack of Rome by the army of Alaric the Goth in 410, 
Pelagius and his follower Caelestius departed to Carthage in North Africa.  At first, 
Augustine sympathized with the Pelagian movement which preached “authentic 
Christianity” to Christians who bore the name “Christian” but who were not living up to 
the moral demands of the faith.  However, gradually, Augustine confronted a deep 
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theological gap between the Pelagians and himself, as he established the link between the 
supremacy of God’s grace and human sin (see Chadwick, 1986, pp. 108-111; Lancel, pp. 
325-334; Markus, p. 504).  For Pelagians, the human being is capable of holiness through 
a combination of natural endowments and personal efforts (Bonner, p. 140).  Indeed, 
Pelagius held to the freedom of the human will; so his position had well expressed his 
motto, “If I ought, I can.”  Based on the popular Stoic ethics,34 Pelagius denied any 
original sin inherited from Adam and believed therefore that children are innocent.  He 
affirmed that human death is not a result of the fall, but a natural event and that all human 
beings have the power not to sin (Tillich, pp. 123-124; Walker, p. 168).  However, 
Augustine repudiated the Pelagian position as denying original sin, rejecting salvation by 
infused grace, and affirming human power to live without sin.  Based on his own 
religious experience (e.g., the garden experience, conf. 8.12.28-30), Augustine believed 
that he had been saved by irresistible divine grace from sins which he could never have 
overcome by his own strength.  In that sense, Augustine placed all his emphasis on the 
helplessness of the human being to do any good whatsoever without the grace of God, 
and upon the disastrous consequences of Adam’s sin for his posterity unless cleansed by 
baptism (Bonner, pp. 138-140, 352-393; Brown, pp. 340-353; Clark, pp. 45-48; Walker, 
pp. 168-169).35 
                                                
34 Pelagius’ attitude was rooted in that of the popular Stoic ethics: “As often as I have to speak of 
the principles of virtue and a holy life, I am accustomed first of all to call attention to the capacity and 
character of human nature and to show what it is able to accomplish; then from this to arouse the feelings 
of the hearer, that he may strive after different kinds of virtue” (Walker, p. 168). 
 
35 In this vein, Carol Harrison (2006) basically depicts Augustine’s theology: “God’s 
transcendence, humanity’s fallenness, and the need for divine grace…form the pivotal axes of his theology 
from 386 to his death in 430” (p. 74). 
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 In a context of the doctrinal conflict between Pelagius and Augustine, Pelagius 
journeyed to the East and his follower Caelestius remained in Carthage and sought to be 
ordained a presbyter by Bishop Aurelius.  At that time, Bishop Aurelius received from 
Paulinus, a deacon of Milan and Ambrose’s biographer, a letter accusing Caelestius of six 
errors: “(1) Adam was made mortal and would have died whether he had sinned or had 
not sinned. (2) The sin of Adam injured himself alone, and not the human race.  (3) New-
born children are in that state in which Adam was before his fall.  (4) Neither by the 
death and sin of Adam does the whole race die, nor by the resurrection of Christ does the 
whole race rise.  (5) The law leads to the kingdom of heaven as well as the Gospel.  (6) 
Even before the coming of the Lord there were men without sin” (Walker, p. 169; gr. et 
pecc. or. 1.36, 2.2).  As such in 411, an advisory synod in Carthage rejected Caelestius’ 
ordination.  In 416, two North African synods—one for its local district in Carthage and 
the other for Numidia in Mileve—condemned the Pelagian opinions; then Pope Innocent 
I (402-417) confirmed the decision of these African synods.  In May 418, the Council in 
Carthage continuously held Augustine’s position that Adam became mortal by sin, that 
children should be baptized for the remission of original sin, that grace was necessary for 
right living, and that sinlessness is impossible in this life.  Moved by the actions of this 
Council, the new Pope Zosimus issued a circular letter condemning Pelagius and 
Caelestius.  After the death of Augustine, in 431, the Third Council in Ephesus officially 
rejected Pelagianism in the West and East (Bonner, pp. 312-351; Bourke, pp. 175-200; 
Lancel, pp. 331-343; Lohse, pp. 110-122; Markus, p. 504; Sun, pp. 264-268; Walker, pp. 
169-170, 135-136). 
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 While involving in his controversy with the Pelagians, Augustine had composed 
his anti-Pelagian works.  For example, he wrote On the Merits and Remission of Sins, and 
on the Baptism of Infants (411-412) in which he repudiated the teaching of Caelestius, 
who denied any transmission of original sin from Adam, while approving of infant 
baptism, not for the remission of sin but to make infants inheritors of the kingdom of 
heaven; Augustine insisted that Adam’s sin caused the necessity of infant baptism, and 
that no one has ever lived or will live in the present world without sin, that is, baptism is 
necessary for people of all ages for the forgiveness of sins.  Augustine also published On 
Nature and Grace (413-415) and On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin (418) in which 
he disagreed with the Pelagian doctrine that Adam’s sin injured himself alone and not his 
descendants, that is, human nature cannot be corrupted by sin; Augustine argued that 
human nature, created sound, has been disordered by sin, which could be purified by 
Christian baptism through divine grace—the grace of Christ.  Augustine produced The 
Enchiridion (421-422) which was written for a layman, Laurentius, who had asked 
Augustine for a handbook explaining some basics of Christian faith.  While articulating 
his doctrine of grace, Augustine answered by expressing his hope that Laurentius will 
grow wise; he contended that true wisdom is not simply knowledge of the basics of what 
Christians believe, but a way of life—the worship of God—in which one involves faith in 
what is presented for Christian belief, and the ordering of hopes and loves to reflect this 
faith.  The aged Augustine wrote two treaties: On Grace and Free Will (426/427) and On 
Rebuke and Grace (426/427), addressed to the monks of Hadrumetum, in which he 
insisted that free choice of the will or good was impossible unless aided by divine grace, 
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and that admonition is justified in the case of a Christian who had fallen into sin.  Along 
with these works, Augustine had a long confrontation with Julian of Eclanum, the 
Pelagian bishop, who disagreed with Augustine’s concept of original sin and held that 
Adam was created mortal, with an intellect like that of his descendants.  As such, 
Augustine published Against Julian, an Unfinished Book (428-430) in which he argued 
that the superiority of Adam’s unvitiated created nature made his fall the greater and the 
more disastrous; it brought death, spiritual and physical, on him and his progeny. 
 During his long debates with the Pelagians and his polemical writings, Augustine 
had formulated the doctrine of original sin and God’s grace, which dominated Western 
theology for over a thousand years.  Augustine argued that the sin of Adam and Eve (“the 
first human beings”) affected their human nature in such a way that it must be inherited to 
their children (Gn. litt. 10.11.18).  For Augustine, Adam, the first man, was originally 
created good but he was corrupted by sin.  Adam fell into a state of total and hopeless 
ruin, of which the proper ending is eternal death (civ. Dei 14.15).  This sin and its 
consequences involved all the human race: “For we were all in that one man [Adam], 
seeing that we all were that one man who fell into sin through the woman who was made 
from him before the first sin” (civ. Dei 13.14).36  Augustine contended that the soul of the 
infant is guilty; the sin of the infant is real (not just sins by analogy) and is transmitted by 
way of propagation/generation (pecc. mer. 1.2, 1.8-10; see Rom 5:12; Mann, 2006, pp. 
                                                
36 In a same way, Augustine wrote, “By one man [Adam] sin entered into the world, that and death 
by sin, and so passed upon all men; in which all have sinned” (pecc. mer. 1.10).  The sin of Adam is 
original sin for two reasons: “[Firstly] we all existed potentially in Adam, in his procreative power, and in 
this way we participated in his free decision and thus are guilty.  Secondly, Adam introduced libido, desire, 
into the process of sexual generation, and this element was passed on by heredity to all posterity.  Everyone 
is born out of the evil of sexual desire” (Tillich, p. 128). 
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81-82; Gonzalez, pp. 43-46).  Augustine wrote, “If Adam had not fallen from you, there 
would not have flowed from his loins that salty sea-water the human race—deeply 
inquisitive, like a sea in a stormy swell, restlessly unstable” (conf. 13.20.28).  For this 
reason, for Augustine, baptism is the necessary means of salvation for all humankind, 
including infants (pecc. mer. 1.70; see Holt, 1999, p. 608). 
Augustine struggled to unite the spiritual character of sin in everybody with the 
hereditary character of sin that derives from Adam.  Original sin is something that 
happens in the spiritual dimension of the person, but it is also bodily.  For Augustine, sin 
(peccatum) refers to the willful misdirection of the love that is fundamental to the life of 
the soul.  It is deeply rooted in the human being’s turning away from God: “Sin…is a 
disorder and a perversion in the human being—that is, a turning away from the creator, 
who is more excellent, and a turning to created things, which are inferior” (Simpl. 1.2.18; 
see Lohse, p. 114; Mann, p. 80).  As such sin is not simply moral failure; it is not even 
disobedience.  Disobedience is not the cause of sin, but a consequence.  The cause of sin 
is turning away from God—the highest good (see nat. et gr. 33).  The immediate 
consequence of human turning away from the highest good is the loss of this good.  This 
means that the fallen human being is excluded from God—the divine loving ground of 
being: “For wherever the human soul turns itself, other than to you, it is fixed in 
sorrows…[the soul] rush[es] towards non-being” (conf. 4.10.15; see ench. 2; Tillich, pp. 
125-128).  The loss of the highest good is the essential and existential punishment to the 
human being—the death of both the soul and the body; so the human being “has become 
like nothingness” (civ. Dei 14.15).  Augustine stated, 
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The death of the soul results when God abandons it, the death of the body when 
the soul departs.  Therefore the death of the whole man, of both these elements, 
comes when the soul, abandoned by God, leaves the body.  For then the soul no 
longer derives life from God, nor does the body receive life from the soul.” (civ. 
Dei 13.2) 
 
As such, Augustine paid attention to the first death of the human soul and body.  
For Augustine, Adam, the first man, opted to be apart from God (Gn. litt. 11.42.59; div. 
qu. 51.1).  Indeed, Adam forsook God, and was then forsaken by God: “The soul [of 
Adam]…was not first forsaken by God, so that it forsook him as a result; it first forsook, 
and as a result it was forsaken” (civ. Dei 13.15); “so he [Adam] was dead in spirit, of his 
own will; but doomed, against his will, to die in body; forsaking eternal life, he was 
condemned also to eternal death, unless he should be set free by grace” (civ. Dei 14.15).  
 Augustine argued that the natural state of the human, created good (ench. 15) and 
disordered by sin, can only be restored by the redemptive action of God in Christ (see ep. 
145.1-3; Trin. 13; civ. Dei 14.11; Gn. litt. 10.11.19).  For Augustine, human sin is 
“eradicated not by the removal of some natural substance which had accrued to the 
original, or by the removal of any part of it, but by the healing and restoration of the 
original which had been corrupted and debased” (civ. Dei 14.11).  In this vein, human 
weaknesses or unhappiness, which is related to punishment for sin, can be cured by 
God’s healing (see civ. Dei 15.6).  Healing begins when the human being turns to God 
through Jesus Christ.  Augustine had accepted the Incarnate Christ as the mediator 
between God and humanity in order to strongly experience the saving power of God (conf. 
7.18-19, 7.21.2; ench. 108; pecc. mer. 1.18, 1.33, 1.62; Harrison, 2006, pp. 32-34, 37, 
252-254; McGinn & McGinn, p. 156).  To restore loving relationships between God and 
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the human, Christ became flesh: “Christ Jesus, the Son of God, is both God and man” 
(ench. 35; see en. Ps. 148.8).  Augustine stated, “When sin had placed a wide gulf 
between God and the human race, it was expedient that a Mediator, who alone of the 
human race was born, lived, and died without sin, should reconcile us to God, and 
procure even for our bodies a resurrection to eternal life, in order that the pride of man 
might be exposed and cured through the humility of God” (ench. 108).37  As a divine and 
human mediator, the Incarnate Christ wished to bring eternal peace to humankind and to 
restore true freedom (libertas) (Col 1:19-22; 1 Jn 4:9; corrept. 2).  Augustine noted, 
God gave it that true freedom, and now that it has been lost, through its own fault, 
it can be restored only by him who had the power to give it at the beginning.  
Hence the Truth says, ‘If the Son sets you free, then you will be truly free.’  This 
is the same as saying, ‘If the Son saves you, you will be truly saved.’  For he is 
our Saviour for the same reason that he is our liberator. (civ. Dei 14.11) 
 
 Augustine contended that the punishment of sin has been turned by the great and 
wonderful grace of the Savior to a good use and to the promotion of righteousness (civ. 
Dei 13.4).  He noted, 
From the misuse of free will there started a chain of disasters: mankind is led 
from that original perversion, a kind of corruption at the root, right up to the 
disaster of the second death, which has no end.  Only those who are set free 
through God’s grace escape from this calamitous sequence. (civ. Dei 13.14) 
 
 For Augustine, grace (gratia) refers to the divine operation in humans through 
which we are moved to know and love God (corrept. 3; ep. 166.2.5; nat. et gr. 4, 34; 
Burns, p. 391): “This grace…is hiddenly bestowed in human hearts by the Divine gift” 
(praed. sanct. 13).  Augustine insisted that the soul has a longing for the restoration of the 
                                                
 37 Augustine wrote, “The Lord suffers, his precious blood is shed, the sinner is redeemed, grace is 
granted the one who sins and says, Wretched man that I am, who will deliver me from the body of this 
death? The grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ (Rom 7:24-25)” (s. 125.6). 
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first good nature of Adam and Eve before the fall, even if it is in the fallen state.  The 
restoration of the soul can be actualized in the loving grace of God: “Little by little, Lord, 
with a most gentle and merciful hand you touched and calmed my heart” (conf. 6.5.7).  
Augustine believed that God’s grace restores and reactivates the interior spiritual senses 
of the human beings that were originally intended to lead us to God before being 
wounded by sin (McGinn & McGinn, pp. 166-167).38  Thus, God’s grace acts to counter 
the damage which sin has done to human nature, by cooperating with the good which 
remains in human nature—in order to make the human completely good again (nat. et gr. 
4, 34). 
Augustine asserted that God’s grace transforms the human image of God into 
Christ-likeness.  At this point, free choice (liberum arbitrium) is also transformed (nat. et 
gr. 81); it becomes a spiritual freedom (a libertas), whereby one spontaneously chooses 
to do God’s will with delight (ench. 32; nat. et gr. 67; c. Jul. imp. 6.11).39  Within the 
Incarnated Christ, God’s grace means the divine presence in the world upon which the 
creatures’ own operations are totally dependent.  Through God’s grace, the healing of the 
human soul and body involves a turning from the restless desires of the heart to God, the 
source of existence and reality.  God’s grace, as the infusion of love by the Holy Spirit, 
frees the enslaved will to choose that which is pleasing to God, “not only in order that 
                                                
38 The divine operation takes many forms, which are differentiated by the condition of the 
particular created spirit: “repentance, faith, prayer, charity, perseverance, and glory” (Burns, 1999, p. 398). 
 
39 For Augustine, the human freedom is “nothing but the possibility of good and of evil”; in that 
sense, human sin is “nothing but bad will” (c. Jul. imp. 6.11).  God’s grace enables the human being to seek 
for the will of God’s rather than the bad will of the human. 
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they may know, by the manifestation of that grace, what should be done, but moreover in 
order that, by its enabling, they may do with love what they know” (corrept. 3). 
As early noted, for Augustine, God’s grace is irresistible (see Gilson, pp. 153-156; 
Gonzalez, 1987, pp. 46-47).  The effect of this saving grace is twofold: 1) Faith is 
instilled—“The faith by which we are Christians is the gift of God” (praed. sanct. 3; see 
39), and 2) sins, both original and personal, are forgiven at baptism (pecc. mer. 1.34, 1.39, 
1.70).  Grace is given by God (ench. 107; nat. et gr. 4); it is given to everybody who 
becomes a Christian through the sacrament of baptism.  The forgiveness of sins happens 
in baptism and is received by faith (Tillich, p. 129; Walker, p. 165).  In that sense, 
Augustine confessed, “I will love you, Lord, and I will give thanks and confession to 
your name because you have forgiven me such great evils and my nefarious deeds.  I 
attribute to your grace and mercy that you have melted away my sins away like ice” (conf. 
2.7.15). 
Consistent with the formulation of his doctrine of original sin and God’s grace, 
Augustine had developed his concept of infant baptism during the controversy with the 
Pelagians.  As noted earlier, Caelestius, one of Pelagius’ disciples, claimed “that Adam’s 
sin injured only Adam himself, and not the human race; and that infants at their birth are 
in the same state that Adam was in before his transgression” (gr. et pecc. or. 2.2; see 
1.36).  Although Caelestius was willing to grant the legitimacy of infant baptism, he was 
unwilling to accept that transmission of original sin was part of traditional Christian 
teaching (gr. et pecc. or. 2.2-4).  For the Pelagians, “[the] actual sin has not been 
transmitted from the first man to other persons by natural descent, but by imitation” (pecc. 
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mer. 1.9).  In this vein, the Pelagians refused “to believe that in infants original sin is 
remitted through baptism, for they contend that no such original sin exists at all in people 
by birth” (pecc. mer. 1.9).  However, Augustine did not agree with the Pelagians’ claims 
about infant sinlessness.  For Augustine, such claims implicitly denied that Jesus had 
saved infants, for if they were truly sinless, then there would be nothing for him to save 
them from (s. 174.7; gr. et pecc. or. 2.33).  Augustine was convinced that the church’s 
practice of infant baptism had been handed down from Jesus and the apostles (pecc. mer. 
1.39).  He argued that the Christian church has been accustomed to baptize truly “infants 
for the remission of sins—not, indeed, sins which they have committed by imitation 
owing to the example of the first sinner, but sins which they have contracted by their very 
birth, owing to the corruption of their origin” (gr. et pecc. or. 2.17).  Through the 
sacrament of baptism, infants came to enjoy the “benefits of the Mediator”; they were 
delivered from evil, reconciled with God, enlightened by the Spirit, and incorporated into 
the body of Christ, the church (pecc. mer. 1.18, 1.26, 1.33, 1.35, 1.39, 1.70; see Harmless, 
1999, pp. 89-90). 
Meanwhile, as a monk and priest/bishop of Hippo, Augustine reorganized and 
managed the monastery in a more specific fashion with established rules (Possidius, v. 
Aug. 5), which was influenced by the spirit and actions of the apostolic community at 
Jerusalem as described in the Acts of the Apostles: “When they had prayed…they were 
filled with the Holy spirit…Now the whole group of those who believed were of one 
heart and soul…There was not a needy person among them, for as many as owned lands 
or houses sold them and brought the proceeds of what was sold.  They laid it at the 
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apostles’ feet, and it was distributed to each as any had need” (Acts 4:31-35).  Following 
the community rule of one mind and one heart in the one Christ, Augustine’s monastic 
group settled down to a life of prayer, scripture reading, (philosophical and theological) 
discussion, and writing (Possidius, v. Aug. 5).40  Later Augustine’s monastic community 
had produced many devoted Christian believers (who had distinguished talents) and 
important church leaders of Africa (who had strongly supported Bishop Augustine’s anti-
heretical controversies.  Later Augustine’s monastic community had produced many 
devoted Christian believers (who had distinguished talents) and important church leaders 
of Africa (who had strongly supported Bishop Augustine’s anti-heretical controversies):41 
                                                
40 The Rule of St. Augustine at the monastery refers to a life-style which derived its inspiration 
from Acts 4:32-35 (Possidius. v. Aug. 5).  The word monachus literally signifies “a spiritual unity of many 
persons and not ‘one’ who lives for God alone in isolation from other persons” (Clark, 2000, p. 88).  
Augustine wrote, “The rules which we lay down to be observed by you as persons settled in a monastery 
are these: First of all, in order to fulfill the end for which you have been gathered into one community, 
dwell in the house with oneness of spirit, and let your hearts and minds be one in God” (ep. 211.5).  This 
Rule of St Augustine leads adherents into a spiritual ascent to God within a community of one mind and one 
heart in the one Christ.  Augustine views monks as “those who live in community in such a way that they 
form but one person, monachus, one single person bring to life what is written, ‘of one mind and one heart’, 
that is, many bodies, but not many minds, many bodies, but not many hearts” (Clark, 2000, p. 88; see en. 
Ps. 132.3-4).  Such oneness in mind and heart generates a religious community; it entails a striving day by 
day for greater interior life for the love of God, thus sharing more deeply God’s love for one another and all 
creatures in the divine image and likeness.  Augustine stated, “Just as I had sold my slender poor man’s 
property and distributed the proceeds to the poor, those who wished to stay with me did the same, so that 
we might live on what we had in common.  But what would be our really great and profitable common 
estate was God himself” (s. 355.2; see Bourke, 1945, pp. 126-127; Clark, 2000, pp. 88-92; Harrison, 2000, 
pp. 182-187; Lancel, 2002, pp. 224-232; Lawless, 1999, pp. 739-740). 
 
 41 For thirty-five years, Augustine remained Bishop of Hippo and changed the bishop’s residence 
into a monastic household for clerics.  In particular, about ten bishops of the African Church came from 
this monastic community—Bishop Alypius of Thagaste (393), Bishop Profuturus of Cirta (395), [Bishop 
Augustine of Hippo (396)], Bishop Evodius of Uzala (396), Bishop Severus of Milevis (396), Bishop 
Possidius of Calama (397), Bishop Fortunatus of Cirta (397), and Bishop Peregrinus of Thenae; in later 
years, Bishop Urbanus of Sicca, Bishop Leporius of Carthage, and Bishop Novatus of Sitifis (Possidius, v. 
Aug. 11; Bourke, 1945, pp. 127-128; Brown, 2000, pp. 136-137; Clark, 2000, p. 11).  Augustine’s own 
personal life was extremely frugal.  His table was sparing; his dress was modest and unostentatious (s. 
355.2; v. Aug. 22).  He commonly wore a byrrhus or coat, which was also worn by laymen, and he intended 
not to receive a gift of costly clothing from persons who deemed it suitable for Augustine’s episcopal 
station.  Augustine said, “I’m offered…a very expensive cloak; perhaps it would be suitable for a bishop to 
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Here [at Hippo] he [Augustine] established a new community.  He was joined by 
some of his friends from Thagaste, including Evodius and Severus, while new 
recruits subsequently came forward: Possidius, the future bishop of Calama and 
Augustine’s biographer; Profuturus, afterwards bishop of Cirta; Urban, the future 
bishop of Sicca; and Peregrinus, who was to preside over the church of Thenae.  It 
is possible that a written rule was provided…The little band of friends who for 
nearly three years had followed a common way of life at Thagaste was 
transformed into a regular religious community. (Bonner, pp. 113-114; see 
Bourke, p. 126) 
 
 As one of the members of the monastery and one of Augustine’s closest friends, 
Alypius was faithfully at the side of Augustine throughout his lifetime.  Born in Thagaste 
(conf. 6.7.11), Alypius was a student of Augustine (6.7.11), and became a Manichee with 
him (6.7.12).  Augustine admired his integrity (6.10.16) and treated him as a “heart’s 
brother” (9.4.7).  Alypius was baptized with Augustine and Adeodatus by Bishop 
Ambrose of Milan on April 24-25, 387 (9.6.14) and participated in the discussions at 
Cassiciacum (9.4.8).  He returned to Africa and engaged in a monastic life with 
Augustine and others at Thagaste and then at Hippo.  He was appointed as bishop of 
Thagaste in 394 and cooperated with Augustine in order to serve and guide effectively 
the African Church.  As such Alypius was one of seven Catholic bishops at the 
conference of 411 with the Donatists and he played an important part in the Pelagian 
controversies (Fitzgerald, 1999, pp. 16-17). 
 While engaging in both his monastic life and his pastoral ministry (including his 
long controversies with the Manichees, Donatists, Arians, and Pelagians), Augustine had 
developed his understanding of the unity of the love of God and love of neighbor—
contemplation and action.  Love (caritas) is one of the central subjects of Augustine’s 
                                                                                                                                            
wear it, although it isn’t suitable for Augustine to do so, that is to say a poor man, born of poor parents” (s. 
356.13; see en. Ps. 132.3-4; Bonner, p. 129). 
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thought.  According to Augustine, love is a movement, an inclination, or a striving: 
“Since love is a kind of motion, and there is no motion unless it be towards something, 
when we look for what should be loved, we ought to look for the thing towards which the 
motion is directed” (div. qu. 35.1).  Human beings live on the basis of this love.  Love is a 
force of the soul and the life; it determines life in a good or evil way.  This love flows 
from the dynamism of the will, which becomes concrete through the loved object: “In 
fact, the joining is itself called a coin, a co-union, as it were.  What about every kind of 
love?  Does it not wish to become one with what it is loving?  And, if it reaches its object, 
does it not become one with it?” (ord. 2.18.48).  Augustine elucidated that love is a gift 
of God; it endows the human will with a new desire, a striving for divine truth, wisdom, 
and justice.  God has loved us first (1 Jn 4:19; s. 34.2), as appears from the sending of his 
incarnate Son as well as from the gift of the Holy Spirit (see 1 Jn 4:9).  He asserted that 
“the love of God has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit which has been 
given to us” (amare deum de deo): (s. 34.3; Rom 5:5; Van Bavel, pp. 514-515). 
 Throughout his life, Augustine had reflected on the role of love in the path to 
God—“love is the soul’s weight” (conf. 13.9.10).  By means of the gift of divine love of 
caritas –the God-centered love—one has the power to ascend to God, while through the 
self-centered love of cupiditas one flees from God (see div. qu. 36.1-4; Babcock, 1993, 
pp. 31-34; McGinn & McGinn, pp. 161-162).  God’s love of caritas enters into human 
hearts by means of the Holy Spirit rather than that of the human free will.  It enables 
human beings to receive a new knowledge of God in faith; it also enables us to 
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experience a new impetus of desire—a longing for God that always pursues the ineffable 
God.  Augustine wrote,  
The psalm said always with reference to our life here on earth from the moment 
when we first came to know that we must seek God, this life in which we must 
still seek him even after we have found him.  Faith does indeed find him, but hope 
seeks him still.  Charity [caritas] both finds him through faith and seeks to 
possess him in vision, where he will be found so completely that he will wholly 
satisfy us and need be sought no longer. (en. Ps. 104.3) 
 
 Through this love of caritas, our likeness to God is growing—the greater our 
likeness to God, the more our love will increase, and the more clearly we will perceive 
God, for “God is love” (1 Jn 4:8).  The more we perceive God, the better we become 
aware of his ineffability and incomprehensibility: “The closer you come to his likeness, 
the more progress you make in charity, and the more sensitive to God you become” (en. 
Ps. 99.5). 
 For Augustine, the authenticity of the love of God is only tested by the love of 
neighbor.  The human being’s capacity to love God comes only from God, and with this 
love we should love the neighbor (Trin. 15.17.31, 15.18.32; s. 265.9).  God’s self-
revelation as love becomes for us an appeal, a demand, and a commandment to love our 
neighbors as God loves them (s. 350.2; ex. Gal. 45; ep. Jo. 8.4).  Indeed, it is impossible 
to love God without loving our neighbors (f. et op. 16.27-30; div. qu. 36.4).  Augustine 
relied strongly on biblical arguments for his position (e.g., Matthew 5:23-24, 1 John 
4:20).  That means that his argument was derived not only from the revelation in St. 
John’s Gospel that God is Love (1 John 4:8), but also from Christ’s assurance that human 
beings are specially loved by God (doc. Chr. 1.27.28).  In order to experience the love of 
God, one must begin by loving one’s neighbor.  Although the love of God comes first in 
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the order of commanding (ordo praecipiendi), the love of neighbor comes first in the 
order of performing (ordo faciendi) (Jo. ev. tr. 17.8; s. 265.9; see Van Bavel, pp. 512-
513).  Augustine contended that one, who loves one’s brother or sister, loves God 
because one loves love itself, which is of God, and is God (Trin. 8.8.12).  
For Augustine, the reason for the incarnation of the Son of God is the revelation 
of God’s love for the human being (Jn 1:14, 3:16; Van Bavel, p. 510).  Augustine insisted 
that Jesus Christ “came in the flesh to gather in one” through love; as such, if one does 
not possess this love, one denies Christ’s incarnation (ep. Jo. 6.13-7.2).  The experience 
of and participation in Christ involves charity for others.  He stated, 
In Christ, you have it all.  Do you want to love your God? You have in Christ, In 
the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God 
(Jn 1:1).  Do you want to love a neighbor?  You have in Christ, And the Word was 
made flesh and dwelt among us (Jn 1:14). (s. 261. 8) 
 
Augustine used the terms uti and frui, which could be considered a proper pair, in 
order to discuss a relationship between love for God and love for neighbor.  In On 
Christian Teaching, he defined theses words: “Enjoyment [frui], after all, consists in 
clinging to something lovingly for its own sake, while use [uti] consists in referring what 
has come your way to what your love aims at obtaining, provided, that is, it deserves to 
be loved” (1.4.4).  Frui is love in an absolute way—the love of enjoyment; uti is love in a 
relative way—the love of use.  Augustine raised a provocative question: “whether human 
beings ought to regard themselves as things to be enjoyed, or to be used, or both” (doc. 
Chr. 1.22.20).  Augustine basically answered that only God can be enjoyed (i.e., loved) as 
an absolute end, whereas finite things must always be used as vehicles to God’s love, or 
enjoyed for God’s sake (doc. Chr. 1.23.22, 1.33.36-37).  More specifically, he clarified 
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these notions when responding to the following questions: (1) Is the human being to be 
an object of frui?  To this Augustine immediately answers no, not here on earth.  (2) Is 
the human being to be an object of uti?  To this Augustine immediately answers yes, here 
on earth.  (3) Is the human being to be an object of both frui and uti?  Augustine’s final 
answer is yes: Human beings are to be objects of uti and we are also to be objects of frui 
in the proper sense of the term, but this is a heavenly not an earthly frui, and it is frui “in 
God” because God alone, and not other human beings, brings human life to full supreme 
happiness (doc. Chr. 1.22.20-1.34.38; civ. Dei 19.13, 19.17; see Canning, 1999, p. 860; 
Sun, pp. 178-180).  Human beings are allowed to love created things, especially our 
neighbor, but we have to love them in relation to the Creator; so it is no longer 
cupidity/desire (cupiditas) but love (caritas) (Trin. 9.8.13).  Augustine stated, 
The peace of the Heavenly City [the city of God] is a perfectly ordered and 
perfectly harmonious fellowship in the enjoyment of God, and a mutual 
fellowship in God; the peace of the whole universe is the tranquility of order—
and order is the arrangement of things equal and unequal in a pattern which 
assigns to each its proper position. (civ. Dei 19.13) 
 
 From Augustine’s mature spiritual and theological perspective, the reciprocity of 
love of God and neighbor is essential for the proper relationship between contemplation 
and action.  Based on the primacy of love of God and neighbor in the Bible (e.g., Mt 
22:37-40), Augustine constantly confronted with a following issue during his lifetime: To 
what extent can “the inner life of the spirit” (i.e., a life of prayer/solitude) be harmonized 
with “an active apostolate and the performance of charitable works” (i.e., a life of 
community/social engagement)?  Indeed, Augustine had struggled to reconcile his early 
and continuing preference for the contemplative life with the many duties surrounding his 
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priesthood, and later, his episcopacy (see epp. 10.1-3, 21.1-6, 48.1-4; Torchia, 1999, pp. 
233-235).  Although he designated contemplation as the “better part” (melior pars, e. g., 
the story of Martha and Mary, Lk 10:38-42), this did not imply that action is bad, but 
only that it must give way to something more perfect (s. 103.5-6).  Augustine intended to 
establish a more refined ideal of Christian charity that fully integrates the love of God 
and neighbor, and thereby upholds both precepts of the Great Commandment (Trin. 
8.8.12; civ. Dei 19.19). 
 Augustine sought to harmonize these seemingly disparate but mutually enriching 
dimensions of Christian living—contemplation and action.  According to Augustine, 
“faith cannot save without good works” for others, that is, faith “works by charity” (f. et 
op. 16.27).  This implies that the necessity of love (necessitas caritatis) demands a 
willing acceptance of our social engagement and ecclesiastical obligation, while the love 
of truth (caritas veritatis) seeks the “sanctified leisure” (otium sanctum) of contemplation 
(civ. Dei 19.19).  In other words, “no one has a right to lead a life of contemplation to the 
neglect of temporal responsibilities, but no one should be so immersed in active service 
as to relinquish the delight of truth (veritatis delectatio) completely” (Torchia, p. 233).  In 
effect, the good of the earthly city deserves our attention as we patiently anticipate the 
realization of the heavenly city (see civ. Dei 11.1, 14.28, 18.2, 19.13-19). 
 Throughout his long episcopate, in addition to his duties as bishop of Hippo, 
Augustine worked and wrote for the benefit of the whole Church of God.  In particular, 
he spent much of his time to participate, vigorously and powerfully, in debates with the 
Manichees, Donatists, Arians, and Pelagians for defending and reestablishing essential 
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elements of Christian teaching and doctrine (e.g., the concepts of God and the soul, sin 
and God’s grace, the Christian community and the sacrament of baptism, the unity of 
love of God and neighbor, etc).  As such, Augustine courageously faced the political and 
cultural challenges of his times.  On August 24, 410, Rome, the former capital of the 
Roman Empire, was taken by the army of Alaric the Goth.  Many pagans criticized 
Christianity, contending that Rome had been preserved inviolate while she worshipped 
the old gods, but that Rome had fallen to barbarians after adopting Christianity.  Many 
Christians were anxious about this tragedy and had fundamental questions about the 
meaning of this terrifying portent.  In order both to defend Christianity against pagans 
and to comfort God’s people within the depths of disturbance, Augustine composed a 
majestic work, City of God (413-426/427); it has been valuable in the study of 
Augustine’s thought (Bonner, p. 140; Chadwick, 1986, pp. 96-106; Clark, pp. 94-107; 
Harrison, 2000, pp. 194-221; Lancel, pp. 391-412).42  On September 26, 426, Augustine 
nominated Eraclius (or Heraclius) to succeed him as bishop of Hippo with the acceptance 
of his whole congregation and retreated for his health for a while (ep. 213.1-7).  About 
                                                
 42 City of God consists of the twenty-two books that are divided by two main parts: 1) Books 1-10 
are a refutation of the “false teachings” of the pagans; 2) Books 11-22 are a “demonstration and defense” of 
the truth of Christian faith.  In this work, Augustine dealt with various yet crucial themes of Christian 
theology and life—the Trinity, the incarnation, creation and divine governance, nature and grace, free will 
and predestination, the origin of evil, marriage and virginity, and a host of other critical issues (which are 
related to the major heresies or schisms of his time: Manichaeism, Donatism, Arianism, and Pelagianism).  
In particular, Augustine distinguished the heavenly city (the city of God) from the earthly city.  For 
Augustine, the city of God is directed by God-centered love and acquiesces in divine revelation and 
instruction.  Because its pattern is laid in heaven and because its perfect state is achieved only in the 
afterlife, the city of God is called the heavenly city; but insofar as, by adhering to Christ, the citizens of this 
city now have the possibility of leading virtuous lives here on earth; they place their trust in God rather than 
in themselves.  In contrast, the earthly city is guided by self-love and lives according to what Scripture calls 
the flesh.  The term flesh is to be taken as referring to the body and bodily pleasures as the highest good; it 
embraces all of the human being’s thoughts, actions, and desires to the extent to which they are not ordered 
to God as to their supreme good (civ. Dei 11.1, 14.28, 18.2, 19.13-19; see Fortin, 1999, pp. 196-202). 
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this time, he began to write The Retractions in order to list and review all his works 
(except his Epistles and Sermons); he completed it in 427 (v. Aug. 28; Bonner, p. 153; 
Brown, p. 411).  In 429, Gaiseric and his Vandals landed in North Africa.  Before this 
Vandal army raided the rich eastern provinces of Africa, a number of bishops appealed to 
Augustine to take refuge, with regard to the proper conduct of a bishop in the event of 
hostile attack.  In particular, Bishop Honoratus of Thiabe quoted the words of the 
Gospel—“When they persecute you in one town, flee to the next” (Mt 10:23)—to 
persuade Augustine and to justify flight in the face of persecution.  Augustine held 
strongly to the traditional African view that it was the duty of a bishop to remain among 
his flock for as long as anyone had need of him, while quoting words of the Gospel: “I 
am the good shepherd.  The good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep.  The hired 
hand, who is not the shepherd and does not own the sheep, sees the wolf coming and 
leaves the sheep and runs away” (Jn 10:11-12) (ep. 228.1-6; Bonner, pp. 152-154; Brown, 
pp. 428-429).  Augustine sent a pastoral letter for the African churches in order to deliver 
advice on the withdrawal of bishops from the churches at the approach of the Vandals: 
There were circumstances when flight was justified: when, as in the case of St 
Athanasius, the bishop was the sole object of attack and his sacred ministry could 
be discharged by others, or if all the inhabitants of a spot had fled, so that there 
was nothing to be gained by the clergy remaining.  But if the laity remain, and the 
danger to clergy and laity is the same, then the laity must not be deserted in their 
time of need. (Bonner, p. 154; see ep. 228.2, 228.6; Possidius, v. Aug. 30) 
 
Indeed, Augustine managed to pass his message onto the African churches and 
stood firmly by his pastoral responsibilities, ideals, and Christian beliefs while other 
Bishops were driven from their churches and provinces by the Vandal invaders: 
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With the approach of the enemy, people will flock to the churches, some seeking 
to be baptized, some to be reconciled, others to be absolved.  If the clergy have 
gone, they will depart unregenerate and absolved.  Accordingly, the clergy must 
remain.  If their blood is shed, they will have their reward like the martyrs, for 
having laid down their life for the people committed to their charge. (Bonner, pp. 
154-155; see ep. 228.8-9) 
 
 In the time of this calamity, the aged Bishop Augustine was bitterly grieved in his 
heart.  He had only one prayer to God: “either that He [God] may be pleased to free this 
city which is surrounded by the foe, or if something else seems good in His sight that He 
make His servants brave for enduring His will, or at least that He may take me from this 
world unto Himself” (Possidius, v. Aug. 29; see Bonner, pp. 153-154; Brown, p. 429).  
The presence of the savage army of Vandals around the city wall did not alter 
Augustine’s ministry, writing, and his spiritual way of life: 
Until he [Augustine] fell ill with his last sickness, he continued to preach to the 
people, and with the Vandals at the gate, he continued writing the great reply to 
Julian of Eclanum, the last and most formidable of the Pelagian controversialists. 
(Bonner, p. 154; see v. Aug. 31) 
  
 Augustine’s friends and followers joined Augustine in offering up the same prayer, 
although they had been lamenting the calamities which had overtaken them.  After three 
months of the siege of Hippo by the Vandals, old Bishop Augustine became sick with a 
high fever (v. Aug. 29).  During the last ten days of his illness, he had prayed to God and 
had meditated on penitential Psalms of David with abundant tears.  At the age of seventy-
six, he died in peace on August 28, 430 (v. Aug. 31).  After the death of Augustine, the 
siege of Hippo lasted eleven months; it was sacked by the Vandals and was burned and 
destroyed by them in July 431 but Augustine’s library was fortunately preserved by 
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Possidius43 (v. Aug. 29, 31; Bonner, pp. 153-156; Brown, pp. 436-437; O’Donnell, 2005, 
pp. 315-316; Harrison, pp. 221-222).  On August 28 every year the Christian Church 
celebrates the heroic virtues of this bishop and theologian, who celebrated in his 
Confessions the steadfast love of God as source of the salvation of all God’s creatures 
(Clark, p.12).  Confessions has remained influential for millions of religious people who 
have humbly agreed with Bishop Augustine’s faithful statement—“You stir man to take 
pleasure in praising you, because you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless 
until it rests in you” (conf. 1.1.1). 
 
 In summary, the case of Augustine’s conversion experience enables us to 
understand the impact of personal, social, cultural, and religious factors on the process of 
religious conversion.  The sufficient account of Augustine’s main life history helps us 
establish a better account of his transformational process.  This means that it leads us to 
realize that Augustine’s conversion experience was the sum of what happened in his life 
before, during, and after his conversion to Christianity in the summer of 386.  Following 
the specific changes of localities and the chronological order of his life history, 
Augustine’s main life-changing experiences are presented: 1) his experiences of beatings 
                                                
 43 Possidius was one of members of Augustine’s monastery at Hippo (v. Aug.15) and later became 
bishop of Calama in 397.  When the Vandal army besieged Hippo in 429, he remained there with 
Augustine; after the death of Augustine and the sack of Hippo by Vandals, Possidius, as Augustine’s 
biographer, published a book, The Life of Augustine.  He later recalled his loving relationship with 
Augustine for a long time: “By the grace of God I have lived with this man [Augustine], who is now dead, 
on terms of intimate and delightful friendship, with no bitter disagreement, for almost forty years, I may 
also continue to emulate and imitate him in this world and may enjoy with him the promises of God 
Almighty in the world to come.  Amen” (v. Aug. 31).  Bishop Possidius of Calama, a North African town 
about forty miles south-west of Hippo Regius, tried to accomplish his episcopal duty to rebuild the 
Christian church in North Africa.  However, he was expelled by order of the Vandal King Gaiseric (also 
called Genseric) in 437 (see Vessey, 1999, p. 668). 
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at school and parents’ laughing/God’s silence about them (conf. 1.9.14-15), 2) the pear-
stealing episode (2.4.9-2.6.12), 3) the death of his unnamed friend (4.4.7-9), 4) the failure 
of Faustus to address the objections of Augustine to Manichean cosmology (5.6.10-
5.7.13), 5) his escape from his mother through an act of deception (5.8.15), 6) his 
dismissal of his unmarried wife (6.15.25), 7) the relationships with his spiritual mentors 
(e.g., Christian Platonist Simplicianus [8.5.10]) and his friends (e.g., Alypius [8.9.27-
8.12.30, 9.6.14]), 8) the famous garden experience (8.12.28-30), 9) his baptism by Bishop 
Ambrose (9.6.14), 10) the mystical vision he and his mother shared at Ostia (9.10.23-26), 
11) his monastic life and church ministry as a monk-priest/bishop of Hippo Regius 
(Possidius, v. Aug. 4, 5, 7, 8), and 12) his last ecclesiastical struggle for defending his 
flock and church during the blockade of Hippo by the Vandal army (v. Aug. 29, 30, 31). 
Along with knowing Augustine’s life history, the exploration of some of his basic 
thought helps us to promote a more appropriate understanding of the process of his 
conversion.  Augustine’s thought was deeply rooted in his transformation from 
Manichaeism, through skepticism and Neoplatonism, to Christianity, which pivoted on 
his life-changing events.  It was related to the social, cultural, historical, political, and 
religious environments of his time.  Especially, his main thought—God and the soul; sin 
and God’s grace; creation, time, and eternity; the unity of the love of God and love of 
neighbor; the Christian church and baptism—was more developed within his numerous 
and vigorous debates with the Manichees, Donatists, Arians, and Pelagians.  This 
dissertation will now attempt both to explore how previous studies have interpreted 
Augustine’s conversion experience from psychological, sociological, anthropological, or 
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theological perspectives, and to provide interdisciplinary questions for critically 
extending the contributions of the literature. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW OF INTERPRETATIONS  
OF AUGUSTINE’S CONVERSION 
 
 This chapter presents a critical literature review of interpretations of Augustine’s 
conversion from psychological, sociological, anthropological, and theological 
perspectives.  While retrieving the contours of the interpretations of religious conversion 
in chapter two, this chapter moves to examine the key contributions and limitations of the 
previous studies of Augustine’s conversion, at which point it attempts to deepen the basic 
ideas of the interpretations of Augustine’s conversion as well as to investigate the most 
salient or essential elements of interpretations of his lived experience of transformation.  
Then it presents specific interdisciplinary questions that intend to extend critically the 
contributions of the literature by bringing together various disciplines. 
Augustine’s conversion was a complex and multi-dimensional process of 
religious change that brought about the total reorientation and transformation of his life, 
influenced by the interplay of personal, social, cultural, and religious components.  This 
means that Augustine’s conversion process involved the sum of what happened in his life 
before, during, and after his conversion to God in the summer of 386.  Because of the 
complexity of his conversion, scholars have offered various understandings of his 
conversion from different perspectives.  For example, from a psychological perspective, 
scholars have primarily investigated the influence of personal factors on Augustine’s 
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conversion experience, at which point they have focused on Augustine’s inner crisis, 
need, and mental development.  From a sociological perspective, scholars have paid 
attention to the social and institutional aspects of traditions in which Augustine’s 
conversion took place.  They have elucidated how others’ conversion stories had 
influenced Augustine’s conversion narrative as well as how Augustine’s extensive 
interpersonal bonds and his networks of Christian friendships had affected the process of 
his transformation.  From anthropological and philosophical perspectives, scholars have 
explored the role of cultural and philosophical forces in the process of Augustine’s 
change.  They have articulated the impact of the Neoplatonic heritage, the Christian 
monastic movement, and the North African context on Augustine’s thought and 
conversion.  From a theological perspective, Augustine scholars have considered the 
religious dimension (e.g., God’s grace) as absolutely essential to the whole process of his 
transformation.  Accordingly, they have primarily emphasized the efficacy of the 
transforming power of God in his conversion.  Indeed, there is no single theoretical 
discipline (e.g., psychology, sociology, anthropology, and theology) that can encompass 
the various interpretations of Augustine’s conversion process.  Thus, it is necessary to 
develop a more critical and integrative dialogue among theological and social scientific 
studies of conversion. 
 
I. Psychological Studies of Augustine’s Conversion: 
The Impact of Personal Factors 
 
Augustine’s conversion has long been an important subject in the field of 
psychology of religious experience.  Psychologists (of religion) have explored the impact 
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of personal factors on Augustine’s conversion experience.  There are different 
interpretations of the phenomenon of Augustine’s religious change among the scholars of 
different schools.  Mindful of the complexity and diversity of the psychological studies of 
Augustine’s conversion, this section of the literature review focuses on three main themes 
because they are valid for appreciating the personal dimension of religious change and 
because they are helpful to achieve an integrated understanding of Augustine’s 
conversion narrative.  These main themes are 1) Augustine’s conversion and regressive 
psychopathology, 2) Augustine’s conversion, crisis, and the unification of his divided self, 
and 3) Augustine’s conversion and his mental development.1 
 
A. Augustine’s Conversion and Regressive Psychopathology 
Freudian scholars have primarily interpreted Augustine’s conversion experience 
in light of the oedipal conflict, self-reproach, and a sense of guilt (Bakan, 1965; Dittes, 
1965; Dodds, 1927-1928/1990; Kligerman, 1957/1990; Pruyser, 1966; Rigby, 1985).  As 
noted earlier, Sigmund Freud (1928/1957) considers religious conversion as a matter of 
surrendering to the father’s or Father’s will within the context of the Oedipus complex 
(which is inherently accompanied by emotional illness and pathological regression) (pp. 
                                                
 1 While rehearing the contributions of the previous psychological interpretations of conversion in 
chapter two, I attempt to organize the main psychological (or psychology of religious) themes pertaining to 
the studies of Augustine’s conversion.  In dong so, I am indebted to 1) Sigmund Freud’s concept of 
religious conversions as a matter of surrendering to the father’s or Father’s will (1928/1957) and E. R. 
Dodds’ emphasis on the oedipal complex, self-reproach, and sense of guilt of Augustine’s conversion 
(1927-1928/1990) to formulate the theme of Augustine’s conversion and regressive psychopathology; 2) 
William James’ idea of Augustine’s discordant personality and his experience of interior transformation 
(“twice born”) through his inner embrace with the divine (“a More”) (1902/1982) to establish the theme of 
Augustine’s’ conversion, crisis, and the unification of his divided self; and 3) Donald Capps’ view on 
Augustine’s conversion as a transformative process of self-exposure or self-becoming through development 
and progressive maturity (1983, 1985, 1990, 1993, 2004, 2007b) to shape the theme of Augustine’s 
conversion and his mental development. 
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245-246).  Freud (1923/1989) in The Ego and the Id describes the origins of the Oedipus 
complex: 
In its simplified form the case of a male child may be described as follows.  At a 
very early age the little boy develops an object-cathexis for his mother, which 
originally related to the mother’s breast and is the prototype of an object-choice 
on the anaclitic model; the boy deals with his father by identifying himself with 
him.  For a time these two relationships proceed side by side, until the boy’s 
sexual wishes in regard to his mother become more intense and his father is 
perceived as an obstacle to them; from this the Oedipus complex originates.  His 
identification with his father then takes on a hostile colouring and changes into a 
wish to get rid of his father in order to take his place with his mother.  
Henceforward his relation to his father is ambivalent; it seems as if the 
ambivalence inherent in the identification from the beginning had become 
manifest…Along with the demolition of the Oedipus complex, the boy’s object-
cathexis of his mother must be given up.  Its place may be [normally] filled 
by…an intensification of his identification with his father...In this way the 
dissolution of the Oedipus complex would consolidate the masculinity in a boy’s 
character.  In a precisely analogous way, the outcome of the Oedipus attitude in a 
little girl may be an intensification of her identification with her mother. (pp. 26-
27; see pp. 22-31, 48-49) 
 
Freud insists that the human sense of guilt is rooted in the Oedipus complex of 
one’s childhood in light of the structure of mind of id, ego, super-ego: “man’s sense of 
guilt springs from the Oedipus complex” (1930/1989, p. 93; see pp. 94-95; 1923/1989, p. 
30).  He notes, 
Clearly the repression of the Oedipus complex was no easy task.  The child’s 
parents, and especially his father, were perceived as the obstacle to a realization 
of his Oedipus wishes; so his infantile ego fortified itself for the carrying out of 
the repression by erecting this same obstacle within itself.  It borrowed strength to 
do this, so to speak, from the father, and this loan was an extraordinarily 
momentous act.  The super-ego retains the character of the father, while the more 
powerful the Oedipus complex was and the more rapidly it succumbed to 
repression (under the influence of authority, religious teaching, schooling and 
reading), the stricter will be the domination of the super-ego over the ego later 
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on—in the form of conscious or perhaps of an unconscious sense of guilt. 
(1923/1989, p. 30, see pp. 48-49)2 
 
In “Mourning and Melancholia,’’ Freud (1917/1957) discusses the 
symptomatology of melancholia,3 and contends that in melancholia, the lost object is 
internalized and the rage against the lost object is therefore self-directed.  This, in Freud’s 
view, explains why the melancholic person engages in exaggerated self-reproach (pp. 
243-251).  Endorsing Freud’s concepts of religious conversion, oedipal complex, and 
melancholia, Freudian psychologists have argued that Augustine’s conversion experience 
is in part an effort to resolve his oedipal conflict which involves his self-reproach and 
oedipal anxieties.  As such, they have predominantly viewed Augustine’s Confessions as 
a record of a pathological personality.  In doing so, they are concerned with the oedipal 
issues of Augustine, which focus on his ambivalent relationships with his father 
(Patricius) and with his mother (Monica) (in terms of triadic relationships between 
                                                
2 For Freud, the superego emerges from a little boy’s oedipal conflict.  In this sense, Freud 
introduces the notion of the oedipal conflict through a reference to the superego.  He notes, “The broad 
general outcome of the sexual phase dominated by the Oedipus complex may, therefore, be taken to be the 
forming of a precipitate in the ego, consisting of these two identifications in some way united with each 
other.  This modification of the ego retains its special position; it confronts the other contents of the ego as 
an ego ideal or superego” (1923/1989, p. 30, italics in the original).  Freud contends that the superego is a 
part of one’s personality that retains the father’s values and exercises the function of conscience 
(1923/1989, pp. 22-31, 48-49; see Pruyser, 1966, pp. 285-287). 
 
3 Freud (1917/1957) discusses the similarities and differences between these two phenomena of 
mourning and melancholia.  In Freud’s view, the major similarity is that both are the reactions to the loss of 
someone or something that was deeply valued—“the loss of a loved object” (p. 245).  The major difference 
lies in the fact that mourning indicates a normal grieving process, whereas melancholia refers to a 
pathological disposition or condition that may require medical treatment.  In that sense, in mourning, one’s 
sense of loss is painful; but there is little of the self-reproach as well as of the anticipation of impending 
punishment and chastisement.  However, in melancholia, one’s sense of loss is painful and one’s self-
reproach is invariably present: “The distinguishing mental features of melancholia are a profoundly painful 
dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, 
and a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-
revilings, and culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment” (p. 244; see 1923/1989, p. 23). 
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parents and child), and on relational issues of difference, power, competition, and 
sexuality. 
 Influenced by Freud, E. R. Dodds (1927-1928/1990) in “Augustine’s 
Confessions: A Study of Spiritual Maladjustment” interprets Augustine’s conversion 
experience in light of the oedipal complex, self-reproach, and a sense of guilt.  Dodds 
describes Augustine’s disrupted mental status as “at war” within himself (p. 44), 
acknowledging William James’ idea of the divided self (see James, 1902/1982, pp. 162-
167).  For Dodds, Augustine’s sick soul or dividedness is “the recurrent ground-theme of 
the Confessions” which is rooted in his oedipal complex and his sense of wrongness 
before the divine and others.  In that sense, Dodds depicts Augustine’s Confessions as an 
“introspective autobiography,” which indicates “the intimate record of a neurotic 
conflict” (p. 44).  In his understanding of the Confessions, Dodds is more concerned with 
Augustine the man rather than Augustine the saint or Augustine the theologian.  As such 
he writes, 
With the theological and devotional content of the Confessions the present paper 
is not concerned.  It is addressed to the ordinary reader; and its purpose will have 
been attained if it convinces him that the humanity revealed in the Confessions is 
neither irrelevant to the saint’s achievement nor limited in its tragic appeal by the 
unfamiliarity of its setting...Just as we do not face the surgeon’s knife unless there 
be something seriously amiss with our bodies, so no man faces the anguish of 
self-analysis unless there be grave trouble in his soul.  Every introspective 
autobiography represents an act of spiritual surgery, and its raison d’etre is a 
condition of spiritual maladjustment which must be laid bare before it can be fully 
dealt with. (p. 44) 
 
Within a Freudian psychosexual framework of the Oedipus complex, Dodds 
asserts that the origins of Augustine’s self-condemnation and his neurotic conflict were 
rooted in the circumstances of his early childhood.  For Dodds, the self-reproach and 
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pathological conflict of the early Augustine had inherently influenced the formation of 
the young and adult Augustine’s basic thought.4  Dodds states, 
The origins of the conflict are to be looked for in Augustine’s family history.  His 
mother, Monica, was a pious countrywoman who had been reared by an old nurse 
in a tradition of fervent Catholicism, at a time when paganism was still in the 
ascendant in Roman Africa…While still in her teens this devout and sensitive 
child was given in marriage to a small country squire named Patricius, a pagan by 
tradition and temperament if not also by confession…Monica suffered much in 
the early years of her married life…Of this ill-assorted union Augustine was the 
fruit.  It was his tragic destiny to combine in a small and sickly body the warring 
souls of both his parents and fastidious intellect which served each soul in turn.  
He hardly realizes this himself, believing as he does that every soul is a fresh 
creation, though burdened with a portion of Adam’s sin; to him the two [divided] 
selves appear as Nature and Grace, the flesh and the spirit, the old Man and the 
new. (pp. 44-45) 
 
Importantly, Dodds views Augustine’s conversion more as a suppression than a 
resolution of his neurotic conflict, whereas James regards his conversion as a 
transformative process of unifying his divided self (see 1902/1982, pp. 171-176).  In this 
way, Dodds contends that the adult (or the saint) Augustine’s condition of spiritual 
maladjustment emerged from his earlier familial conflict; his spiritual maladjustment, as 
founded in his introspective autobiography itself, showed evidence of the un-resolving or 
continuing neurotic conflict until his adulthood.  Although Dodds admires Augustine’s 
impressive capacities for self-analysis and for employing words in order to communicate 
his subjective experiences with precision and depth of understanding—“Augustine is the 
                                                
 4 In particular, Dodds (1927-1928/1990) pays attention to the role of Monica in the formation of 
Augustine’s personality, his life-style, and his thought.  For Dodds, the factor of Augustine’s relationship to 
his mother Monica does not assure psychological well-being: “One need not have studied Freud to 
recognize in this exceptional relationship to his mother one of the determining factors in Augustine’s life 
history.  From this springs his inability to find happiness in the love of women; from this his desperate 
pursuit—in philosophy, in friendship, at last in religion—of an elusive substitute for that happiness” (p. 
48). 
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last original master of Latin eloquence, and at the same time the first writer of modern 
romantic prose” (p. 54), he negatively concludes, 
In that moment in the garden—did the old Adam really die?  Was the conflict 
never renewed?  The answer is, I think, Yes and No.  The immediate consequence 
of the decision was, so far as we can judge, a sense of happiness and a return to 
normal mental activity...Nevertheless it is difficult to believe that the Augustine of 
later years—the bishop who forbade any woman to set foot in his palace, the 
theologian who defended the use of coercion in religious schisms, the moralist 
who thought it folly to weep for the death of a friend, the ascetic who boasted that 
he had learned to swallow his food as though it were physic (Epp. 93, 204; Conf. 
IV., 7 [12], X., 31 [44])—it is difficult to believe that this man had found within 
the Church the true mental balance which he had failed to achieve outside it. (p. 
53) 
 
 Similarly, Charles Kligerman (1957/1990) in “A Psychoanalytic Study of the 
Confessions of St. Augustine” describes Augustine’s conversion and his life story within 
a classical psychoanalytic framework of the Oedipus complex.  According to Kligerman, 
Augustine’s conversion emerged from “an [abnormal] identification with the mother and 
a passive feminine attitude to the father displaced to God” (p. 108).  Kligerman regards 
Augustine’s Confessions as “a psychiatric personal history without the contaminating 
presence of an interviewer” (p. 99).  For Kligerman, the Confessions shows vividly how 
desperately Augustine struggled for his manhood (p. 102); this book is analogous to the 
free association in psychoanalytic treatment in which Augustine was “emotionally labile 
and [spoke] from the heart in a rhapsodic fashion” (p. 99).  Kligerman notes that 
Augustine suffered from unresolved oedipal conflicts.  Like Dodds (1927-1928/1990), 
Kligerman insists that Augustine’s psychopathological conflict was rooted in his earlier 
family environment.  In particular, the religious difference between Patricius and Monica 
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led to profound parental conflict in the family which had affected Augustine’s personality 
and his mental development.  He writes, 
His father, Patricius, a civil servant of the Roman state, was a sort of magistrate or 
tax collector—and a pagan.  The mother, Monica, later St. Monica, was a devout 
Christian from a Christian family.  This religious difference led to intense parental 
conflict which was decisive for Augustine’s entire development (p. 98)...In the 
childish imagination of Augustine, Patricius represented the power and prestige of 
Rome, paganism, the religion of the ruling class, and masculinity.  Monica 
represented Africa, the mother country, whose great city was Carthage, 
Christianity, then more prevalent among the lower classes, and femininity.  His 
boyhood dreams of glory must have been associated with following in his father’s 
footsteps leading him to Rome—magnificent center of the universe.  Carthage 
was great, but it was not Rome; Africans were provincials. (p. 104) 
 
Indeed, Kligerman views Monica’s influence on the construction of Augustine’s 
psychic development negatively, whereas Augustine himself praises her piety and gives 
her a great deal of positive credit in the Confessions.  Kligerman pays attention to 
Augustine’s problematic relationship with his mother in light of Augustine’s oedipal 
conflict, especially his unhealthy identification with his mother.  He states, 
Often frigid, but passively compliant, such women are extremely frustrating to 
their husbands.  Monica had a hostile attitude toward sexuality but submitted 
dutifully to her unfaithful husband (p. 98)…Emotionally alienated from her 
husband [Monica] had grown especially close to her oldest son and pinned her 
hopes on him.  Augustine tells us how she daily wept over him, praying for his 
soul.  It is not hard to detect an erotic quality in such behavior.  Frigid hypermoral 
women frequently find concealed incestuous gratification in such stormy 
emotional scenes with their sons.  For him it must have been extremely seductive 
yet frustrating process, and sheds light on the turbulence of his adolescence.  
Augustine was a typically overstimulated child, culminating in a character type 
who seeks constantly to master his overwhelming tension and never finds 
adequate discharge—hence his violent emotionality and passionate fervor. (p. 
101) 
 
 In consideration of Augustine’s oedipal situation, Kligerman asserts that 
Augustine was deeply attached to his mother and viewed his father as a rival for his 
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mother’s affections.  Importantly, the oedipal Augustine could not resolve his 
psychosexual conflict in the normal way, through positive identification with his father, 
because his mother, Monica who disappointed in her marital relation, “turned her love to 
her eldest son in an engulfing type of seductiveness” (p. 104).5  As such, Augustine was 
unable to form a normal identification with his father; while receiving confusing signals 
from his mother—both attraction and repulsion—Augustine’s only choice was to develop 
an abnormal identification with her.  For Kligerman, Augustine’s abnormal identification 
with his mother was reflected in his conversion to her religious faith; during the 
conversion to his mother’s religion, Augustine identified with God in the passive way 
that a male, deprived of his masculinity by an overpowering mother, was forced to relate 
to a father-figure.  In this sense, while viewing Augustine’s conversion as an act of 
submission to a super-ego God, Kligerman states, 
Augustine regarded this voice of a child as the voice of God.  Probably it was his 
own voice projected and perceived in hallucinatory fashion.  Since Augustine 
retreated from incestuous attachment to a mother identification, then redoubled 
his masculine strivings, during the height of his tension when the ego was 
especially weak, he resorted to projection and regression to a pregenital level.  
Thus it is the voice of a boy or girl—it does not matter.  “Take up and read” 
repeated his childhood technique of appeasing his elders; by study he averted 
cruel punishment.  His earliest prayers to God were that he might not be beaten at 
school.  Thus “take up and read” was one of the first external voices of a harsh 
punitive authority introjected as superego.  Under its prodding, Augustine made 
up his mind. (p. 107; see p. 108) 
 
 Consequently, Kligerman contends that Augustine’s conversion was rooted in his 
oedipal conflict, which did not deploy his healthy identification with his mother. 
                                                
 5 In detail, Kligerman (1957/1990) explains this engulfing type of seductiveness within the 
oedipal situation as follows: “When the oedipal child, thus overstimulated, responds with some overt sexual 
gesture, the mother generally recoils with horror and indignation, so that the child feels bewildered, 
frustrated and angry.  Perhaps the most common protection against such a seductive mother is hostile 
identification—followed in turn by a narcissistic ‘masculine protest’” (p. 104). 
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For Kligerman, Augustine did not successfully resolve his oedipal conflict throughout his 
life.  In other words, Augustine’s oedipal conflict kept plaguing him to the end of his 
days (p. 108); as such, Augustine’s resort to religion is nothing more than a futile effort in 
order to externalize his psychosexual conflicts associated with an emotionally charged 
oedipal situation.6 
 Like Dodds and Kligerman, David Bakan (1965) and James E. Dittes (1965) 
agree with the idea that Augustine’s conversion experience is an effort to resolve his 
oedipal conflict.  From a classical psychoanalytic point of view, Bakan (1965) in “Some 
Thoughts on Reading Augustine’s Confessions” examines Augustine’s conversion and 
his life story in light of the Oedipus complex, the unentailment of the self, and a sense of 
guilt/reproach.  Bakan views Augustine’s Confessions as an autobiography in which he 
struggled to separate himself from life; in other words, in the Confessions, Augustine 
vividly showed a “vaulting struggle to identify the limited ego with all of the grandness 
and timelessness which he attributes to God” (p. 150).  In this vein, Bakan characterizes 
Augustine’s writing as reproach: 
[Augustine] reproaches his contemporaries.  He reproaches himself, and there are 
veiled reproaches to his father and even to his mother.  He brings himself to the 
reproach of God, particularly in connection with the discussion of the problem of 
good and evil in the world, the implicit reproach of God for having made him 
with certain imperatives, especially the sexual imperative, but then always falls 
short of asserting the reproach against God.  He almost reproaches God, and then 
substitutes devotional discourse for what might have been reproach. (p. 149) 
                                                
 6 In this Freudian psychosexual framework of the Oedipus complex, Kligerman provides an 
interpretation of Augustine’s vision at Ostia with his mother (conf. 9.10.23-26): “A few days before her 
death, when Monica seemed quite well, Augustine relates in equally masterly fashion quite a different sort 
of experience.  He tells how they leaned together in a window overlooking the garden ‘discoursing then 
together, alone, very sweetly’ what the eternal life would be like.  He goes on to describe a mystical 
ecstatic experience he shares with his mother which in rhythm, flow and imagery strike the reader as 
passionately orgastic” (p. 107). 
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 In consideration of Augustine’s reproach, Bakan asserts that Augustine attempted 
to make himself to be totally “unentailed,” remote, or alienated from all existence.  
According to Bakan, “Augustine was one of the vainest of men because he so sought to 
concern himself only with himself” (p. 150).  From a Freudian perspective, Bakan tends 
to pathologize Augustine’s conversion and his life story in terms of oedipal conflict and 
infantile immaturity.  In doing so, similar to Kligerman, he emphasizes Augustine’s 
“compulsive sexuality” (pp. 150-151).7  For Bakan, the oedipal elements in Augustine are 
“patent.”  Significantly, these oedipal and immature elements of Augustine’s psyche were 
deeply related to his understanding of religiosity (which had later profoundly affected the 
formation of Western religiousness and its culture) (p. 151).  As a result, Bakan 
concludes, 
[Augustine’s] severe distinction of lust from affective involvement is in itself 
indicative of immaturity; and it is perhaps one of the unfortunate things of the 
history of Western culture, that this particular immaturity should have been made 
one of the foundation tenets of the world’s religiosity.  He is critical of his sexual 
activities because he sees them as expressions of habit, compulsion, flesh, and 
lust.  However, instead of attempting to move in the direction of being able to 
enlarge his love, he moves, rather, in the reverse direction, of alienating himself 
from any real love. (p. 150) 
 
 In the same way, James E. Dittes (1965) in “Continuities between the Life and 
Thought of Augustine” interprets Augustine’s conversion and his life story in light of his 
Oedipal complex and his psychological bondage to his mother.  Like Dodds and 
Kligerman, Dittes contends that Augustine’s internal conflicts were deeply rooted in his 
                                                
 7 Like Dodds and Kligerman, Bakan (1965) focuses on Augustine’s oedipal situation related to 
his sexuality.  Bakan explores on oedipal themes, noting that Augustine reproached his father (Patricius) for 
his sexuality and implicitly praised his mother (Monica) for refusing to make sexual relations with his 
father.  He writes, “There is great attachment to the mother.  The father is reproached for not being a 
Christian, for his sexuality, for his anger, etc.  His mother’s sexual relations with the father are conceived 
of as sufferance on her part and impiety on his” (p. 151). 
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earlier familial environment that had stirred Augustine’s oedipal conflict and guilt 
feelings.  In doing so, Dittes focuses on Augustine’s attachment to his mother, Monica, 
who had captured her little son away from any relation with his father, Patricius.  He 
writes, 
Augustine shared with Joseph of Egypt and with Freud of Vienna the fate of being 
the first-born son of a young woman and of an older and aloof father.  Monica 
seems especially to have hovered and fawned over Augustine…If she suffered so 
much emotional deprivation in her own marriage…she sought great gratification 
from her young son, in their earlier years together, as well as in the later years, 
when she was capable of moving in on Augustine’s household, of forcing him to 
send away the mother of his child (VI, 15), of sabotaging his marriage plans at 
least twice (II, 3; VI, 13) and later of sharing a mutual mystical experience in 
which it is difficult to avoid hearing erotic overtones. (IX, 10) (p. 133) 
 
 Dittes asserts that the little Augustine raised by such an insistent mother 
developed a strong attachment and dependence upon her.8  In such a situation, for Dittes, 
Augustine was unprepared for the rugged life of school and the world of other boys.  He 
tended to have shrunk, virtually as a cowering “mama’s boy,” from the sternness of 
teachers, and from the shenanigans of fellow students (p. 133). 
 Similar to Bakan, Dittes points out the immature personality of Augustine as 
found in the Confessions: “In a number of ways, Augustine seems preoccupied with 
himself, in a way appropriate for an infant, and relatively unconcerned with the welfare 
                                                
8 Like Dittes, Paul W. Pruyser (1966) in “Psychological Examination: Augustine” emphasizes 
Augustine’s attachment to his mother throughout his lifetime.  Pruyser writes, “In these Confessions there 
is great emphasis on his relation to the mother with a concomitant neglect of the relations to father, son, 
siblings, and concubine.  Little is said about the impact of father’s death, if any, on the boy Augustine” (p. 
287).  While establishing his clinical report of Augustine, Pruyser organizes his account of Augustine 
around certain key psychological categories—perception, thought processes, language, action, and emotion.  
Although he attempts to minimize a tendency toward infantilizing or pathologizing Augustine and his life, 
he concludes that Augustine never fully renounced his attachment to his mother and never completely 
identified with his father: “His lengthy description of his resistances to becoming a Christian and peculiar 
absence of true remorse (indeed, very little guilt feeling is expressed directly) once more suggest the 
ambivalence of his feelings for his parents and the subsequent inconsistencies within the superego” (p. 288). 
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of circumstances and persons beyond himself, except as they affect him” (p. 133).  As 
such, Dittes illustrates a case of Augustine’s “apparent coldhearted dismissal of the 
mother of his child” in order to elucidate Augustine’s abnormal personality.  He claims 
that “she [the mother of Adeodatus] apparently suffered genuine distress (VI, 15), but 
Augustine seems heedless of her—he never even mentions her name—and remains 
preoccupied with his own feelings of deprivation” (p. 134). 
 Like Kligerman and Bakan, Dittes argues that Augustine did not resolve his 
oedipal conflicts in the normal way, through positive identification with his father, 
Patricius.  In consideration of the dynamics of the oedipal situation, he contends that 
Augustine suffered the misfortune of having won the oedipal conflict with his father 
because his father died when he was sixteen.  The death of his father led the adolescent 
and young Augustine to establish more submission and dependency upon his mother, 
Monica (p. 134).9  Dittes notes, 
After years of the most vigorous assertion of his independence, Augustine 
submitted.  He surrendered to his mother, and to her church and to her wishes.  He 
abandoned masculine sexuality.  He abandoned all active personal striving, 
including his vocational roles and aspirations.  He abandoned those things which 
his father particularly endorsed and represented.  He abandoned, in short, the 
effort to be a father [for Adeodatus].  Instead he became an obedient son [for 
Monica]. (p. 137) 
 
Although Dittes acknowledges that during his early and mid-thirties, Augustine’s 
life and thought underwent radical transition, he asserts that there was still the impact of 
ongoing unresolved oedipal conflicts on the adult Augustine’s life (pp. 137, 140).  In this 
                                                
 9 Dittes (1965) depicts Monica as “a rigid, constricted person,” while noting for example, “the 
battle she found necessary against wine (IX, 8), [and] her controlled, unspontaneous relation with her 
husband (IX, 9)” (p. 134).  Dittes suggests that “Monica’s celebrated virtues and purity were firmly set 
against her own temptations (I, 11), also her anxiety and strong reactions against Augustine’s wantonness 
(II, 3)” (p. 134). 
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sense, Dittes supports the traditional Freudian interpretation that Augustine’s oedipal 
problems forced him to relate to God in the same passive way that he related to Monica.  
Concerned with the interconnection between Augustine’s personal history, his unresolved 
psychological conflicts, and his theological views, Dittes places Augustine’s relations 
with the divine in terms of the Oedipus complex: “If Augustine’s neo-Platonic 
understanding of God and the God and the world is monistic, it may not be too facetious 
to say that it is also mom-istic” (p. 138).  For Dittes, Augustine’s persistent adult Oedipal 
conflicts had affected his teaching on creation and sovereignty, the problem of evil, 
original sin and grace, predestination, redemption, church authority and the sacraments, 
and his dealings with the Manichees, Donatists, and Pelagians (pp. 132-133, 138-140). 
 In a related vein, Paul Rigby (1985) in “Paul Ricoeur, Freudianism, and 
Augustine’s Confessions” explores Augustine’s conversion and his life story in light of 
the Oedipus complex and the recognition of fatherhood.  For Rigby, Augustine’s 
conversion was closely linked to his proper identification with his father, Patricius, in the 
oedipal situation.  Acknowledging that a Freudian reading of religion is “the necessary 
deconstructive moment in the modern appropriation of such classical religious texts as 
the Confessions” (p. 94), Rigby recasts the psychological study of Augustine as an 
instance of the “constructive dialogue between Freudianism and religion” proposed by 
Paul Ricoeur (pp. 93-95).10  For Rigby, the Confessions revealed two Augustines and two 
                                                
 10 According to Rigby, Ricoeur’s hermeneutical method for a constructive conversation between 
Freudianism and religion “enables us to find in the Confessions the arduous path which the individual, the 
Christian churches, and culture must follow to arrive at an articulation of Christianity credible among the 
human sciences and to enter into dialogue with a God who is more than a necessary illusion” (1985, p. 95).  
Influenced by Ricoeur, Rigby views as the Confessions as “an attempt to come to self-knowledge credible 
in our age” (p. 94).  He writes, “Progress will be measured in terms of the succession of the Hegelian 
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theologies: “one neurotic with a theology satisfying wish-fulfillment; the other 
transformed beyond the reach of Freudianism by the figures of the Spirit” (p. 95).  This 
implies that the outcome of Augustine’s oedipal conflicts is neurotic as well as non-
neurotic. 
 Previous scholars interpreting Augustine’s conversion and his Confessions in a 
classical Freudian approach—Dodds, Kligerman, Bakan, and Dittes—have examined 
how Augustine’s mother (Monica) had influenced the formation of the personality, 
thought, and religiosity of her son.  They have argued that Augustine did not resolve his 
oedipal conflicts; that is, he could not normally identify with his father (Patricius) 
because his mother had frozen Patricius out of her affections and because she had 
seductively controlled Augustine and determined to have her son all for herself.  As such, 
they have emphasized Patricius’ inability to be an effective father, a positive role model, 
for his son.  However, Rigby provocatively examines how Augustine’s father had 
affected the construction of the personality, thought, and religiosity of his son.  He 
contends that Augustine did resolve his oedipal conflicts in the appropriate, prescribed 
way through positive identification with his father.  For Rigby, Patricius was not a weak 
or ineffective father for his son.  Rather, Patricius limited his fatherhood to procreation 
which was related to a narrow biological view of the father-son relationship that does not 
take seriously the personhood of the other. 
                                                                                                                                            
figures of the Spirit as understood by Ricoeur—an eschatological hope, a promise.  But first it must be 
examined in the suspicious Freudian light in which religion is nothing more than the tendency toward 
regression and repetition” (p. 94). 
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 Significantly, Rigby challenges us to reconsider the psychological influence of 
Patricius on Augustine, and to look at Patricius’ possible influence on his son’s 
understanding of the divine and religiosity.  For Rigby, after Patricius’ baptism, 
Augustine did not condemn his father but accepted him: “Augustine’s portrait of his 
father is no longer antagonistic after Patricius’ baptism…At the end of Book IX 
Augustine recognizes before God, without antagonism or remorse, his dead father” (p. 
99).  In this sense, concerned with the neurotic aspect of Augustine’s oedipal conflict, 
Rigby emphasizes the non-neurotic outcome of his oedipal conflict.  This implies that 
Augustine recognized “Patricius as a mortal father whom it is no longer necessary to kill 
and thereby renounced the megalomania of his own omnipotent desire” (p. 106).  While 
advancing Peter Brown’s idea of a complimentary process in Augustine’s relations with 
Monica,11 Rigby emphasizes the two dimensions of the successful resolution of 
Augustine’s oedipal conflicts which were related to that “with Patricius the move is from 
rejection to acceptance; with Monica it is from idealization to ordinariness” (p. 99).   
 Importantly, Rigby argues that Augustine developed the grounds for a deeper 
view of fatherhood during and after observing his father’s baptism into the Christian 
church.  For Rigby, while repudiating the fatherhood of “contingency and caprice of 
bodily desire,” Augustine affirmed his father (Patricius) who became not an individual 
father but an actual member of “the ethical life of the [Christian] community” (pp. 105-
106).  This affirmation led Augustine to recognize the fatherhood of the divine.  For 
                                                
 11 For Brown, after the death of Monica, the adult Augustine had recollected and re-established 
his relations with his mother: “Monica, the idealized figure that has haunted Augustine’s youth like an 
oracle of God is subtly transformed, by Augustine’s analysis of his present feelings on remembering her 
death, into an ordinary human being, an object of concern, a sinner like himself, equally in need of [God’s] 
mercy” (2000, pp. 157-158; see conf. 9.12.34). 
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Rigby, Augustine rejected the idea that God was father by virtue of the procreative role.  
Rather, he understood God as father who was a God of gratuitous act of liberation: “God 
as father is a figure modeled on salvation, on a new creation: he is in the future; he is not 
an ancestor connected with kinship or begetting; he is not caught in the immediacy of life.  
He is a figure of transformation offering the possibility of mutual recognition between 
himself and his children” (p. 108). 
 As a result, Rigby points out that Augustine constructed a positive identification 
with his father (Patricius) and with his “God father,”12 although Augustine did not 
achieve a wholly healthy resolution of his oedipal conflicts.13  Through this constructive 
identification with his father, as both human and divine, Augustine actually deepened 
prevailing cultural and theological understandings of fatherhood. 
As noted above, Freudian scholars have emphasized the oedipal conflict and a 
sense of guilt in the interpretation of Augustine’s conversion experience.  They have 
described Augustine’s Confessions as a record of regressive psychopathology.  In doing 
so, they contribute by elucidating Augustine’s endless self-reproaches, his oedipal 
anxieties, his oedipal guilt, and his obsessive personality within Augustine’s relationships 
with his father (Patricius) and with his mother (Monica) in light of triadic relationships 
between parents and child.  As such, Freudian studies of Augustine’s conversion have 
                                                
 12 Rigby emphasizes that Augustine’s God is mainly a father figure, acknowledging that the 
image of God in the Confessions is immensely complex, that is, it “combines all the traditional maternal 
and paternal qualities but it adds spousal images” (p. 108). 
 
 13 For Rigby, Augustine’s resolution of his oedipal conflicts, at both the personal and the 
theological level, was not a totally “healthy” dissolution.  In consideration of Augustine’s sublimation of 
his oedipal conflicts, Rigby presents some evidence of Augustine’s neurotic residues, which are found “not 
only in his doctrines of predestination, the damnation of unbaptized infants, and the use of religious 
coercion but also in his understanding of grace, original sin, creation, church, sacraments, and the image of 
God as father that underpins them” (p. 111). 
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focused on the importance of childhood, the unconscious, and the possibility of pathology 
in Augustine’s conversion experience.  They provide us with insights into the link 
between the young Augustine’s psychological crisis/distress and his early familial 
environments when interpreting the first stages of his conversion process. 
 However, Freudian interpretations of Augustine’s conversion have tended to 
reduce all of Augustine’s mental processes to psychopathological processes without 
adequate historical facts about his childhood experiences,14 because they have explained 
Augustine’s personality and his conversion in light of a model of a person derived from 
the study of psychopathology.  More specifically, Freudian scholars have too much 
depended on Freud’s concept of the Oedipus complex as a primary explanatory principle 
of Augustine’s conversion, his thought, or his life history.15  As such, they have guided 
                                                
14 As noted earlier, Freudian scholars—Dodds (1927-1928/1990), Kligerman (1957/1990), Bakan 
(1965), and Dittes (1965)—insist that Augustine’s guilt feelings and neurotic behaviors were rooted in the 
intractable and inevitable contrariety of having a pagan father and a Christian mother in light of Freud’s 
concept of the Oedipus complex within the psychosexual framework.  However, Lawrence Daly (1978) in 
“Psychohistory and St. Augustine’s Conversion Process” claims that Freudian scholars have tended to 
distort historical facts because they do not present sufficient evidence of fundamental hostility between 
Augustine’s father and his mother (pp. 245-249; see Fredriksen, 1978, pp. 209-214; O’Meara, 2001, p. 213; 
Rambo, 1982, p. 155).  For Daly, the classical psychoanalytic approach has relied too much on Freud’s 
concept of the Oedipus complex as the single explanatory principle of Augustine’s behaviors in his lifetime 
(p. 250).  As such, Daly (1981) casts a doubt in James E. Dittes’ idea that Augustine was “mom-istic” in 
character due to an unresolved Oedipus complex and that Augustine’s conversion was a kind of a 
repression of a neurotic conflict (p. 186; see 1978, pp. 246-250).  In particular, while pointing out Dittes’ 
suggestion that “Augustine shared with Joseph of Egypt and with Freud of Vienna the fate of being the 
first-born son of a young woman and of an older and aloof father” (see Dittes, 1965, p. 133), Daly 
comments on this part of Dittes’ essay: “It is not at all a fact that Augustine was ‘the first-born son’; indeed, 
he was younger than his brother Navigius” (pp. 185-186). 
 
 15 As discussed earlier, Freudian scholars have argued that Augustine’s (thought or) theology is 
rooted in and is a response to his oedipal conflict (see Bakan, 1965, pp. 150-151; Dittes, 1965, pp. 138-
140).  In this study, basically, I agree with that the early Augustine’s inner conflict within his familial 
context might have affected the formation of his personality and thought.  However, as noted in chapter 
three, we need to remind that Augustine had moved from Manichaeism, through skepticism and 
Neoplatonism, to Christianity.  This implies that the formation of Augustine’s thought/theology is not 
simply located in a response to his early experience of oedipal conflict, but an evolving process of his faith 
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readers to interpret Augustine’s conversion as “a regressive, disintegrative, and 
pathological phenomenon” which was inherently related to his expression of emotional 
illness and neurotic conflict.  In doing so, they have overemphasized the issues of 
Augustine’s sexual conflict in light of the oedipal complex and anxiety, at which point 
they are more concerned with the regressive and pathological dimension of Augustine’s 
conversion than the developmental and progressive dimension of his conversion. 
 Moreover, Freudian scholars have exclusively examined Augustine’s personality 
and his experiences with reference to a particular period in childhood (the “oedipal” 
period).  For this reason, they have neglected the exploration of the influences of 
Augustine’s experiences and events that occurred before or after that time.  They have 
also tended to have a muted appreciation of the ongoing interaction between Augustine 
and others/(Other) after his childhood.  This implies that Freudian interpretations are not 
sufficient for explaining the life-long effects of conversion on Augustine’s relationships 
with himself, others, and the divine for facilitating psychological development and 
spiritual maturity. 
 
B. Augustine’s Conversion, Crisis, and the Unification of His Divided Self 
Psychologists of religion have viewed Augustine’s conversion as a progressive 
and regenerative phenomenon that resolves an emotional crisis through the unification of 
the divided self.  They suggest that Augustine’s conversion occurred during and after a 
period of stress, despair, and even crisis.  For example, William James (1902/1982) 
                                                                                                                                            
and knowledge which are profoundly related to the social, cultural, historical, political, and religious 
contexts of his time, especially his debates with the Manichees, Donatists, Arians, and Pelagians. 
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proposes Augustine’s conversion as “a classic example” of religious change.  James 
characterizes Augustine as a morbid-minded person.16  More specifically, he elaborates 
on Augustine in light of “the psychological basis of the twice-born character” which 
“seems to be a certain discordancy heterogeneity in the native temperament of the subject, 
an incompletely unified moral and intellectual constitution” (p. 167). 
From a perspective of psychology of religion, James views Augustine’s 
conversion as a psychological process of unifying his divided self (pp. 171-176).  For 
James, during this unifying process, Augustine’s interior world was a battle-ground for 
what he felt “to be two deadly hostile selves, one actual, the other ideal” in light of self-
loathing and self-despair (p. 171).  As such, James depicts Augustine as a sick soul and 
introduces him as the first of several typical cases of discordant personality, with 
melancholy in the form of self-condemnation and sense of sin: 
You all remember his half-pagan, half-Christian bringing up at [Thagaste and in] 
Carthage, his emigration to Rome and Milan, his adoption of Manicheism and 
subsequent skepticism, and his restless search for truth and purity of life; and 
finally how, distracted by the struggle between the two souls in his breast, and 
ashamed of his own weakness of will, when so may others whom he knew and 
knew of had thrown off the shackles of sensuality and dedicated themselves to 
chastity and the higher life, he heard a voice in the garden say, “Sume, lege” (take 
and read), and opening the Bible at random, saw the text, “not in chambering and 
wantonness,” etc., which seemed directly sent to his address, and laid the inner 
storm to rest forever.  Augustine’s psychological genius has given an account of 
the trouble of having a divided self which has never been surpassed. (pp. 171-
172) 
 
                                                
16 As noted earlier, James classifies two types of persons’ lives: “Some persons [i.e., the healthy-
minded ones] are born with an inner constitution which is harmonious and well balanced from the outset.  
Their impulses are consistent with one another, their will follows without trouble the guidance of their 
intellect, their passions are not excessive, and their lives are little haunted by regrets.  Others [i.e., the 
morbid-minded ones] are oppositely constituted; and are so in degrees which may vary from something so 
slight as to result in a merely odd or whimsical inconsistency, to a discordancy of which the consequences 
may be convenient in the extreme” (p. 168). 
 239 
For James, Augustine’s conversion involved an interior transformation from the 
divided self to the integration of the self in relation to his experience with the divine (“a 
More”).  This means that Augustine’s conversion experience enabled him to enter into a 
(psychological) process for remedying his inner incompleteness and for reducing his 
inner discord; that is, during his transformation process, Augustine shifted from the state 
of storm, stress, and inconsistency to the state of firmness, stability, and equilibrium (pp. 
173-174). 
James contributes by advancing the approach of psychology of religion to 
Augustine’s conversion as a conflict resolution in his profound experience of interior 
transformation (“twice born”) through his inner communion with the Other.  
Consequently, he notes, 
Saint Augustine…emerged into the smooth waters of inner unity and peace, and I 
shall next ask you to consider more closely some of the peculiarities of the 
process of unification…It brings a characteristic sort of relief; and never such 
extreme relief as when it is cast into the religious mould.  Happiness! 
[H]appiness!  [R]eligion is only one of the ways in which men gain that gift.  
Easily, permanently, and successfully, it often transforms the most intolerable 
misery into the profoundest and most enduring happiness. (p. 175) 
 
As contemporary scholars of Augustine’s religious change, W. Paul Elledge 
(1988) and Donald Capps (2007a) basically agree with the statement that Augustine’s 
conversion is an effort to resolve the dividedness of his self through the experience of the 
divine.  From an extended way, in “Embracing Augustine: Reach, Restraint, and 
Romantic Resolution in the Confessions,” Elledge (1988) views Augustine’s conversion 
as a transforming process for unifying his divided self, for reconciling to his previous 
disrupted relationships with others (e.g., Monica and his unnamed friend), and for 
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embracing the divine.  He accepts James’ argument that conversion is a satisfactory 
response to the threat of the disintegration of the inner self, while acknowledging the 
Freudian interpretation that “conversion was in part an effort to resolve an oedipal 
conflict” (p. 74).  Based on these Jamesian and Freudian legacies, he hypothesizes that 
conversion partially results from the operation of unconscious forces in combination with 
“manipulation by other persons” (p. 74).  Following James, Elledge characterizes 
Augustine as “a classic incarnation of the divided will” (p. 81; see James, p. 161).  He 
insists that Augustine’s conversion experience enabled him to change “a sense of [his] 
diffusion, division and fragmentation into a sense of [his] order and integration, 
wholeness and inner harmony” (p. 74, quoted in Allison, 1969, p. 24).  Elledge notes, 
On this complex identity, conversion works to revolutionize and stabilize, 
radically to alter and quietly to preserve established life patterns in slightly 
readjusted modes.  The process of conversion takes Augustine from restraint 
through renunciation and release into a repossession which includes an escape 
hatch, i.e., from the closed embrace of mundane attachments into God’s open one 
that neither empties itself nor ceases by its openness to embrace. (pp. 81-82) 
 
Elledge proposes the “embrace” motif to link Augustine’s relations with Monica 
and his unnamed friend to the conversion experience.  For Elledge, the word embrace 
captures the very ambivalent nature of Augustine’s relationships with others.  Elledge 
insists that in Augustine’s case, to be embraced means, by and large, to be held back, 
restrained, and controlled; accordingly, embraces are imprisoning and emasculating.  Yet, 
not to be embraced means to be ignored, abandoned and betrayed.  Whether tendered or 
withheld, invited or rejected, embraces are not simply experiences of joy; rather, they are 
associated, in Augustine’s own experiences, with pain and wounding (see pp. 75-76).  
For Elledge, Augustine wrestled with his two life-shaping embraces—one with his 
 241 
mother; one with his unnamed friend—before engaging in his final struggle with and his 
surrender to God’s embrace (pp. 75-81).  Elledge reads Augustine’s conversion 
experience as developing from “earlier vexed relationships, particularly those with his 
mother Monica and the unnamed friend,” and as reflecting the “reconciling 
transformation, or sublimation” of these relationships.  These relations involve two major 
figures in his garden experience (conf. 8.7.16-8.12.30): Continence, the woman who 
beckons to him from across the garden, and Alypius, Augustine’s lifelong friend.  Elledge 
demonstrates dynamic parallels between Monica and Continence; and between the 
unnamed friend, whose death caused Augustine tormenting grief (4.4.7-9), and Alypius, 
who was with him throughout his conversion experience (8.8.19-8.12.30). 
Like David Burrell (1970), Elledge describes Monica’s prominent role in 
Augustine’s conversion process positively, although he comments that Monica, in part, 
functions as “manipulating and controlling” within the mother-son relationship.  For 
Elledge, Monica’s tears for Augustine (3.11.19-3.12.21) “simultaneously beckon and 
chastise, summon and ward off, invite a consoling embrace and dare one to try it” (p. 76).  
They did “recreate [her] son, make him anew”; accordingly, her tears led Augustine to 
“become spiritually engendering, ontologically regenerative” (p. 78; see Fenn, 1986, p. 
81).  In this sense, Elledge regards Monica’s dream of the wooden rule (3.11.19) as a 
revelation of Augustine’s surrender to “an embracing merger,” which will undo all the 
estrangements, large and small, that have occurred between them, in “one massive 
capitulation” (p. 77).  He also considers Monica’s dream of the wooden rule as an 
invitation to Augustine to the Christian faith of his mother: “That Augustine will join his 
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mother [and] will embrace her faith” (p. 78).  Elledge emphasizes a dynamic link 
between the mother-son relationship and the God-self relationship in terms of the 
embrace motif, although the God-self relationship is not merely reducible to the mother-
son relationship.  For Elledge, Augustine came to God “in and through Monica,” and her 
embrace served as a mediating channel to God and God’s embrace.  As such, Augustine’s 
conversion experience was engaged in not only reconciliation to his mother, but also 
reconciliation to God.  Elledge writes, “Augustine salvages something of his identity and 
autonomy by moving through Monican arms that contain, extend, and point to seek the 
God beyond mortal fastening.  The Monican embrace finally serves as a kind of conduit 
or channel, containing the son passing through her and even directing him, but unable to 
hold except in passage, possessing and surrendering at the same time” (p. 86).  
Elledge asserts that Augustine’s conversion is a satisfactory response in order to 
integrate his divided self, to overcome his earlier vexed relationships with others, and to 
embrace the divine in light of repairing “fragmented wholeness” and becoming “a 
Romantic.”17  Consequently, he notes, 
For Augustine, this God nourishes precisely by maintaining a distance which is 
His presence; in an infinitely and eternally extensive process He draws Augustine 
nearer, though never into imprisoning embrace.  Conversion for Augustine seems 
to mean just giving way to, giving up to, this deific gravity without ever quite 
landing in God’s lap.  It is finally an irresistible pull; and it generates a 
corresponding irrepressible urge toward Itself which continues to make the heart 
deep, to make it move, and make it restless. (p. 87) 
 
                                                
17 Elledge says, “If to be a ‘Romantic’, means to be a man acutely aware of being caught in an 
existence that denies him the fullness for which he craves, to feel that he is defined by his tension toward 
something else, by his capacity for faith, for hope, for longing, to think of himself as a wanderer seeking a 
country that is always distant, but made ever-present to him by the quality of the love [and/or imagination] 
that ‘groans’ for it, then Augustine has imperceptibly become a ‘Romantic’” ( p. 87, quoted in Brown, 2000, 
p. 150). 
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From a more specific and extended view, Donald Capps (2007a) in “Augustine’s 
Confessions: The Story of a Divided Self and the Process of Its Unification” takes up 
William James’ observation that Augustine is a classic example of the discordant 
personality or divided self, and employs E. R. Dodds’ article (1927-28/1990) on 
Augustine’s “spiritual maladjustment”—in order to explore the psychological bases, 
especially parental, for Augustine’s discordant personality and to evaluate the 
effectiveness of Augustine’s efforts to overcome the discordancy through his personal 
religious conversion.  Like James, Capps characterizes Augustine in light of “the 
psychological basis of the twice-born character.”  This implies that Augustine’s early 
personality was discordant and heterogeneous in his native temperament, “an 
incompletely unified moral and intellectual constitution” (p. 552; see James, p. 167).  
Capps explains this heterogeneous personality as “the result of the inheritance of the 
traits of character of incompatible and antagonistic ancestors” that are supposed to be 
preserved alongside each other (pp. 553-554; see James, p. 169).  For Capps, Augustine’s 
emotional distress played an important role “in precipitating [his] mental rearrangements” 
through the resolution of his self’s dividedness.  Following James’ description of 
religious conversion—“to be converted…[refers to become] unified and consciously right, 
superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities” (James, p. 
189), Capps identifies the characteristic of Augustine’s conversion as “hope, happiness, 
security, and resolve” (Capps, pp. 558-559). 
Importantly, Capps asks why Augustine’s self was disrupted and how his 
personality became “heterogeneous,” commenting that James did not sufficiently 
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speculate the cause of Augustine’s divided self.  Discussing E. R. Dodds’ article, 
“Augustine’s Confessions: A Study of Spiritual Maladjustment,” he agrees with Dodds’ 
statement that the origins of Augustine’s divided self “are to be looked for in his family 
history” (pp. 551-552, 559; see Dodds, 1927-1928/1990, pp. 44-45).  In other words, the 
division of Augustine’s self “was due to the fact that he was raised by parents of very 
different personalities and conflicting worldviews” (p. 559).  More specifically, for Capps, 
Augustine’s father, Patricius, was a civil servant of the Roman state and a pagan; his 
mother, Monica, was a devout Christian from a Christian family.  This religious 
difference led to intense parental conflict which was decisive for the development of 
Augustine’s personality: “Augustine had the misfortune to be the fruit of ‘this ill-assorted 
union…It was his tragic destiny to combine in a small and sickly body the warring souls 
of both his parents and a fastidious intellect which served each soul in turn’” (p. 561; see 
Dodds, p. 45). 
In fact, for Capps, Augustine underwent “the warring souls of both his parents” 
until his religious experience in a garden of Milan (pp. 560-564).  Through this personal 
religious experience in Milan, Augustine resolved his heterogeneous conflicts of two 
souls, thus, he unified his wavering and divided self.  As a result, he asserts that 
Augustine’s conversion is a valuable response in order to overcome his discordancy 
through his personal religious experience. 
 As noted above, Jamesian scholars have regarded Augustine’s conversion 
experience as a satisfactory and positive response to the state of his tension and inner 
conflict.  In doing so, they contribute to understanding the process of Augustine’s 
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conversion by advancing their psychological approaches to Augustine’s conversion as a 
conflict resolution in his profound experience of interior transformation (“twice born”) 
through his inner embrace with the divine, which entails a process of unifying his divided 
self. 
 As such, when we attempt to understand Augustine’s conversion, these Jamesian 
studies encourage us to look at how Augustine’s conversion experience was involved in a 
(psychological) process to overcome his inner discord or division (the sickness of the 
soul), that is, during his transforming process, how Augustine moved from a state of 
storm, stress, and inconsistency to a state of firmness, stability, and equilibrium.  In 
particular, while preserving the existence or activity of the religious subject—the divine, 
the sacred, or God—in the process of human transformation, these studies provide us 
with insights into how Augustine’s psychological distress or crisis had compelled him to 
think about what was the real problem in his life as well as to enter into his quests for 
knowing himself and knowing the divine in light of the interaction of the experience of 
the self and the experience of the divine. 
 
C. Augustine’s Conversion and His Mental Development 
Post-Freudian scholars have primarily examined Augustine’s conversion 
experience in light of the process of self-becoming through his mental development and 
progressive maturity.18  In doing so, they have emphasized pre-oedipal experiences, 
                                                
18 As post-Freudian psychoanalysts, Donald W. Winnicott and Heinz Kohut reject Freud’s 
drive/instinct model by using a relational understanding of human development.  Winnicott and Kohut 
move psychoanalytic thinking and practice from a “one-person psychology,” which focuses on the internal, 
unconscious life of the isolated individual, toward a “two-person psychology” in which a person’s internal 
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shame, and narcissism to interpret Augustine’s conversion experience (Capps, 1983, 
1985, 1990, 1993, 2004, 2007b; Dixon, 1999; Gay, 1986; Nino, 1990; Paffenroth, 2003; 
Parsons, 1990).  Post-Freudian interpretations explain Augustine’s Confessions as a 
record of the process of self-becoming through developmental and progressive maturity 
rather than a record of the pathological personality (see Capps, 1983, p. 261; Paffenroth, 
2003, p. 152; Parsons, 1990, p. 171; Woollcott, 1966, p. 281). 
 Paula Fredriksen (1978) in “Augustine and His Analyst: The Possibility of a 
Psychohistory” significantly suggests that scholars should interpret the themes of the pre-
oedipal years in Augustine’s Confessions.19  In other words, while repudiating Freudian 
                                                                                                                                            
world is always understood to be a reaction to current relational experience (e.g., one’s interaction with a 
mother or with an analyst).  More specifically, in Freud’s perspective, one is isolated from others in light of 
a subject-object orientation; that is, “one approaches a separate other from the outside, seeking objectivity” 
(Schlauch, 1995, p. 72).  In the alternate perspectives of Winnicott and Kohut, one is related to others in 
light of “in between” or the interpersonal relationships; that is, “one approaches a connected other from the 
inside, seeking appreciation of subjectivity” (p. 72; see pp. 55-72).  Both Winnicott and Kohut emphasize 
the pre-oedipal line of human development—the interdependent mother-infant dyad. 
 
19 Paula Fredriksen (1978) proposes an alternate psychological interpretation of Augustine and his 
life story, as found in the Confessions, although she is not primarily a post-Freudian scholar, but rather, a 
historian.  From a psychological and historical perspective, Fredriksen gives an insight into the exploration 
of Augustine’s conversion experience in light of narcissistic personality and human development, and leads 
us to examine the sufficient historical data for facilitating a more accurate and coherent explanation of 
Augustine’s conversion.  She argues, “Personality plays a discernibly large role in Augustine’s intellectual 
and theological development.  Personality theory can provide us with a means of further discerning the 
impact of this factor on Augustine’s thought” (p. 224); “if an analysis…does not take the historical 
evidence fully into consideration, it can be discounted as insufficient or incorrect” (p. 223).  Like 
Fredriksen, although they are predominantly historians, some scholars—Peter Brown (2000), Lawrence J. 
Daly (1978, 1981), Margaret R. Miles (1982), and Diane Jonte-Pace (1993)—spell out and emphasize the 
psychological variables at work in Augustine’s conversion process.  From a psychological and historical 
perspective, these scholars have examined the historical facts or circumstances of Augustine’s conversion 
in the fourth century as well as the source of religious experience in the relationship between infant and 
mother or the pre-oedipal dynamics of the infantile psyche.  This means that during the description of 
Augustine’s conversion, they have paid attention to the emotional/affective dimension as well as the 
intellectual/cognitive dimension.  In this way, Brown (2000) states, “The Confessions are, quite succinctly, 
the story of Augustine’s ‘heart,’ or of his ‘feelings’—his affectus.  An intellectual event, such as the 
reading of a new book, is registered only, as it were, from the inside, in terms of the sheer excitement of the 
experience, of its impact on Augustine’s feelings: of the Hortensius of Cicero, for instance, he would never 
say ‘it changed my views’ but, so characteristically, ‘it changed my way of feeling’—mutavit affectum 
meum” (p. 163; see conf. 3.4.8).  Like Brown, Daly (1981) in “Augustine’s Confessions and Erik Erikson’s 
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studies of the Confessions, Fredriksen proposes a narcissistic “interpretation of Augustine 
partly as an alternative to the [Freudian] Oedipal interpretations” with respect to the 
historical evidence (p. 223).  She hypothesizes that “Augustine manifests the conflicts of 
the narcissistic personality” (p. 219).  While emphasizing Monica’s relentless pursuit of 
her son (which she accepts as historically true) in light of the mother-son relationship, 
Fredriksen characterizes Augustine as a narcissist, who deeply experienced an “inability 
to achieve true object-love and a crushing need for the approval of others” (p. 221).  For 
Fredriksen, Augustine underwent a “troubled separation/individuation process” (pp. 220-
221).  Fredriksen pays attention to Augustine’s narcissism, which is related to 
Augustine’s attitudes toward sexuality.  She asserts that in the matter of sexuality, 
Augustine came to critique his own narcissism; he came to “see sex as pure narcissistic 
gratification, self-serving cupiditas” (p. 221).  Consequently, Fredriksen notes, “He 
                                                                                                                                            
Young Man Luther: Conversion as ‘Identity Crisis’” supports the use of psychological concepts for 
understanding the historical figure.  For Daly, psychological history enables to appreciate emotional factors 
when interpreting a historical figure.  He notes, “psychoanalytic theory has a remarkable potential for 
systematically explaining…the fundamental reasons for behavior, not only in terms of interest, but also in 
terms of the emotional based for compliance or non-compliance” (1981, p. 196, quoted in Weinstein & 
Platt, 1973, p. 419).  Daly contends that Erikson’s Young Man Luther provides a theoretical model for 
organizing and explaining comparatively Augustine’s Confessions.  In emphasizing the historical evidences 
of Augustine’s life story, Daly interprets Augustine’s conversion in light of identity crisis and its new 
formation from the Eriksonian perspective.  He writes, “The psychological frame-of-reference might 
provide an ancillary avenue of research for interpreting the series of actions and web of circumstances that 
culminated in the classic scene in the garden in August of 386” (1981, p. 183).  Daly comments that 
historians have overlooked the connection Augustine made between emotions and situations in the 
recollection of past behavior: “If psychoanalysts have failed to pay sufficient attention to the historical data, 
historians can be faulted for, at best, merely making allusion to the emotional content of Augustine’s 
testimony” (p. 186); “Augustinian historiography has, for the most part, shown itself reluctant—and, in 
some instances, even resistant—to establishing and exploring the connection between internal and external 
reality in its interpretations of the most crucial and significant transition of Augustine’s life” (p. 184; see p. 
195).  Importantly, Daly claims that Augustine’s conversion is neither a neurotic product in the classical 
Freudian perspective nor “an idiosyncratic process” in the perspective of traditional historians (p. 192).  He 
emphasizes the affective as well as the cognitive aspects of Augustine’s conversion experience. 
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cannot truly love; his assessment of the nature of sexual love is shaped by his experience 
of only enjoying a narcissistic gratification from the person loving him” (p. 222). 
By accepting and advancing Paula Fredriksen’s preeminent suggestion of a 
narcissistic reading of the Confessions (see Capps, 1985, pp. 119-122), Donald Capps 
(1983, 1985, 1990, 2007b) has interpreted Augustine’s conversion in the Confessions in 
terms of the pre-oedipal experiences, self-reproach, narcissistic injury, and a sense of 
shame.  Capps (1983) in “Parabolic Events in Augustine’s Autobiography” describes 
Augustine’s conversion experience as a process of self-disclosure or self-becoming, 
which indicates a sign of developmental and progressive maturity (pp. 260-269).  For 
Capps, shame is related to the whole self whereas guilt is related to the acts of 
transgression: “Guilt can be externalized, while shame is totally self-involving” (p. 264, 
see 1993, pp. 74-76; 2007b, p. 585). 
Influenced by Heinz Kohut’s self psychology,20 Capps (1993) in The Depleted 
Self: Sin in a Narcissistic Age characterizes shame as a sense of inner isolation or “tragic 
estrangement” (pp. 71-84).  For Capps, shame or narcissistic injury is rooted in a lack of 
                                                
20 Heinz Kohut (1977) defines the self as an enduring personality structure, which serves as “a 
center of initiative and recipient of impressions” as well as “the center of the individual’s psychological 
universe” (pp. 99, 311; see pp. 93-139).  According to Kohut, “selfobjects are which we experience as part 
of our self” (Kohut & Wolf, 1978, p. 414).  For Kohut, the self-selfobject relationship determines the health 
and vitality of the self.  The self lies in relationship with others.  Selfhood means essentially being-in-
relationship: “a self can never exist outside a matrix of selfobjects” (1984, p. 61); “the self needs selfobjects 
not only in infancy but throughout the whole span of life” (p. 50).  Significantly, Kohut describes his 
concept of selfobject experience by using the three narcissistic transferences of mirroring, idealizing, and 
twinship/merger.  During infancy and childhood, the self gains structure and cohesiveness in a matrix of 
selfobject relationships which provide reassurance and solidify the self in the midst of anxieties and 
conflicts.  In particular, selfobjects respond empathically to the child’s inherent need for 
“acknowledgement and acceptance” (mirroring experience), the need to admire and merge with an 
“omnipotent selfobject” (idealizing experience), and the need to feel a degree of “alikeness” with other 
people (twinship or alter ego experiences) (1977, pp. 37-56, 105-125; 1984, pp. 192-207; see Lee & Martin, 
1991, pp. 128-177). 
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parental empathy toward a child; it involves one’s experience of disconnection with 
oneself, others, and the divine.21  Indeed, shame is a threat to one’s basic disposition of 
trust and it constricts the shamed person within the “narrow life-world.”  Capps notes, 
Shame is a response to our failure to live up an ideal that we have held for 
ourselves and that shame is therefore the experience of a self-deficiency.  Even 
where this ideal was implanted originally by a parent, it is now self-owned, and 
thus the shame is a reaction to the failure to live up to one’s own self-ideals.  We 
are disappointed in ourselves.  We have once again let ourselves down, and we 
are puzzled and angry at ourselves: “Why do I do this to myself?” (p. 72) 
 
Capps asserts that the shame experience could be a seed of “disenchantment” with 
the world.  This means, this shame experience is profoundly alienating; it determines that 
the shamed person will never return to the place or setting where this shameful 
experience occurred: “Shame experiences are strangely out of place” (1993, p. 77); “We 
have become strangers in a world where we thought we were at home.  We experience 
anxiety in becoming aware that we cannot trust our answers to the questions Who am I?  
Where do I belong?” (1990, p. 79, quoted in Lynd, 1965, p. 46).  For Capps, as a shamed 
person tends to hide from others, he or she also tends to hide from God.  However, this 
shamed person could be healed in empathic relationships with the divine and with others 
(see 1983, pp. 266-269; 1993, pp. 27-37, 86-100).  This implies that overcoming one’s 
shame experiences means re-establishing one’s relationships with the divine and others. 
Capps (1983, 1990, 2004, 2007b) states that in Augustine’s case, his self-reproach 
was rooted in the dynamics of his shameful events over his lifetime.  In others words, 
Augustine’s self-reproach in the Confessions involves his sense of shame or narcissistic 
                                                
21 For Capps, the narcissistic self may experience depletion (2007b, p. 585).  Following Kohut, 
Capps views depletion as “subtly experienced, yet pervasive feelings of emptiness and depression” (p. 585, 
quoted in Kohut, 1971, p. 16). 
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injury rather than his sense of guilt.  Unlike Freudian psychologists who have viewed 
Augustine’s conversion experience as an excessive preoccupation with guilt, and 
therefore as evidence of an obsessional personality structure, Capps understands his 
conversion as a progressive and mature process in light of the dynamics of shame.  For 
Capps, in the Confessions, Augustine’s self-reproach is the effect of his decision to 
expose the shameful state of his inner self to the divine and to his readers (1983, p. 263).  
Capps states, 
We moderns tend to view Augustine’s self-reproach solely in terms of the 
dynamic of guilt and of the need, therefore, for divine forgiveness.  But it is more 
accurate, both psychologically and theologically, to review this self-reproach 
according to the dynamics of shame.  It is not that his self-reproach, because 
exaggerated, reflects an inability to acknowledge his wrongdoing.  Rather his self-
reproach is the effect of his decision to expose his “shameful self” to God [and to 
his human readers]. (p. 263) 
 
 Capps (1983) asserts that in his Confessions, Augustine’s self-disclosure is 
central for understanding the process of his transformation experience.  For Capps, there 
are five self-disclosive events of Augustine in the Confessions: “a) the pear-stealing 
episode, b) the death of Augustine’s unnamed friend, c) his escape from his mother 
through an act of deception, d) the famous garden experience, and e) the mystical vision 
he and his mother shared shortly before her death” (p. 262).  These episodes basically 
demonstrate that Augustine had struggled with his profound sense of shame.  In 
recollecting these experiences, Augustine came face to face with his shameful self.  This 
process of his self-examination was painful but absolutely necessary in order to re-
experience his shame through memory and narrative and to open himself to God and to 
his readers.  For Capps, during the description of his main life history, Augustine raised a 
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critical autobiographical question, “What has become of me?” (p. 262).  Augustine’s 
answer was something like this: “I am becoming a person who, in disclosing shame, is 
open to God” (p. 268).  More specifically, Capps writes, 
Augustine understands that to hide himself from God, out of a sense of shame and 
exposure, is to hide God from himself...While Adams sought to hide his shame 
from God, Augustine dares to reveal his shame through his Confessions because 
he perceives that, through such self-disclosure, God will appear to him.  The 
problem with concealing one’s shame is not that one thereby hides from God, but 
that one hides God from oneself.  By forcing himself to confront his shame, 
Augustine opens himself to the presence of God [and to his readers]. (pp. 267-
268) 
 
 In consideration of Augustine’s shame and his self-disclosure, Capps (1985) in 
“Augustine as Narcissist: Comments on Paul Rigby’s ‘Paul Ricoeur, Freudianism, and 
Augustine’s Confessions’” portrays Augustine as a “transformed narcissist.” Capps 
asserts that, in contrast to Freudian view of the Oedipal experiences and the origins of 
guilt, shame derives from pre-oedipal experiences, namely, it is associated with 
narcissistic dynamics that are not related to oedipal conflicts.  More specifically, whereas 
Freudian psychologists are concerned with oedipal issues, which focus on the ambivalent 
relationships between mother, father, and child, and on issues of difference, power, 
competition, and sexuality, Capps emphasizes pre-oedipal issues, which involve the more 
primitive or primordial relationship between mother and child, and center around the 
child’s needs for emphatic response.22  Following Kohut’s view, Capps describes that 
                                                
22 Capps writes, “In Freud’s own writings, narcissism was closely linked to the Oedipus complex 
because he believed that the Oedipal conflict addresses the troubles engendered by the earlier narcissistic 
trend, especially problems involved in the male child’s exclusive attachment to the mother.  But Heinz 
Kohut has more recently argued that the Oedipal conflict and narcissism are two dynamic processes that 
may be differentiated and separately analyzed” (1985, p. 121; see Kohut’s The Analysis of the Self [1971]).  
In this way, Schlauch (1995) states, “Given the psychoanalytically oriented [Freudian] clinician’s 
theoretical commitments, narcissism is understood as the libidinal investment in or cathexis of the 
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“the narcissist is manifestly unable to respond to demands for a change from narcissism 
to object love” (p. 124).  He characterizes “untransformed narcissism” which involves 
“an inability to relate to the external world, a tendency toward emotional isolation and a 
resistance to the claims of others” (p. 126).  For Capps, there are the two crucial elements 
of a narcissistic structure: “a grandiose self image…and a powerfully idealized parent 
image” (p. 123).  Capps insists that one’s transformation of narcissism usually occurs in 
the middle of adulthood.  During the process of this transformation, the narcissism of 
exhibitionism and grandiose fantasies is replaced with a more mature narcissism, which 
consists of the following basic features: 1) personal creativity; 2) empathy; 3) 
acknowledgement of the finitude of the self; 4) capacity for humor; and 5) wisdom (pp. 
124-125).  In particular, Capps explains the link of transformed narcissist with the 
capacity for empathy as follows:23 
The child originally reached out in true empathy with the mother, or idealized 
parental figure.  But, owing to narcissistic injury, this empathy has been repressed 
and the narcissist has been incapable of any real feeling for another.  The 
transformed narcissist recovers the capacity for empathy, which is now 
emancipated from the original experience of recognition by the mother.  This 
characteristic of narcissism is a potential basis for future object-love.  But, at this 
                                                                                                                                            
self…Transference meant the transfer of sexual or aggressive energies from one object to another 
object…Transference is by definition (1) repressed, (2) sexual or aggressive (3) wishes, (4) seeking 
pleasure (5) with objects” (pp. 57, 60).  While commenting these Freudian concepts of narcissism and 
transference, Schlauch writes, “Kohut observed how narcissistic transferences had a tone quite different 
from classical transference.  Repression was not an essential constituent.  The experience was neither 
sexual nor aggressive, but narcissistic—having to do with the maintenance of self-esteem” (p. 60; see p. 61; 
Lee & Martin, 1991, pp. 118-127). 
 
23 Heinz Kohut (1984) describes empathy as “vicarious introspection,” which is “the capacity to 
think and feel oneself into the inner life of another person.  It is our lifelong ability to experience what 
another person experiences, though usually, and appropriately, to an attenuated degree” (1984, p. 82; see pp. 
18, 66, 96, 172-191; Lee & Martin, 1991, pp. 105-117; Schlauch, 1995, pp. 63, 148).  Indeed, empathy is 
an ability to relate to other persons; it involves a very crucial movement for overcoming the narcissist’s 
self-isolation and facilitating his or her self-esteem. 
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point, this is not love of another for the other’s sake, but rather empathy owing to 
one’s identification of oneself in the other. (1985, p. 124) 
 
 From a self psychological perspective, Capps attempts to show “a narcissistic 
reading of the Confessions”—in order to articulate Augustine’s struggles with his sense 
of self-depletion, shame, and narcissistic injury.  He notes that “Augustine presents 
himself in the Confessions as a self-acknowledged narcissist” (1985, p. 121).  Whereas 
Freudian psychologist Paul Rigby (1985, 1990) focuses on Augustine’s relationships with 
his father (Patricius) in light of the oedipal conflict and guilt, Capps emphasizes more 
Augustine’s relationship with his mother (Monica) in light of shame and narcissistic 
personality (1985, p. 123, 2007b, p. 589).  In doing so, he points out, 
[The Confessions] provides the basic rationale for Augustine’s autobiographical 
project, includes patent narcissistic themes, including the powerfully idealized 
parental image (God as one who sees our innermost thoughts and feelings but 
who is also loved and longed for); renunciation of the grandiose self (“I am a 
thing displeasing to myself”); and narcissistic injury in the form of shame (“the 
abyss of man’s conscience lies naked” and “I feel shame for myself”).  A 
combination of interpretive methods could thus be employed to explore the claim 
that Augustine is a narcissistic personality. (1985, p. 123) 
 
 According to Capps, it is not difficult to find evidence of Augustine’s narcissistic 
characteristics in the Confessions.  Indeed, Augustine’s personal stories with others (e.g., 
the pear-stealing episode, his jocular behavior prior to his unnamed friend’s death, or the 
dismissal of his common-law wife), which had preceded his garden experience in 386, 
were inherently narcissistic; these narratives commonly consisted of “experiences 
involving narcissistic injury, or threats to personal self-esteem” through humiliation, 
disapproval, and embarrassment (1985, pp. 121-122).  For Capps, the transformations of 
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Augustine’s narcissistic injury occurred in his middle of adulthood when he engaged in 
writing the Confessions (pp. 124, 125-127). 
 As a result, Capps asserts that Augustine’s conversion was “a life-changing 
event” in light of self-reproach, shame, and the transformation of narcissism (2007b, p. 
586).  For Capps, Augustine’s conversion experience led him to overcome the 
immobilizing and despiriting influence of the shame, which was reflective of his earlier 
isolated life-style.  Further, it enabled Augustine to make constructive use of his shame 
for his new life in relationship with the divine and others (although he might not become 
“an unambiguously transformed narcissist”) (1985, pp. 125-127). 
 As self psychological scholars, Volney Gay (1986), Andres G. Nino (1990), and 
Sandra L. Dixon (1999) basically support and advance the idea that Augustine’s 
conversion experience is a transformative process of self-exposure or self-becoming, 
which involves a progressive maturity by overcoming a sense of shame and narcissistic 
injury (self-isolation) and by establishing empathic relationships with others and the 
divine (self-esteem).  In “Augustine: The Reader as Selfobject,” Gay (1986) focuses on 
pre-oedipal experiences/anxieties, shame, and narcissism to interpret Augustine’s 
conversion experience.24  According to Gay, there are two types of anxieties: 1) oedipal 
anxieties are reflected in “triadic relationships between distinct actors: mother, father, and 
child,” which involve issues of difference, power, and competition; in contrast, 2) pre-
oedipal anxieties are deeply related to the dyadic relationship between mother and child, 
which involve the child’s need for empathic response in the form of assurance, 
                                                
24 According to Gay, “pre-oedipal theory systematically investigates the pathways that lead from 
relatively diffused, partial selves, to an adult sense of continuity and coherence” (p. 70). 
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reassurance, and positive approval (pp. 65-67).  In other words, whereas oedipal anxieties 
have symbolically to do with fear of external attacks on one’s body, particularly treasured 
body parts like the eyes and the genitals (“castration anxiety”), pre-oedipal anxieties 
emerge as internal attacks upon the self through unbearable feelings of worthlessness, 
which has the effect of dissolving or hopelessly fragmenting the inner self 
(“fragmentation anxiety”—the fear of going to be pieces) (pp. 65-67).25  Gay repudiates 
Freudian oedipal interpretations of the Confessions which have overemphasized issues of 
sexual conflict in light of the oedipal complex and anxiety (p. 65).  However, like Capps, 
Gay pays attention to the psychological importance to Augustine’s purpose and his act of 
writing the Confessions.  He regards Augustine’s Confessions as “a covert plea for 
selfobject relationships” with both God and his human readers, which involves a need for 
affectionate resonance from God and his readers as well as a lament and protest over their 
absence and loss (p. 69).  More specifically, Gay 
Describe[s] Confessions as a selfobject generated by Augustine to consolidate a 
newly won sense of coherence.  Since everyone needs selfobjects throughout their 
lives, this is not pathologizing the text.  On the contrary, it may help us 
understand why we find it necessary to revive Augustine’s ideal image again and 
again (p. 68)…Confessions is written for an audience which Augustine uses as 
selfobject.  That is, we, his imagined audience, are a crucial, underlying element 
in his work and our (imagined) responses help him reconstitute himself, to feel 
coherent in time and space...It would gain him God’s forgiveness and so union 
with God, and an audience of readers who would mirror back to him their esteem. 
(p. 65) 
 
From a Kohutian perspective, Gay looks at how Augustine had tried to overcome 
his shame experiences and pre-oedipal anxieties in the Confessions; in this vein, he raises 
                                                
25 In the same way, Heinz Kohut (1977) in The Restoration of the Self states that “the core of 
disintegration anxiety is the anticipation of the breakup of the self, not the fear of the drive” (p. 104). 
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a question, “How could [Augustine] control himself and how channel his skills in ways 
that would restrain himself and keep his feet on the ground?” (p. 69).  Gay contends that 
Augustine’s unending self-analysis and his unending complaints about his moral failings 
derived from his repression of selfobject needs.  However, for Gay, during the writing of 
the Confessions, Augustine confronted his narcissistic injuries and his pre-oedipal 
anxieties and struggled with his sense of self-fragmentation; as such, he made a decision 
to open his painful conditions of incoherence and he remarkably moved himself to be 
related to the divine (the Selfobject) and others (selfobjects) (p. 69).  Consequently, Gay 
writes, 
An extraordinarily talented boy [Augustine] searched for other persons whom he 
could idealize and then trust with that task.  In Kohut’s terms, he needed to find 
suitable selfobjects.  Hence he looked to Faustus, then Ambrose, and finally God, 
the most ideal of fathers.  If it is God, not I, who commands such powers, then 
surely God will hear my confession, “because you first willed that I should 
confess to you, O Lord my God.  For you are gracious, your mercy endures for 
ever.” (p. 69) 
 
 In the same way, within the framework of Heinz Kohut’s self psychology, 
Andres G. Nino (1990) in “Restoration of the Self: A Therapeutic Paradigm from 
Augustine’s Confessions” depicts Augustine’s conversion experience as a process of self-
becoming in terms of a transcending self, empathic relationships, and transformed 
narcissism, while rejecting Freudian view that Augustine’s conversion was just “a vehicle 
for the expression of unresolved [oedipal] conflicts” (p. 9).  Nino agrees with Peter 
Brown’s view that “the writing of the Confessions was an act of therapy of [self-
examination]” (2000, p. 158, see p. 175).  As such, he states, “Augustine’s personal story 
has been recognized as a pioneering self-analysis and a fore-runner of modern 
 257 
psychology and existentialism…The Confessions, written ten years after Augustine’s 
conversion, documents a revision of his life at a critical juncture in the form of a dialogue 
between the self, God, and the reader” (1990, p. 9).26  This means that the Confessions 
contains Augustine’s relational dialogue between Augustine and God, and between 
Augustine and his readers—an appeal for an empathic response from God and human 
readers (p. 16; see conf. 10.1.1, ret. 2.6.1; Capps, 1983, p. 268; Gay, 1986, pp. 65, 69; 
TeSelle, 1986, p. 93; Weintraub, 1978, p. 22).27  Importantly, Nino focuses on the 
psychological and transcendental dimensions of the restoration of the self which relates to 
a human need for the inner experience of the divine: “Transcending one’s self through a 
relation to that Being constitutes another dimension of human experience with a potential 
for cohesiveness at various levels of personality functioning” (p. 9).  In consideration of 
the transcending self and transformed narcissism, Nino notes, 
By reconstructing and organizing the narrative of his own experience [in the 
Confessions],28 he sets the foundations for a new ideal of personality that includes 
                                                
26 Similar to Brown (2000) and Nino (1990), Karl J. Weintraub (1978) in The Value of the 
Individual: Self and Circumstance in Autobiography states, “Augustine’s act of confessing becomes largely 
identical with self-searching, self-questioning, self-discovery, self-description, and self-assessment.  The 
act of writing is itself a process of bringing to self-consciousness again the nature of this personality and its 
implications for the course of life” (p. 26). 
27 Following Kohut, Nino (1990) insists that “the empathic responses emanating from parental 
figures first and then from other people play a decisive role on the building and sustenance of the nuclear 
self.  These others are called ‘selfobjects’ because they function as nourishing elements to the self” (p. 10).  
According to Nino, empathic relationships “constitute the other vital element of Augustine’s dialogic 
paradigm.  It is the central force that animates his search from the beginning and shapes the process of his 
restoration” (p. 14).  In this way, Nino emphasizes God’s empathic functions within the therapeutic context 
of Augustine’s restoration: “Augustine perceives God, not outside of oneself, external like another 
selfobject, but within, ‘hidden deeper than any secret in our hearts’ (IX, 1; III, 6), and beyond, as the 
empathic Other who not only responds to the ‘psychological manifestations of the self’ (Kohut, 1977, p. 
311) but reaches the self per se, and works through the ultimate aspirations of the individual.  God as 
selfobject is experienced as the careful, modulating craftsman in the restoration process, guiding (VI, 10), 
providing corrective experiences (IV, 15), enlightenment (X, 4), and inner freedom” (p. 15). 
28 For Nino, the narrative “artfully presents self-conscious interpretation of a life and a being from 
the vantage point of a meaningful center” (p. 9, quoted in Weintraub, 1978, p. 26).  While paying attention 
to a link between the personal narrative and the therapeutic process, Nino writes, “The most striking 
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individuality, introspection, and the capacity for transcendence (p. 
9)…Throughout Confessions, we see Augustine gradually making the move from 
living by the pleasure principle, a man enjoying “a truant’s freedom” (III, 3), to 
participating in a deeper dimension of life which happened because he yearned for 
both the truth and a new way of being. (p. 12) 
 
 As a result, Nino asserts that during his conversion experience, Augustine was 
involved in the process of restoration, though not completed, which was relevant to a 
movement from a sense of emptiness and fragmentation to a sense of coherence and 
meaning.  In this vein, Nino proposes a therapeutic paradigm of the conversion process 
from Augustine’s Confessions: 1) the inquiry initiated by the recognition of self-
fragmentation, 2) the realistic appraisal of one’s own particular situation related to one’s 
“return to interiority,” 3) the construction of one’s life narrative as a distinctive form of 
recollection, 4) the relation to others and the divine beyond the boundaries of the self, and 
5) creative responses in continuity (pp. 8, 10-16). 
In a more advanced way, Sandra L. Dixon (1999) in Augustine: The Scattered and 
Gathered Self describes Augustine’s conversion story in light of shame and narcissism—
“Shame appears to be a large part of this representation of the moment of his conversion” 
(p. 133).  Dixon regards Augustine’s conversion as “change” which involves the unity of 
the scattered self as well as the healing of the narcissistic injury (“damaged grandiosity”) 
(p. 121).29  For Dixon, through this process of change, Augustine’s self was integrated or 
                                                                                                                                            
characteristic of the narrative points to an effective element of communication in mutual receptiveness, 
which becomes central to the search for a transcendent self.  Indeed, the dialogue of Confessions resembles 
a sequence of therapeutic encounters in which many aspects of human experience have been empathically 
explored in an attempt to discover and clarify, heal, and repair, and to feel whole and strong again” (p. 13). 
29 Following Kohut, Dixon (1999) insists that a child begins life with a sense of perfection 
(“primary narcissism”) within which self and other are not clearly distinguished within a symbiotic bond.  
In the healthy development of the person, grandiosity becomes realistic self-appraisal, self-regard, and 
ambition, while idealizations turn into ideals; in effect, a cohesive self maintains “a ‘tension arc’ between 
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gathered; it “allows him to find stability and continuity in his life” (p. 121).30  Dixon 
considers Augustine’s experiences of floggings at school in his boyhood (and his parents’ 
lack of sympathy) as the origins of his shame and narcissistic injury.  She emphasizes the 
influence of Augustine’s experiences of beatings, damaged grandiosity, and a sense of 
deep shame on his personality and mental development: 
Augustine tells us that empathy was not the order of the day for him when he 
suffered a beating at school.  The schoolteacher’s harshness seems to have elicited 
an unempathic response from the formerly doting elders: “adult people, including 
even my parents, who wished no evil to come upon me, used to laugh at my 
stripes, which were at that time a great and painful evil to me” (I.ix.14).  Their 
behavior could introduce an injury to narcissism that could impede Augustine’s 
transition from childhood grandiosity to mature narcissism that would support his 
empathy for others when he reached adulthood. (p. 56; see pp. 54-57, 131-132) 
 
Dixon asserts that Augustine’s sense of shame and damaged grandiosity led to a 
lack of coherence for himself and for others in which he felt “sorrow, hostility, and 
coldness” (p. 39).  She uses the metaphor of a vertical split in the psyche to interpret 
Augustine’s personality and life story.  For Dixon, the word split refers to “a strong 
division” of the person; the vertical split indicates “a division in the person’s 
consciousness” (p. 122).  This vertical split appears most distinctly in persons who in one 
way or another lead a double life (p. 122).  In consideration of the concept of the vertical 
                                                                                                                                            
the poles of modified grandiosity and ideals made more realistic.”  Importantly, one’s “injured” grandiosity 
or idealization causes one’s repressed memories, which become unconscious influences on, or determinants 
of, one’s behaviors in the process of development (pp. 37-40). 
30 Similar to Dixon, Don S. Browning (1990) in “The Psychoanalytic Interpretation of St. 
Augustine’s Confessions: An Assessment and New Probe” interprets Augustine’s conversion and his life in 
light of the sense of fragmentation and the sense of cohesion.  Acknowledging Freudian oedipal 
interpretations of Augustine’s life story, Browning pays attention to the post-Freudian narcissistic 
interpretations of Augustine and his life within a framework of Kohut’s self-psychology.  He views 
Augustine’s Confessions as an autobiographical genre, which involves “a mode of self-presentation” (p. 
142).  According to Browning, “the Confessions is written...to gain a heightened sense of self-cohesion 
from the anticipated response of both friends and God…The writing of the Confessions and the deepened 
dialogue with God that it occasioned was successful, that is, actually contributed to his sense of cohesion” 
(p. 142). 
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split, Dixon depicts Augustine as a shamed person who has a fragmented inner self and 
has an inability to relate to the divine and others. 
While acknowledging Kohut’s concept of many-ness (the fragmented self) and 
one-ness (the cohesive self), Dixon pays attention to Augustine’s use of the symbolism of 
the many and the One, which he drew from both Neoplatonic and biblical sources, and in 
particular on his specification of it in his image of the “scattered and gathered self” in the 
Confessions (pp. 24-37).  For Dixon, the theme of the scattered self and the many focuses 
on the status of the self in isolation or estrangement.  This implies that an isolated person 
in his or her earthly life is scattered among other persons in light of the fragmentation of 
the soul.  On the other hand, the theme of the gathered self and the One emphasizes the 
status of the self in relation to the divine and others.  This implies that a relational person 
is (or relational persons are) gathered toward the divine in light of the unity of the soul 
(or souls) for inner healing.  Using this theme of the many (many-ness) and the One (one-
ness), Dixon describes Augustine’s transforming process which moves from self-isolation 
or self-reproach to self-relation or self-esteem.  She notes, 
The language of the many and the One suits this shifting terrain of Augustine’s 
psychological and spiritual life.  Each of these examples called Augustine back 
from the belief that success as a government official would give him what he 
wanted.  They also represented the possibility that giving up the many 
commitments and rewards of his career would gain for him the wisdom for which 
the Hortensius has set him on fire.  Rather than being lost by giving up the many 
delights of a life of glory and wealth, he would discover a unity himself as he 
focused on the One through whom everything exists. (p. 135) 
 
In emphasizing Augustine’s theme of the many and the One, Dixon suggests a 
psychological study of mysticism which illustrates Augustine’s religious experience: 
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A person who has had a mystical experience, whatever one may believe about the 
divinity or humanity of its source, would come away from the experience with a 
very strong magnet for idealizing…Augustine’s experience with Monica at Ostia 
can thus be seen to have reinforced the shift in his self from reliance on 
grandiosity to reliance on the idealizing pole of the unconscious core of his being.  
This interpretation in no way precludes the possibility that they did touch in a 
moment of total absorption “eternal wisdom which abides beyond all things.”  
The mystics’ claims that such experience strengthens the psyche could be 
understood in part through the psychological concept of idealizing. (p. 160) 
 
As a result, Dixon concludes that Augustine’s conversion in book eight of the 
Confessions and his mystical experience with his mother at Ostia in book nine “did not 
result in regression from adulthood, as some [Freudian] psychological interpreters would 
have it” (p. 158).  Rather, these experiences enabled Augustine to overcome his inner 
division (his vertical split) and his narcissistic injury, to maintain an effectively changed 
balance between grandiosity and idealization, and to establish a new life in relation to the 
divine and others. 
Similarly, from an object relations perspective,31 William B. Parsons (1990) in “St. 
Augustine: ‘Common Man’ or ‘Intuitive Psychologist’?” elaborates on Augustine’s 
                                                
31 Object Relations Theory is a strand of post-Freudian psychoanalytic theory, which explores the 
nature and origins of interpersonal relationships or “object relations” rather than instinctual drives.  An 
“object” is the other, that is, a person from the external environment that is internally and psychologically 
significant to the person.  In this vein, object relations refers to the feelings, images, memories, and 
attitudes that have something to do with a “relationship” with this or that object, usually with significant 
caretakers or persons in one’s life.  Object relations theory places an emphasis than did Freud on the 
influence of early relationships with primary caregivers on personality formation as well as adult 
interpersonal experiences (see Clair, 1994, p. 7; Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, pp. 13-14; Hamilton, 1990, p. 
13).  In object relations theory, the term transition refers to a state of changing (Horton, 1981, p. 18).  
According to Donald Winnicott (1971), the term transitional space refers to “an intermediate area of 
experiencing” that exists between subjectivity and objectivity, between fantasy and reality, between the 
internal and the external, and between “me” and “not-me (1971, pp. 2-3, 107).  Based on Winnicott’s 
concept of transitional space, Paul Pruyser (1983) positions the “illusionistic world” between the autistic 
world and the realistic world (pp. 64-65).  The term illusion is derived from the Latin ludere, which means 
to play (pp. 68, 165).  Play stands at the interface of the external world and the world of inner psychological 
space.  For Pruyser, religion is a kind of “illusion processing” in the illusionistic world in which one may 
develop one’s capacity for play, creativity, imagination and symbolization.  Through creative play in the 
illusionistic world, one may experience the holy or the mystery (pp. 152-178). 
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conversion as a process for healing through self-exposure and self-examination in light of 
transformed relation, the changed representation of God, and enhanced creativity.  He 
portrays Augustine as “a ‘great man,’ an intuitive psychologist who fashioned a religious 
therapeutic system” (p. 156).  In consideration of Capps’ concepts of shame and self-
disclosure (1983), Parsons asserts that Augustine came to be transformed by exposing 
himself toward God: “The process of disclosure…is not merely the guilty confession of 
one tempted by instinctual demands yet fearful of super-ego condemnation.  For 
Augustine, one becomes oneself by speaking to God…This speaking or confessing 
entailed not simply a recognition of one’s past but an active catharsis of it” (p. 171).  
Following Peter Brown’s understanding of the Confessions,32 Parsons views Augustine’s 
Confessions as a therapy, which involves “a turning about of the heart, a purging of the 
inner eye” (p. 171; see Brown 2000, p. 159).  In that sense, he states, “the aim of this 
catharsis [through the therapy] was not to abandon strong feeling or even repress them, 
but rather to transform them, to direct them more profitably through insight into their 
nature.  In this context, then, confession becomes an earnest attempt to be healed through 
a process of self-exposure and self-examination in which one can isolate elements of 
recollection, insight, catharsis, renunciation/structure building and sublimation” (p. 171).  
Like Woollcott (1966) and Nino (1990), Parsons emphasizes the creative dimension of 
Augustine’s conversion rather than the regressive psychopathological dimension.  For 
Parsons, Augustine had reconstructed and transformed his earlier conflicts into his 
strengths in adulthood.  In other words, Augustine felt inner conflicts, but he “used his 
                                                
32 Brown (2000) states, “The writing of the Confessions was an act of therapy of [self-
examination]” (p. 158; see p. 175). 
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[Christian] beliefs to investigate his conflicts, not defend against them” (p. 178).  Parsons 
writes, “The resolution of unconscious intrapsychic conflict following religious 
conversion results in a shift in psychic economy with resultant greater unity and 
integration, and with the subsequent sense of liberation and may lead to more creative 
endeavor in gifted persons” (p. 177, quoted in Woollcott, 1966, pp. 279-280).33 
For Parsons, Augustine’s conversion must be qualified with respect to the issue of 
the therapeutic use of his beliefs and religion which relates to “the highly elaborated 
intellectual aspect of Augustine’s God Representation (God as ‘inner physician,’ etc.)” (p. 
178).  Parsons casts doubt on “Freud’s assertion that the God Representation of all 
individuals based solely on the Oedipus complex and subject to the return of the 
repressed” (p. 172).  Influenced by Ana-Maria Rizzuto (1979), Parsons regards the God 
Representation as “a ‘work of art’ overdetermined on a variety of levels, being influenced 
by culture at large, incorporating sexual and non-sexual elements, pre-oedipal as well as 
oedipal developmental considerations, representational/ideational components, and 
subject to the ‘evolution’ implied in the epigenetic view of the life-cycle” (p. 173; see 
                                                
33 Although he is not primarily a post-Freudian, but a Freudian, Philip Woollcott (1966) in “Some 
Considerations of Creativity and Religious Experience in St. Augustine of Hippo” attempts to surpass a 
Freudian tendency toward infantilizing and pathologizing Augustine and his life.  Importantly, Woollcott 
analyzes Augustine, found in the Confessions, focusing particularly upon his creative abilities to resolve 
inner conflicts.  In other words, he views Augustine’s continuing childhood tension from his oedipal 
conflicts as a force for his creative breakthrough and change in adulthood rather than a decisive factor of 
his regressive pathology: “It is important…to remember that Augustine’s conflict with his mother…may 
have driven his creative effort to a more penetrating view of God” (p. 283).  In this vein, while keeping in 
mind the idea that “Augustine…used his [inner] conflicts” (p. 283), Woollcott emphasizes the “creativity” 
of Augustine’s conversion rather than “a ‘peak’ of psychopathology.”  For Woollcott, Augustine’s creative 
conversion enabled him to feel a “sense of liberation” as well as to establish his “great theological works 
and the writing of his Confessions” (pp. 280-282).  As a result, although Woollcott contends that “it is 
questionable whether Augustine ever successfully integrated his own masculine strivings” (p. 276), he 
concludes that “like other great historical figures, [Augustine] seemed to have had the uncanny ability to 
play out his problem solving on a cosmic scale” (p. 283). 
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Rizzuto, p. 46).34  In order to effectively understand Augustine’s conversion, Parsons 
introduces Rizzuto’s description of conversion such as “the ego-syntonic release from 
repression in a given individual of an earlier (or even present) parental representation 
linked to a God Representation” (p. 176, quoted in Rizzuto, p. 51).  According to Parsons, 
in the Freudian perspective, Ambrose was “at best nothing more than a consolation for 
Augustine’s masculine narcissism after the fact of conversion.”  Unlike the classical 
psychological interpretation, Parsons emphasizes the preeminent role of Ambrose in 
Augustine’s transforming process, especially in the new formation of his God 
representation.  Parsons writes, 
Ambrose was to serve as a [transference-] Father figure for Augustine, being able 
to secure his trust and hence easing of the unconscious ambivalence he felt toward 
Patricius.  Further, Ambrose provided a kind of “fatherly sponsor” for 
Augustine’s emerging Christian identity.  At the same time, Ambrose was to 
function as the mediator of new ideas that would radically alter Augustine’s world 
views. (p. 174) 
 
In consideration of the role of Ambrose, Parsons insists that through this 
conversion process, Augustine’s God representations were positively changed from harsh, 
                                                
34 Ana-Maria Rizzuto (1979) contends that psychologically speaking, “God is a special [or 
illusory] transitional object” (p. 178).  For Rizzuto, the God representation, like an image of mother or 
father, is a kind of transitional creation in transitional space (p. 177).  This God representation develops 
throughout the human life span: “The God representation changes along with us and our primary objects in 
the lifelong metamorphosis of becoming ourselves in a context of other relevant beings” (p. 52); “we 
engage in constant dialectical reshaping of our self- and object representations to attain psychic balance” (p. 
89).  In a related vein, Parsons (1990) summarizes Rizzuto’s view on the God representation “as a ‘special’ 
Transitional object insofar as (1) unlike teddy bear, blankets or dolls which are formed from ‘plushy 
fabrics’ the God Representation is composed of ‘representational materials whose sources are the 
representations of primary objects’ in conjunction with the child’s capacity to create a God representation 
according to his needs.  (2) Unlike other transitional objects, the God Representation is increasingly 
cathected through the pre-genital years, further being available for transformation and use throughout the 
life-cycle” (p. 172; see Rizzuto, pp. 177-180).  Indeed, the studies of the God Representation have 
contributed to understand not only the religious sphere of human affairs, but also the psychic life of all 
persons through their status as psychological objects within the representational world. 
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critical, and judging to forgiving, guiding, and healing; Augustine had eventually restored 
his sense of “basic trust” and his cohesiveness of the self.   
Significantly, Parsons repudiates the Freudian view of Augustine’s conversion to 
Christianity that “[Augustine’s] Christianity was that of the common-man, i.e., born out 
of a need to escape from the hard truths of reality, based on the dynamics of the Oedipus 
complex and subject to the enduring cycle of repetition and the return of the repressed” (p. 
165).  He points out that “in the process of growth Augustine came to prefigure many of 
the later insights of existentialism and depth psychology—that it is here where Augustine 
displays his talents as an ‘intuitive psychologist’” (p. 166).  From an object relations 
perspective, Parsons asserts that Augustine’s conversion should be understood as a 
healing process through self-examination with respect to the interplay of transformed 
relation, the reconstructed representation of God, and enhanced creativity.  He concludes, 
Augustine’s conversion became the occasion through which he could start on the 
path to a new, transformed relation to his “Father”…One could almost speak of 
Augustine’s God Representation as displaying elements of the “wished-for” 
father: one who “punishes,” yet does so out of love; who guides, leads, finds and 
forms in his image the lost and despondent “son.”  In return, Augustine is able to 
start putting aside his ambivalence by learning to “forgive” his Father, hence re-
instituting the trust and love that characterizes a healthy, father/son 
relationship…The benefits of such a “conversion” gave rise in Augustine to 
enhanced creativity. (p. 177) 
 
In a related vein, Kim Paffenroth (2003) in “Book Nine: The Emotional Heart of 
the Confessions” characterizes Augustine’s conversion as change and continuity in light 
of his ability to relate to himself and others.  Paffenroth emphasizes “conversion to 
continuity” rather than a simply static conversion itself.  According to Paffenroth, 
“conversion is not the climatic, most difficult, or most important step: reconciling one’s 
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postconversion self with one’s preconversion self is the real challenge, and the real 
measure of personal success, psychological integration, and new spiritual health” (p. 152).  
Agreeing with Margaret R. Miles’ evaluation of the Confessions,35 Paffenroth depicts 
Augustine’s Confessions as “therapeutic [work] in a deep and ancient sense—diagnosis 
and healing of a sick and broken human nature” (p. 138).  While acknowledging 
“Augustine’s crisis conversion”—his own spiritual death and rebirth within his 
relationships with the divine—in book eight of the Confessions, Paffenroth elucidates 
Augustine’s transformative process in book nine, which involves his reconciling 
relationships with himself and others (p. 150).  In doing so, he examines how Augustine 
presents his friends, family, and the Manichees in his final autobiographical book nine in 
light of resolutions of distorted relationships with others and within himself.  As such, he 
pays attention to the process of reconciling Augustine’s postconversion self with his 
preconversion self.  Whereas describing Augustine’s preconversion self “as divided, 
conflicted, [and] alienated” in terms of a being split, Paffenroth describes Augustine’s 
postconversion self as integrated, unified, and reconstructed in terms of a being in 
relationship (pp. 147, 153).  While regarding book nine as “the real climax of 
Confessions,” Paffenroth asserts that Augustine entered into his healing process, by 
speaking of his attitude toward their past sinful lives and selves; indeed, he resolved all 
his deep interpersonal issues with father, mother, friends, and even the Manichees (p. 
                                                
35 In “Infancy, Parenting, and Nourishment in Augustine’s Confessions,” Miles (1982) insists, 
“The Confessions is primarily therapy in the Platonic sense of a methodical conversion from a 
‘misidentification of reality,’ to recognition of the reality, the patterns of behavior, that has been implicitly 
but identified within one’s most intimate and pressing experience…The task of [this] therapy is the 
construction of an articulated orientation to a final, authoritative, and implicit reality” (p. 351; see Brown, 
2000, pp. 158, 175). 
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138).36  This implies that Augustine coped with his painful past (p. 152);37 he became a 
better adjusted, more faithful, or more normal person in light of the process of the 
constant reinvention of Augustine himself.  As a result, Paffenroth insists that Augustine 
moved from the state of an injured narcissist who was unable to relate to others 
(“discontinuity”) to the state of a transformed or retrieved narcissist who was able to 
relate to others (“continuity”): “Augustine has now learned how to love properly” (p. 
147; see p. 153).  He notes, 
Augustine is not finally [an injured] narcissist, for he concludes and climaxes the 
autobiographical part of Confessions not with a story about himself, but with 
…stories about others (p. 150)…[More specifically] in the profundity of his heart 
Augustine held a story which was not only his own but that of Monica, of 
Adeodatus, of Alypius, of Simplicianus, of Ambrose, of Nebridius, of 
Romanianus, [and] of the host of friends who had shared his experiences.  
Certainly there is something thoroughly narcissistic in the very writing of an 
autobiography, but within this project, Augustine seems to have made a large 
amount of room for the other characters, and he treats them with concern and 
interest that goes beyond their effect on him or their place in his life (p. 
146)…Augustine’s attachment and loyalty to his friends, his appreciation and 
                                                
36 Importantly, Paffenroth (2003) elucidates Augustine’s resolution of his distorted relationships 
with father, mother, friends, and even the Manichees in book nine: 1) Augustine became to be reconciled 
with his father (Patricius) and his mother (Monica): “Augustine no longer blames his parents for their 
failings or excesses, nor denies their shortcomings, for he now sees them and their actions for what they 
finally are—inevitable, unchangeable parts of who he now is” (p. 150).  2) Augustine recovered his 
friendships.  For example, while it paralyzed him with grief and despair in book four (i.e., the death of his 
unnamed friend), Augustine recounted here (book nine) the deaths of Verecundus and Nebridius with 
thanks for the love and faith they shared and for the surety of their salvation (conf. 9.3.5-6) (p. 147).  3) 
Augustine became to be reconciled with Adeodatus and his son’s mother.  Augustine recounted Adeodatus’ 
death with solemnity, and, most of all, peace and assurance (conf. 9.6.14) (p. 147; cf. Capps’ view on the 
relationship between Augustine and his son [1990, pp. 87-92]).  This implies that “with the final mention of 
Adeodatus, this may even include some resolution of his feelings for his son’s mother, though Augustine 
resolutely hides these feelings from us as too private and painful” (p. 147).  4) Augustine re-established 
relationships with his former co-religionists, the Manichees (p. 150).  Augustine felt “a strong sense of 
continuity with the past, not in the sense that [he] is still a Manichee,” but that he felt “a sense of identity 
and responsibility for what has gone before” in light of conversion to continuity (p. 151; see conf. 9.4.8). 
 
37 For Paffenroth, it is difficult that one confronts one’s painful past and he or she deeply 
participates in the process of an ongoing reconciliation with one’s past—“The past has created the present, 
but it has not simply duplicated or continued itself into the present.  The final and integrative part of such a 
transformation is to see the sinful past as contributing (however imperfectly or painfully) to one’s 
happiness and well-being, and not just as an obstacle that had to be overcome” (p. 151). 
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love for his parents, and finally this even more difficult attitude of forgiveness and 
hope toward the Manichees together go a long way toward such a reconciliation. 
(p. 152) 
 
As noted above, post-Freudian psychologists have viewed Augustine’s conversion 
as an earnest effort to be healed through a process of self-exposure and self-examination, 
to overcome a sense of shame and pre-oedipal anxieties (self-isolation), and to promote 
loving relationships with others and the divine (self-esteem).  In doing so, they contribute 
to an understanding of Augustine’s Confessions as a record of the transformative process 
of self-becoming through developmental and progressive maturity rather than a record of 
abnormal and regressive psychopathology.  Post-Freudian interpretations provide us 
insights into the interaction between Augustine’s psychological development and his 
ongoing relationships with others/Other in the process of his conversion. 
 In sum, there is no common psychological definition of Augustine’s conversion.  
There are different accounts of Augustine’s conversion experience based on the specific 
theories of psychology of conversion.  Augustine’s conversion has been regarded as 
regressive psychopathology, a process of unifying his divided self, or a part of his mental 
developmental process.  On the whole, psychological studies of Augustine’s conversion 
have primarily focused on his inner crisis, need, and mental development. 
More specifically, Freudian scholars have described Augustine’s endless self-
reproaches, his oedipal anxieties, his oedipal guilt, and his obsessive personality within 
Augustine’s relationships with his father (Patricius) and with his mother (Monica) in light 
of triadic relationships between parents and child (Bakan, 1965; Dittes, 1965; Dodds, 
1927-1928/1990; Kligerman, 1957/1990; Pruyser, 1966; Rigby, 1985).  They lead us to 
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realize the importance of childhood, the unconscious, and the possibility of pathology in 
Augustine’s conversion experience.  Jamesian scholars have elucidated the correlation 
between one’s emotional crisis, the unification of the divided self, and religious change in 
light of a progressive and regenerative phenomenon of Augustine’s conversion (Capps, 
2007a; Elledge, 1988; James, 1902/1982).  They help us to look at how Augustine’s 
conversion resulted in conflict resolution through his inner transforming experience 
(“twice born”) which was deeply related to the experience of the divine (“a More”).  
Post-Freudian scholars have emphasized Augustine’s pre-oedipal experiences, his sense 
of shame, and his transformation of narcissism to interpret his conversion experience 
(Capps, 1983, 1985, 1990, 1993, 2004, 2007b; Dixon, 1999; Gay, 1986; Nino, 1990; 
Paffenroth, 2003; Parsons, 1990).  They guide us to recognize that Augustine’s 
conversion experience was not simply a single event, but a process of self-disclosure or 
self-becoming, which indicated a sign of developmental and progressive maturity rather 
than a sign of regressive pathology. 
As such, these psychological studies of Augustine’s conversion contribute by 
articulating the impact of personal factors (especially Augustine’s psychological crisis) 
on the process of religious change.  This means that they lead us to look at how the young 
Augustine’s psychological distress was deeply related to his early traumatic injuries 
(“empathic failure” or “internalized bad object”) within the specific personal and familial 
contexts of his childhood (e.g., his experiences of floggings at school and parents’ 
mocking at his stripes/God’s silence about it [conf. 1.9.14-15; civ. Dei 21.14]).  In this 
way, some scholars encourage us to investigate how Augustine’s early traumatic injuries 
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had negatively influenced the formation of both his self-image and his representation of 
God (as scourging or indifferent [e.g., conf. 1.9.14, 3.3.5]) in light of the correlation of a 
deep sense of self-reproach, inability to love others/Other, and suffering (see Capps, 1985, 
1990, 2004; Dixon, 1999; Dodds, 1927-1928/1990; Ferrari, 1974). 
While acknowledging the link between the young Augustine’s psychological 
crisis and his early personal and familial environments, Jamesian and Post-Freudian 
scholars provide us with insights that Augustine’s expression of psychological distress 
(e.g., conf. 8.5.10) was not simply a negative symptom of pathology, fragmentation, or 
estrangement; rather, for Augustine, it could be a painful yet meaningful movement to 
think about what was the real problem in his life as well as what was the real cause of his 
sense of dividedness and restlessness in his mind. 
Apparently, some psychological (or psychology of religious) studies of 
Augustine’s conversion also contribute by assuming the presence or activity of the 
religious subject—the divine, the sacred, or the Divine/God—in the process of his 
transformation (e.g., Capps, 1983, 1985, 1990, 2007a, 2007b; Dixon, 1999; Elledge, 
1988; Gay, 1986; James, 1902/1982; Nino, 1990; Parsons, 1990) (although they have not 
investigated, primarily and explicitly, the influence of religious factors [e.g., the 
transforming power of God’s grace] on the process of Augustine’s spiritual change).  
They give us insights into how Augustine’s sense of inner division and restlessness had 
affected himself to recollect and reflect upon his life history as well as how it had stirred 
himself to enter into his search for knowledge of the self and the knowledge of the divine 
in light of the correlation between the experience of the self and the experience of the 
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divine.  This means that they lead us to pay attention to the process of Augustine’s inner 
transformation from the divided self to the integration of the self in relation to his deep 
experience with the divine, the sacred, or God (e.g., 8.12.28-29). 
However, psychological interpretations of Augustine’s conversion almost 
exclusively focus on the personal factors in the process of his transformation.  As such, 
psychological studies of Augustine and his conversion have not paid attention to the 
social and cultural conditions of intellectual climate of Late Antiquity (see Daly, 1978, p. 
249).  In order to facilitate a better understanding of Augustine’s conversion, the 
psychological studies need to respect more social, cultural, and religious/theological 
approaches to human transformation, while acknowledging the influence of personal 
factors on the process of human change. 
 
II. Sociological Studies of Augustine’s Conversion: 
The Impact of Social and Institutional Factors 
 
Scholars have explored the impact of social and institutional factors on the 
conversion process of Augustine within Christian communities (although most of them 
are not primarily sociologists in the field of sociology of religion but Augustinian 
scholars).  This section of the literature review focuses on two main themes which are 
suitable for articulating the social and communal dimensions of the religious conversion 
process and which are preeminent for establishing a richer and more accurate perception 
of Augustine’s lived experience of change.  These main themes are 1) the influence of 
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others’ conversion stories on Augustine’s conversion, and 2) Augustine’s conversion, 
interpersonal bonds, and the Christian community.38 
 
A. The Influence of Others’ Conversion Stories on 
Augustine’s Conversion 
 
Scholars have examined the impact of the conversion stories of other people on 
Augustine’s conversion process.  For example, William J. O’Brien (1978) in “An 
Approach to the Reaching Augustine’s Confessions” explores the correlation of 
Augustine’s conversion narrative with others’ conversion stories.  O’Brien focuses on the 
stories within the conversion narrative: “Simplicianus’ story about Victorinus; 
Ponticianus’ story about Antony; and Ponticianus’ story about two of his friends who 
happened upon Antony’s life story—a story within a story” (p. 49).39  According to 
O’Brien, the first storyteller, Simplicianus (who was a philosophical and spiritual mentor 
of Ambrose, the bishop of Milan) told Augustine the story of Victorinus.  Victorinus was 
identified as a professor of rhetoric in Rome and he translated some books of the 
Platonists (which had affected Augustine’s life and thought).  But later, Victorinus, who 
was an old man and learned in all the liberal sciences, was drawn toward Christian 
                                                
 38 While reconsidering the contributions of the previous sociological interpretations of conversion 
in chapter two, I attempt to establish the main sociological themes pertaining to the studies of Augustine’s 
conversion.  In doing so, I am deeply affected by 1) William J. O’Brien’s emphasis on the correlation 
between Augustine’s conversion narrative and others’ conversion stories in the Confessions (“a story within 
a story”) (1978) to accomplish the theme of the influence of others’ conversion stories on Augustine’s 
conversion; and 2) both Garry Wills’ consideration of the link of  Augustine’s transforming experience 
with his intimate interactions with other people (1999, 2004) and Alan Kreider’s view on Augustine’s 
conversion as a process of “resocialization” or institutionalization of the young Augustine through his 
participation in the Christian communities (1999) to formulate the theme of Augustine’s conversion, 
interpersonal bonds, and the Christian community. 
 
39 In a same way, Wills (1999) claims that a series of the conversion accounts of other people did 
“form a kind of drumbeat leading up to Augustine’s own conversion” to Christianity in the garden in Milan 
(p. 45; see 2004, pp. 53-8, 101-105, 112-113, 118-119). 
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conversion through his study of the Holy Scriptures and Christian literature.  As a result 
of his attentive reading, Victorinus was determined to declare publicly his conversion to 
Christianity and his salvation in the Christian community, for he was “seized by the fear 
that Christ might deny him before the holy angels if he was too faint-hearted to 
acknowledge Christ before men” (p. 49; see conf. 8.2.4).40  O’Brien insists that this story 
of Victorinus’ conversion stirred in Augustine’s heart a desire to follow his example of 
humility; further, it enabled Augustine to pay attention to his state of bondage of the will, 
especially his inner division, which he had not noticed before (pp. 49-50; conf. 8.5.10-12). 
 According to O’Brien, at the time of Augustine’s experience of his inner division 
of the will, Ponticianus, a high court official and a Christian, came to Augustine.  When 
Ponticianus found that Augustine was reading Paul’s epistles, he was moved to tell 
Augustine about conversion stories of his friends, who had been deeply influenced by the 
story of Antony, the Egyptian monk.  If Simplicianus’ story about Victorinus’ conversion 
occasioned for Augustine an inner division, then Ponticianus’ story about his friends’ 
conversions compelled Augustine to acknowledge the roots of his inner conflict (pp. 50-
51; see conf. 8.7.16-18).  In this way, O’Brien writes, “As it was a fellow rhetorician’s 
story [of Victorinus] which brought Augustine to the realization of the tug exerted by his 
own past, so he indicates it was the story of a fellow countryman from Africa named 
Ponticianus which brought him to the brink of conversion” (p. 50). 
                                                
40 In this vein, Vaught (2004) depicts, “Victorinus had mastered the liberal arts; had read, 
criticized, and explained many of the writings of the philosophers; had been the teacher of many senators in 
Rome; and had been a worshiper and defender of idols for most of his professional and intellectual life.  
Yet in spite of this, Victorinus becomes a Christian, ‘bending his neck under the yoke of humility,’ and 
lowering ‘his brow before the reproach of the cross’ (8.2.3)” (p. 72). 
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 O’Brien asserts that after listening to Ponticianus’ story about his friends’ 
conversions, Augustine, in turmoil, now retreated with Alypius to a Milanese garden in 
order to ponder the meaning of others’ conversion stories (p. 51).  While weeping in his 
agony, he withdrew from Alypius and heard the voice of a child saying, “Take it and read, 
take it and read.”  Augustine understood this voice as “a divine command,” and he 
opened his book of Scripture and read it; finally, he converted to Christianity (p. 52). 
 Importantly, in the case of Augustine’s conversion, O’Brien emphasizes the 
structural importance of the story within the story because he is convinced that Augustine 
meant “for his story to be for his reader as effective as others’ stories have been for him” 
(p. 53).  As such, O’Brien says, “Suppose there is another story within Augustine’s story 
of his conversion that his reader may have heard before, a story which, if remembered, 
would increase the impact of Augustine’s account immeasurably” (p. 53).  Consequently, 
while emphasizing the interrelatedness between Augustine’s conversion story and others’ 
conversion stories, he states, 
If Augustine had not known about this incident in the life of Antony, Ponticianus’ 
story about his friends’ conversions would probably have had no further effect 
than Simplicianus’ story about Victorinus.  Because Augustine had heard the 
story within the story, when he hears the child say, “Take it and read,” he turns 
immediately to the book he had been attentively reading throughout this period. (p. 
52) 
 
 Likewise, E. Ann Matter (1990) in “Conversion(s) in the Confessiones” 
elucidates how others’ conversion stories affected Augustine’s spiritual change in light of 
the interlocking stories of conversion in the Confessions.  While commenting on Arthur 
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D. Nock’s concept of conversion,41 Matter understands Augustine’s conversion as a 
“gradual progression” in which his narrative was deeply related to others’ stories (p. 26; 
see Stark, 1990, p. 45).  She notes, “The story of the Confessiones cannot be told with the 
vocabulary of Nock’s idea of conversion, because the striking flexibility and sense of 
progression documented in Augustine’s account of the search for ultimate truth does not 
accord with Nock’s idea of the ‘sudden moment of truth’” (p. 26).  Employing the 
metaphor of “a Chinese [or Korean] box of stories of conversion,”42 Matter attempts to 
explore Augustine’s conversion narrative within others’ conversion stories.  She writes, 
To proceed chronologically: Antony was moved by a chance encounter with the 
Gospel of Matthew, the young men at Trier by the story of Antony, Ponticianus 
by the experience of these friends, Augustine by the narrative of Ponticianus.  The 
cumulative weight of precedents seems a more important part of the story than the 
idea of a “sudden dramatic moment.” (p. 25) 
 
 More specifically, Matter describes the “interlocking stories of the conversion” 
of Antony, Ponticianus’ two friends, Ponticianus, and Augustine as follows: as found in 
book eight of the Confessions, before his conversion to Christianity, Augustine was 
unable to conceive of a spiritual substance and was unable to relinquish his sensual 
                                                
 41 In Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of 
Hippo, Arthur D. Nock (1933) writes, “By conversion we mean the reorientation of the soul of an 
individual, his deliberate turning from indifference or from an earlier form of piety to another, a turning 
which implies a consciousness that a great change is involved, that the old was wrong and the new is right.  
It is seen at its fullest in the positive response of a man to the choice set before him by the prophetic 
religions” (p. 7).  As such, Nock tends to emphasize the sudden and immediate aspect of religious 
conversion rather than gradual and progressive aspect of it. 
 
42 This Chinese or Korean box is formulated by the ongoing-containing structure of a smaller box 
within a bigger box.  Similar to Matter, Vaught (2004) writes, “The great rhetorician [Augustine] is leading 
his readers toward the most important moment of his life…He builds his account around a series of 
examples, nesting them inside one another like Chinese boxes: first we have the Confessions, then the story 
of Ponticianus, then the story of Anthony, next the story of the secret service agents, and finally, the story 
of their fiancées...In all of these ways, Augustine is spinning a web of words that will eventually lead us to 
raise the question about the way out of the labyrinth” (pp. 82-83). 
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gratifications.  At that time, Augustine met a fellow North African, Ponticianus, who had 
a position in the Emperor’s court.  Ponticianus told a series of conversion stories that 
fitted together neatly: the first was the story of Antony, who was a monk of Egypt, and of 
the “flocks of monasteries” that had grown up from Antony’s example (conf. 8.6.14-15).  
Then Ponticianus told Augustine how the conversion story of Antony had influenced two 
of his friends.  Ponticianus’ two friends (who were imperial officials) had gone to Trier 
with the royal court.  One evening, while wandering in the gardens close to the city walls, 
they came upon “a certain house, where lived certain servants of God, poor in spirit, of 
whom is the kingdom of heaven” (8.6.15).  There they found a book of the life of Antony.  
After reading this book, they had been influenced by the life of Antony and then decided 
to give up their imperial posts and to enter into the monastic community.  Because of 
their example, Ponticianus himself decided to be baptized a Christian.  After hearing the 
conversion stories of Ponticianus and his two friends, Augustine was disgusted with 
himself.  He reflected that after reading Cicero’s Hortensius at the age of nineteen, he had 
made little progress in resolving his spiritual quest for the Truth.  Instead, Augustine had 
pursued his worldly career, satisfied his earthly needs, and dabbled in a variety of 
religious and philosophical groups such as Manichaeism, astrology, or Neoplatonism.  In 
the depth of his anguish, he rushed into the garden.  There Augustine heard a divine voice 
and read one of Paul’s Epistles.  He finally dedicated himself to God and engaged in the 
celibate and monastic life (“a life of ascetic renunciation of the flesh”) (pp. 24-26; see 
Elledge, 1988, p. 82; Stark, 1990, pp. 49, 51).  Consequently, Matter asserts that there is 
an analogous relation between Augustine’s conversion narrative and others’ conversion 
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stories.  This implies that we need to examine the conversion stories of other people in 
order to understand “the special quality” of the conversion story of Augustine in the 
Confessions. 
 Like Matter, Frederick Van Fleteren (1990) in “St. Augustine’s Theory of 
Conversion” probes how Augustine’s conversion narrative is related to the conversion 
stories of other persons in the Confessions.  Van Fleteren regards Augustine’s conversion 
to Christianity as “a radical change” in which Augustine committed himself to a new life 
(p. 73).  According to Van Fleteren, there are no fewer than twelve various conversion 
stories in the Confessions: (1) Augustine’s reading of the Hortensius (conf. 3.4.7-8); (2) 
the first conversion of Alypius, from the Carthaginian circus (4.7.11-12); (3) the final 
conversion of Augustine from astrology (7.6.8-10); (4) the intellectual conversion of 
Augustine (7.9.13-7.21.27); (5) the conversion of Victorinus (8.2.3-5); (6) Augustine’s 
conversion from the story of Ponticianus (8.6.14-16); (7) the conversion story told by 
Ponticianus (8.6.15); (8) the conversion of Antony (8.6.14, 8.12.29); (9) Augustine’s own 
conversion (8.8.19, 8.11.27; 8.12.28-30); (10) Alypius’ conversion (8.12.30); (11) the 
conversion of Monica from wine-bibbing (9.8.19); and (12) the vision at Ostia (9.10.23-
26) (pp. 65-66).  Van Fleteren claims that in the Confessions, Augustine depicted others’ 
conversion stories in order to help the reader to understand better his own conversion 
narrative.  More specifically, Van Fleteren notes, 
The similarities between Augustine’s own conversion and the conversions of 
others afford us a further insight into Augustine’s conversion; the deeper meaning 
of what is merely mentioned in the description of the scene in the garden becomes 
clearer when compared to the other stories.  Thus, the literary structure of the 
conversion passages is identified as a Formgeschichte.  This is not to say that a 
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conversion in the garden in Milan did not take place; but it is to say that 
Augustine interpreted other lives in terms of his own. (p. 73) 
 
 According to Van Fleteren, this Formgeschichte as a structure of the conversion 
story/history consists of the following three distinguished yet mutually-informing 
moments: “(1) the events leading up to the conversion; (2) the moment of conversion 
itself; (3) the short and long term effects of the conversion” (p. 73).  While emphasizing 
this literary structure within conversion stories, Van Fleteren delves into the radical 
changes of the converts, including Augustine and others, as founded in the Confessions: 
for example, the conversion of Victorinus enabled him to confess publicly his faith of 
Jesus Christ before the members of the Christian community (although his public 
confession caused to be left his professorship of rhetoric in the context of the persecution 
of Christianity within the Roman Empire) (conf. 8.2.5);43 the conversion of Antony 
involved a change to the life of a hermit (8.6.14); the conversions of the friends of 
Ponticianus encouraged them to enter into a movement from secular service for the 
empire to the service of God (8.6.15); the conversion of Augustine stirred him to resign 
the chair of rhetoric, to engage in a celibate life, and to reject any desire for worldly gain 
(8.12.30) (pp. 70-71).44  Significantly, Van Fleteren understands Augustine’s spiritual 
change within the context of others’ transformative stories.  As a result, he concludes that 
                                                
43 In a related vein, William Harmless (1995) states, “Augustine and Victorinus had much in 
common: both were Africans; both, rhetoricians; both had come to Italy to earn fame and fortune; and both 
held powerful public positions” (p. 92).  According to Harmless, Victorinus had retired from public life 
when Julian the Apostate had banned Christians from holding such prestigious teaching posts.  In the midst 
of persecution, Victorinus had kept the following moral and faithful position: “throw off all delay; profess 
the Christian faith; remember the Last Judgment; abandon ambition, even at the cost of retirement” (p. 92). 
 
 44 Van Fleteren (1990) asserts that “[Augustine’s] conversion is not merely an interior matter; 
[his] public profession [of faith and his action for others] play a central role” in his spiritual life (p. 71). 
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the conversion stories of other people played an important role in the process of 
Augustine’s transformation. 
 
B. Augustine’s Conversion, Interpersonal Bonds, and the Christian Community 
Scholars have explored the link of Augustine’s conversion experience with his 
intimate interactions with other people and his participation in Christian communities.  
For example, Garry Wills (1999, 2004) examines the role of Augustine’s affective bonds 
and his intensive encounters with others in the experience of his transformation in light of 
a network of friendships.  Wills views Augustine’s conversion as a process which was 
inherently related to the “continuity” of change in his life development (2004, pp. 5-6, 
20).  According to Wills, Augustine came to Simplicianus when he was in the depth of 
his spiritual struggle against his desire for “lust” and his worldly ambition for a 
successful career.  Simplicianus expertly diagnosed Augustine’s needs and appropriately 
provided the moral and spiritual guidance for the young Augustine (pp. 111-113).  As 
such, Wills describes how Simplicianus had specifically cared for Augustine as follows: 
Simplician…helped in the four crucial ways.  First, he regularly [met] 
Augustine…Simplician was a sympathetic interlocutor who “by asking questions 
like a student became the teacher of those he asked”…..Augustine corresponded 
with him later, calling him “Father”…A second service was Simplician’s 
recommendation to read the letters of Paul, which engaged Augustine at levels 
Isaiah could not, at that time, reach.  [Augustine] was reading Paul on the day of 
his conversion.  A third service was the introduction of Augustine to a flourishing 
Christian Neoplatonism in Milan.  Simplician had been a friend of Marius 
Victorinus, the translator of Plotinus…As the center of the Neoplatonist circle in 
Milan, he was familiar with Mallius Theodore, to whom Augustine would 
dedicate one of his earliest works.  A last kindness he did Augustine was to tell 
him pointed stories of others’ conversions.  Augustine…appreciated it. (1999, pp. 
44-45) 
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 Wills contends that, like Simplicianus, Ponticianus led Augustine to be changed 
when Augustine had lost his way in spiritual darkness.  He guided Augustine to think 
about the correlation between Christian life in solitude and Christian life in community 
by illustrating the ascetic life of Antony in the desert (“the single excellence of hermits”) 
as well as the life of Ponticianus’ two friends (and their two affianced women) in the 
monastic community (“‘flocks’ [greges] of monastic saints”).  For Wills, eventually, 
Ponticianus challenged Augustine to enter into the interior journey for God in the garden 
of Milan and to engage in Christian life in community (2004, pp. 117-119). 
 Importantly, from the viewpoint of Augustine’s conversion as a process, Wills 
claims that Augustine became a Christian in the summer of 386, but that his life of 
conversion did not “end in the garden in Milan” (p. 6).  After his garden experience, 
Augustine involved “membership in a community of learned celibates” (p. 118).  As such, 
Wills illustrates the friendship of Verecundus for Augustine and his fellows.  Verecundus 
provided his villa of Cassiciacum to Augustine and his fellows in order to support them 
while they engaged in philosophical and religious discussions and to establish their 
continuous spiritual journey for God and community (even though he could not join this 
group because of his tie to a wife) (p. 117; see conf. 9.3.5-6).  Wills insists that the 
monastic and communal life of Augustine and his followers at Cassiciacum was deeply 
influenced by the example of the ascetic life of Ponticianus’ four friends at Trier.45  
Acknowledging the communal aspect of human sin and redemption within the Christian 
                                                
 45 Wills (2004) writes, “The four holy companions (two men, two women) at Trier was a more 
enticing model for Augustine than any of the other conversion stories—those of Victorinus, of Sergius 
Paul, of Anthony, or even of Paul himself” (p. 119). 
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community, Wills pays attention to Augustine’s ongoing spiritual life with other people 
in the Christian group (pp. 117-119; see Harrison, 2000, pp. 162-167; Martin, 2003, pp. 
46-47; McMahon, 2006, pp. 129-142).46  More specifically, he notes, 
Augustine is setting up a network of friendships that will correspond to the 
network of friendship exemplified in Pontician’s immediately following and 
crucial account of the four friends in Trier.  Augustine’s final struggle in the 
garden, when he separates himself even from his closest friend Alypius, may give 
the impression that his conversion was an entirely private and single action.  But 
he means to show that grace acts within the social framework.  Even sin came into 
the world by a perverse social sense, the socialis necessitudo that made Adam 
retain his solidarity with Eve.  Redemption also has a communal aspect.  The 
generosity of Verecundus, based on his sense of duty to his friends, is a happier 
kind of socialis necessitudo, which will be continued when he offers his villa at 
Cassiciacum to the community of his friends. (p. 117) 
 
 Wills asserts that for Augustine, the Christian life “was not a matter of his single 
salvation but of a philosophical [and spiritual] discipline jointly pursued with others” (p. 
118).  Augustine did “finally bring together the partners he needed to pursue the Christian 
                                                
46 John F. Monagle (1971) insists that the theme of Christian friendship is essential for Augustine 
spiritual life.  According to Monagle, Augustine was deeply influenced by Cicero’s concept of amicitia 
(friendship) which defines as “an accord of wills, tastes, and thought, all of which blend into the harmony 
of good will and affection” (p. 81).  Monagle contends that for Cicero, true friendship presupposed “a 
virtue which has its roots in a good man of strong character—a man who is just, generous, loyal, upright, 
and free from passion and insolence” (p. 81); the harmony of friendship is “the result of an essentially 
altruistic [human] relationship based on mutual good will and affection” (p. 81).  Monagle states that 
Augustine most often used the Cicero’s concept of amicitia to convey the meaning of friendship that 
signifies a human “bond which unites two or more persons in mutual sympathy” (p. 81; see Lienhard, 1999, 
p. 372; Paffenroth, 1992, pp. 126-131).  However, after his conversion to Christianity, Augustine became 
more convinced that “no true and virtuous friendship can exist unless it is rooted in the common love of 
God” (p. 85).  In this way, Monagle claims that for Augustine, God is the source and the reference of 
Christian friendship: “He loves his friend truly who loves God in him either because God is in him or in 
order that He may be in him” (p. 85, cited in s. 361.1); Christian friendship is “accomplished by the Holy 
Spirit and the embrace of God’s grace through Christ Jesus Our Lord” (p. 86; see civ. Dei 13. 24; Lienhard, 
1999, pp. 372-373; Paffenroth, 1992, pp. 131-133).  For Monagle, Augustine concept of Christian 
friendship involves “Christian, fraternal charity” in light of the love of God and neighbor.  While 
emphasizing the role of Christ—“the Way, the Truth, and Life” in the Christian community who purifies 
the whole human beings and cleanses their friendships (p. 86, see civ. Dei 10.22, 10.24, 11.2), Monagle 
concludes, “A happy life is one that is social; a social life means friends which include first and foremost 
the family: wife, children, and domestics.  In a wider sense the happy life is that of the citizens of a town, 
of a nation, of the world: a brotherhood of all men and angels.  Friendship is to be extended even to 
enemies and sinners” (p. 92, italics added). 
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life in community” at Cassiciacum and Hippo (p. 118).  Consequently, Wills remarks that 
Augustine’s continuous interactions with other people played an important role in 
establishing “drumbeat” directing of his own conversion to Christianity in the Milanese 
garden as well as his participation in the Christian community. 
Along the same line, Carl G. Vaught (2004) probes how Augustine’s 
interpersonal bonds and his participation in Christian communities deeply affected the 
process of his conversion in terms of correlation between personal transformation and a 
web of Christian friendships.  Vaught contends that Augustine’s Christian conversion of 
book eight is interwoven with two themes: 1) becoming a Christian and 2) the emergence 
of a Christian community (p. 67).  In the time of his hesitation to become a Christian, 
surprisingly, Augustine experienced loving care and support from other important 
persons: for example, 1) Bishop Ambrose of Milan helped Augustine to overcome the 
impact of Manichaean heritage on his thought and belief in which Augustine could not 
“conceive of spiritual substance that transcends the distinction between Good and Evil” 
(p. 57).  Ambrose’s sermons, which reflected Christianized Neoplatonism, especially 
encouraged the intellect Augustine to make an inner journey toward union with the Truth 
in light of the relation between God and the soul (see pp. 139, 146); 2) Simplicianus 
became a spiritual mentor for Augustine, as he was a spiritual father for Ambrose.  
Simplicianus, as a Christian Platonist, had been a servant of Christ for many years.47  
Augustine wanted to talk with Simplicianus about more personal and existential issues 
                                                
47 Vaught (2004) depicts, “Simplicianus is a Christian Neoplatonist, who approves the introduction 
of God and his Word in the Neoplatonic writings.  However, he is also a humble follower of Christ, 
opposing other philosophers who focus only on the physical world, and diverging from proud Neoplatonists 
who neglect the pathway that leads to God” (p. 72; see O’Donnell, 1992, III, pp. 6-7, 13-15). 
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than he had ever been able to talk publicly with Ambrose; importantly, he met 
Simplicianus because he was “a Christian” rather than “a Neoplatonist” (p. 72; see 
Starnes, 1990, p. 217).48  Throughout their meetings, Simplicianus illustrated how he 
himself moved from paganism to Christianity; then he advised Augustine how to deal 
with his spiritual abyss and existential predicament and how to follow Christ’s example 
of humility.  (As such, Simplicianus told the story of Victorinus’ transformation—a role 
model of Christian humility through dedication to Jesus Christ.) (pp. 69-74); 3) At the 
time of his visit, Ponticianus realized that Augustine had read the letters of Paul and that 
he had seriously struggled with his own spiritual and existential problems rather than his 
philosophical and intellectual reflections.  Ponticianus came closer to Augustine’s heart, 
not only by informing him of the life of Antony in the desert, but also by telling him a 
story about himself and his friends, who were members of the emperor’s court that 
Augustine aspired to join.  Like Ambrose and Simplicianus, Ponticianus led Augustine to 
become a Christian; that is, he encouraged Augustine to engage in a turning toward God 
and to embrace the humility of the cross in light of the radical reorientation of the will 
(pp. 79-81). 
Vaught asserts that with this loving care and support from other significant 
persons (i.e., Ambrose, Simplicianus, and Ponticianus), Augustine converted to 
Christianity in the garden of Milan (pp. 90-99).  Vaught emphasizes that during and after 
Augustine’s conversion to Christianity, Alypius and Monica were changed (“converted”) 
                                                
48 While agreeing with Colin Starnes’ emphasis on the Christian Simplicianus than the 
Neoplatonist Simplicianus, Vaught states, “Augustine does not go to Simplicianus because he is a 
Neoplatonist, but because he is a Christian.  What the young philosopher needs at this stage of his life is not 
instruction in Neoplatonism, but a sympathetic ear, and the wisdom that can lead him beyond the spiritual 
abyss into which he has fallen” (p. 72). 
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together.  This means that Alypius, who was present with Augustine in the garden, also 
cast himself to Christ and overcame his weakness of will through faith in God.49  After 
hearing what had happened to Augustine and Alypius in the garden, Monica leaped for 
joy at the good news of their conversions.  While she praised God for accomplishing 
more than she could ever ask or think, Monica abandoned her own worldly ambition and 
desire for her son Augustine to achieve professional success by marrying a Roman 
heiress.  As such, Vaught claims that the transformations of Augustine, Alypius, and 
Monica in the summer of 386 enabled them to become real “friends” in faith in God and 
to establish “a new kind of community” in light of interaction with companions and a 
web of Christian friendship (pp. 100-103; see conf. 8.12.30).  More specifically, Vaught 
writes, 
When Augustine reads a passage from the book of Romans in the garden in Milan, 
he not only trembles at the voice of God, but also finds the deliverance he seeks 
while his friend, Alypius, is sitting beside him (8.12.30).  From this experience, a 
Christian community emerges (8.12.30); and the structure it exhibits not only 
overcomes the philosophical isolation of the Neoplatonic vision, but also 
expresses the new creation that God generates within Augustine’s soul (p. 
65)…[This] new kind of community…is not a collection of role players like the 
adolescent community with which Augustine begins, nor is it a negative 
community in which participants become isolated from one another.  Rather, it 
includes an indefinite number of individuals that are (finite-infinite) images of 
one another in relation to God…Augustine, Alypius, Monica, and other members 
of this new community are identical in certain respects, but also different.  The 
transforming Word of God that the Bible makes accessible does not cancel their 
                                                
49 Vaught insists that although the conversion of Alypius was derivative on the experience of 
Augustine, both conversions displayed their uniqueness, and each conversion reflected the character of the 
one who underwent it.  Vaught notes, “In the case of Alypius, fallenness expresses itself in weakness rather 
than in self-accentuation; in the case of Augustine, this same predicament expresses itself in erotic power 
rather than humility.  However, in both instances, the grace of God inverts the structure of the soul.  The 
transformation of Alypius differs from the conversion of Augustine, but each has an internal structure that 
mirrors the other: the weakness of Alypius becomes the strength to accept a divine gift, and the strength of 
Augustine becomes the weakness to embrace his limitations.  The same inversion that has transformed 
Augustine transforms Alypius as well; and when this occurs, the internal structure of their separate 
experiences binds them together” (p. 101). 
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differences; for though it is rich enough to individuate them, it also gives them 
common ground in relation to God. (p. 102) 
 
Vaught insists that for Augustine, Christian friendship is a crucial factor in this 
new community as found in the Confessions.  According to Vaught, this Christian 
friendship presupposes “that those who have stood alone before God stand together” (p. 
103).50  In that sense, Vaught points out that the pear-stealing episode, as described in 
book two, led from a positive community of friends to a negative community of isolated 
individuals.  By contrast, Christian conversions, as portrayed in book eight, led “from 
individuating experiences with God to a community that not only holds its members apart, 
but also binds them together” (p. 103; see p. 100). 
Significantly, in the view of Christian friendship, Vaught pays attention to the 
communal dimension of the Ostia vision in which Augustine and his mother a shared 
mystical experience (conf. 9.10.23-26) (while acknowledging the personal dimension of 
spiritual experience).  Augustine and Monica were bound together by the fact that they 
became the members of the new spiritual community in faith in Christ (“putting on 
Christ”), that is, they celebrated their citizenship in the City of God (“a foretaste of 
eternal life”) (pp. 105-106, 124-129).  Vaught notes, 
                                                
50 More precisely, Vaught says, “In this new community [of Christian friendship], each member 
stands alone; each experiences the grace of God in his own way; each stands alongside the others as a 
(finite-infinite) image of God that has returned to itself; and each interacts with the others as they stretch 
out toward God in a communal quest for fulfillment” (p. 103).  Vaught writes, “As [Augustine] understands 
the issue, the individual and the community are an irreducible polarity, where God has created hearts that 
remain restless unity they find rest in him.  With this conception in mind, Augustine envisages a 
community in which we are bound together by a common object of affection.  Unlike Plato, who holds the 
community together with a noble lie, and unlike Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke, who bind it together with a 
social contract, Augustine suggests that communities arise naturally when separate individuals are oriented 
positively toward the same object.  Thus, he suggests that the love of God binds Augustine, Alypius, and 
Monica together, where they turn away from merely finite objects of affection, and where they are oriented 
toward what is infinite in its own right” (p. 103). 
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Experiences like this [Ostia vision of Augustine and his mother] are rare in 
mystical literature; for moments of mystical ecstasy often obliterate the 
individuals who engage in them, and usually involve a single individual the 
exclusion of a larger community.  However, in this case, Augustine describes a 
shared mystical experience that mirrors the structure of the Christian community, 
and within which individuals stand alone together in the presence and absence of 
God. (p. 128) 
 
 As a result, Vaught asserts that other significant people (i.e., Ambrose, 
Simplicianus, and Ponticianus) played a pivotal role in the process of Augustine’s 
conversion.  These persons helped Augustine when he underwent his spiritual abyss and 
existential predicament.  Augustine overcame his hesitation of becoming a Christian 
when he converted to God in the Milanese garden.  During and after Augustine’s 
conversion to Christianity, Alypius and Monica were transformed together; finally, 
Augustine and his fellows engaged in the new Christian community, which was rooted in 
the web of Christian friendship. 
 Similar to Vaught, Mary J. Kreidler (1990) elaborates on how Augustine’s 
continuous interactions with other people influenced his conversion to Christianity as 
well as his participation within the Christian community.  She regards Augustine’s 
conversion experience as “a life-process” of change during which he engaged in Christian 
life of humility and community (pp. 515, 520).  In line with Wills and Vaught, Kreidler 
contends that Simplicianus and Ponticianus guided Augustine to enter into “a movement 
away from the intellectual pride” of the young philosopher who saw himself as the source 
of his own wisdom and virtue “to an experience of the humility of the Incarnate Christ as 
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model and healer” (pp. 511-513).51  For Kreidler, within the context of the loving care 
and support by other people, Augustine finally converted to Christianity (p. 513). 
 Kreidler claims that Augustine’s conversion in the Milanese garden did not 
remain the alienated experience of an individual (p. 515).  Augustine’s conversion 
experience enabled him to accept “the humble servant Christ” and to become a “humble 
Christian” for others.  While emphasizing the link between Augustine’s conversion and 
his solidarity in the church community, Kreidler writes, “Augustine’s conversion…took 
place within an ecclesial community…[As such] Augustine’s understanding of 
community [did] undergo a metanoia.  That metanoia center[ed] in a growing 
understanding of unity and a perception of community as a corporate entity” (p. 515). 
 Importantly, Kreidler pays attention to Augustine’s spiritual life and his pastoral 
ministry as a priest and a bishop at Hippo based on the interaction of humility and 
community.  For Kreidler, there is the interrelatedness between Augustine’s garden 
experience and his pastoral ministry (“the life of charity of the humble Christian”) in 
terms of the personal transformation and the network of Christian friendships.  Clearly, 
Kreidler points out that after his conversion to Christianity, Augustine became involved 
in a strong solidarity with others: “ministry for [priest and bishop] Augustine begins with 
solidarity not superiority” (p. 513).  That means that Augustine’s life of charity began 
with his identification with “the humble Incarnate Christ” as well as his identification 
with his brothers and sisters as sinners in a process of ongoing change (p. 510). 
                                                
51 Kreidler (1990) notes, “In the Confessions Augustine consistently contrasts pride and humility.  
Pride is the characteristic of the unconverted Augustine while humility is the possession of the incarnate 
Christ” (p. 511). 
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 As a result, Kreidler asserts that significant other people (i.e., Simplicianus and 
Ponticianus) provided their care and support to Augustine to place himself in the humble 
Incarnate Christ.  Augustine’s conversion enabled him to facilitate a corporate sense of 
his own identity as a member of the church community (p. 518).  That is, his garden 
experience led him to bind together his brothers and sisters within Christian community: 
“It is [Augustine’s] conversion that understands that love makes [the] solidarity of [his] 
relationship with others possible in the community of the Church and religious 
communities that model that Church for the rest of the Body” (p. 520).  While agreeing 
with Zumkeller’s idea that Augustine’s pastoral activity began with his service of love to 
the Church community (p. 519; see Zumkeller, 1986, pp. 198-199), Kreidler concludes 
that Augustine’s conversion experience brought him out of his own narrow world to an 
awareness of and presence to a larger world that demanded “a humble love which stands 
in solidarity with all the members of the Body, [the Church community]” (519-520). 
In a related vein, Alan Kreider (1999) in The Change of Conversion and the 
Origin of Christendom examines the relation between the conversion experience of the 
person and the resocialization process within the Church community.  Kreider 
emphasizes the corporate dimension of conversion in the context of the early Christian 
church in light of conversion and solidarity.  In doing so, he pays attention to the stories 
of early Christian converts and examines the processes by which they became Christian.  
Kreider views Christian conversion as a “journey” of change in which the convert 
involves the transformation “not just of belief but also of belonging and behavior” (p. xv; 
see pp. xiv, 109).  Influenced by William Harmless (1995), Kreider formulates the 
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journey of conversion in the context of the early Church (which was fully developed in 
the fourth century) by using the following the four stages of resocialization: 1) 
evangelization, 2) the catechumenate, 3) enlightenment, and 4) mystagogy.52  Agreeing 
with Wayne A. Meeks’ attentiveness to the convert’s belonging of the community,53 
Kreider writes, 
[Early Christian] conversion involved becoming the kind of person who belonged 
to that kind of community.  This could not happen quickly.  It could come about 
only when candidates submitted themselves to a process of “resocialization” by 
which their new community superintended the transformation of their beliefs, 
their sense of belonging, and their patterns of behavior.  No longer would they 
                                                
52 According to Kreider, the journey of conversion in the context of the early Church consisted of 
the four stages of resocialization: 1) the stage of evangelization involved “contact between Christians and a 
potential believer” which was informal and depended on the particular experience of each person; 2) in the 
stage of the catechumenate, church leaders examined the candidates, after which they gave potential 
believers their approval and admitted them to become catechumens; 3) the stage of enlightenment referred 
that when a candidate’s behavior was adjudged to have changed sufficiently, he or she was admitted to be 
concentrated upon Christian belief.  The catechists were concerned to impart to their candidates orthodox 
teaching.  The candidates received exorcisms and other spiritual preparations culminating in the baptismal 
rites through which the catechumens were “born in water”; they could take part in the community’s prayers 
and Eucharist; 4) the stage of mystagogy, which was added in the fourth century, indicated that the 
catechists in the week after Easter explained the meaning of the rites of baptism and Eucharist and 
“experience” in which the new converts had just participated (1999, pp. 21-22, see pp. 57-64). 
 
53 Meeks (1993) in The Origin of Christian Morality: The First Two Centuries emphasizes the 
communal dimension of early Christian conversion.  Meeks characterizes early Christian conversion as 
“the change of primary reference groups, the resocialization into an alternative community” (p. 26).  He 
writes, “[In the context of the early Church] becoming a Christian meant something like the experience of 
an immigrant who leaves his or her native land and then assimilates to the culture of a new, adopted 
homeland.  Such a transfer of allegiances and transformation of mores requires a resocialization.  That is, 
something like the primary socialization that occurs normally in the interactions between child and family, 
the process in which the self receives those components of its structure and those basic values that are 
contributed by its environment, is reenacted in a new context” (p. 12).  According to Meeks, the early 
Christians had depicted themselves as “a movement of converts”; at the earliest stage of the movement, 
they “created a rite of passage to dramatize the separation from one life and one society and the joining of 
another, leaving the family of birth and the culture of residence and becoming a sister or brother of those 
who are God’s children” (p. 12).  While emphasizing the conversion stories in the (early and modern) 
Christian community in light of the conversion experience and the institutionalization process, Meeks states, 
“Converts create retrospective stories of their own conversions that serve several functions in the process 
by which they come to be at home in the new group or movement.  Their own understandings of their 
identity and their relation to their new reference group and to former reference groups and individuals are 
transformed by the making of the story, which follows the model of a typical ‘conversion career’ that is 
believed in by the group…The uses of the conversion stories that we see in the early texts are themselves 
important clues to the process of resocializing moral intuitions that is the real object of our inquiry” (p. 21). 
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live by the values of the dominant society.  A process of examination, instruction, 
and ritual rehabituated the candidates for conversion, re-reflexing them into the 
lifestyle of an alternative community. (p. 21; see Meeks, 1993, p. 12) 
 
For Kreider, Augustine’s conversion was one of the most famous early Christian 
conversion stories (p. 54).54  Augustine’s conversion involved belonging and solidarity 
with the Christian community in light of the resocialization into an alternative community.  
That means that the young Augustine eventually belonged to his mother’s religion (i.e., 
Christianity) as well as the Roman Empire’s religion (i.e., Christianity) in the late fourth 
century in the West.  Later Bishop Augustine was being asked to attempt to foster more 
members of the Christian church as well as to engage in the use of religious coercion in 
order to defend Christianity against the Donatists and pagans and to accomplish the unity 
of the African Church (pp. 54-65, 70). 
From a more specific viewpoint about the pastoral ministry of Bishop Augustine, 
by using this model of the journey of conversion in the early Church, Kreider distills how 
Augustine had attempted to urge potential believers to become a Christian as well as to 
establish the unity of the converted person with the converted community.  As such, 
Kreider depicts Bishop Augustine as not a simply convert, but a converter who had 
strongly (or rigorously) urged “the catechumens to be converted” (pp. 54-55, 57).  In 
other words, he focuses on “the story of Augustine the converter” in his pastoral ministry 
                                                
54 Kreider presents two types of conversion that he finds in many societies: “through the first kind 
of conversion, once-respectable citizens become members of groups that deviate from the values of the 
larger society; their conversion entails ‘the resocialization into an alternative community.’  Through the 
second kind of conversion, ‘someone who was leading a dissolute, barren, or otherwise deplorable life, who 
turns about, shapes up, and henceforth exhibits deportment approved by all...The deviant has been won 
over to the norms that society at large upholds’” (pp. 69-70; see Meeks, 1993, pp. 21, 26).  Kreider insists 
that in early Christian centuries, conversion of the first type took place amidst risk and high adventure.  For 
Kreider, the conversion of Augustine belonged to the second type of conversion (p. 70). 
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at Hippo rather than on “Augustine as convert” in the garden of Milan (p. 54).  More 
specifically, Kreider describes, 
Augustine was bishop of Hippo in North Africa for thirty-four years, from 396 to 
430.  During this time, “orthodox” Catholic Christianity decisively established 
itself as the religion of the imperial establishment, and through this its influence 
spread into every town.  Augustine reflected on the results of this 
Christianization:  “In this city there are many houses in which there is not even a 
single pagan, nor single house in which there is not a Christian” (Sermon 302.19).  
In this process of conversion, Augustine played a role that was vital locally, but 
he also left his impact upon the history of Christendom as a whole. (p. 54) 
 
According to Kreider, Augustine of Hippo (who wrote a book, First Catechetical 
Instruction) retained and used the model of the four stages of the conversion journey in 
the context of the North African Church in the late fourth and early fifth centuries.  In 
doing so, Augustine actively participated in the process of Christianization, that is, he 
was involved in the process of converting (“christening”/“recruiting”) the catechumens 
into the church community through the sacrament of Christian baptism (pp. 54-55, 94).55  
Kreider remarks that Augustine, as a missionary pastor, was profoundly concerned that 
people would be converted in the fullest sense of the word (p. 56).  Following his 
predecessor Cyprian, Augustine understood his role as “an exalted one” within the 
process of facilitating the membership of the Christian community (p. 55). 
 As a result, Kreider asserts that Augustine’s conversion was a movement of 
spiritual journey of change in light of the resocialization or institutionalization process 
within the church community.  Augustine’s conversion experience was deeply relevant to 
his personal change of belief and behavior as well as to his sense of belonging and 
                                                
 55 Kreider contends that for the early Christians, Christian baptism was a “means of entry into the 
Christian community” in which conversion was “completed” (p. 20). 
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solidarity with others in the Christian community.  Further, his conversion experience 
stirred him to establish a new kind of Christian community with his followers and to 
engage in the process of converting (“resocializing”) potential believers—the christening 
of the catechumens—into the church community (i.e., the North African Church). 
 In conclusion, from the perspective of sociology of religion, Augustine’s 
conversion has been viewed as a product of the effectiveness of the conversion stories of 
other people (on his transformation) and a change through his interpersonal bonds within 
Christian communities.  On the whole, sociological studies of Augustine’s conversion 
have described the young Augustine as an active religious seeker who had established 
relations with other persons within specialized religious settings. 
 The sociological studies of Augustine’s conversion have primarily contributed by 
elucidating the impact of social and institutional factors on the complex process of his 
transformation.  In doing so, they have effectively showed the interaction of the 
experience of the self with the experience of others in the process of Augustine’s 
socialization or institutionalization.  More specifically, they have demonstrated how 
Augustine molded and confirmed the values, expectations, and beliefs of religious groups 
through his interactions with significant other people and his participation in religious 
communities.  As such, when we attempt to reinterpret Augustine’s conversion, these 
sociological studies encourage us to realize that the conversion stories of other persons—
“a story within a story”—compelled Augustine to overcome his isolated life style, to be 
converted to Christianity, and to follow their example of humility in faith in Christ.  In 
doing so, they lead us to recognize that Augustine’s intimate interactions with other 
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people (e.g., Simplicianus or Ponticianus) in the Christian communities helped him to 
make up for his frustration with his deprivations in the social and cultural conditions of 
his time, as well as to foster a new ability to live together with others in the community in 
light of interpersonal bonds and a network of Christian friendships.  However, these 
sociological interpretations of Augustine’s conversion are not sufficient to depict deeply 
Augustine’s inner disconnection and restlessness in his mind, or to articulate Augustine’s 
interior journey toward union with the divine and his unique transformation in the 
conversion process in light of knowing himself and knowing the divine. 
 
III. Anthropological Studies of Augustine’s Conversion: 
The Impact of Cultural Factors 
 
Scholars have explored the impact of philosophical and cultural factors on the 
conversion process of Augustine in the field of the anthropology of religion (although 
most of them are not predominantly anthropologists but Augustinian scholars).  This 
section of the literature review pays attention to two main themes because they are proper 
and beneficial for articulating the philosophical and cultural dimensions of religious 
conversion as well as for achieving a richer and more accurate perception of Augustine’s 
conversion narrative.  These main themes are 1) the impact of the Neoplatonic heritage 
on Augustine’s conversion and 2) Augustine’s conversion and the Christian monastic 
movement.56 
                                                
 56 While retrieving the contributions of the previous anthropological interpretations of religious 
conversion in chapter two, I attempt to establish the main anthropological themes pertaining to the studies 
of Augustine’s conversion.  In doing so, I am profoundly influenced by 1) both Phillip Cary’s view on 
Augustine’s reformation of religious identity, worldview, and belief through his experiences of 
philosophical and cultural changes (1999, 2000, 2003) and John J. O’Meara’s emphasis on the intellectual 
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A. The Influence of the Neoplatonic Heritage on Augustine’s Conversion 
Scholars have explored the influence of Neoplatonic sources on Augustine’s 
intellectual conversion in order to elucidate how Augustine reshaped his (personal and 
religious) identity, worldview, and belief through his experiences of philosophical and 
cultural changes.  For example, Phillip Cary (1999, 2000, 2003) probes how 
Neoplatonism affected Augustine’s inner spiritual journey toward the divine.  Cary 
explains the nature of inwardness within the Western philosophical and cultural context 
(which is deeply related to Augustine’s concept of interiority) as follows:  
The history of inwardness is the story of how Westerners developed the desire to 
see within the soul and therefore came to conceive of the soul doing what no eye 
ever did: turning to look within its own self...The god’s command “Know 
Thyself,” interpreted to mean “know thy soul,” stood as a motto at the head of 
ancient treatises on the soul, hinting at a promise of divine knowledge as the fruit 
of self-knowledge.  Thus inwardness involves more than a conception of the self; 
it is concerned with the divine, the eternal, the ultimate.  From its inception, 
inwardness meant seeking a glimpse of the soul’s inner relation to its divine 
origin. (2000, p. 10) 
 
Cary contends that the deeper dimension in Platonism was inherently linked to the 
soul, even if it was not originally inside it (p. 11).  As such, he explores how Plato’s 
theme of the intelligible world was modified into Plotinus’ theme of the inner world.  
Cary writes, 
It was…Platonism that first conceived of that deeper dimension, that other world 
that is more real and true than the visible, bodily world—and it is to this other 
world that we must look for the roots of Western inwardness…Plato himself did 
not locate this other world in the soul but rather in what he called “the intelligible 
                                                                                                                                            
and philosophical dimension of Augustine’s transformation (2001) to establish the theme of the impact of 
the Neoplatonic heritage on Augustine’s conversion; 2) both Carol Harrison’s idea of the correlation 
between Augustine’s conversion to Christianity and his ascetic and celibate life (2000) and Adolar 
Zumkeller’s view on Augustine’s conversion as an ongoing process of becoming a servant of God 
(“monk”) through the monastic way of life (1986) to design the theme of Augustine’s conversion and the 
Christian monastic movement. 
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place,” a realm of being whose elements are not material and therefore are not 
visible to the eyes of the body, but rather are “intelligible”, that is, understood by 
the intellect alone.  This is the place of Platonic Ideas or Forms.  Later Platonists 
called it “the intelligible world.”  Plotinus was evidently the first to conceive of it 
as an inner world, located within the soul. (p. 11) 
 
In this sense, Cary (2003) in “Book Seven: Inner Vision as the Goal of 
Augustine’s Life” elucidates how the books of Neoplatonic thinkers (e.g., Plotinus) 
guided Augustine to realize the incorporeal dimension of divine nature as well as to enter 
into an interior journey for the Truth.  According to Cary, the central problem of the 
young Augustine’s life was his intellectual problem, which was related to “how to see 
God” (pp. 107-108).57  In other words, influenced by Manicheism, the young Augustine 
thought of God as a material being (“being a bodily thing’”) (p. 109).  More specifically, 
Cary notes, 
In fact young Augustine’s problem is that he is accustomed to thinking of God as 
being nothing more than the light of the heavens, a physical element perceived by 
the eyes of the body.  This is how the Manichees conceived of God, our author 
tells us earlier: as a “huge bright body” of which the soul was part (4.16.31).  In 
fact according to his analysis, the Manichean heresy is thoroughly materialistic 
(5.10.20; cf. also 3.7.12).  Manicheism is famed as a kind of dualism, of course, 
but Augustine traces this back logically to an underlying materialism.  The 
Manichees’ dualism consisted in their belief that the whole universe is made up of 
two radically opposed substances or natures, which we could call the Good Stuff 
and the Bad Stuff.  Their underlying materialism consisted in conceiving of both 
the Good Stuff and the Evil Stuff as stuff, i.e., as material substances that take up 
space. (p. 108) 
 
According to Cary, the young Augustine was still under the influence of 
Manicheism (that is, he was present with the materialist habits of thought), although he 
                                                
57 While explaining the intellectual problem of Augustine, Cary (2003) differentiates young 
Augustine (“the central character in the Confessions”) with Augustine the author (who knows so much 
more than the character does about his own problems) (p. 107).  Cary remarks that this book seven is 
central to the whole of the Confessions.  He writes, “Book Seven of the Confessions, after solving 
intellectual problems the author has been developing in the first six books, sets the agenda for the next six 
books, as well as for the rest of Augustine’s life” (p. 107). 
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was no longer a member of the Manichean sect (p. 109).  For this reason, when 
Augustine tried to conceive of God, his mind did draw “images from the world perceived 
by [his] five physical senses and then [did] think that these mental images (which he 
call[ed] ‘phantasms,’ related to the Greek word from which we get ‘fantasy’) somehow 
represent God” (p. 109; see conf. 7.1.2).  Cary points out that his intellectual and 
philosophical failure led him to conceive of God as taking up space: 
God is present everywhere, young Augustine knows, but how?  His materialistic 
heart can only imagine God as spread out through all the places in the universe, 
like water filling a sponge (7.5.7).  But that means one part of God must be in one 
place, and another part in another place, and more of him in an elephant than in a 
sparrow. (7.1.2) (p. 109) 
 
Cary examines how Augustine resolved his intellectual problem after his reading 
of Plotinian books (pp. 112-117; see Chadwick, 1986, p. 23; Harrison, 2000, pp. 11-15, 
178, 2006, pp. 27-28; Kenney, 2002, p. 90; Lawless, 1987, pp. 35-39, 156-157).  He 
emphasizes the role of Plotinus in reshaping Augustine’s conception of the divine nature, 
while acknowledging the influence of Porphyry on the reformation of Augustine’s 
thought (p. 113).  In particular, Cary pays attention to the conceptual structure of 
Plotinus’ “turning into the inside,” which underlies Augustine’s theme of inwardness.  
For Cary, Plotinus emphasized that the human person “must turn inward to find [the 
divine] because the higher part of the soul, continually contemplating, is identical to the 
divine Mind.  Hence turning into the soul’s interior is turning to God, and self-knowledge 
yields knowledge of all that is divine, eternal, and ultimate” (2000, p. 28; see p. 20; 1999, 
p. 455; see enn. 1.6.8, 5.1.12, 5.8.11, 6.5.7, 6.9.7).  Cary asserts that through the books of 
Plotinus (which were written with an intellectual depth and poetic beauty), Augustine had 
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learned “the Platonist [ontological] notions of incorporeality, incorruptibility, 
unchangeability, and omnipresence” (2003, p. 113).  As such, Augustine had gradually 
realized a pivotal way to turn into the inside, namely, to see the Good in the soul:58 
What is the way?  And what is the means?  How can one behold this 
extraordinary beauty which remains in the inner sanctum and will not come 
outside to be seen by the profane?  Let him who can arise and come into the 
inside, leaving the sight of his eyes outside and not turning back to corporeal 
beauties. (p. 114, quoted in Plotinus, enn. 1.6.8; see 2000, pp. 9-11, 28-30) 
 
Augustine did think of this Plotinian call to “arise and come into the inside,” 
where God is found (2003, p. 114).  In that sense, the solution to Augustine’s intellectual 
problem (of conceiving the nature of God) began when Augustine came to himself and 
turned inward, just like the Plotinian Prodigal Son.59  This means that, admonished by the 
books of the Platonists to return to himself and led by God’s inward help, Augustine 
entered his “inmost place” of the soul and found the light of eternal Truth (p. 115; see 
conf. 7.10.16).  In doing so, by employing Plotinus’ conception of integral omnipresence, 
Augustine felt convinced that “the divine is not spread out part-by-part in space like 
water in a sponge, but is present everywhere as a whole” (p. 115; see enn. 6.4.1-6.5.12).  
                                                
58 Cary (2003) insists that for Augustine, the traditional Platonists had ability to search for the 
divine, although they were not Christians.  Cary writes, “The pagan Platonists may not have known the 
Gospel of John, but they knew that ‘In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God and the 
Word was God’ (7.9.13, quoting John 1:1).  They knew that this eternal divine Word is the inner light, ‘the 
true light that enlightens every human being coming into this world’ (7.9.13, quoting John 1:9).  Unlike the 
Manichees, they knew that the human soul ‘is not that light’—i.e., that the soul is not a part of God—but 
rather ‘bears witness to that light’ (1.9. 13, quoting John 1:8)” (p. 112). 
 
59 For Cary, Augustine’s return to the divine is not a physical journey through space (conf. 
1.18.28), picking up imagery from further on in the same chapter of Plotinus: “Our fatherland is that from 
whence we came, and the Father is there.  What then is our journey, our flight?  Not by feet is it 
accomplished; for feet carry you from here to there all over the earth.  Nor should you procure horse-
chariot or ship; you should leave all such things behind and not look, but close your eyes and awaken a 
different kind of vision instead—a sort of kind of vision which everyone possesses but few make use of” 
(2003, p. 114, quoted in Plotinus, enn. 1.6.8). 
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This implies that this Plotinus’ conception of integral omnipresence had played a 
prominent role in Augustine’s opening meditation on the nature of God at the beginning 
of Confessions (1.2.2-1.4.4); further, Augustine clearly expressed his newly changed 
understanding of the omnipresence of the divine: 
God is not stretched out or poured out through space, whether finite or infinite (as 
if there could be more of Him in one part than in another) but is present as a 
whole everywhere—just like Truth, which no one in their right mind would say is 
partly in this place and partly in that; for after all, Truth is God. (p. 115, quoted in 
ep. 118.23) 
 
As a result, Cary asserts that Neoplatonism had affected the young Augustine to 
overcome his materialistic thinking of God as “being a bodily thing” and to enter into his 
mind for his interior journey for the Truth.  For Cary, Augustine’s concept of inwardness 
is rooted in Plotinian Platonism and its doctrine of the divinity at the core of the soul.  
Augustine’s reading of the books of Neoplatonists (especially some Plotinus’ works) had 
guided him to achieve a deeper ontological understanding of the nature of being, namely, 
to establish a better conception of God’s omnipresence.  While emphasizing that 
Augustine’s vision of the mind’s eye gave him the solution to his problem of conceiving 
the nature of God, Cary concludes, 
[In the movement of turning inward (“examining the soul”) and looking upward 
(“contemplating God”)] Augustine charts a journey toward God which begins 
when he enters into the depths of his own self (intravi in intima mea, conf. 
7.10.16) and reaches its destination when he looks above himself to see the light 
of immutable Truth (i.e., God), which is visible only to the eye of the mind.  In 
turning inward Augustine looks first at the cognitive powers of his own soul.  
Ascending through these faculties, from senses through memory to intellect or 
mind, Augustine finally recognizes that the Truth the mind sees is above the mind 
itself, because Truth is immutable while the mind is not. (1999, p. 455)60 
                                                
 60 In the same way, Robert McMahon (2006) in Understanding the Medieval Meditative Ascent: 
Augustine, Anselm, Boethius, & Dante views Augustine’s conversion as “not simply a crucial event in 
 299 
 
In the same vein, John J. O’Meara (2001) in The Young Augustine: The Growth of 
St. Augustine’s Mind Up to His Conversion examines the role of Neoplatonism in 
Augustine’s conversion in light of the ascent of the soul.  In doing so, O’Meara pays 
attention to the intellectual and rational dimension of Augustine’s transformation in terms 
of the submission of intellect, while acknowledging the moral and spiritual dimension of 
it in terms of the submission of will.  Basically agreeing with Arthur D. Nock’s idea 
about “conversion to philosophy,”61 O’Meara contends that the search for and the 
acceptance of a new philosophy tend to stir persons to set up a different (or better) 
standard of values within the intellectual and cultural context.  In that sense, he argues 
that Neoplatonism affected Augustine’s transformation of religious identity as well as his 
cultural change. 
                                                                                                                                            
one’s life,” but as “an ongoing process implied in the Christian-Platonist ascent,” which “requires the 
continuing dedication of the whole human being” (p. 152).  While paying attention to the link of Christian-
Platonist theme of the ascent of the soul to God with Augustine’s transformation (“the change being”), 
McMahon writes, “The return to God depends on this return into oneself…the meditative ascent demands a 
conversion: [Augustine] the pilgrim turns away from things outside him (extra se) to those within him 
(intra se), with proper guidance and grace he eventually comes to the Divine Presence above him (supra 
se)...Though visible evidence of the invisible God can be found in the beauties of creation, [Augustine] the 
pilgrim encounters God himself not by looking outward with the senses, but by turning inward with the 
mind” (pp. 9-10; see pp. 60-77, 2003, pp. 212-217; Bouyer, 1963, pp. 468-475; Newton, 1971, pp. 2-4). 
 
61 According to Nock, conversion to philosophy was a common thing at the time of Augustine.  
Nock views the philosopher as “the man able to relieve humanity of this and that failing, and his functions 
as reproaching and exhorting and teaching” (1933, p. 173).  He states, “Any philosophy of the time set up a 
standard of values different from those of the world outside and could serve as a stimulus to a stern life, and 
therefore to something like conversion when it came to a man living carelessly” (p. 173).  In this way, 
Eugene Kevane (1986) in “Christian Philosophy: The Intellectual Side of Augustine’s Conversion” argues 
that for Augustine, philosophy in classical antiquity not referred to merely “academic study of treaties De 
philosophia or reading in the literature of the philosophical dialogues,” but “meant a way of life” (p. 49).  
In emphasizing Augustine’s philosophizing process for establishing a better way of Christian life, Kevane 
writes, “Augustine is promising a renewed and healed condition of philosophy, because the purgation of the 
pagan condition of mind and soul by the power of the new religion will brighten the vision of the inner 
eye” (pp. 60-61). 
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According to O’Meara, Augustine was influenced by Neoplatonists (especially 
Plotinus and Porphyry who were related as “master and principal interpreter”) (pp. 127-
128, 131, 152-153).62  More specifically, O’Meara elucidates the impact of Plotinus and 
Porphyry on the formation of Augustine’s Neoplatonic thought as follows: 
Plotinus’ essay On Beauty informed him of a spiritual Trinity and dispelled 
forever his Manichean notions of a corporeal deity.  Other essays of Plotinus 
equally dispelled his Manichean view of evil as a substance.  Plotinus, moreover, 
summoned him from amongst the many to aspire through purgation and the 
higher operation of his intelligence to union with the One.  [In the meanwhile] 
Porphyry’s Return of the Soul also spoke to him of the Trinity and of purgation 
and union.  Further it alone told him of the necessity of a Mediator for the many 
[who were incapable of raising themselves to a life of purgation and intellectual 
contemplation]. (p. 153)63 
 
For O’Meara, in book seven of the Confessions, Augustine described how the 
theme of the Neoplatonic ascent of the soul had so impressed him in the process of his 
intellectual submission to Christianity (p. 133; see conf. 7.10.16, 7.17.23, 7.20.26).  Here 
Augustine could reach his lofty contemplation to experience the divine, that is, he could 
arrive at the vision of the Good (p. 138).  As a result, O’Meara remarks that the new 
Neoplatonic knowledge of Augustine had greatly affected his conversion experience in 
                                                
62 For O’Meara, there is a controversy whether Augustine had been affected by Plotinus or 
Porphyry, or both.  While supporting the idea that Augustine was influenced by both Porphyry and Plotinus, 
he notes, “Augustine was influenced by Neo-Platonists….The list could be narrowed down to two: 
Porphyry and Plotinus.  Theiler said that Porphyry only was in question.  Henry said Plotinus only.  This 
controversy…has abated, and no scholar would nowadays deny that both Porphyry and Plotinus played 
their parts” (2001, pp. 127-128; see pp. 135, 152-153; Chadwick, 1986, pp. 17-24; Harrison, 2000, p. 13, 
2006, pp. 27-28; Van Fleteren, 1999, p. 64). 
 
 63 According to O’Meara, although Porphyry helped Augustine to search for “a Mediator to lead 
the mass of mankind to the Father,” like other Neoplatonists, he regarded Jesus as “an excellent man” and 
rejected the Christian belief of the Incarnate Christ who became a mediator between the divine and the 
human (pp. 139-141; see Bonner, 1990, p. 165; Cary, 2003, p. 120; Harrison, 2000, pp. 30-38, 2006, pp. 
32-33; O’Connell, 1969, pp. 79-80).  In the context that Augustine did not discover the theme of the 
Incarnation in the teaching of Neoplatonists, Augustine read the Bible, especially the letters of St. Paul.  
Like his reading of the books of the Neoplatonists, his reading of the Epistles of Paul affected his 
transformation (pp. 155-158, 191; see Cary, 2000, p. 31, 2003, pp. 119-120; Harrison, 2000, pp. 88-93; 
Lancel, 2002, pp. 87-88; O’Donnell, 1992, III, p. 3). 
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the garden of Milan64 (as well as his mystical experience at Ostia [pp. 205-209]).65  
O’Meara concludes, 
This…was the stage to which the Neo-Platonist books had brought him.  
[Augustine] aspired to a life not only free from worldly cares and preoccupations, 
but given wholly to the contemplation of the immaterial One, the Good, the 
Father.  Such a life involved an ascetic purgation of the soul of all the unnecessary 
defilements which arose from its being imprisoned in the body.  He could not 
expect that he would immediately he granted an ecstatic vision of the One; nor 
was it in fact granted him.  He could aspire to it and make himself less worthy of 
it: this he attempted to do. (p. 138) 
 
 Like O’Meara, Serge Lancel (2002) in Saint Augustine explores how Augustine’s 
reading of the books of the Neoplatonists influenced the intellectual dimension of his 
conversion in terms of the inward turn and ascent of the soul towards the divine.  For 
Lancel, Augustine was not able “to conceive of the incorporeal” dimension of the divine 
because of his old Manichean belief (p. 85).  As such, Augustine met Bishop Ambrose of 
Milan who was a Christian Neoplatonist and participated in the worship service in the 
Milanese cathedral, at which point he heard the sermons of Ambrose: 
                                                
64 O’Meara (2001) insists that while scholars have explored the impact of the Neoplatonists on 
Augustine and his thought, there is an enormous controversy whether Augustine was converted to 
Neoplatonism or Christianity (pp. 125-127).  According to O’Meara, some scholars have supported the idea 
that Augustine was a Neoplatonist rather than a Christian during (and after) his garden experience in 386.  
O’Meara writes, “Harnack, for example, contended that the Dialogues do not bear out the idea of a radical 
conversion to Christianity.  Loofs even maintained that in 391, five years after his ‘conversion,’ Augustine 
was still nothing more than a Neo-Platonist with a tincture of Christianity.  The Confessions in short 
misrepresent what actually happened…Gourdon put Augustine’s sincere conversion to Christianity as late 
as 400, when he had already been a Christian bishop for five and a priest for nine years…Prosper Alfaric 
[insisted that]…‘morally as well as intellectually [Augustine] was converted to Neo-Platonism rather than 
the Gospel…If he had died after he had written the Solioquies, we would not have regarded him as 
anything but a convinced Neo-Platonist, with a tincture, more or less, Christianity’” (pp. 126-127).  
However, acknowledging Augustine had been deeply influenced by Neoplatonism (see p. 155), O’Meara 
claims that Augustine truly became a Christian: “Augustine’s conversion to Christianity was sincere and 
complete, due emphasis is placed on the part played in it by Neo-Platonism” (p. 127; see pp. 165, 215-216). 
 
65 Like O’Meara, scholars have claimed that the Neoplatonic theme of the ascent of the soul 
toward the divine affected Augustine’s vision of God at Ostia (conf. 9.10.23-26), as it influenced his garden 
experience in Milan (8.12.28-29) (see Bouyer, 1963, pp. 497-499; Cary, 2003, p. 121; Lancel, 2002, p. 86; 
Van Fleteren, 1999, p. 64; Vaught, 2004, pp. 124-128). 
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In May or June following the Eastertide of 386 Ambrose preached a series of 
sermons—including the De Isaac and the De bono mortis—in which, as in the De 
Iacob, preached previously, there is a heavy use of themes that hark back to the 
Enneads of the emperor Gallienus’ favorite thinker, Plotinus, who in the middle 
of the third century had developed in Rome, but in Greek, an original philosophy 
that rethought Plato’s doctrine and had made him the master of what is 
conveniently termed Neoplatonism. (p. 82; see Cary, 2003, p. 122; O’Connell, 
1969, pp. 64-65; Vaught, 2004, pp. 57, 146) 
 
In the meantime, Augustine as a young rhetorician also participated in “the 
Milanese circle” of the intellects—the “network of intellectual relationships”—in which 
some members were Christians, including Ambrose, and others were pagans (pp. 78-79, 
82-83).66  Within his engagement in this intellectual group, Augustine read some books 
of the Neoplatonists (pp. 83-84).  At this point, Lancel pays attention to the role of 
Neoplatonists in the process of Augustine’s intellectual transformation.  Particularly, he 
                                                
66 Lancel (2002) illustrates the members of the intellectual circle of Milan which had played a role 
in the process of Augustine’s understanding of the Neoplatonic themes/doctrines (e.g., “the sovereign good, 
the origin of evil, the ascent of the soul towards God to the point of ecstasy, the celestial fatherland, the 
liberation achieved by the death of the body, and the perpetual life of the Blessed”) as follows: “Parallel 
with that of Ambrose, the powerful influence of the ‘Milanese circle’ is undoubted.  In the front ranks of its 
members was Manlius Theodorus, to whom Augustine would soon dedicate his De beata vita.  Flavius 
Manlius Theodorus was the Christian counterpart of pagan dignitaries such as Symmachus and 
Nicomachus Flavianus—but unlike them and Ambrose, he was of modest origins—who were capable of 
leading an intellectual life worthy of the name at the same time as pursuing their career in high office in the 
imperial administration.  After being prefect of the praetorium for the Gauls, he was living at that time in 
philosophical retirement in his suburbanum near Milan; he had taken advantage of it to write a history of 
philosophy and various other treatises whose existence is known to us through the poet Claudian, who 
wrote a verse panegyric for him on the occasion of his consulship in 399; for Manlius Theodorus had had 
returned to office at Stilicho’s instigation at the end of the century.  We know from Augustine himself that 
Theodorus was a fervent disciple of Plotinus and, in the same text, Augustine credits him, like Ambrose, 
with edifying words on God and the nature of the soul from which he had benefited” (p. 82). 
Along this line, Henry Chadwick (1986) in Augustine depicts the link of Augustine’s intellectual 
transformation with the Milanese circle of the intellects as follows: “The Milan group of Platonists gripped 
their new professor of rhetoric with Victorinus’ translations of tracts by Plotinus and Porphyry.  The 
language Augustine found there about the problem of evil and about mystical experience of the immaterial 
transcendent realm had an immense impact.  The Neoplatonists were telling him that the soul has an 
immediate and inherent power of self-knowledge; moreover, that this power can be realized only as and 
when the perceptions of the five senses are set aside and the mind undergoes a purification, by dialectic, 
which purges it of physical images and elevates it to the beatific vision of which Plato spoke.  They 
believed this to be a natural power of the soul, realized as it gradually opens itself to divine light and truth” 
(p. 22; see Brown, 2000, pp. 485-486; O’Donnell, 1992, II, pp. 413-420; Vaught, 2004, p. 146). 
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emphasizes the influence of Plotinus on Augustine’s intellectual conversion in 386, 
acknowledging the influence of Porphyry on him (pp. 84-85; see O’Connell, 1969, pp. 
73-74).  Lancel asserts that through his reading of Plotinus’ books, Augustine had not 
received simply the intellectual information of Neoplatonism, but “had created in him the 
conditions for a reflective withdrawal into himself, experienced with great intensity” (p. 
84; see conf. 7.10.16).  For Lancel, in book seven (7.10.16-7.17.23) of the Confessions, 
Augustine described “not a single experience, but a series of ‘spiritual anabases’” which 
were related to the theme of the ascent of the soul towards God (“Plotinian ecstasies”) (p. 
85).  Here Augustine accounted for his spiritual apprehension of God and the soul in light 
of the knowledge of the self and the knowledge of the divine.  While emphasizing the 
impact of Neoplatonists on Augustine’s (religious) life and thought, Lancel describes 
Augustine’s continuous intellectual transformation in light of the conversion of the 
intellect: 
From the Neoplatonists Augustine had received not only encouragement to 
spiritual exercise; through them he had gained access to a philosophy which 
seemed able to answer many of the questions he had been asking himself for some 
dozen years; to be more exact, the reflective withdrawal into himself, the first 
condition of an ‘anagogic’ ascent towards the divine, after that fleeting grasp of 
the Being, had enabled him, thanks to that illumination, to achieve a view of the 
world that was to become the basis of his metaphysics.  Many of the articles of 
that philosophy, notably in its most strictly ontological aspects, would remain the 
fixed points in his thinking in the rest of his works, including his preaching as 
bishop. (p. 87) 
 
Importantly, Lancel insists that during his struggling toward an interior journey 
for the divine, Augustine overcame the Manichaean doctrine of evil which claims a real 
existence, independent of good.  This means that, influenced by the Neoplatonic 
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ontological theme of the hierarchical order of being,67Augustine effectively resolved his 
problem of evil; now he understood that evil has no “substance” or ultimate source of its 
own, but it is merely a privation of good.  Lancel writes, 
There is…between beings—the ‘things’—a hierarchy of well-defined ontological 
density starting from the Being and dependent on him.  God is Supreme Good, 
and what is corruptible and mutable, very low down on the ontological scale, is 
also good, since created by God.  As for evil, whose origin had obsessed 
Augustine for a long time, ‘it was not a substance, because if it were a substance, 
it would be good’.  The right question regarding evil was not, ‘Where does it 
come from?’ but, ‘What is it?’, as he would soon develop it in two of his early 
works.  In this Augustine was reacting like a good disciple of Plotinus, but also as 
a listener to Ambrose, who had probably drawn his attention to the definition of 
evil as the deprival of good in his preaching in the spring of 386. (p. 87)68 
 
As a result, Lancel asserts that the Neoplatonists had helped Augustine to 
establish a new way of understanding of the divine nature—the incorporeality and 
indivisibility of God—and to participate in the movement of the ascent of the soul to seek 
union with the divine.  In other words, Augustine’s reading of the Neoplatonic books had 
enabled him to “escape from the Manichaean errors” which were related to his 
conceiving of God as a material and divisible being as well as to his conceiving of evil as 
a substance (see pp. 87-88).  Lancel concludes that Neoplatonists (e.g., Plotinus) and 
                                                
 67 According to Lancel, Augustine confessed that “I beheld all things below you, and saw that it 
cannot be said absolutely that they exist or absolutely that they do not exist: they are, in truth, because they 
are from you, but they are not, because they are not what you are.  For what truly exists, is that which 
endures immutably” (p. 87, quoted in conf. 7.11.17).  In a related vein, Chadwick (1986) describes the 
Plotinian concept of the hierarchy as follows: “Plotinus taught that at the apex of the hierarchy are three 
divine existences: the One, Mind, and Soul.  The One is supremely Good, and therefore all lower levels of 
the hierarchy below the One must be also distinct from the Good; in short, less than perfectly good.  Even 
Mind has some inferiority about it, some delusions about its own grandeur.  Soul, still further down the 
scale, has the power to produce matter.  Matter, being at the opposite extremity of the hierarchy from the 
good One, is in cosmic terms utter evil, formless non-being” (p. 19; see Cary, 2003, p. 117). 
 
 68 In this way, Harrison (2006) writes, “[Augustine’s] question of evil was resolved: it is nothing 
other than non-existence” (p. 32; see pp. 29-31; see Bonner, 1990, p. 165; Kevane, 1986, pp. 64-66). 
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Christian Neoplatonists (e.g., Ambrose) had played a preeminent role in Augustine’s 
intellectual conversion. 
 
B. Augustine’s Conversion and the Christian Monastic Movement 
Scholars have articulated the influence of the Christian monastic movement on 
the process of Augustine’s conversion.  For example, Carol Harrison (2000) in 
Augustine: Christian Truth and Fractured Humanity examines the relation between 
Augustine’s conversion to Christianity and his ascetic and celibate life in the context of 
the Christian monastic movement.  Harrison depicts the link of the Christian monastic 
movement with the social and cultural milieu of the fourth century in the West: 
Throughout the Christian Empire, and especially when persecution came to an 
end with the conversion of the Emperor Constantine, asceticism was linked with, 
and often expressed in terms of, or held to replace, martyrdom—the martyrs had 
been the Christian elite, those who had denied the world and battled with the 
forces of evil.  Celibacy, asceticism, and the common life were later viewed 
within the same frame and motivated by the same ideals. (p. 185) 
 
While portraying Augustine’s conversion and his life history in light of the 
transition from paganism to Christianity, Harrison writes, 
For Augustine lived at a time of transition—from a classical pagan past to a new 
Christian empire—initiated by the conversion of the Emperor Constantine to 
Christianity in AD 312.  Of course, paganism and the thought world and social 
structures that went with it were not [suddenly] obliterated, rather there was a 
slow, unsteady, faltering and rather ambiguous process of confrontation, 
accommodation, rejection and coercion before an indentifiably ‘Christian’ culture 
and society founded upon a conviction that Christianity was the true philosophy 
and true religion, emerged. (p. xii) 
 
In the emphasis on the social and cultural change of the fourth century, Harrison 
pays attention to the impact of the ascetic life of the Egyptian Antony (who was the 
architect of desert monasticism) on Augustine’s life of change (pp. 178-179).  By the 
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time (especially the summer of 386) that Augustine was struggling with his search for the 
divine, Ponticianus talked about the story of Antony, the most well-known and influential 
Eastern ascetic.69  (Meanwhile, he also mentioned the Christian monastery on the 
outskirts of Milan which was under the care of Bishop Ambrose.)  Ponticianus told of the 
monastic life of his two friends who were former imperial officials.  At Trier, after their 
reading the book on the life of the monk Antony, Ponticianus’ friends “were converted on 
the spot, deciding to ‘serve God’—in other words, become monks, too” (p. 179).  (When 
their fiancées later heard of this, they also dedicated their virginity to God.)  As such, 
Harrison asserts that both the ascetic life of Antony and the celibate life of Ponticianus’ 
friends had challenged Augustine to become a Christian as well as to imitate their lives.  
More specifically, she writes, 
Augustine took Ponticianus’ words to heart; they gave him an appalling vision of 
his own vileness from which he could not escape except by heeding them and 
suffering their judgement upon his own situation.  The subsequent passages 
recount Augustine’s attempt to embrace the celibate, ascetic life, and are followed 
by the famous conversion scene. (p. 179) 
 
According to Harrison, after his conversion to Christianity in 386, Augustine did 
not choose to pursue the “ideal of marriage,” but did enter into the communal life of 
celibacy which would be later related to the (re)formation of Christian monasticism in the 
West (p. 177).  Prior to his baptism, Augustine came to Cassiciacum with his friends; this 
Christian philosophical community at Cassiciacum was “social, organizational, [and] 
                                                
69 In Desert Christians: An Introduction to the Literature of Early Monasticism, William Harmless 
(2004) regards Christian Egypt as “the birthplace of monasticism” (p. 17).  According to Harmless, Antony 
(c. 254-356) has been routinely described as “the first monk” and the “father of monasticism.”  He was 
certainly a pioneer who won worldwide acclaim because of Athanasius’ influential biography, the Life of 
Antony (published c. 357).  Athanasius portrays Antony as an “anchorite,” that is, a hermit.  There is a set 
of seven letters ascribed to Antony, and virtually every early text passes on sayings of his or stories about 
him (p. 18; see Bouyer, 1963, pp. 308-317). 
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ascetic,” although it was not explicitly regarded as a Christian monastery (pp. 178-179).  
Harrison insists that after his baptism in 387, Augustine had planned to return to Thagaste, 
his hometown in North Africa, with his mother and friends to carry out their “holy 
enterprise” (placitum sanctum) (conf. 9.9.2), that is, to establish a Christian community 
there.  However, because of Monica’s death at the seaport of Ostia as well as a blockade 
of the Mediterranean, Augustine and his followers instead came to Rome for a year (p. 
179).  
Harrison claims that in Rome, Augustine learned much more about Christian 
monasticism.  The Christian monastic movement of Rome had impacted Augustine to 
better understand the formal structure of the Christian monastery.  Harrison notes, 
Augustine spent this year in Rome, which…was very much at the centre of strong 
ascetic movements and debates in the 380s and 390s.  Athanasius had spent seven 
years in Rome, from 339, during his second exile.  Peter, his successor and 
brother, had also stayed in Rome after Athanasius’ death, from 373 to 378.  
Jerome had been in Rome from 382 to 385.  Evagrius of Antioch had translated 
the Life of Antony into Latin c. 370.  Through these channels…Eastern 
monasticism influenced the emerging monastic movements of the West. (pp. 179-
180; see Lawless, 1987, pp. 41-42)70 
 
                                                
70 Harmless (2004) illustrates some figures who were deeply involved in the development of 
Christian monasticism (that is, who had introduced the desert spirituality of Egypt to the Lain West) as 
follows: 1) Athanasius (c. 295-373) was bishop of Alexandria, off and on, from 328 to 373.  He was also a 
gifted theologian who helped formulate the classic defense of the divinity of Christ.  He authored the Life of 
Antony, which popularized desert monasticism throughout the Empire (p. 19); 2) Evagrius Ponticus (c. 345-
399) grew up in Pontus, near the Black Sea, and eventually settled in Kellia in Lower Egypt.  He was a 
pioneer of monastic theology and is now best known for two works, the Praktikos and the Chapters on 
Prayer (p. 19); 3) John Cassian (d. after 435), who was a disciple of Evagrius Ponticus, helped translate 
desert spirituality for the Latin West.  After leaving Egypt, he settled in southern France.  He composed two 
major works in Latin, the Institutes and the Conferences which had later affected the formation of Christian 
monasticism in the West, including Saint Benedict’s Rule (p. 19); 4) Jerome (c. 347-c. 420), who was a 
native of Dalmatia, is best known for his biblical scholarship because of his translation of the Bible into 
Latin, the so-called Vulgate.  After leaving Rome in 385, he established a monastery in Bethlehem, at 
which point he exerted great influence on Western asceticism via his letters, his biographies of monks 
(especially his Life of Paul), and his translation of the Rules of Pachomius (p. 20). 
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During his stay in Rome, Augustine had visited a number of monasteries, at 
which point he was deeply impressed with the practices of Eastern asceticism which 
included “manual labour (which he regards as an Eastern tradition), the common life and 
sharing of possessions, chastity, the rule of the ‘father’ who cares for his ‘sons’” (p. 180).  
Augustine was gradually aware of the forms of Christian communal life which would 
inform the Christian community at Thagaste and which would be later included in his 
Rule for Christian monasticism at Hippo (p. 180). 
According to Harrison, after learning about the Christian monastery in Rome 
(especially about the traditional Eastern asceticism), Augustine returned to Thagaste in 
388.  This implied that he began to enter into the celibate and ascetic life in North Africa.  
By using his family house and land, here Augustine established a Christian 
(philosophical) community with his friends which was called a lay monastery of serui dei 
(“servants of God”) (pp. 180-181).  For Harrison, there were various monastic forms in 
the West of the fourth century which ranged “from house asceticism and house 
communities, to anchorites, wandering monks, and coenobitic monasteries, together with 
the thin line between ascetic and monk” (p. 181).  Harrison remarks that Augustine (and 
his followers) at Thagaste did not simply participate in “philosophical retreat,” but 
engaged in Christian living of celibacy and asceticism.  In this community of Thagaste, 
Augustine was primarily concerned with Christian themes of Scripture, faith, incarnation, 
and the church, although he had participated in philosophical discussions with his friends 
(p. 181). 
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According to Harrison, in 391, Augustine moved his monastery from Thagaste to 
Hippo because he was unpredictably ordained as a priest of the cathedral of Hippo.  He 
reformulated his monastery with his friends in the garden of basilica at Hippo; namely, he 
continued his monastic life in the community with the permission of Bishop Valerius (p. 
181; see ep. 31, 33.2; s. 355.2).  This implies that as a monk (and as a priest), Augustine 
began life in community at Hippo and adopted the way of monastic life in which he was 
to remain until his death.  In doing so, in order to organize and manage the lay and 
clerical monasteries at Hippo, Augustine had established specific rules, which were 
primarily influenced by the spirit and actions of the apostolic community at Jerusalem as 
described in Acts 4:32-35.  Harrison contends that for Augustine, the first goal of the 
monastic life is “to live together in unity, and to have ‘one heart and soul’ directed 
towards God” (p. 182; see reg. 1.2).  In that sense, the essential rule of this monastic 
community was that “all things must be held in common, and there was given to 
everyone as he had need” (p. 182, see Possidius, v. Aug. 5).  Following early African 
theologians’ emphasis on the Christian life in community,71 the Rule of the Christian 
community of Hippo focuses on oneness through charity in light of “many bodies but not 
many minds, many bodies but not many hearts” (p. 183; see en. Ps. 132.3-4; Clark, 2000, 
p. 88).  Harrison writes, 
The Augustinian Rule is characterized by its emphasis upon motivation for an 
action—why something is done, what is going on within—rather than on laying 
down regulations to be observed.  Augustine’s main aim is embodied in his 
                                                
71 According to Harrison, “African theologians, such as Tertullian and Cyprian, foreshadow 
Augustine’s emphasis on Acts 4: 32-35 and the oneness of charity expressed in the holding of goods in 
common in a life in community, when they speak of Christian perfection.  They, and numerous witnesses 
before them, provide evidence for the long-standing practice of chastity in the African Church, by women 
(uirgines) and men (spadones, continentes), and also clergy” (p. 185). 
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quotation of 1 Cor. 13: 5 in Chapter 5 of the Rule which says of love that ‘it is not 
self-seeking’.  It is love which puts the interests of the community before personal 
interests which is to be the goal of the individual monk: ‘The degree to which you 
are concerned for the interests of the community, rather than your own, is the 
criterion by which you can judge how much progress you have made’ (5.2). (p. 
183) 
 
Clearly, Harrison asserts that the relationships of members within the monastic 
community at Hippo were viewed as “selfless mutual service and regard” (p. 183).72  
Augustine regarded the ideal form of the Christian community or human society as “a 
perfectly ordered and perfectly harmonious fellowship in the enjoyment of God and 
mutual fellowship in God” (p. 158; see civ. Dei 19.13).  Within the context that 
emphasizes oneness, harmony, and love in the treatment of monastic life of the Rule, 
human sin was understood as “a failure of the love, fellowship, and friendship which lies 
at the heart of [the Christian community] and which defines it in relation to God” (p. 191). 
As a result, Harrison states that there is a close interrelatedness between 
Augustine’s conversion to Christianity, his life of celibacy, and Christian monasticism.  
This means that 1) the early Christian monastic movement (i.e., the acetic life of the 
Egyptian Antony and the celibate life and Ponticianus’ friends and their fiancées) helped 
Augustine to be converted to Christianity in 386 as well as to embrace a life of celibacy 
and asceticism; 2) during his celibate life in Rome, the traditional Eastern asceticism 
encouraged Augustine to learn more about the forms of Christian monasticism (e.g., the 
pattern of communal prayer, of manual labor, or of the authority structure); 3) 
                                                
72 Harrison notes, “The superior, or praepositus, is not, for Augustine, the same figure as the 
Eastern abba, placed above the community and concerned with spiritual direction, rather, he is, literally, 
one put forward from within the community, who does not stand above it, but remains part of it, to serve it 
in everyday administration.  He is superior because of the esteem in which he is held, but the least of all the 
brethren because of his responsibility to God ([reg.] 7.3)” (pp. 183-184). 
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Augustine’s transformation in the Milanese garden as well as his learning of the practices 
of Eastern asceticism in Rome enabled him to engage in a more developed Christian 
monastic movement as well as to establish a Christian philosophical community at 
Cassiciacum (386), the community of serui dei at Thagaste (388), and the lay and then 
clerical monastery at Hippo (391, 395/6) (pp. 177-193; see Van Bavel, 1986, p. 4).  
While paying attention to Augustine’s basic rule of “one heart and mind in loving 
fellowship and by sharing of goods” within the Christian monasticism, Harrison 
concludes, 
The positive attraction of the monastic life is…significant: community, friendship, 
intellectual companionship, order—all things which the early works and the 
Confessions make clear Augustine was seeking from the beginning.  The ascetic 
environment in North Africa, fostered by Tertullian, Cyprian, and Ambrose, the 
martyr ideal and the classical, contemplative, philosophical mould into which the 
Christian monastic ideal so easily fitted, together with Augustine’s own profound 
personal inclination towards the values of the monastic life. (p. 193) 
 
In line with Harrison, George Lawless (1987) in Augustine of Hippo and His 
Monastic Rule explores the correlation of Augustine’s conversion to Christianity with the 
Christian monastic movement.  Lawless views Augustine’s conversion as “a voluntary 
surrender of sexuality, property, and power” which will be later related to his monastic 
ideal of “chastity, poverty, and obedience” (ix).  For Lawless, Augustine’s garden 
experience in the summer of 386 challenged him to make a “decision to live as a celibate 
servant of God” (p. xi).   Like Harrison, Lawless emphasizes the influence of the ascetic 
lives of Antony and the monks of the Egyptian desert on Augustine’s transformation.  For 
Lawless, Ponticianus’ vivid account of the monastic living of Antony and his followers 
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had guided Augustine to stand humbly before God in the garden of Milan and to enter 
into the life of celibacy and asceticism (pp. 9-10, 13, 57; see E. A. Clark, 1999, p. 67). 
In consideration of the impact of the ascetic lives of Antony and his followers on 
Augustine’s conversion to Christianity, Lawless pays attention to the juxtaposition of 
Matthew 19: 21 (which moved Antony into his transformation and his monastic life in the 
desert) with Romans 13: 13-14 (which affected Augustine’s placing himself in Jesus 
Christ in the Milanese garden as well as his resolution to embrace the life of celibacy and 
asceticism) (pp. ix, 15, 25-26).  More specifically, Lawless writes, 
While Paul enjoins a triple injunction, Jesus’ invitation to the ‘rich young man’ 
evokes a single renunciation as regards riches, property, and possessions.  
Juxtaposition of Matt. 19: 21 with Rom. 13: 13-14 in the Confessions (8. 12. 29) 
is a deliberate stroke of Augustine’s artistry.  In and of itself, of course, ascetic 
renunciation is valueless. ‘Come, follow me’ in Matt. 19: 21 echoes the words 
with which Jesus called his disciples.  ‘Put on the Lord Jesus Christ’ of Rom. 13: 
14 likewise insists upon this positive aspect of asceticism. (p. 25)73 
 
Lawless asserts that at this particular time of Augustine’s decision to imitate the 
example of Antony, that is, to follow Jesus Christ and give up his worldly career (i.e., his 
professorship of rhetoric), the new convert Augustine began to enter into the life of 
asceticism, which would later be related to his celibate and communal life with his 
friends at Cassiciacum and then in Rome as well as his lay or clerical monastic life at 
Thagaste and then at Hippo.  According to Lawless, Augustine retreated with his friends 
to Cassiciacum during the idyllic interlude between Augustine’s conversion in the 
Milanese garden and his baptism by Ambrose at the Easter Vigil in 387 (pp. 29-37).  This 
                                                
73 In consideration of Augustine’s ascetic impulse and his monastic inclination in the context of 
his converting to Christianity, Lawless (1987) states, “Leaving aside discussion of a ‘liberal’ and an 
‘ascetic’ exegesis of Matt. 19: 21, there is no doubt that Antony of Egypt and Augustine both interpreted 
this biblical text in the latter sense.  And more to our present purpose: this ascetic impulse embraced both 
the selling of property and the renunciation of marriage” (p. 26). 
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retreat at Cassiciacum had offered an opportunity to Augustine to experience the life of 
community as well as the life of contemplation: “Work (both physical and intellectual), 
contemplation (both philosophical and Christian), prayer and serious dialogue on a 
variety of themes—these were the happy notes which sounded in this lovely place of 
retreat” (pp. 36-37).  During these tranquil days at Cassiciacum, a monastic inclination 
lay dormant in Augustine’s soul: “This monastic impulse in the young Augustine 
manifested itself in his indefatigable desire for God and the intensely personal character 
of his experiences to such a pitch that his proselytizing temperament attracted others to 
share their lives with him” (p. 34). 
According to Lawless, after his baptism, Augustine and his followers arrived in 
Rome by way of Ostia (pp. 38-39).  As Harrison points out, Lawless insists that during 
this time in Rome, Augustine had learned the hallmarks of the Christian monastic life 
which included “shared possessions, chastity, and holiness” (p. 40).  In doing so, he was 
impressed with the organizational skills and practices of eastern monasticism (especially 
the Pachomian tradition) which included the pattern of prayer, reading of the Scriptures, 
manual labor, fasting, or clothing (p. 40).74 
                                                
74 According to Harmless, Pachomius (c. 292-346)—the Egyptian monk—has been viewed as the 
“founder of cenobitic monasticism”—that is, of monks living in organized communities.  He was an early 
and gifted organizer who established a remarkable confederation of monasteries in Upper Egypt and 
composed the first known monastic rule.  Pachomius’ life was celebrated in a sense of a series of 
biographies, composed in the 390s and preserved in Greek and Coptic.  Now we have various rules, letters, 
and addresses attributed to Pachomius and to his successors, Theodore and Horsiesius (2004, p. 18; see 
Schaff, 1950, pp. 195-198).  In a related vein, George Lawless (1999) in “Rules, monastic” depicts the Rule 
of Pachomius as follows: “Translated from Greek into Latin by Jerome at Bethlehem in 404 (the original 
language was Coptic), the Rule of Pachomius (d. 345) reflects the state of monastic legislation at the end of 
the fourth century.  This ensemble of Pachominan texts has four divisions: Praecepta, Instituta, Judicia, 
and Leges.  The text reveals the transition from an oral to a written culture and a steady evolution with 
continuing adjustment to particular needs.  It does so by taking its inspiration from Scripture, from spoken 
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 In emphasizing Augustine’s admiration of eastern monasticism, Lawless contends 
that the heritage of Neoplatonism had affected Augustine’s understanding of the practices 
of eastern monks (e.g., “their contemplation of God’s beauty”) in Rome as well as his 
establishment of the Christian monasteries at Thagaste and then at Hippo (pp. 11, 35-
39).75  While paying attention to the link of the Plotinian theme of the ascent of the soul 
toward the divine—“the flight of the alone to the Alone” (enn. 6.9.11)—with Augustine’s 
meditation and his monastic life in light of the human desire to know God and the soul 
(see reg. 8.1; sol. 1.2.7, 1.13.22), Lawless states, 
The soul’s activities are depicted in Plotinian terms as a seven-stage process: 
animation, sensation, art, virtue, tranquility, ingress, and contemplation.  On 
Augustine’s own admission, this sevenfold schema is arbitrary and breaks down 
further into a tripartite ascent: body—soul—God, stressing sequentially the 
significance of the soul to the body, to itself, and to God.  Seven similar levels of 
ascent resemble a ladder of beauty and lend still another perspective on the soul’s 
movement towards God.  The importance of this model is equally germane to 
Augustine’s aesthetic and ascetical theory.  In the concluding chapter of his 
monastic Rule Augustine will, in fact, urge the servants of God who live in the 
monastery ‘to observe these precepts with love as lovers of spiritual beauty’ [reg. 
8.1].  Here at Rome, he describes eastern monks as ‘completely happy in their 
contemplation of (God’s) beauty’.  This anti-Manichaean treatise thus adumbrates 
a salient feature of the Rule written at Hippo some ten years later. (p. 39)76 
                                                                                                                                            
exhortations of the abbas or Pater, and from a tendency to codify individuals and communal experience in 
conjunction with some general guidelines for cenobitic life” (p. 739). 
 
75 Lawless (1987) insists that for Augustine, there was a certain congruity of vocation between the 
Neoplatonic philosopher and the Christian ascetic.  Augustine employed Plotinus’ theme of oneness with 
the One (i.e., “Plotinian attraction towards the one over against dissipation towards the many”) in order to 
make a better ascetic practice and to establish an advanced monastic Rule: “Augustine’s approach to 
monasticism can be viewed in some respects as filling out Plotinus’ doctrine of ‘the flight of the alone to 
the Alone’, rather than contradicting it” (p. 36). 
 
76 Lawless writes, “At the heart of [Augustine’s monastic] Rule as well as within the heart of 
Plotinian metaphysics one hears undertones, resonating at a still deeper level, between the one and the 
many, unity and multiplicity…With the full force of his Trinitarian theology Augustine gradually enriches 
and enlarges Plotinus’ concepts of unity and multiplicity.  Only in the company of others could he long for, 
desire, search, find, and love the beauty which he established as the goal for all adherents of his monastic 
Rule” (pp. 156-157).  Along the same line, Vernon J. Bourke (1973) states, “In good part, Augustine’s 
growing desire to establish religious communities originated in the Platonic dream of a group of like-
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For Lawless, after learning Christian monasticism in Rome, Augustine returned to 
Thagaste in North Africa in 388.  Agreeing with Peter Brown’s view on Augustine’s life 
at Thagaste,77 Lawless insists that the goal of the Thagaste group was not to participate in 
simply a philosophical retreat, but to achieve better Christian living in the lay community 
(pp. 45-54).  In 391, Augustine left Thagaste for Hippo for an interview with an aspirant 
to monastic life and in search of another place to found a monastery (p. 54).  Here 
Augustine was unexpectedly ordained to the presbyterate of Hippo.  Augustine as a 
monk-priest established a lay monastery in a garden within the Church property at Hippo 
(pp. 58-59).  Moreover, after ordination to episcopate, the monk-bishop Augustine also 
founded the clerical monastery at the “bishop’s house” (as well as monasteries for 
women at Hippo).  This means that, surprisingly, Augustine had attempted to 
“monasticize” the cleric—the clericalization of the monk—“the monk exemplifies the 
ideals of Acts 4: 32, at the same time deepening his solidarity with Christ and his Church 
on their way to the Father” (p. 158; see p. 62).78  In this process of the clericalization of 
                                                                                                                                            
minded scholars living together and sharing in those dialogues of the spirit that were to lead to a very high 
level of religious thinking” (p. 211).  Likewise, William Collinge (1985) asserts, there was “the continuity 
between Augustine’s monastic ideal and his earlier Platonic ideal of philosophical of friendship” (p. 60). 
 
77 Brown (2000) depicts Augustine’s life at Thagaste as follows: “At this time, Augustine was a 
contemplative” (p. 128); “Thagaste could never be another Cassiciacum.  Even during his stay in Rome, 
Augustine’s writings show a new determination.  From that time onwards, he intended to live a secluded 
life no longer, as in Milan, on the fringe of a society of intellectual laymen, but directly in the shadow of 
the organized life of the Catholic Church” (p. 125; see pp. 126-129). 
 
78 According to Lawless, after Augustine was ordained bishop of Hippo, he was needed to change 
his life-style due to the demands of episcopal hospitality.  Lawless writes, “The ‘bishop’s house’ will 
require a more open ambience than the lay monastery at Hippo could provide.  House guests, travel, 
liturgical expectations of the laity, the ministry of preaching, allied pastoral duties, arbitration of civil and 
ecclesiastical cases in the lawcourt, all these would surely be inimical to the daily life of a monk.  Yet 
Augustine in old age will describe the ‘bishop’s house’ as a ‘monastery of clerics’.  In this second 
monastery at Hippo life will be different; for one thing, there will be conversation at meals.  Augustine’s 
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the monk, about ten bishops of the African church came form Augustine’s monastic 
community at Hippo, including Bishop Alypius and Bishop Possidius.79  In doing so, 
Augustine had employed his monastic Rule in order to take care of his monasteries 
effectively.  His monastic Rule was primarily influenced by the apostolic Jerusalem 
community in which all members had attempted to become “one heart and one soul” in 
God (p. 59).  In that sense, Lawless writes, “With respect to common life, Matt. 19: 21 
will eventually be upstaged by Augustine’s decided preference for Acts 4: 32-5, which 
had idealized the early Christian community in Jerusalem” (p. 15; see 1999, p. 739; 
Collinge, 1985, p. 56). 
Importantly, Lawless remarks that as a monk and a bishop, Augustine had kept a 
balance between the life of contemplation and the life of church ministry (“the nexus 
between the individual and the common good”) (p. 156).  This implies that for Augustine, 
there was an inherent correlation between the service of God and the service of God’s 
people in light of the interaction between his monastery and his church (pp. 59-60).  
Indeed, Augustine had participated in his monastic life which was associated with the 
fulfillment of his pastoral ministry in the church community.  Lawless writes, 
As a monk-priest [and a monk-bishop], Augustine inveterately combined 
intellectual activity with pastoral ministry.  Common life at Hippo resonated with 
many religious and philosophical ideals from the world of late 
antiquity…[Augustine’s] life together remained fundamentally fraternal and was 
                                                                                                                                            
monasticism reaches another turning-point: the clericalization of the monk.  From the time he is obliged to 
relocate in the ‘bishop’s house’, two monasteries will exist side by side, one for laymen, the other for 
clerics.  The bishop, moreover, will soon establish at Hippo the first monastery for women in North Africa.  
There will be two others for men, directed by the priests Leporius and Eleusinus respectively” (p. 62). 
 
79 Lawless notes, “Alypius…will become bishop of Thagaste.  Possidius is destined to become 
bishop of Calama, as Profuturus will become bishop of Cirta…‘About ten men’ later become bishops in the 
north African Church and these, in turn, ‘established monasteries’” (p. 60; see Zumkeller, 1986, p. 84). 
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inspired by the example of the apostles in the primitive Jerusalem community.  Its 
[cultural and] social dimension was triggered as much by the requirements of 
Augustine’s temperament as by the pastoral solicitude which was demanded by 
ministry in a servant-Church. (pp. 61-62) 
 
As a result, Lawless asserts that Augustine’s conversion experience and his 
celibate and ascetic life were profoundly influenced by the early Christian monastic 
movements (i.e., the acetic life of the Egyptian Antony in the desert, the celibate life of 
Ponticianus’ friends at Trier, and the traditional eastern asceticism in Rome, and the early 
Christian communal life at Jerusalem).  While emphasizing the interaction of conversion 
to Christianity, the life of celibacy, and Christian monasticism, Lawless concludes that 
these early Christian monastic movements had played a pivotal role in Augustine’s 
conversion to Christianity as well as in his foundations of the lay Christian community at 
Thagaste and the lay and clerical monasteries at Hippo. 
Along the same line, Adolar Zumkeller (1986) in Augustine’s Ideal of the 
Religious Life elucidates how Christian monastic movements affected Augustine’s 
transformation in the Milanese garden as well as his Christian living through the service 
of God and the service of God’s people.  Zumkeller views Augustine’s conversion as a 
life change which engages in the renunciation of worldly ambition and the life of celibacy 
and asceticism: “From the time of his conversion his only desire was to live as a ‘servant 
of God,’ i.e., a monk.  As bishop, too, Augustine lived and died as ‘a poor man of 
Christ’” (p. ix; see Van Bavel, 1986, p. 3).  Zumkeller contends that for Augustine, to be 
converted to Christianity meant to become a Christian, that is, to become a servant of 
God (“a monk”) through the monastic way of life: 
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To Augustine monastic profession (professio) meant a change in the conduct of 
one’s life.  It presupposed a sort of conversion (conversio)—not that fundamental 
conversion through repentance and the reversal of the will which a man achieves 
when he turns away from serving false gods to serving “the true God.”  In this 
case, Augustine was much more concerned with a new and special meaning of the 
word.  Its content is a decision to live a celibate life, the renunciation of “hope in 
this world,” and a promising of oneself “in a freely chosen servitude to God’’ in a 
monastic life of poverty and asceticism. (p. 210) 
 
Like Harrison and Lawless, Zumkeller emphasizes the role of early Christian 
monastic movements in the process of Augustine’s life change.  For example, 
Ponticianus’ anecdote about the ascetic life of the hermit Antony had profoundly moved 
Augustine’s transformation in the Milanese garden (pp. 5-7).  For Zumkeller, Augustine’s 
encounter with the anchoritic monasticism of Antony enabled Augustine to enter into the 
celibate and acetic life in community at Cassiciacum and then in Rome. 
Zumkeller insists that at Cassiciacum, Augustine and his friends were involved in 
Christian life in the community as well as in religious and philosophical discussions.  
Although the Cassiciacum community was not an explicitly monastic community, here 
Augustine had more determined to engage in the life of celibacy and asceticism and to 
participate in the Christian monastic movement of “serving God” (pp. 7-13).80  In 387, 
Augustine had unexpectedly spent nine months with his friends in Rome.  Now 
Augustine had the opportunity not only to study the basic theory of Christian monastic 
asceticism, but also to observe its practical application (e.g., the pattern of prayer, the 
                                                
80 Zumkeller depicts the Cassiciacum community as follows: “Certainly, the circle of friends at 
Cassiciacum was not yet a monastic community, but the groundwork had been laid for the new way of life 
which was to be established at Tagaste and Hippo.  The echo of Pontitianus’ account, the philosophic-
religious meditations and dialogues, even the daily association with friends who thought as he did, and the 
example of his mother’s deep faith may have helped to make Cassiciacum for Augustine into more than a 
place of ascetic resolution in the spirit of ancient philosophy—into a vital Christian community in which 
his intention of ‘serving God’ (servire Deo) could go on ripening” (p. 13). 
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reading of Scripture, manual labor, and pious conversation) (pp. 13-16).81  In 
consideration of Augustine’s encounter with Christian monasticism in Rome, Zumkeller 
pays attention to the impact of Pachomius (who was viewed as a founder of cenobitic 
monasticism) and Jerome (who was called the hermit of Bethlehem) on the learning 
process of Augustine of the eastern monastic ideal and the way of life.82  He notes, 
St. Anthony of Egypt (d. 356) ranks as the true Father of Christian monasticism.  
In the second half of the third century he withdrew into the Libyan desert as a 
hermit, as many before him had also done.  A larger settlement of hermits grew 
up around him, and he emerged as their spiritual leader.  Monasticism entered a 
new phase when St. Pachomius, beginning about A.D. 320, united many hermit-
monks in a single large monastery at Tabennisi in the Theban desert.  Soon other 
foundations were made, so that at the time of Pachomius’ death, in 347, this 
association of monasteries, which he himself had governed, comprised nine 
houses of men and two of women.  The monks were said to number several 
thousand.  Pachomius’ Rule, the complete text of which is preserved only in a 
                                                
81 According to Elizabeth A. Clark (1999), after his conversion to Christianity, Augustine learned 
more about Christian ascetic and monastic practices, at which point he rejected the view on the asceticism 
of the Manicheans.  Clark remarks that, for Augustine, the Manicheans’ motivation of asceticism was not 
appropriate because it was decided more by a rejection of material creation than by the love of God; as such, 
the Manichees mocked “the stories of creation and production in Genesis 1-2, claiming that the highest 
principle, Light, or the Good, could never have enjoined such practices” (p. 69).  More precisely, Clark 
writes, “Augustine developed and refined his views on ascetic themes in the midst of religious 
controversies.  Most of the ascetic themes he addresses refer to issues of sexuality and reproduction, 
although he is also concerned with fasting practices and other kinds of abstinence…In his early treatise De 
moribus, Augustine faults the Manichean ethic of abstinence in many respects: Manicheans abstain from 
various foods because they believe them ‘polluted’ (mor. 2.16.51); they engage in excessive eating even 
though their diet is limited to vegetables (2.16.51-52); they seek to gratify their sexual desires without 
producing children, and thus indulge in evil contraceptive practices (2.18.65)” (p. 69). 
 
82 Zumkeller elucidates the influence of Jerome on the formation of Augustine’s monastic ideal as 
follows: “It was in Rome as well, a few years earlier (382-385), that St. Jerome had decided on the 
monastic way of life.  In the midst of a pleasure-seeking world, a strongly ascetic movement was 
developing, as the spirit of Christian asceticism was asserting itself in the city, especially among its women, 
and penetrating the ranks of the nobility.  Considerable numbers were entering monastic houses.  We do not 
know if Augustine at this time sought personal acquaintance with the hermit of Bethlehem—that would, in 
any case, happen a few years later—but it is certain at least that Jerome’s ascetic ideals, and those of the 
Roman monasteries under his influence, were not without effect on Augustine.  It must have been chiefly 
from Jerome’s writings that Augustine learned more about Eastern monasticism at this time” (p. 15; see 
Schaff, 1950, pp. 205-214). 
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Latin translation by St. Jerome, influenced many later monastic rules. (p. 1; see pp. 
429-430)83 
 
For Zumkeller, after studying the cenobites’ lives in Rome, Augustine returned to 
North Africa.  Influenced by the early Christian monastic movements, including the 
acetic (“anchoritic”) life of Antony and the communal (“cenobitic”) life of Pachomius, 
Augustine established a lay Christian community at Thagaste (pp. 24-32).  Further, as a 
monk and a priest, at the garden of the cathedral of Hippo, he founded the lay monastery 
within Valerius’ agreement of monastery (pp. 32-40); as a monk and a bishop, he also 
founded the “clerics’ monastery” (monasterium clericorum) at the “house of the bishop” 
(domus episcopi) as well as monasteries for women (pp. 40-51).  According to Zumkeller, 
Augustine’s Rule had been employed by the members of the lay and clerical monasteries 
in order to foster Christian living in community.84  However, there was an essential 
                                                
83 In a related vein, Harmless (2004) contends that the term “monk” (monachos) literally means 
“one who lives alone” (p. 115; see Knowles, 1977, p. 9).  In that sense, the word “monastery” 
(monasterium) refers to “where those who live alone live together” (p. 115).  Strictly speaking, this word 
monastery contains a separated but mutually informing dimension in light of a “contradiction” and 
symbiosis of the life of aloneness and the life of togetherness.  Acknowledging that the historical record of 
the early Christian monastery is more complex and more ambiguous, Harmless raises important questions: 
“How did monasteries arise?  How did monks—those who choose to live alone—choose to live together?” 
(p. 115).  While paying attention to Pachomius the Egyptian monk, Harmless differentiates Pachomius with 
Antony.  Whereas Harmless views Antony as “the ‘founder’ of anchoritic monasticism,” he understands 
Pachomius as “the founder of cenobitic monasticism (from coenobium, ‘community’)” (p. 115).  Antony as 
a hermit tended to emphasize more Christian life in solitude, at which point he has been portrayed as a 
“perfect model of the anchoritic life.”  On the other hand, Pachomius tended to focus more Christian life in 
community, at which point he has been depicted as the model of the communal (“cenobitic”) life (which 
was called “the Pachomian Koinonia”).  Harmless writes, “Pachomius may not have invented the 
monastery as such, but he was certainly a pioneer.  He was also an organizational genius.  By the time of 
his death, he headed a confederation of nine monasteries for men and two for women.  These housed 
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of monks.  His achievement earned him an international reputation, and the 
rules he composed provided a model for later monastic legislators, notably Basil of Caesarea in the Greek 
East, [Augustine of Hippo], and Benedict of Nursia in the Latin West” (p. 115; see pp. 116-147). 
 
84 For Zumkeller, Augustine’s Rule gives us detailed information about the mode of life which 
Augustine and his monks followed in the garden monastery of Hippo.  Zumkeller writes, “The order of the 
day for the community was governed by strict rules.  Time was divided into hours of prayer, Scripture 
reading, and physical labor.  They came together in the oratory and the dining room.  They all went 
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difference between lay monks and clerics, that is, the “pastoral activity” of the cleric 
replaced the traditional “manual labor” of the lay monk.  As such, the clerics’ monastery 
(“the bishop’s monastery”) had combined the contemplative and active life (pp. 41-42). 
Like Lawless, Zumkeller claims that Augustine’s monastic life was deeply 
relevant to “the service of Christ and of His members” (p. 35).  Augustine had evenly 
devoted himself to his contemplation of God and his action for others.  Zumkeller states, 
Augustine shifted the notion of community to the center of monastic life.  The 
chief thought behind his ideal of life was to form a community of Christian love 
and in that community to do everything possible to represent in its perfection the 
Christian ethic of living.  This, above all, is the uniqueness of his monasticism. (p. 
430; see pp. 35-37, 41-42, 260-261) 
 
Zumkeller characterizes Augustine’s concept of the monastic ideal and life as 
“Christian love” (caritas) in which all members of the community had attempted to 
engage in “the service of love” of God and neighbor (pp. 260-261, 431): “Charity (love), 
the very heart of Christianity, is the center of Augustine’s thought, especially of his 
monastic ideal” (p. ix).85  In emphasizing the loving service of God and God’s people 
within Augustine’s monasteries at Hippo, Zumkeller writes, “Not continence or severe 
penances, not poverty or obedience, but love is the soul of the common life, the law of 
                                                                                                                                            
outdoors together; they were together when they went into church, and, when reasons of health required it, 
to the public baths.  And all their work was done for the benefit of the community.  No one was to make 
anything for himself.  The care of the sick was entrusted to one of the monks, the administration of the 
kitchen to another, and still others looked after books, clothing, and shoes” (p. 38; see pp. 36, 172-199). 
 
85 In that sense, Bourke (1973) states, “The monasteries sponsored by Augustine cherished poverty 
for their residents, including Bishop Augustine, and offered hospitality to visitors and strangers, 
irrespective of their economic status…His monasticism was no negative withdrawal from human interests 
and obligations…Augustine’s attempts at withdrawal were more efforts to avoid the wealthy than to evade 
his duties to the poor.  Possidius wrote that it was a much greater privilege to live and converse with 
Augustine in his monastery at Hippo than to read all his great theological works.  The monastery, for 
Augustine, provided a positive and enriched form of human living” (p. 211; see Collinge, 1985, pp. 55-60; 
E. A. Clark, 1999, pp. 68-69). 
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monastic perfection; love ought to form a monk’s whole life.  For [Augustine], love is the 
one fruit that life in his monasteries ought to bring to ripeness, his monks’ dearest 
treasure, which they should cherish more than all the wealth of the world” (p. 260). 
Consequently, Zumkeller asserts that Augustine’s transformation in the Milanese 
garden was inherently related to the early Christian monastic movements.  This means 
that the early Christian monastic movements (including the anchoritic life of Antony and 
the cenobitic life of Pachomius) played a preeminent role in Augustine’s conversion to 
Christianity, his resolution to enter into the life of celibacy and asceticism, his dedication 
to God as a servant of God, his establishments of the Christian and philosophical 
community at Cassiciacum, his formation of the monastic ideal of religious life, his 
foundations of the lay Christian community at Thagaste as well as the lay, clerical, and 
women monasteries at Hippo, and his loving service of God and God’s people within the 
monastery and the church of Hippo. 
In sum, from the perspective of anthropology of religion, Augustine’s conversion 
has been regarded as a result of the influence of the Neoplatonic heritage (of Late 
Antiquity) on his thought, and a change through the Christian monastic movement in the 
context of the late fourth and early fifth centuries.  On the whole, anthropological studies 
have explored Augustine’s conversion process in specific cultural settings of his time.  
Thus, they have paid attention to the contextual matrix of Augustine’s conversion that 
had occurred through long-term relationships with other persons or Christian 
communities. 
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 Importantly, the anthropological studies of Augustine’s conversion have 
contributed by elucidating the impact of cultural and philosophical forces on the complex 
process of his transformation.  This means that in the consideration of the process of 
acculturation or cultural revitalization of Augustine, they have effectively elaborated the 
interplay of two levels of Augustine’s conversion—personal and communal.  As such, 
when we attempt to reinterpret Augustine’s conversion in chapter five, these 
anthropological studies guide us to recognize how the young Augustine had gradually 
undergone cultural and philosophical changes which resulted in the reconstruction of his 
religious identity, worldview, and belief in specific cultural values of the late fourth 
century.  In doing so, they lead us to realize how Christian Neoplatonism helped the 
former Manichee Augustine 1) to reformulate his view on the divine nature from the 
material and divisible being to the immaterial and indivisible being, 2) to engage in his 
intellectual and spiritual journey toward union with the Truth (in light of knowing the 
divine and the soul), and 3) to acknowledge the Christian concept of the Incarnate Christ 
(who is a mediator between temporal creation and the eternal God and who is a perfect 
example of humility).  Furthermore, these anthropological studies encourage us to look at 
1) how the early Christian monastic movements (especially Antonian anchoritism and 
Pachomian cenobitism) had compelled Augustine to enter into the life of celibacy within 
the Christian philosophical community at Cassiciacum (386) and then at Rome (387), as 
well as 2) how these monastic movements had stirred Augustine to become a servant of 
God (“a monk”) and to establish a monastery/lay Christian community at Thagaste (388) 
in North Africa, and then the lay and clerical monasteries at Hippo Regius (391, 395/6).  
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However, these anthropological interpretations of Augustine’s conversion are inadequate 
to investigate how the young Augustine’s psychological crises were related to his 
personal and familial environments of his childhood because they have exclusively 
explored the influence of philosophical and cultural components on the process of his 
transformation.  As such, they are not sufficient to elucidate the role of the divine, the 
sacred, or God in the process of Augustine’s conversion in light of the correlation 
between divine intervention/grace and human transformation. 
 
IV. Theological Studies of Augustine’s Conversion: 
The Impact of Religious Factors 
 
Scholars in the field of Christian theology have examined the impact of religious 
factors on Augustine’s conversion experience.  In doing so, they have primarily paid 
attention to the dominant role of God in the process of Augustine’s transformation.  With 
respect to the complexity of the theological studies of Augustine’s conversion, this 
section of the literature pays attention to four main themes because they are valuable for 
appreciating the religious dimension of conversion experience and because they are 
crucial for accomplishing a more coherent and integrated picture of Augustine’s 
conversion process.  These main themes are 1) Augustine’s conversion and the 
transforming power of God’s grace, 2) Augustine’s conversion and the Christian 
Scriptures, 3) Augustine’s conversion and Christian baptism, and 4) Augustine’s 
conversion and the reciprocity of the love of God and neighbor.86 
                                                
 86 Corresponding with the previous theological understandings of conversion in chapter two, I 
attempt to organize the main theological themes pertaining to the studies of Augustine’s conversion.  In 
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A. Augustine’s Conversion and the Transforming Power of God’s Grace 
 Theologians have explored the interrelatedness between Augustine’s encounter 
with God and his spiritual change.  For example, David Burrell (1970) in “Reading the 
Confessions of Augustine” delves into the primacy and sufficiency of God’s grace in the 
process of Augustine’s transformation.  Acknowledging psychological explanations of 
Augustine’s personality and his life, Burrell emphasizes a theological reading of the 
Confessions, which involves an attempt to understand Augustine’s conversion and his 
life story.87  In this way, he regards Augustine’s Confessions as an exercise in theological 
understanding, and as a “hymn of thanksgiving and praise to the Creator who revealed 
himself in Jesus” (p. 350). 
Burrell demonstrates how Augustine could continue in his attitude of self-
reproach in the face of God’s affirming mercy toward him: “One feels that the grace of 
                                                                                                                                            
doing so, I am deeply moved by 1) both David Burrell’s idea of the interplay of Augustine’s encounter with 
God and his spiritual change (1970) and Carl G. Vaught’s emphasis on the role of divine intervention in 
Augustine’s transformation (2004) for establishing the theme of Augustine’s conversion and the 
transforming power of God’s grace; 2) both John M. Quinn’s consideration of the impact of the word of 
God on Augustine’s transformation (2007) and Eugene TeSelle’s concept of the crucial relation between 
Augustine’s hearing the voice of God and his reading a biblical text (1970/2002) for formulating the theme 
of Augustine’s conversion and the Christian Scriptures; 3) both William Harmless’ idea of the correlation 
of the ritual performance of Christian baptism with Augustine’s spiritual change (1995) and Thomas M. 
Finn’s metaphor of death and rebirth related to the Milanese baptismal liturgy (1997) for organizing the 
theme of Augustine’s conversion and Christian baptism; and 4) Bernard McGinn and Patricia F. McGinn’s 
idea of the convert Augustine’s Christian living in solitude and community (2003) as well as Thomas F. 
Martin’s emphasis on the link of the pilgrim Augustine’s turning toward God with his toward others (2003, 
2005) for designing Augustine’s conversion and the reciprocity of the love of God and neighbor. 
 
87 Burrell (1970) elucidates a crucial distinction in interpretation theory between explanation and 
understanding.  For Burrell, Freudian studies (e.g., Kligerman, Bakan, and Dittes) attempts to explain 
Augustine’s personality and his life, whereas the Confessions itself is an effort to understand them.  Burrell 
insists that understanding engages in gaining insight into the working of a particular mind, whereas 
explanation involves accounting for a phenomenon by means of some universal law.  In Burrell’s view, the 
Freudian explanatory method has sought to fit Augustine within a psychoanalytic interpretive framework or 
model which has been developed and tested in other settings, with other subjects.  In contrast, Burrell 
presents an alternate approach to understanding Augustine, largely by tracking Augustine’s own self-
understanding as revealed through the Confessions (pp. 340-344). 
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God which Augustine celebrates so generously should in ten years have worked a greater 
self-acceptance than the continued tone of self-accusation betrayed in the Confessions” (p. 
348).  According to Burrell, Augustine’s self-reproach was rooted in an inability to 
acknowledge his sinfulness and to present himself available for forgiveness (pp. 348-349).  
In other words, his self-reproach actually reflected “a lingering unwillingness to 
surrender” himself to God.  Whereas Freudian psychologists—Kligerman, Bakan, and 
Dittes—negatively describe Monica’s role in the formation of Augustine’s personality, 
worldview, and religiosity, Burrell positively depicts the influence of Monica on 
Augustine’s life, his understanding of God, and his formation of theology (although he 
does not deny that Augustine’s relationship to his mother was, at least to some degree, 
conflictual and ambiguous) (pp. 341-342).  In this sense, Burrell asserts that Augustine’s 
relationship to his mother could be exemplary of his theology of grace. 
Importantly, Burrell challenges the psychologist’s assumption that autonomy and 
dependency must be polar opposites.  More specifically, rejecting James E. Dittes’ view 
that Augustine’s surrender to his mother involves the relinquishment of his autonomy 
from his mother (see Dittes, 1965, pp. 136-138), Burrell raises a question: Are autonomy 
and dependency really opposed to one another?—“Can it not be argued that the genuinely 
autonomous person is precisely the one who has come to accept the basic parameters of 
his life?  Does not the person who acknowledges his dependency stand more of a chance 
for genuine autonomy and creativity?” (p. 346).  For Burrell, Augustine’s autonomy 
resulted from the conversion itself; namely, his truly genuine autonomy came from an 
acceptance of his dependency on God, the ultimate source and ground of genuine human 
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freedom.  Augustine’s reciprocal theme of his truly genuine autonomy with his 
dependency on God was deeply related to his theological views on God’s grace; this 
theme was later based on Augustine’s rejection of Pelagian views on human freedom (pp. 
344-346, 349). 
For Burrell, Augustine’s heart was ever restless, ever in motion, until he found his 
ultimate rest in the relationship with God and himself.  In becoming a Christian through 
God’s grace, Augustine found a new way of confessing (“speaking”) of God, and of the 
self in relation to God: “to be is to be related to God the Creator” (p. 332).  This new way 
of speaking of God and of himself enabled him to create a whole new way of life.  As a 
result, theologically, Burrell understands Augustine’s conversion as “the gracious gift of 
God” in which Augustine affirmed the primacy and sufficiency of God’s grace for 
entering obviously into the creativity of his subsequent life.  He concludes, 
Linguistically, the Confessions is a carefully and a highly constructed work…The 
choice of form illustrates better than anything else Augustine’s feel for 
theological understanding…As bishop and as theologian, he must speak of God 
and the things of God.  But where does he himself stand?  How can he 
responsibly speak of such things, as distinguished from analytically or 
defensively?  Perhaps this is too modern a hypothesis to foist upon Augustine, but 
I think not...The double sense of “confession” is well served by this hermeneutic 
hypothesis—praising God for all that He has made him and confessing how much 
he yet remains in need of purification. (pp. 330-332) 
 
Similar to Burrell, Eugene TeSelle (1986, 2002) examines the efficacy of God’s 
love in Augustine’s conversion experience.  Acknowledging psychological (i.e., oedipal 
and narcissistic) readings of the Confessions,88 TeSelle (1986) pays a great deal of 
                                                
88 For TeSelle, the Confessions is psychologically revealing in light of development in such form 
as self-examination and autobiography—“the new sense of a coherent and growing and conflictive self 
through time, the recognition of the need not merely to recall but to interpret and structure one’s 
experiences, the quest for continuity not only through recollection of the past but through discovery of an 
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attention to the theological reading of the Confessions, which primarily attempts to 
explore Augustine’s relationships with God in his transforming process.  For TeSelle, 
Augustine’s concept of love involved the “appreciation of the other”; as such, 
theologically, Augustine viewed God as the object of his affections.  TeSelle notes, “In 
Augustine’s theory love at its best is an appreciation of the object and a finding of 
happiness through relationship with the object—in Augustine’s view, first God, then all 
others ‘in’ God” (p. 99).89  According to TeSelle, Augustine at least partially understood 
the Trinity to be this God’s self-relatedness, whereas Plotinus finally understood the One 
to be the Alone (p. 100). 
While describing the factors of Augustine’s conversion, TeSelle (2002) stresses 
the internal dimension—“an inward presence of God”—rather than the external media of 
communication—“words, events, [or] rituals” (pp. 332-335).  For TeSelle, “divine aid” 
through God’s love (caritas) is a decisive factor for fostering Augustine’s conversion in 
terms of God’s calling, response, and conversion: “For many years Augustine 
assumed…that conversion is effected by the presenting of appropriate suasions through 
the channel of the understanding; the first assistance that is given to the will from within 
comes with the infusion of caritas, and this is given only to those who, responding to the 
call, have desired to do the good and have sought divine aid” (p. 332).  TeSelle asserts 
                                                                                                                                            
authentic destiny” (1986, p. 92).  However, TeSelle finds oedipal and narcissistic readings of the 
Confessions inadequate.  He contends that a historically sensitive and theologically informed interpretation 
of Augustine’s relationships is far more illuminating (pp. 92-93, 98-99). 
 
89 According to TeSelle, the Confessions includes the following three significant sets of 
relationships: “with other people, either immediately or through institutions; with himself in his full 
concreteness; and with God as in his view the only adequate object of his affections” (1986, p. 93). 
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that as founded in the Confessions, God alone provides Augustine a sense of the 
coherence of “his life in the past, present, and future” (p. 191).  Consequently, he states, 
[Augustine] cannot bring himself to make a wholehearted commitment to the 
good because he is attached to many things, past and present, by the bonds of 
affection and is deeply involved with them because of his concerns and anxieties.  
The balance is tipped by a factor coming from beyond [him].  It is not something 
hidden and mysterious which overpowers the will or gives it some special 
impulse.  The crucial factor is fully apparent, for it is simply the “call” which 
comes to [him].  It is something creaturely, and it enters [his] inner life through 
the channel of his understanding; then, by appealing irresistibly to his affections, 
it liberates them to act wholeheartedly in a single direction. (p. 42) 
 
As recent scholars, Colin Starnes (1990) and Carl G. Vaught (2004) agree with 
the idea that the transforming power of God’s grace is a decisive factor in Augustine’s 
conversion.  In Augustine’s Conversion: A Guide to the Argument of Confessions I-IX, 
Starnes (1990) explores how divine grace affected Augustine’s conversion to 
Christianity.90  He provides an excellent “explanation of the move [Augustine] made 
from his birth in nature to his rebirth in grace” (p. xi).  More specifically, Starnes writes, 
“The argument of the Confessions has moved from Augustine’s birth in nature which he 
called ‘a dying life or a living death’ (I,vi,7), to the point where he was about to be reborn 
in grace, ‘to die to death and come alive to life’ (VIII,xi,25)” (p. 234).  For Starnes, 
Augustine seriously underwent an inner division between his own habitual nature and his 
rational will; as such, his sexual desires were ceaseless and his old habits never consented 
                                                
90 Broadly, by using a trinitarian structure, Starnes (1990) formulates the Book I-IX of the 
Confessions as follows: “The first part (Books I-VII) was devoted to Augustine’s relation to the external 
and objective structure of the universe through his search for a true knowledge of God as creator (the 
Father) and for a true mediator between us and him…The second part (Book VIII) has turned on 
Augustine’s inner, subjective relation to Christ, believed to be the Incarnate Son of God…The last part 
(Book IX)…deal[s] with Augustine’s relation to the Holy Spirit as the third person of the Trinity where the 
objective and subjective, the knowledge and the will of the first two parts, will be shown in their unity” (p. 
236).  In this vein, for Starnes, Augustine’s conversion to Christianity, as found in Book VIII, was deeply 
related to his dedication to put himself on the Lord Jesus Christ. 
 330 
to his going over Christ: “His habits were in conflict with his rational will.  Neither could 
ever be fully satisfied nor could their conflict be truly resolved as long as he acted 
according to his nature, in which this division was now explicit and self-consciously 
manifest” (p. 234).  In this situation of his inability to help himself to get rid of the 
bondage of his will, Augustine heard from a neighboring house the voice of a child 
repeating a singsong refrain: “Pick it up and read it, pick it up and read it” (8.12.29).  
Moved by this voice, he read one of Paul’s letters and was transformed (p. 232).  Starnes 
writes, 
This is the sense of the tolle lege incident.  Because he had acknowledged the 
impossibility of healing the division in his soul by himself he was at last open to a 
restoration and cure that would be effected by divine agency—by 
grace…Presented as a divine command, where he had either to obey or disobey, 
he could now at last choose definitively between his habits and his rational will 
since this order—which spoke only to his rational will—did not come from within 
and from what was merely a part of himself.  It was a command he obeyed 
voluntarily.  In doing so his will was wholly and perfectly free since it was at last 
moved by end in which the division of reason and nature was not presupposed and 
from which their confusion, which had characterized his entire life to this moment, 
was totally excluded. (p. 235) 
 
 Starnes emphasizes the impact of the transforming power of God’s grace on the 
healing of Augustine’s divided will in light of the process of becoming a Christian (“to 
walk on the way of God”).  According to Starnes, in obeying the divine command, 
Augustine had freely committed to God.  “Divine grace alone” cured his wounded soul 
and his division in the inner most nature: “God did not let him fall…The actual 
restoration, the healing of his divided soul, if it was to come at all, would have to come 
 331 
from God” (p. 235; see Fredriksen, 1986, pp. 20-23, 26-27; Holtzen, 2000, pp. 110-115; 
Russell, 1997, p. 15; Stark, 1990, p. 58; Van Fleteren, 1990, pp. 67-68, 73).91 
 Importantly, Starnes contends that during the healing of Augustine’s divided soul 
through divine grace, Augustine was perfectly united with Christ.  Augustine followed 
Christ with his whole will; he dedicated himself to Christ throughout the rest of his life 
(pp. 213-214, 233).  While agreeing with O’Connell’s idea about Augustine’s life of 
celibacy,92 Starnes states, “It was true that Augustine would not become a Christian 
unless he became celibate, yet his primary choice was about whether he would remain 
with his old habits in the confusion of reason and nature or else come to a position in 
which they were reconciled and united.  He had found such a union objectively present in 
Christ” (p. 233).  For Starnes, Augustine’s life of continence was a gift that expressed the 
grace of God rather than an achievement by his own effort and power: “The continence 
which had been impossible so long as he tried to achieve it by his own power had become 
actual in the moment that he placed his whole confidence in Christ” (p. 236; see Vaught, 
2004, p. 89). 
Like Starnes, Vaught (2004) in Encounters with God in Augustine’s Confessions: 
Books VII-IX articulates the crucial role of divine interjection through God’s grace in the 
                                                
91 In a same way, Roger Haight (1979) in The Experience and Language of Grace emphasizes the 
impact of “sanative power of God” in Augustine’s transformation.  For Haight, God’s grace as “a medicinal 
force” had released Augustine from an internal bondage, especially of sin.  As such, since Augustine, the 
notion of grace as a sanative power of God has been a permanent fixture in the Christian language about 
grace (pp. 50-51). 
 
92 Robert J. O’Connell (1969) in St. Augustine’s Confessions: The Odyssey of Soul pays attention 
to Augustine’s life of celibacy: “[Augustine] no longer seeks intellectual illumination, he desires spiritual 
counsel on the style of life he should adopt as a Catholic…The ‘second stage’ of his conversion, then, is not 
to Catholic Christianity as such, but to the contemplative—and therefore celibate—‘way’ of Catholic 
Christian life” (pp. 93-94). 
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process of Augustine’s conversion in light of creation, fall, conversion, and fulfillment.  
According to Vaught, Augustine’s Confessions unfolds on three important levels: “the 
author praises the greatness of God, confesses his sins by writing an autobiography, and 
defends his faith by describing the conditions that make memory, temporal experience, 
and existential transformation possible” (p. ix).93  Acknowledging both the 
intellectual/philosophical dimension of Augustine’s conversion in book 7 (“the soul’s 
ascent to God”) and the communal dimension of his conversion in book 9 (“shared 
mystical experience” with Monica), Vaught emphasizes the existential/volitional 
transformation of Augustine in book 8 (“Augustine’s conversion to Christianity”) in 
terms of the transformation of the will (see Babcock, 1994, pp. 180-182, 187).94  For 
Vaught, Augustine’s fundamental problem was “the distortion of [his] will” that led away 
himself from God at the deepest level (p. 82).  Although Augustine turned away from 
those among the Neoplatonists who knew God without glorifying him, preferred wisdom 
                                                
93 Vaught (2004) writes, “The Confessions is not only Augustine’s story, but also the story of 
Adam and Eye, and hence the story of us all.  It is a microscopic expression of a macroscopic theme: in a 
single life the relation between God and the soul unfolds as sustained encounters between an individual and 
the ground of its existence” (p. 1); “The Confessions thrusts us into the hyphenated place between the 
universal and the particular, the past and the future, the community and the individual, and God and the 
soul, challenging us to listen, not only to what God says to Augustine, but also to what God says to us” (p. 
2; 2003, p. 2).  According to Vaught, “Augustine speaks as a psychologist, a rhetorician, a philosopher, and 
a theologian; but he speaks most fundamentally from the heart.  If we are unwilling to probe the depths of 
our souls, we will never understand Augustine; for he makes insistent demands that we trace out the path he 
has traveled in our own spiritual and intellectual development” (2004, p. x; 2003, p. ix). 
 
94 More specifically, Vaught (2004) labels book seven of the Confessions as “the philosophical 
conversion” of Augustine.  He shows how Augustine saw in Platonism correct concepts of God and evil.  
However, for Vaught, since Platonism was so grounded in human pride and unable to accept the humility 
of the Incarnation, Augustine’s own vision of God in book 7 is faltering and fleeting.  Vaught describes 
book 8 as “Augustine’s Christian Conversion” in which Augustine moved from “a mystical encounter with 
the Father to an existential response to the Son, making a transition from the transformation of the intellect 
to the conversion of the will” (p. 67).  He primarily recounts book 9 as Augustine’s “shared mystical 
experience” with his mother, Monica, at Ostia which is deeply related to the communal dimension of 
human transformation within the Christian community. 
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to piety, and embraced profession rather than confession, he remained separated from 
God because of his incapacity to orient his will toward God who created the world and 
who died to set him free (p. 70).  In that sense, Vaught raises the following pivotal 
questions: “What does Augustine reject, and what does he accept during his conversion to 
Christianity?”; “What does he embrace, and what does he repudiate as he moves beyond 
the Neoplatonic vision to the Christian faith?”  He writes, 
The most familiar answer is that for Augustine, becoming a Christian involves the 
abandonment of sexuality, the repudiation of worldly ambition, and the 
acceptance of the ascetic life of a monastery, first as a layman and then as a priest.  
However, this answer is inadequate because it focuses on the surface rather than 
the center of Augustine’s existential transformation…His conversion to 
Christianity points beyond these relatively superficial phenomena to the 
transformation of his will.  Augustine’s attitudes toward sexuality and toward the 
advancement of his career are symptoms of an addiction that expresses a radical 
distortion of the will.  Thus, when he responds to the voice of God in the garden, 
he not only relinquishes sexuality and renounces ambition at the surface of life, 
but also abandons the willfulness at the center of his being. (p. 68) 
 
Vaught asserts that Augustine himself understood his decisive moment in a 
garden of Milan (8.12.28-29) in light of “a divine interjection that transforms his 
fragmented heart into a center of certainty and serenity” (p. ix).95  Indeed, Augustine 
opened himself to the divine intervention through God’s grace in light of the interplay 
between the soul and the ground of its existence.  This means that Augustine’s journey of 
dependence on the grace of God enabled him to move into the positive relation between 
                                                
95 Vaught (2004) demands us to remember four gardens in order to understand Augustine’s 
narrative about his conversion to Christianity: “The first is the garden where Adam and Eve eat the 
forbidden fruit and attempt to become gods.  The second is the orchard where Augustine and his friends 
steal the pears and imitate omnipotence (2.6.14).  The third is the place where Jesus prays before the 
crucifixion.  And the fourth is the garden where Augustine leaves his friend behind to listen to a voice that 
speaks to him alone (8.12.28-29)” (p. 93).  For Vaught, in the description of his conversion to Christianity, 
Augustine attempted to bind the Garden of Eden, the garden of his neighbor, and the garden where Jesus 
prayed together in the garden in Milan (p. 93). 
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God and his soul (p. 15).  During his conversion to Christianity, Augustine was willing to 
stand before God.  Finally, he placed himself before “Jesus, the Christ” (8.7.16-8.12.30). 
According to Vaught, in book 8, Augustine moved beyond his conversion to 
Neoplatonism to the transformation of his will (p. 72).96  In other words, Augustine’s 
shift from knowledge about God to a desire for more steadfastness in God led him 
beyond the Neoplatonic vision of He Who Is to a volitional transformation (p. 69).  
Vaught insists that at his decisive moment in the garden of Milan, Augustine needed 
existential transformation rather than philosophical reflection about his fragmented 
situation.  Until hearing a divine voice (8.12.29), Augustine’s search for wisdom was 
primarily intellectual.  But now it began to shift in a voluntaristic direction; that is, he 
turned away from theoretical abstractions to the transformation of his will (pp. 79-80, 90).  
Vaught notes, 
The voice chants, “Tolle, lege. Tolle, lege.”  “Take and read; take and read” 
(8.12.29).  It is important to notice that these words come from a place beyond 
Augustine’s reach and not simply from the “house of his soul.”  The self-enclosed 
garden in which Augustine weeps, the inner life to which it calls our attention, 
and the self-reflexivity of the soul to which it points cannot generate the 
transformation he needs.  Rather, an encounter with a transforming source of 
power from beyond the circle of self-consciousness is necessary if Augustine is 
finally to come to himself.  Yet since God not only transcends him infinitely, but 
is closer to him than he is to himself, God’s voice can reach beyond the garden 
wall to address Augustine directly. (p. 91) 
                                                
96 Vaught insists that the Christian conversion in the garden of Milan differs radically from the 
Neoplatonic conversion: “First, though the conversion described in Book VII presupposes a Neoplatonic 
intellectual community, the conversion we are now considering presupposes a multifaceted community, 
including philosophers and theologians, government officials, children, Christian saints, old men and 
women, Augustine’s mother, and his closest companions from childhood (8.6.15, 8.12.29, 8.12.30).  
Second, the Christian conversion is volitional rather than intellectual, requiring a change of direction before 
Augustine can build a philosophical system that reflects the richness of the existential transformation he 
undergoes.  Third, the conversion in the garden allows Augustine to bring himself into a positive 
relationship with God without canceling his uniqueness.  Finally, the conversion experience we are 
analyzing not only transforms Augustine’s soul and his body, but also brings him into a new kind of 
community that expresses the Christian conception of the proper relation to God” (p. 95). 
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Significantly, acknowledging that two Latin imperatives—tolle lege—mean 
“Take up and read,” Vaught attempts to translate this passage, at least to some degree, 
“Destroy and read.”  More specifically, Vaught writes, “Tollo is irregular and its principle 
parts are tollo, tollere, sustuli, and sublatum.  As Hegel points out in the Phenomenology, 
sublation has four stages: it means to take up, to destroy, to move beyond, and to embrace 
in a higher unity.  The Latin tollo carries this significance as well.  God not only asks 
Augustine to take up a book, but also to put off his old nature and to accept 
transformation by something new” (p. 94). 
Vaught argues that Augustine’s “faith in Christ” was essential for his conversion 
to Christianity in light of embracing the Christ and creating a new way of living.  After 
hearing a divine voice in the Milanese garden, Augustine read a passage from the book of 
Romans, which demanded him both to put off the lusts of the flesh and to put himself on 
Jesus, the Christ (pp. 96-99, 102; see 2003, p. 14; 2005, p. 16).  Vaught states, 
In the phrase, “Put on Christ,” the words “put on” translate induo.  Induo 
sometimes means to put on a costume, but it also describes the moment when a 
Roman boy becomes a man by receiving a toga from his father.  Augustine 
assumes many guises, not only in childhood, but also throughout his intellectual 
development.  Now he must put these earlier stages behind him if the old 
costumes are to become a new creation.  The need for a new creation leads us to 
the center of Augustine’s transformation. (2004, p. 96) 
 
Clearly, Vaught contends that during his conversion to Christianity, Augustine’s 
embrace with the incarnation, the death, and the resurrection of Christ brought peace to 
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his fragmented heart (p. 98).97  For Vaught, the Christ mediated the chasm between God 
and Augustine himself.  This Christ enabled Augustine to turn away from his infinite self-
accentuation, to accept his finitude and his fallenness, to set free from the bondage of the 
will that had enslaved him so long, and to become a newly created being (pp. 94, 97-98; 
see 2003, pp. 102-103, 117; 2005, pp. 96-99, 194).  As such, Augustine not only forsook 
“the chain of sexual desire” and “the slavery of worldly business,” but also took his stand 
on the rule of faith that Monica had dreamed about (p. 102).  As a result, Vaught 
concludes that through an encounter with a transforming power of God’s grace, 
Augustine overcame his sense of willfulness, placed himself in Christ, and reestablished a 
peaceful relationship with God. 
 
B. Augustine’s Conversion and the Christian Scriptures 
Scholars have examined the interconnection between the Christian Scriptures and 
the conversion experience of Augustine.  For example, Karlfried Froehlich (2004) in 
“‘Take Up and Read’: Basics of Augustine’s Biblical Interpretation” pays attention to the 
impact of the word of God on the process of Augustine’s spiritual change.  According to 
Froehlich, during years of his membership in the Manichean group, Augustine developed 
a rational criticism of the Bible, especially the Old Testament, for its crude 
anthropomorphisms and seemingly immoral teachings were unacceptable to the youth 
and young Augustine in his search of the truth.  However, influenced by Bishop Ambrose, 
                                                
97 According to Vaught, “the incarnation is a way of embracing finitude; accepting an unjust death 
is a way of taking sin on oneself; and the resurrection is a way of indicating that the one who dies on our 
behalf makes conversion and fulfillment possible” (2004, p. 97). 
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Augustine’s view of the Bible had changed radically.  Froehlich writes, “[The mature 
Augustine] now praised it as the book of books and celebrated the biblical God…whose 
eloquent word had the power to persuade, instruct, delight, and move beyond the power 
of anyone using the instrument of language” (p. 5).  For Froehlich, Augustine understood 
the function of the Bible as “a privileged means of God’s interaction with humanity” in 
the context of God-in-relation (p. 9).  This means that he connected the function of the 
Scripture with God’s revelation to humans: “Clearly the function of scripture is to make 
known God’s will, to reveal what God wants to reveal to humans” (p. 10); as such, 
Augustine regarded the inspiration of the Bible as “a matter of personal discovery, not 
doctrine” (p. 7).  For Froehlich, in book 8, Augustine portrayed his personal discovery 
which was deeply related to his experience of divine intervention through the word of 
God—“He had experienced God as the master rhetorician in the garden scene where the 
divine Word had moved him through the chant of a child and the words of the Apostle 
Paul” (p. 9).  More specifically, Froehlich writes, 
[Augustine’s personal discovery/experience of the divine inspiration by the 
Christian Scriptures] becomes quite clear in the story of his last and decisive 
conversion, the scene in the garden with the unexplained sing-song of a child—
Tolle, lege! (“take, read!” Conf. 8.11.29).  In answer to this divine oracle, he takes 
the copy of Paul’s letters form the table and reads Rom 13:13-14.  The words hit 
home.  Rather than the teacher of rhetoric interpreting the Bible, the Bible 
interpreted him through the providential action of God’s Spirit.  He had no other 
choice but to see it this way. (p. 7) 
 
Froehlich asserts that God communicated with Augustine in the Milanese garden 
by means of the word of God.  That is, through the authoritative word of the Christian 
Scriptures, God the master rhetorician taught and moved Augustine who took up this 
word of God and read it (p. 5).  For Froehlich, in light of the Christocentric understanding 
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of the Bible, Augustine emphasized the link of Christian Scriptures with Incarnation 
which essentially related to the theme of God’s revelation to humanity and theme of 
paradoxical presence of God’s perfect Word within imperfect human language (pp. 10, 
12-13).98  In that sense, Froehlich insists that the Incarnated God was revealed to 
Augustine through the Bible, and then enabled Augustine to enter into a new spiritual 
journey for fostering his faith, hope, and charity in light of the human soul to the love of 
God on the road to the blessed life (see p. 12).  As a result, Froehlich concludes that 
God’s interaction with Augustine through Christian scripture played an eminent role in 
Augustine’s transformation. 
Like Froehlich, Eugene TeSelle (2002) explores the link between the Bible and 
Augustine’s conversion in terms of divine voice, Scripture, and conversion.  TeSelle 
reminds us to look at a crucial relation between hearing the voice of God and reading a 
biblical text when we account for Augustine’s conversion.  While Augustine’s will was 
immobilized by inner conflict in the garden of Milan, Augustine heard a divine voice 
(“call”)—Tolle, lege—beyond his own power, and acknowledged this voice as a divine 
command: “Do you still claim to be uncertain?  The solution to your problem is right 
before your eyes.  Pick it up and read” (p. 41).99  At this decisive moment, Augustine did 
                                                
98 More precisely, Froehlich writes, “Just as God stooped down to our human level in the 
incarnation, taking on our flesh, God stooped down to our human language.  Augustine realized that 
language not only presents infinite opportunities for interaction but also comes with its own set of problems.  
God’s revelation in scripture, God’s pulling back the veil, necessitates a new covering: God’s perfect Word 
takes on the veil of our imperfect language” (p. 13; see civ. Dei 20.4). 
 
 99 TeSelle (2002) portrays the divine call which entered into the depths of the heart of Augustine: 
“The crucial factor is fully apparent, for it is simply the ‘call’ which comes to [Augustine].  It is something 
creaturely, and it enters [Augustine’s] inner life through the channel of his understanding; then, by 
appealing irresistibly to his affections, it liberates them to act wholeheartedly in a single direction” (p. 42; 
see O’Brien, 1978, p. 52). 
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take up the Bible, opened, at random, the codex of Paul’s letters, and read the words of 
Romans 13:13-14.  This reading of a biblical text led Augustine to throw himself upon 
God (pp. 41-42; see Harrison, 2000, pp. 48-53, 88-93; Starnes, 1990, p. 235; Vaught, 
2004, p. 82). 
 TeSelle pays attention to the transfiguring power of the word of God in the case 
of Augustine as well as the cases of Antony (who was a Egyptian monk) and Alypius 
(who was one of best friends of Augustine and was together with Augustine in the 
Milanese garden).  He states, 
[Augustine] says first of Anthony that he was converted when he read a passage 
from the gospels—Jesus said to him, “If you wish to be perfect, go, sell your 
possessions, and give the money to the poor, and you will have treasure in 
heaven; then come, follow me” (Mt 19:21)—and felt that it was addressed directly 
to him (Conf., VIII, 12, 29); then that his friend Alypius was given firm resolve 
and bound to a worthy purpose suited to his own character by reading another 
passage—Welcome those who are weak in faith, but not for the purpose of 
quarreling over opinions (Rom 14:1); and then that he himself was turned toward 
God by still another passage—Let us live honorably as in the day, not in reveling 
and drunkenness, not in debauchery and licentiousness, not in quarreling and 
jealousy.  Instead, put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the 
flesh, to gratify its desires (Rom 13:13-14)—in such a way that he would no 
longer vacillate, still entertaining hopes for marriage and [worldly] honor (Conf., 
VIII, 12, 30).  The words of Scripture, then, are the means by which God turns 
men toward himself, in each case by issuing an exhortation or presenting a 
possibility that is “congruous” with a man’s condition. (p. 42, italics added) 
 
Similar to TeSelle, John M. Quinn (2007) in A Companion to the Confessions of 
St. Augustine probes how the word of God affected Augustine’s conversion to 
Christianity.  Quinn contends that “in brief, the Confessions praises God for the healing 
of sins confessed” (p. 1).  For Quinn, the story of Augustine’s conversion was a tale of 
divine providence highlighting three major themes: “First, the Lord is a God of mercy, 
responding to Augustine’s radical misery that is sin.  Second, it is mercy constantly 
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operative his whole life long, in every incident…Third, this divine action works ‘in 
wonderful and hidden ways’ (4.4.7; 5.6.10; 7.21.27)…by employing the very depths of 
desolation of the prodigal son to vault him to the embrace of the Father” (p. 4). 
Quinn asserts that after studying Neoplatonic thought, Augustine’s state of mind 
attested to the large-scale temptation to pride latent in an understanding of religious and 
metaphysical truths in the absence of saving grace (pp. 396-399).  According to Quinn, as 
Augustine reached the summit of intellectual striving, he became subtly corrupted with 
egoism which rooted in his exclusive self-reliance: “the more apparently wise he became, 
the more actually unwise he grew, consumed by overweening pride” (p. 398); “ironically, 
the more their philosophic vision was liberated, the more they were imprisoned by pride” 
which related to the enormity of his self-exaltation (p. 397).  Quinn notes, 
Even as [Augustine] capitulated to intellectual triumphalism, the wounds of his 
spirit throbbed with pain.  General and abstract knowledge of the shape of things 
left him morally hollow; a feeling of stultification of spirit mitigated only when he 
began to feed on the Scriptures, whose nourishment soothed soul and self.  The 
divine physician’s fingers lovingly applied ointment to sores of his spirit so that 
his eyes were opened to the fine, sometimes undiscerned, line between 
presumption that is pseudo-salvation and confession indispensable in genuine 
salvation. (pp. 396-397) 
 
For Quinn, Augustine’s longing for conversion was hindered by his vacillating 
will;100 as such, in his mind, he might have just murmured “one word of true confession 
pleading for mercy” (p. 397).  In other words, because of his exclusive self-
reliance/exaltation, Augustine knew nothing of the cry of mercy to an offended God for 
                                                
100 Quinn notes, “[Augustine’s] willing was not strong and whole; more precisely, his will was 
weak because it was not integral or whole.  His will was split in two, semi-wounded, one part sound, the 
other sick, torn between the good toward which his higher self sped him and the lower goods toward which 
his lower self was dragged” (p. 447; see p. 449; conf. 8.8.19). 
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forgiveness of inner misery (p. 399).  Quinn describes, in detail, Augustine’s divided 
(“diseased”) will as follows: 
So enchained, Augustine’s spirit was condemned to a cruel slavery domineered by 
necessity, poles apart from the free servitude under the reign of charity got by 
grace [en. Ps. 99.8].  His fledgling new will was aiming to serve God 
unencumbered by self-interest that awards primacy to sexual pleasure or worldly 
honors; and through that loving service he was aiming at joy; God was to be his 
absolute source of delight, absolute, because the divine is immutable.  Lamentably, 
his new desire could not eradicate his old will, affixed unshakably, apparently, in 
moral perversity.  Conflict raged between the old or carnal will and the new or 
spiritual will, with the discord rivening his soul; civil war divided the one self into 
two warring camps. (p. 436) 
 
Quinn insists that in the culmination of his inner turmoil, God intervened to 
transfigure Augustine through the word of God.  For Quinn, when Augustine experienced 
the peak of his divided will, he flung himself under a fig tree in the Milanese garden.  He 
released lots of penitential tears.  He heard the voice of a child chanting “Take and read” 
at which point he read Christian Scriptures (Rom 13:13-14).  This reading of the Bible 
suddenly triggered his conversion to cast himself on the Lord (pp. 457-459; see pp. 399-
400; Georgiou, 1994, pp. 70-71; Van Fleteren, 1990, p. 67). 
Like TeSelle (see 2002, p. 42), Quinn claims that as a specific Scriptural text (i.e., 
Mt 19.21) affected deeply Antony’s transformation and his monastic life in the desert, a 
specific verse of the Bible (i.e., Rom 13: 13-14) influenced Augustine’s conversion to 
Christianity in an “obscure” garden of Milan in 386; further like the cases of Antony and 
Augustine, another verse of the Christian Scriptures (i.e., Rom 14.1) played an important 
role in Alypius’ transformation and his life (pp. 458-459; see pp. 471-472; conf. 8.12.29-
30; Matter, 1990, pp. 24-25).  More specifically, Quinn depicts this garden scene of 
Milan as follows: 
 342 
[Augustine’s] face underwent a change; the galling stream of tears started to 
ebb…As the tears dried up completely, his mind was illumined with the insight 
that God was leading him to discover a clue to conversion in Scripture, after the 
pattern of St. Antony, whose life was wholly turned around by an apparently 
coincidental hearing of Mt 19.21.  Snatching up the Epistle to the Romans near 
Alypius, he opened at random to Rom 13.13-4, which commanded him, in effect, 
to stop chasing women and the world, to stifle the clamor of the lower self and 
robe himself in the light of Christ.  At the moment he finished reading the lines, 
his soul was flooded with light, banishing all anxiety and bathing him in profound 
peace.  The light dissipated all darkness and doubt, all travail and the gloom of 
spirit coupled with moral uncertainty, healing the paralysis (8.8.19) that 
benumbed his capacity to voice one definitive yes of the higher self to God’s law.  
When he related his inner transformation to Alypius, remarkably, he learned, 
Alypius had been graced with a like interior transmutation, applying to himself 
the following line, “But receive the man who is weak in faith” (Rom 14.1). (pp. 
458-459) 
 
Clearly, Quinn elucidates that before his conversion in the garden, the young 
Augustine had rated the style of Scriptures barbarous in contrast to the eloquence of 
Cicero, that is, he might have put down the Scriptures as unworthy and unscientific in 
comparison with the analytical yet stylish superiority of Neoplatonic writings (p. 398; see 
conf. 3.4.8-3.5.9).  However, after his conversion, Augustine regarded the Scriptures as a 
treasure trove of wisdom (p. 134; see s. 60 A.1).  For Quinn, Augustine employed two 
keys in order to unlock Scriptural treasures: “faith, for which humility disposes the mind, 
and understanding, which explicates the data of faith.  Faith is the introductory 
acceptance, understanding, the developed grasp of Scriptures” (p. 134, italics added).101 
                                                
101 In detail, Quinn states, “To the eye of faith ripened to understanding are disclosed the things of 
God in the Bible.  Scriptural language is largely simple or unadorned, but its contents, long meditated in 
prayer, stand out as majestic.  Augustine was at once spiritually decrepit (1.4.4) and intellectually puerile, 
too proud to believe in the word of God, too mentally underdeveloped to understand Biblical insights” (p. 
135); however, “a more mature Augustine drastically curtailed the scope of reason operating somewhat 
independently of faith.  Faith and understanding are coupled in the quest of spirituals for a sure knowledge 
and love of God.  Yet faith remains fundamentally superior to and directive of reason; understanding 
analytically articulates the revelatory givens of faith.  Only within the framework of faith can a soaring 
personal experiential knowledge of God be won.  Rationalism, whether the fantastic mutant of Manicheism 
or the sober species of Neoplatonism, is spiritually sterile, yielding no healing or kin spiritual fruits.  Thus 
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As a result, emphasizing the historicity of Augustine’s conversion scene in an 
“obscure” garden of Milan in 386 (conf. 8.12.28-30),102 Quinn pays attention to the inner 
                                                                                                                                            
prior contact with Neoplatonism safeguarded Augustine from a fresh entrapment in a rationalism 
advertising itself as the open sesame to genuine purification and highest fulfillment.  Neoplatonism…was 
salvific promise without delivery, a program without actual fruits of the spirit.  The requisite light and 
power would proceed only from faith to be sharpened by an ancillary reason in quest of understanding” (p. 
399). 
 
102 According to Quinn (2007), Pierre Courcelle, the French Augustine scholar, casts a doubt on 
the historicity of Augustine’s conversion scene in the garden of Milan.  Courcelle claims that while 
Augustine’s interior conversion was unquestionable, the exterior details of his conversion scene were 
intentionally constructed in his literary imagination.  In other words, Courcelle regards the external 
elements of the garden scene as fictive devices.  For example, the fig tree symbolized the shadow of death 
which related to the sinful condition of the human being, including Augustine.  In this sense, the words, 
Tolle, lege, were not actually uttered by a child; Augustine heard them interiorly in the same manner as he 
heard continence speaking within (p. 460).  However, rejecting Courcelle’s fictional interpretation of 
Augustine’s conversion, Quinn emphasizes the factual character of Augustine’s narration.  For Quinn, 
Augustine gave no clue whatsoever that he was having recourse to literary constructs; he seemed to be 
unequivocally stating the factual features and events in the decisive moments in his conversion.  Quinn 
writes, “In Book 8 Augustine simply records the fact that he threw himself under a [real] fig tree without 
appending any symbolic meaning” (p. 461).  As such, for Quinn, the child’s (i.e., a real boy or girl’s) 
chanting of Tolle, lege truly appeared to be coincidental (pp. 460-463; see Starnes, 1990, pp. 241-242; 
Wills, 2004, pp. 31-34). 
On the other hand, influenced by Courcelle, Leo C. Ferrari (1980, 1982, 1984, l992, 2003) 
suggests that Augustine’s conversion did replicate that of St. Paul in light of the intentional literary 
reconstruction.  Ferrari views Augustine’s Confessions as “not strictly a historical document, but was rather 
written basically as a romantic story to be read aloud before a live audience” (2003, p. 136).  He notes, 
“The reality of Augustine’s conversion as depicted in the Confessions is embellished with concrete details 
derived not from lived experience…but from the dramatic exigencies of the work” (1984, pp. 57-58).  In 
this sense, he argues that Augustine’s conversion scene in book eight of the Confessions is dependent upon 
St. Paul’s conversion on the road to Damascus as found in Acts 9:1-9; 22:6-16; 26:12-18.  As with Paul, 
Augustine fell down to the ground, his eyesight was affected, and he heard a divinely influenced voice.  
Especially, the repetition of Saule…Saule corresponded to the iteration of tolle…tolle.  By employing his 
biblical citation method, Ferrari suggests that there is no evidence for Augustine’s awareness of the passage 
in Romans that he claimed to have read in the garden at Milan.  That means that whereas prior to 396 
references to Paul’s conversion are sparse, the six years around the time of the Confessions contain fourteen 
references.  Importantly, this concentration of references indicates that Paul’s conversion served as a 
paradigm for fashioning the fictionalized garden scene.  In other words, the tolle lege scene is a fictional 
composite based in part upon an earlier experience of Pauline discovery; that is, Romans 13.13-4 did not 
actually play a part in Augustine’s conversion scene, but was a fictional embellishment (1980, pp. 8-20, 
1984, pp. 50-70, 2003, pp. 132-136). 
However, repudiating Ferrari’s idea that Augustine’s conversion scene is fictional, Quinn argues 
that Augustine’s conversion did not duplicate that of St. Paul.  For Quinn, Augustine’s conversion was not 
a Damascan experience; he prepared himself for the breakthrough step by step, through prayer, reading, 
and dialogue with friends (2007, pp. 471-472; see pp. 464-465).  Whereas Ferrari emphasizes the 
similarities between Paul’s and Augustine’s conversions, Quinn pays attention to the dissimilarities of two 
conversion scenes.  He writes, “Whereas Paul was stricken to the ground, Augustine fell prone on his own.  
Paul was blinded; Augustine’s eyes were merely flooded with tears.  The voice Paul heard descended 
directly from heaven while the child’s chanting was only indirectly heaven-sent.  Moreover, the relevance 
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workings of the divine word in Augustine’s transformation.  Through reading of the Bible, 
Augustine overcame his sense of exclusive self-reliance, that is, his divided will became 
one; he opened his mind to hear the inward divine locution—“It is I who am with you 
now as always”(p. 458).  Further, Augustine actually committed himself to God in terms 
of right relationship with God. 
 
C. Augustine’s Conversion and Christian Baptism 
Scholars have speculated about the link between Christian baptism and 
Augustine’s spiritual change.  For example, Richard Fenn (1986) in “Magic in Language 
and Ritual: Notes on Augustine’s Confessions” probes the ritual dimension of 
Augustine’s transformation in terms of “the magical power of ritual.”103  Fenn articulates 
how “the holy waters of baptism” enabled Augustine to be recreated and to be anew.  
According to Fenn, in spite of his garden experience in the summer of 386, Augustine as 
                                                                                                                                            
of a repeated tolle with Saule seems no more than superficial” (pp. 464-465).  Importantly, Quinn asserts 
that the text itself of Augustine’s conversion scene (conf. 8.12.28-30) is more paralleled with the 
conversion story of Antony rather than that of Paul.  He notes, “The chanting of the child’s voice reminded 
Augustine not of Paul but of Antony.  Like him, [Augustine] felt admonished to consult the Scriptures, and 
in line with a similar oracle or sign from heaven he was at once converted.  This explicit textual pairing 
with Antony clearly undercuts any essential connection with Paul’s conversion” (p. 465, italics added); 
“Augustine’s conversion seems close to that of Antony: both believed in Christ and were open to complete 
dedication to God by practicing the evangelical counsels” (p. 472; see Matter, 1990, pp. 24-25; cf. 
Fredriksen, 1986, pp. 20-26; Kreidler, 1990, p. 511). 
 
103 Fenn (1986) focuses on the link of transfiguring (“magical”) power of ritual with language (pp. 
78-81; see Elledge, 1988, p. 82).  According to Fenn, Augustine invested “in language itself the magical 
power otherwise contained in the rite of baptism” (p. 80).  Fenn notes, “There are passages in the 
Confessions in which he talks first in his own words and then in those of Scripture with hardly any mark of 
transition.  Blending his own words with the Scriptural text, of course, he guarantees that his own unique 
conceptions have been adopted, so to speak, into the Christian tradition.  In so doing, he not only cloaks his 
ideas with the authority of Scripture but invests them with the potency of a sacred text.  Such magic invests 
in words and texts the power to link the individual with people of other times and places and so to gain a 
spiritual parentage that transcends finitude and death itself.  It is the magical antidote, so to speak, to the 
poisonous sting of death” (p. 80). 
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a (former) professor of rhetoric had still suffered from a serious disease of his lungs (p. 
84).  Specifically, Fenn describes, 
[Augustine’s] conversion [in the Milanese garden] was not enough…to undo the 
damage that he had done by teaching people to harm others through the 
techniques of speech; he developed a symptom that left him too breathless to 
teach anyone further as his lungs “began to decay,” and he therefore became 
unable to speak “too loud or too long” (Book 9, 2).  This is a fitting punishment 
for [Augustine] who prided himself on being able to take others’ breath away by 
the powers of his own rhetoric…[Augustine’s] conversion was therefore not 
enough to stop this cycle of cruelty and self-destruction; only the “holy waters of 
baptism” could provide pardon for his “most horrible and deadly sins.” (Book 9, 
4) (p. 84) 
 
Looking at the context of Augustine’s illness and his sense of pride, Fenn 
emphasizes the healing (“cure”) power of the baptismal waters for Augustine.104  For 
Fenn, through immersion into the holy waters, Augustine has been soothed and 
transfigured; namely, his sin was forgiven by God and he became a humble person.  As a 
result, Fenn concludes that the rite of Christian baptism at Milan played a preeminent role 
in the process of Augustine’s healing and regeneration. 
Similar to Fenn, David F. Wright (2001) in “Augustine and the Transformation of 
Baptism” articulates the link of Christian baptism with Augustine’s change in light of the 
power of ritual process.  According to Wright, by the time of his writing of the 
Confessions, Augustine portrayed his baptismal experience as a “dramatic turning-point 
of his life” (p. 292).  Wright insists that the sacrament of Christian baptism enabled 
Augustine to enter into “the decisive transition from an old life to a new that marked 
                                                
104 In a related vein, Elledge (1988) asserts that there is an analogy between Monica’s tears and the 
baptismal waters for Augustine (pp. 78-79; see Fenn, 1986, p. 81).  He claims that like the baptismal waters, 
Monica’s tears played a prominent role in Augustine’s transformation: “Monica’s tears will recreate the son, 
make him anew, not simply reclaim him for God” (p. 78).  For Elledge, as baptismal waters functioned as 
“a means to and guarantor of salvation” for Augustine, Monica’s tears became “spiritually engendering, 
ontologically regenerative, and…amniotically protective of” his son (p. 78). 
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early Christian baptism” (p. 291).  Clearly, Wright depicts Augustine’s transformation of 
his life through the Milanese baptismal rite as follows: 
The abandonment of his profession of rhetoric, and of all expectation of a 
successful career in the public eye; a final turning away from the pleasures of the 
flesh, within or without marriage; the divine remission of all his ‘horrendous and 
mortal sins’; the ultimate reconciliation with his devoted mother, sealed in the 
climactic vision of Ostia; the new delights of the Psalms, of the hymns and chants 
of worship in Milan, and fresh plans for a shared life in the service of God back in 
Africa. (pp. 291-292) 
 
In the same way, William Harmless (1995) in Augustine and the Catechumenate 
examines how the ritual of Christian baptism was interwoven with Augustine’s 
transformation in light of a movement of Augustine the catechumen, Augustine the 
petitioner, and Augustine the neophyte.  Harmless views Christian baptism as “a sharing 
in the death and resurrection of Christ” (p. 16).  According to Harmless, Augustine 
became a catechumen while he was still a child; that is, he was regularly sanctified from 
birth by the sign of the cross on his forehead and was seasoned with God’s blessed salt on 
his tongue as an act of exorcism (“a sort of inoculation”) (p. 80; see conf. 1.11.17).  
However, Augustine’s baptism was delayed by his mother;105 as such there was a 
conventional wisdom for him: “Leave him alone and let him do it; he is not yet baptized” 
(p. 81; conf.1.11.18); he was not eventually baptized until age thirty-three.  Only after his 
dramatic garden experience, Augustine publicly became a candidate for Christian 
baptism in Milan (see conf. 9.5.13).  He participated in the baptismal liturgy on March 10, 
                                                
105 According to Harmless, in the context of the North African Church of the fourth century, 
parents had usually stopped short of having their children baptized.  Harmless writes, “Augustine’s mother, 
Monica, was typical in this regard, and refused to have him baptized, even when he fell seriously sick.  She 
sensed—and rightly—that her son would inevitably sow his wild oats, and she had no wish to leave him 
vulnerable to the rigors of public penance.  Augustine, writing of this years later, looked back with regret, 
but admitted her sagacity” (1995, p. 80). 
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387; he had undergone the demand regimen of Lent, including asceticism, exorcism, and 
catechesis.  Finally, at the Easter vigil service April 24-25, 387, Augustine was baptized 
by Bishop Ambrose with his son, Adeodatus, and his closest friend, Alypius (pp. 79-81, 
93-104; see Quinn, 2007, pp. 494-496; Smith, 2010, pp. 50-57; Starnes, 1990, p. 254). 
While agreeing with Peter Brown’s view on Augustine’s baptism and his 
transformation,106 Harmless asserts that through the sacrament of Christian baptism, 
Augustine was transfigured; that is, his baptism was effective for the remission of his sin 
and for the rebirth of his life.  In other words, Augustine was delivered from evil, 
reconciled with God, enlightened by the Spirit, and incorporated into the body of Christ, 
the church.  For Harmless, after his baptism, Augustine had retired from his professorship 
of rhetoric; he had set aside any prospect for a comfortable marriage and had committed 
himself to a celibate life (1995, p. 104).  As a result, Harmless concludes that the ritual of 
Christian baptism in Milan played a pivotal role in Augustine’s rebirth and change. 
 Influenced by Harmless, Thomas M. Finn (1997) in From Death to Rebirth: 
Ritual and Conversion in Antiquity deals with Augustine’s change through ritual act of 
baptism within the Christian community.  For Finn, the early Christians had a strong 
conviction “(1) that Jesus had risen from the dead, (2) that his resurrection established an 
                                                
106 Brown (2000) emphasizes the interrelatedness between Augustine’s baptism and his 
transformation: “At Easter, the rite of baptism itself emphasized the momentous nature of the 
transformation which Augustine was undergoing…The theme of ‘putting off the old,’ of ‘putting on the 
new,’ of rebirth and rising again from death, of the consequent ascent of the soul to heaven made possible 
by the descent of Christ to earth, reverberated in Augustine’s imagination.  In the next years, he wove his 
own, refined Platonic doctrine of the ascent of the soul from the ‘old man’ of the sense, around this 
elemental and mysterious action” (p. 118). 
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entirely new relationship between God and humankind, and (3) that baptism symbolized 
that relationship” (p. 141).107  In this sense, Finn states, 
Baptism as the passage from death to life gave rise to the image of the baptismal 
font as tomb and womb…The baptizands are…immersed in the baptismal waters, 
which Ambrose’s contemporary, John Chrysostom (c. 345-407 C.E.), regularly 
calls a tomb (taphos), insisting that the “old self has been crucified with him, in 
order that the body of sin may be destroyed.”  The font as womb emphasizes the 
passage to life, with rebirth and resurrection used almost interchangeably.  The 
same Chrysostom remarks, “Conception without womb, begetting without bosom, 
birth without flesh!”  Yet he insists that in baptism there are both burial (taphe) 
and resurrection (anastasis) at the same time. (pp. 255-256) 
 
 While employing a dominant metaphor of death and rebirth, Finn explores how 
Milanese baptismal liturgy affected Augustine’s transformation.108  He argues that 
Augustine’s conversion “was embedded in complex and richly articulated ritual 
processes” (p. 34).  According to Finn, after recovering from a serious infection in his 
lungs at Cassiciacum, Augustine as a catechuman returned to Milan to be baptized within 
the approval of Bishop Ambrose.  After enrollment in the Milan cathedral, Augustine as a 
“competent” began his Lenten catechumenate with others, including Adeodatus and 
Alypius (p. 221).  This Milanese Lenten catechumenate was composed of 1) enrollment 
and the fast, 2) instruction, 3) scrutinies, 4) the creed, 5) holy week, and 6) the vigil (pp. 
221-226; see 1990, pp. 590-594).  For Finn, after completing successfully the Lenten 
                                                
107 Like Finn, Steve T. Georgiou (1994) pays attention to the link of Augustine’s baptismal 
experience with his rebirth in terms of tomb, divine light, and rebirth.  According to Georgiou, at his 
baptismal rite, Augustine most directly felt the transforming power of God which was rooted in Christ’s 
death, burial, and resurrection.  Georgiou writes, “It is striking to note how [Augustine’s was] baptized 
during Easter Week, the time when Christ was believed to have risen from the darkness of his tomb with 
great radiance and splendor.  This glorious victory of light over darkness was brought out dramatically in 
the Easter vigil of [Augustine’s] baptism” (pp. 106-107). 
 
108 Finn argues (1997) that “contemporary researchers employ a variety of terms for the process of 
reorientation, among them, progress, regression, fixation, faith development, and the reconstitution of the 
self.  Dissatisfaction with abstract descriptors, however, has led some to go back to the Greco-Roman 
metaphors of death and rebirth and enlightenment” (p. 254). 
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catechumenate, Augustine participated in the Milanese baptismal liturgy which consisted 
of 1) the opening ceremony (ephphatha), 2) the anointing, 3) renunciation and profession, 
4) consecration of the waters, 5) immersion, 6) anointing and foot washing, and 7) the 
white garment and the sealing.  More specifically, Finn describes this process of 
Augustine’s baptismal liturgy as follows: 
At the end of the [Easter] vigil, the competents assemble at the door to Ambrose’s 
new baptistery for the first rite, ephphatha [which refers literally to] ‘be 
opened’…Ambrose touches Augustine’s ears and nostrils to open his mind to 
understand the rites and his experience of them...Next Augustine enters the 
baptistery proper…where he ritually removes his clothes.  A priest anoints him 
from head to toe with olive oil to strengthen him…Thus prepared, a naked and 
glistening Augustine stands upright, facing west, and hears two questions. “Do 
you renounce the devil and his works?” “Do you renounce the world and its 
pleasures?”  To both he answers, “I do renounce them”…Ambrose now 
consecrates its waters in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy 
Spirit…Augustine then enters and stands waist-deep in the font.  Baptism is by 
triple immersion, and the form is interrogatory.  Three questions are put to him: 
“Do you believe in God the Father?” “Do you believe in our Lord Jesus Christ 
and in his cross?” “Do you believe also in the Holy Spirit?”  Each time he 
answers, “I believe,” he is immersed…When Augustine emerges from the font, a 
priest awaits to anoint him with chrism on the forehead with the words, “God the 
Father All Powerful, who has given you new birth through water and the Holy 
Spirit and has forgiven your sins, he is the one who anoints you for eternal life.”  
After [Augustine and his fellows] are anointed,…a deacon reads from the Last 
Supper account the words about Jesus tying a towel around his waist, washing, 
and then drying the feet of the disciples (Jn 13:1-11).  Ambrose does the same for 
the newly anointed, with help from the priests…Augustine dries, puts on a new 
linen garment, and takes his place in the white-robed line before Ambrose.  
Ambrose anoints him on the forehead with the sign of the cross in the name of the 
Trinity, thereby stamping him as their possession and strengthening him with the 
fullness of the Holy Spirit. (pp. 226-229; see 1990, p. 594) 
 
For Finn, after Baptism, Augustine was welcomed as a newborn member of the 
Christian community.  He celebrated his first Eucharist with other newly baptized.  
Finally, Augustine became fully Christian, namely, he was reborn and was now risen (pp. 
229-230). 
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 Importantly, Finn views Augustine’s experience of Christian baptismal rite on 
Easter (387) as a climax of Augustine’s life history.  According to Finn, Augustine 
clearly understood that baptism in the Milan cathedral, not his experience in the garden in 
Milan, established his conversion and regeneration, although he said nothing about the 
baptismal rites themselves in the Confessions (p. 230).  In emphasizing Augustine’s 
baptismal experience in Milan, Finn summarizes the movements of Augustine’s life as 
follows: 
[Augustine’s journey of conversion] began with his inscription in the 
catechumenate in 354 and culminated in the mysteries of baptismal initiation on 
Easter 387.  His home and family, his education, his mistress, Adeodatus, the 
Platonic books, the Manichees, Ambrose’s homilies, the garden in Milan, 
Monica’s incessant pressure—they were part of the process, currents in a sea 
change about which Augustine might say, “It is not a lie but a mystery” (non est 
mendacium sed mysterium). (pp. 230-231) 
 
As a result, Finn asserts that Augustine’s conversion happened within the ancient 
ritual process known as the catechumenate.  He concludes that through the baptismal 
liturgy of Milan, the old Augustine died and was buried; now the new one was reborn and 
was risen; publicly, the newly baptized Augustine became a member of the Christian 
church. 
 
D. Augustine’s Conversion and the Reciprocity of  
the Love of God and Neighbor 
 
Scholars have probed the symbiotic relation between love of God and love of 
neighbor in Augustine’s conversion process.  For example, Bernard McGinn and Patricia 
F. McGinn (2003) in Early Christian Mystics: The Divine Vision of the Spiritual Masters 
understand Augustine’s conversion experience as an ongoing transformative process in 
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which he moved into the connection with God as well as the connection with God’s 
people.  According to McGinn and McGinn, after making a decisive commitment to “the 
Incarnate Christ” in the Milanese garden, Augustine involved “not only [Christian] 
baptism but also the choice of a celibate life typical of emerging Christian ideals of 
perfection” (p. 153).  Clearly, McGinn and McGinn depict the rest of life of Augustine 
after his conversion to Christianity as follows: 
Augustine returned to Africa…where he founded a monastic community and was 
ordained priest...[He] was made bishop of Hippo, a small coastal town, where he 
spent the remaining thirty-five years of his life caring for his flock and engaged in 
a series of doctrinal disputes that shaped later Western theology. (p. 153) 
 
 McGinn and McGinn elucidate how Augustine intended to establish a more 
refined ideal of Christian charity that fully integrated the love of God and neighbor (the 
“precepts of the Great Commandment”) (pp. 161-169; see Trin. 8.8.12).  They claim that 
for Augustine, the authenticity of the love of God is only proved by the love of neighbor 
(p. 163).  For McGinn and McGinn, Augustine had experienced a deep and transforming 
awareness of God’s immediate presence in his participation in the corporate life of the 
church (“Christ’s body”) (p. 154).  They insist that Augustine viewed the love of charity 
as “a higher glue that binds [God’s people] to God”; that is, he spoke of union with God 
in terms of the loving bond that knits all believers into the one Body of Christ (p. 163).  
McGinn and McGinn write, “Augustine’s insistence that true progress toward God must 
be thought of as social, that our pursuit of God is not a solitary effort, but one that takes 
place in the bosom of the church and by means of the exercise of loving charity toward 
all, is the core of his message” (p. 167). 
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 As a result, McGinn and McGinn assert that Augustine sought to harmonize the 
mutually enriching dimensions of Christian living—contemplation and action.  They 
conclude that there was a reciprocal relation between Augustine’s movement toward God 
and his movement toward neighbors: “No one should be so contemplative that in his 
contemplation he does not think of his neighbor’s needs; no one so active that he does not 
seek the contemplation of God” (p. 168; see civ. Dei 19.19). 
Like McGinn and McGinn, Thomas F. Martin (2003, 2005) explores the link of 
Augustine’s turning toward God with his turning toward others in his conversion 
experience.  Viewing Augustine’s conversion not as a single event but an ongoing 
“progress” (proficere, proficiens) (2005, p. 138), Martin emphasizes that Augustine’s 
conversion did bring him into a new relationship with God (“solitude”) and with other 
human beings (“community”): “The emphasis on interiority is matched by a just as 
insistent emphasis on the shared nature of Christian existence” (p. 137).  Along with his 
putting on the Lord Jesus Christ, Augustine embraced the ascetical life, foregoing 
marriage and family, wealth and career.  After he returned to Africa, his unexpected call 
to serve the church of Hippo Regius led him both to establish a Christian monastery there 
and to confront the historical and social milieu of the North African Church (see, 2003, 
pp. 21-50; 2005, p. 138).  While repudiating Gerhard Lohfink’s idea that Augustine had 
diverted “ancient Christianity from community to individualism” (2003, p. 47; see 
Lohfink, 1984, pp. 181-185), Martin pays attention to Augustine’s living of “ongoing 
conversion,” which was deeply rooted in the interplay of his sense of solitude and 
community (p. 47).  Martin argues, 
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Does Augustinian spirituality lead to a privatized spirituality?  While it is clear 
that Augustine privileges the heart and the journey within, he would be the first to 
decry any reading of him that would turn the Christian life into a solitary journey.  
It is always a shared pilgrimage, a community of fellow believers on a journey of 
faith to God. (p. 47) 
 
Clearly, Martin states that Augustine’s “emphasis on interiority, its intention is 
never meant to lead to an introverted spirituality” (p. 43); that is, Augustine’s concept of 
solitude never means individualism (p. 48).  For Martin, Augustine was “never 
journeying alone” but journeying with others, especially his friends (e.g., Alypius) as 
found in the Confessions (pp. 46-47).  Based on the dynamic interaction of God, self, and 
community, Augustine’s spiritual life was “imbued with a personalism that defuses its 
rigour and a sense of community that challenges all individualism” (p. 159; see pp. 61-62, 
88-89).  Martin contends that Augustine had struggled to follow God’s commandments of 
love of God and neighbor in his life, while serving his church and taking care of his flock.  
More specifically, Martin writes, 
[Augustine] explored in depth the relationship between love of God and love of 
neighbour, one result being his classic frui/uti distinction: God alone is to be 
loved as an end—effectively subordinating all other loves to this end.  Both 
enthralled and terrified with the scriptural affirmations that ‘God is love’ (1 John 
4.6) and Christ’s own description of the final judgement in terms of neighbourly 
love of the poor Christ (Matt. 25.31-46; see Sermons 389.5), Augustine 
consistently placed Jesus’ love command as the summation of the whole Christian 
life. (2005, p. 137) 
 
According to Martin, Augustine’s life was “a pilgrimage, demanding ongoing 
conversion, the taking up of new challenges, requiring an ever-fresh response to God’s 
call” and engaging in the historical and social context of the Christian community (2005, 
p. 138).  Martin echoes Augustine’s sensitive and insistent awareness that “there is a 
mysterious interpenetrating dynamism between self, God, community and grace” (2003, 
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p. 89).109  In emphasizing Augustine’s new spiritual “journey” (peregrinatio) for union 
with God and his new participation in the Christian community, Martin concludes that 
Augustine’s conversion was not only turning toward God, but also turning toward 
neighbors. 
In the same way, Raymond Canning (1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1993) probes the 
link of Augustine’s spiritual life with his encounter with Jesus’ two great commands—the 
love of God and neighbor.  Canning contends that Augustine viewed love for neighbor as 
“a step (gradus) to love for God” and as a “virtuous action cleansing the eye and the heart 
for contemplation” (1983, pp. 12, 31).  According to Canning, Augustine stressed a 
deeper unity of love for God and the neighbor: “Love of God can be tested in everyday 
practice of love of neighbour” (1987, p. 72).  That means that for Augustine, Christ is 
present in the poor generally—in any needy neighbor.  Indeed, to love this neighbor is to 
love God: “God and the neighbour are loved with one and the same love: the more we 
love God, the more we love ourselves, and consequently the more we are able to 
‘consider all that is mortal of no value in comparison to love for people by which we 
desire that they live righteously’” (p. 120; see 1984, pp. 146, 183, 197; Trin. 8.8.12).110 
                                                
109 Martin (2003) states, “Augustine’s emphasis on ‘a spirituality of the self’ fits into a particular 
historical context that seemed all too prone to eliminate the necessary tension between self and community.  
[Augustine] decried a dualistic and Gnostic Manichaeism that postured as true Christianity and dismantled 
human autonomy….God, self, and community are inextricably bound together in the spirituality of 
Augustine…However, to do so, to remove or isolate or separate God or self or community within the 
thought of Augustine would only result in a profound distortion of his spiritual vision” (p. 49). 
 
110 Russell J. DeSimone (1988) in “Augustine: On being a Christian” focuses on Augustine’s 
schemes of love of God and love of neighbor.  He writes, “Augustine’s Sermon on Christian Discipline is a 
call to live the Christian life, to be a true Christian by the faithful observance of the commandments of love 
of God and neighbor” (p. 20).  Likewise, Kevin Corrigan (2003) insists that for Augustine, love of our 
neighbor is “not only a challenge to be really human, but the deepest and most direct fulfillment of our 
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Importantly, Canning claims that the love of God and the love of neighbor stand 
in an analogous relation within the process of Augustine’s transformation.  According to 
Canning, while emphasizing the identification of the love of God with the love of the 
neighbor (see 1987, pp. 119-120), Augustine pointed out that “love itself makes God 
present” (1983, p. 48) and that “to love the neighbour is to follow Christ’s path to the 
Father which goes by way of the cross” (p. 50; see p. 5; 1986, p. 232).  As a result, 
Canning asserts that “[Augustine’s] turning to the neighbour form[ed] such an integral 
part of [his] turning to God” (1993, p. 420); that is, during the process of his spiritual 
change, Augustine’s sense of love of neighbor played a vital role within his movement of 
love toward God. 
Like Canning, Mary T. Clark (1984, 1990, 1999, 2000) examines an interaction 
between Augustine’s new relationship with God and his new commitment to the 
Christian community.  Clark pays attention to Augustine’s “continued conversion” in 
which he entered into “union with God, communion with his neighbors, and ministry to 
those in need of spiritual and material assistance” (1999, pp. 814-815).  For Clark, 
Augustine understood the love of God and neighbor as an essential Christian value in 
which God’s call to the inward life of love for God expands into a community life of love 
for one another (2000, p. 87-90); as such, the whole members of the Christian community 
could be “united in love of God, one heart, one soul” (1999, p. 815).  Clark contends that 
after his encounter with the Incarnate Christ in the garden of Milan, Augustine did not 
escape from the material or external world.  Rather, he had continuously applied the 
                                                                                                                                            
experience…because God delights in our delight in each other” (p. 106; see p. 103; Froehlich, 2004, pp. 5, 
11; Harrison, 2000, pp. 65-67, 96-100; Kreidler, 1990, pp. 516-520; Van Bavel, 1986, pp. 169, 177, 181). 
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meaning of “the Word made flesh” in the historical and social context of the Christian 
community (pp. 814-815).111 
Significantly, Clark shows how the personal and communal aspects of 
Augustine’s conversion belong together in the process of his transformation.112  
According to Clark, Augustine’s spiritual life was involved in “a longing for mystical 
union with God [and] it is firmly rooted in the biblical command to love one’s neighbor” 
(p. 815).  While Augustine as a layman, a priest, and a bishop lived in Christian 
communities, including his monastery and his church of Hippo of Regius, he realized that 
“an ‘interior life’ of love for God…externalized itself in [and expanded into] a 
community life of respect and love for one another” (2000, p. 92; see p. 87). 
As a result, Clark insists that during his process of spiritual transformation, 
Augustine actively responded to God’s calling.  This calling through God’s intervention 
in the Milanese garden enabled Augustine to establish a new relationship with God; this 
relationship with the divine also enabled him to enter into a new living with other people. 
In conclusion, there are various understandings of Augustine’s conversion 
experience in the field of theology of conversion.  Augustine’s conversion has been 
                                                
111 Clark (2000) depicts Augustine’s theme of loving dedication to God and neighbor as follows: 
“The biblical dedication of the self to God establishes the right order of love.  Since the love (caritas) 
poured into the hearts of the faithful at baptism is not merely a desire for the highest happiness but a 
participation in God’s generous love as manifested in the Trinitarian processions and in creation and in the 
incarnation of the Word of God, this love is directed toward that which is love-worthy—God, first of all, 
for his own sake, and then the self and neighbour as so dear to God as to have been made in his image and 
likeness” (p. 44; see p. 30; 1990, p. 30). 
 
112 Like Clark, Van Bavel (1986) pays attention to the communal aspect as well as the personal 
aspect of Augustine’s thought.  He writes, “Modern individualism contrasts with Augustine’s thought, 
which is basically corporative.  He envisions the whole present in the parts, and, conversely, the parts 
present in the whole.  Consequently, Christ is for him not only an ‘I,’ but also a ‘We.’  Christ incorporates 
us into Himself.  Through love, Christ is present, and mankind in Him” (p. 175). 
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regarded as a result of the transforming power of God’s grace, a turning from godlessness 
to God portrayed in the Bible, a change through ritual act of baptism within the Christian 
community, and a consequence through the mutual interplay between love of God and 
love of neighbor.  On the whole, theological studies of conversion have primarily 
emphasized the efficacy of encounter with God through divine grace in process of 
Augustine’s spiritual change. 
Indeed, the theological studies of Augustine’s conversion have contributed by 
articulating the impact of religious factors (especially the encounter with the divine) on 
the process of religious change.  While emphasizing the impact of the religious forces on 
Augustine’s transformation, they have primarily depicted the correlation between the 
experience of the self and the experience of the divine in the complex process of his 
spiritual change.  In that sense, they have profoundly elucidated how the divine 
intervention or grace—a primary factor—has affected the transformation of Augustine.  
As such, they have contributed by speculating a crucial relation between hearing the 
voice of God and reading a biblical text in Augustine’s conversion process as well as an 
inherent link between the ritual performance of Christian baptism (i.e., the Milanese 
baptismal liturgy) and Augustine’s spiritual change.  Moreover, while emphasizing the 
interaction of Augustine’s turning to God and his turning to others, these theological 
studies have contributed by demonstrating how the convert Augustine has moved into 
loving relationships with himself, others, and God; that is, how he has committed himself 
into both the service of God (i.e., Christian living in solitude) and the service of 
neighbors (i.e., Christian living in community). 
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As such, when we attempt to understand Augustine’s conversion, these 
theological interpretations strongly encourage us to recognize the impact of the 
transforming power of God’s grace on the healing of Augustine’s divided soul/will in 
light of the process of becoming a Christian.  In doing so, these interpretations lead us to 
look at how God intervened to transfigure Augustine through the word of God in the 
context of the culmination of his inner turmoil as well as how the Milanese baptismal 
liturgy was interwoven with Augustine’s transformation in terms of a movement of 
Augustine the catechumen, Augustine the petitioner, and Augustine the neophyte.  
Furthermore, they help us to pay attention to the ongoing transformative process of the 
convert Augustine in which he had continuously engaged in the connection with God as 
well as in the connection with God’s people in light of the reciprocity of his monastic life 
and his pastoral ministry.  However, on the whole, these theological studies of 
Augustine’s conversion have tended to consider the personal, social, and cultural factors 
as subordinate to the theological factor (e.g., sin and God’s grace) in the process of 
Augustine’s transformation.  As such, in order to foster a better understanding of 
Augustine’s conversion, the theological studies need to respect more human science 
approaches to Augustine’s transformation, while acknowledging the influence of the 
transforming power of the divine on the process of his spiritual change. 
 
V. Presenting Interdisciplinary Questions for Critically 
Extending the Contributions of the Literature 
 
 This section of the chapter attempts to formulate interdisciplinary questions for 
critically extending the contributions of the literature of Augustine’s conversion.  By 
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applying Rambo’s interdisciplinary framework, this section claims that the study of 
Augustine’s conversion is profoundly enriched by an interdisciplinary approach, which 
pays attention to the personal, socio-cultural, and religious contexts of his transformation.  
In order to understand the complexity and richness of the phenomenon of Augustine’s 
conversion, it proposes a main interdisciplinary question as follows: How might we 
investigate the interrelated influence of personal, social, cultural, and religious factors 
on the lifelong process of Augustine’s conversion?  
There is no common theoretical definition of Augustine’s conversion.  Previous 
studies have tended to explore Augustine’s conversion process from the perspective of a 
specific theoretical discipline.  This implies that there is a great demand for enhancing a 
mutually-informing conversation among theological and social scientific studies of 
Augustine’s conversion.  As such, the above interdisciplinary question leads us to respect 
the religious/theological approach to Augustine’s transformation while also incorporating 
the importance of personal, social, and cultural issues.  This question helps us to establish 
a more integrated understanding of Augustine’s conversion narrative in his Confessions. 
 Based on the main interdisciplinary question, this section of the chapter suggests 
the following six substantive and mutually-informing questions in order to facilitate a 
more accurate and effective investigation of Augustine’s conversion.  These questions 
provide us an insight into portraying a coherent picture of how multiple factors work 
together, simultaneously and cumulatively, in the process of Augustine’s lived experience 
of change. 
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A. How had Augustine’s psychological crises affected his earnest quests for knowing 
himself and the divine? 
 
 This question provides an insight into a connection between Augustine’s 
experience of psychological distress and his yearning for knowing himself and the divine.  
It attempts to demonstrate that Augustine’s conversion process might begin within the 
context of his restlessness of the heart—his “soul’s sickness”—which could not find a 
resting place on earth (e.g., conf. 7.7.11, 8.5.10).  As such, this question helps us to 
explore the process of Augustine’s interior transformation from the divided self to the 
integration of the self in relation to his profound experience with the divine (e.g., 8.12.28-
29). 
 
B. How were Augustine’s interior journey for union with God and his search for 
community with others knit together in the process of his conversion? 
 
 This question intends to demonstrate how turning to God is related to turning to 
neighbor in Augustine’s conversion experience.  It leads us to investigate a symbiotic 
relation between Augustine’s search for union with God and his search for others in terms 
of solitude and community (civ. Dei 19.19; f. et op. 16.17; s. 261.8).  This implies that 
Augustine’s conversion was deeply rooted in the reciprocal process of his love of God 
and his love of neighbor in light of his contemplation of God and his action for others. 
 
C. How had significant other people in the Christian community provided love, support, 
and belonging to fulfill Augustine’s psychological needs and to make up for his 
frustration with his deprivations in the social and cultural conditions of his time? 
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This question emphasizes intimate interactions between Augustine and other 
persons within Christian communities.  During the period of the depths of his agony and 
spiritual darkness, Augustine experienced loving care and support from other persons 
(e.g., Ponticianus [conf. 8.6.14-15] or Alypius [8.11.27]).  As such, this question provides 
us with an insight into examining how significant other persons (e.g., Ambrose [5.13.23-
5.14.25] or Simplicianus [8.2.3-5]) had affected Augustine to overcome his dualistic 
materialism (i.e., the Manichean belief [3.7.12]) and his skeptic thinking in the Academy 
(5.14.25) as well as how they supported Augustine to fill his (psychological) needs (e.g., 
a sense of belongingness) and to find a new way of life in the Christian community.  
Further, this question helps us to elucidate the influence of significant others’ conversion 
stories (e.g., conversions of Victorinus [8.2.3-5], Antony [8.6.14-15], and Ponticianus’ 
two friends [8.6.15]) on Augustine’s own conversion. 
 
D. How had Augustine reshaped his (personal and religious) identity, worldview, and 
belief through his ongoing interactions with others, through his participation in Christian 
communities, and through his experiences of cultural change? 
 
This question pays attention to the impact of institutional and cultural-
philosophical factors on the complex process of Augustine’s transformation.  It enables 
us to elaborate the influence of the Neoplatonic heritage (e.g., Plotinus’ concept of the 
soul’s ascent to the One [see conf. 7.10.16, 9.10.23-25; sol. 1.2.7, 2.1.1; Plotinus, enn. 
1.6.9]), Christian monastic movement (e.g., a type of the solitary hermitage of the desert 
anchorites—Egyptian monk Antony’s life [conf. 8.6.14-15]—or a type of the community 
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life of the cenobites [Possidius, v. Aug. 3, 5]), and the North African context on 
Augustine’s thought and his conversion process. 
 
E. How were Augustine’s interpersonal relationships, his God representations, and his 
encounters with God bound together in his conversion process? 
  
This question leads us to delve into the interplay of human relationships, the God 
representations, and the experiences of the divine in the process of Augustine’s 
transformation.  More specifically, it helps us to examine how Augustine’s 
(interpersonal) relationships might have affected and have been affected by his God 
representations, and how his God representations might have affected and have been 
affected by his experiences of the divine in the process of his conversion. 
In this dissertation, the God representation refers to an internal structure through 
which one’s experience of and relationship with God is mediated.  It is comprised of 
images, ideas, feelings, sensations, and memories that are unconscious as well as 
conscious.  The God representation evolves throughout the human life span, influenced 
by the complex and rich interplay of the person with personal, social, cultural, and 
religious forces.  There are three concurrent types of the God representation in the 
literature.  From a psychoanalytic object relational perspective,113 Ana-Maria Rizzuto 
                                                
113 Winnicottian object relational psychologists have implored how past interpersonal relationships 
shape relationships in the present, including the relationship with the sacred (Clair, 1994; Jones, 1991, 1996, 
2003; McDargh, 1983; Meissner, 1984; Schlauch, 1995, 2007; Ulanov, 2001; Winnicott, 1971).  Object 
relations theory emphasizes the significance of the earliest relational experiences in the formation of one’s 
personality as well as in the development of the God representation.  The studies of the interaction of 
human relationships, God representations, and the experiences of the divine are closely related to the 
following issues in the literature: the impact of human interpersonal relationships on formation and 
reformation of the God representation (Clair, 1994; McDargh, 1983; Rizzuto, 1979); the interplay of human 
psychological development with religious experience (Meissner, 1984); the interaction of a new sense of 
the self, the transformation of the God representation, and the experience of the sacred (Jones, 1991, 1996, 
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(1979) in The Birth of the Living God focuses on the impact of human interpersonal 
relationships on the formation of God representations during childhood, in addition to its 
transformations and utility throughout life (pp. 3, 177-201).   Rizzuto’s psychoanalytic 
research tends to emphasize almost exclusively on internally constructed and experienced 
representations of God.  Because Rizzuto limits herself to a discussion of the formation 
of the individual’s private representations of God (p. 3), she does not pay attention to the 
workings of an institution consisting of culturally patterned interactions with cultural 
representations of God, and she does not explore the relationship that many people 
develop with God as an external being in which they experience God as a real presence 
which transcends their representations.114  From psychological and anthropological 
perspectives, Melford E. Spiro (1982) in “Collective Representations and Mental 
Representations in Religious Symbol Systems” suggests a developed explanation of the 
representations of God, which includes both the cultural/anthropological (“collective”) 
element and the psychological (“mental”) element (p. 45).  Spiro claims that beginning at 
birth children develop socially-constituted conceptions of the world as a consequence of 
                                                                                                                                            
2003); the link between creative playing, imagination, and religiosity in transitional (“illlusionistic”) world 
(Pruyser, 1983); the interaction of the self with the lived experience in transitional process/space (Schlauch, 
1995, 2007).  In this dissertation, object relations theory helps us know how Augustine’s interpersonal life 
experiences might have influenced his personality and religiosity in his life span.  In doing so, it leads us to 
explore how Augustine’s conversion experience may enhance his play, imagination, creativity, and 
symbolization in the terms of the relational self and transitional space.  More specifically, it provides us an 
insight into exploring the correlation between Augustine’s divided self and his fragmentation anxiety, 
between Augustine’s abuse experience in childhood and his negative representation of God, between 
Augustine’s experiences of loving care by others, his experience of the divine, and his positive 
representation of God, and between Augustine’s creative playing and his conversion experience in light of 
the relational self, creative playing of imagination, and the transformation of the God representation in 
transitional space. 
 
114 John McDargh (1997) argues that God representations are not to be reduced to the collections 
of human object relationships “without leaving room for the possibility that the reality of God him/her/itself 
may be an essential contributor to the representational process” (p. 192). 
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transactions with parents or other primary caretakers.115  For Spiro, God representations 
are not only mentally and individually derived, but also collectively and culturally 
derived from one’s relationships within social groups.  From psychological and 
theological perspectives, Moshe H. Spero (1992) in Religious Objects as Psychological 
Structures proposes that there are two sources of God representations: 1) interpersonal 
relationships (an “anthropocentric” source) from an object relational perspective and 2) 
direct or indirect relationships with an objective God (a “deocentric” source) from 
Judaism’s view of religious experience.  For Spero, God representations are not only 
internally derived, but also externally derived from one’s relationship with God (p. xvi).  
Spero’s model includes a real Deity object in the external environment which is 
internalized.116  From an interdisciplinary and integrative approach, Rizzuto’s, Spiro’s, 
and Spero’s models give us insight into how we can explore together the individual, 
social/cultural, and deocentric representations of God for a more integrated understanding 
of religious conversion. 
 Augustine described his own God representations in his works, especially his 
spiritual autobiography—Confessions—when he (now a mature middle-aged adult) 
recollected his life history before God and his community members.  Augustine portrayed 
his traumatic injuries in childhood, his negative image of the self, and his negative God 
representations (e.g., his experiences of beatings at school and parents’ laughing at his 
                                                
115 Spiro (1982) emphasizes the human psyche at the center of anthropological inquiry, seeking to 
understand the psychological existence of human beings as an integral and dynamic part of social and 
cultural life. 
 
116 Spero’s model goes beyond Rizzuto’s model of the God representation which describes how 
internal God representations are formed from internalized human object representations. 
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stripes/God’s silence about it [conf. 1.9.14-15]; see Capps, 1990, 2004; Ferrari, 1974).  
While expressing his low self-esteem (e.g., 1.19.30), Augustine negatively characterized 
his representations of God as follows: 1) God as punishing—“And my reluctance to learn 
you used for a punishment which I well deserved: so tiny a child, so great a sinner” 
(1.12.19); 2) God as whipping—“I will not pass over in silence the acute pain of your 
chastisement” (9.4.12; 3) God as laughing—“So let the mighty and powerful laugh at our 
expense” (4.1.1). 
However, during the depths of his agony, Augustine experienced loving care and 
support from other persons (e.g., Ponticianus [8.6.14-15] or Alypius [8.11.27]).  During 
the depths of intellectual disruption in the Manichean dualistic materialism, he found a 
new way of life through his cultural change resulting in the reconstruction of his 
(personal and) religious identity, worldview, and belief (e.g., 7.12.18).  During the depths 
of spiritual darkness, he felt the initiating activity of God’s loving grace (e.g., 8.12.28-29).  
This means that Augustine re-created his relationships with himself, others, and the 
divine.  Through these relationships, he underwent progressive restoration and healing.  
Accordingly, his negative God representations were changed into the positive God 
representations as a loving, accepting, and encouraging Being.  As such, Augustine 
depicted 1) God as merciful—“then little by little, Lord, with a most gentle and merciful 
hand you touched and calmed my heart” (6.5.7); 2) God as caring—“I tasted you, and I 
feel but hunger and thirst for you.  You touched me, and I am set on fire to attain the 
peace which is yours” (10.27.38); and 3) God as healing—“By inward goads you stirred 
me to make me find it unendurable until, through my inward perception, you were a 
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certainty to me.  My swelling was reduced by your hidden healing hand, and my mind’s 
troubled and darkened eye, under the hot dressing of salutary sorrows, was from ‘day to 
day’ (Ps. 60:9) brought back to health” (7.8.12). 
 
F. How were Augustine’s relationships with himself, others, and the divine related to 
human development and spiritual maturity? 
 
This question provides us with an insight into realizing that to be converted means 
to be (properly) related with oneself, others, and the divine in terms of human 
development and spiritual maturity.  This implies that the conversion experience involves 
an ongoing process of one’s transformation to search for connection and negotiating 
disconnection and reconnection with oneself, others, and the divine in terms of the 
interaction of self-self, self-other, and self-divine relationships.  In this sense, this 
question demonstrates that Augustine’s conversion was a process of transformation 
(“turning”), which engaged in the new connection with himself, others, and God.  As 
noted earlier, the garden experience at Milan (conf. 8.8.19, 8.11.27, 8.12.28-30) enabled 
Augustine to make a new decision for reorganizing the rest of his lifetime.  During the 
process of his transformation, Augustine became reconciled to himself through his 
encounter with the divine (8.12.29) and he committed himself to the monastic life (9.2.2-
3).  Further, he actively responded to God’s calling and he participated with other 
community members in God’s mission to the world (i.e., his church ministry as a priest or 
bishop).  As such, this question clarifies how the personal, communal, and spiritual 
aspects of Augustine’s conversion belonged together in his transforming process in the 
light of a mutual interaction of human development and spiritual maturity. 
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In summary, due to the complexity and diversity of the phenomenon of 
Augustine’s conversion, scholars have offered diverse interpretations of his narrative of 
transformation.  From psychological perspectives, scholars have viewed Augustine’s 
conversion as an effort to resolve his oedipal conflicts, the process of unifying his divided 
self, or the process of self-becoming through his mental development and progressive 
maturity.  From social/communal perspectives, scholars have regarded Augustine’s 
conversion as a consequence of the impact of the conversion narratives of other people on 
his transformation (“a story within a story”), and a change through his interpersonal 
bonds and Christian friendships within the Christian community.  From cultural and 
philosophical perspectives, scholars have considered Augustine’s conversion as a result 
of the influence of Neoplatonism of Late Antiquity on his intellectual change, and a 
change through Christian monastic movements of the late fourth and early fifth centuries.  
From theological perspectives, scholars have understood Augustine’s conversion as a 
result of the transforming power of God’s grace, a turning through hearing the voice of 
God and reading a biblical text, a experience of rebirth or regeneration through the 
baptismal liturgy of Milan, and a lifelong transformation by way of his engagement in 
Christian life in love of God and neighbor.  Indeed, the contributions of the previous 
conversion studies have tended to remain isolation from one another (like tracks of a 
metropolitan train yard running parallel to each other), because the perspectives are 
established independently.  They have not critically integrated religious and social 
science perspectives for understanding his conversion. 
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In order to extend critically the contributions of the literature by bringing together 
various disciplines, this chapter offers the main interdisciplinary question how personal, 
social, cultural, and religious factors might have affected the unfolding process of 
Augustine’s conversion.  Following this main question, six substantive and mutually-
informing questions guide us to explore the complexity and richness of Augustine’s 
religious change, and thus demonstrate the benefits of constructing an interdisciplinary 
approach to the process of his transformation.  This dissertation will now attempt to 
establish an integrated account of Augustine’s lived experience of change. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AN INTEGRATED UNDERSTANIDNG OF  
AUGUSTINE’S CONVERSION 
 
 This chapter presents an integrated understanding of Augustine’s conversion 
process through the critical and mutually-informing conversation of personal, social, 
cultural, and religious dimensions within Rambo’s interdisciplinary framework.  In other 
words, it shows a coherent picture of how the complicated and multi-layered components 
of Augustine’s conversion process interact with and reinforce one another.  Following 
this reinterpretation, it proposes a holistic pattern of the conversion process from the 
Confessions. 
In Our Restless Heart: The Augustinian Tradition, Thomas F. Martin (2003) 
points out the complexity and richness of the re-readings of Augustine and his life as 
follows: 
What is most essential in facing the abundant new readings of Augustine is to 
keep these readings in conversation with one another as well as with Augustine’s 
own rich complex: Augustine the God-seeker, Augustine who ‘put on Christ’, 
Augustine the monk and pastor, Augustine the thinker, Augustine whose life was 
nourished by prayer and evangelical love, Augustine the historical figure, living 
in a real world with all of its blindness and all of its insight.  Any spirituality that 
claims the name ‘Augustinian’ faces the challenge and responsibility to take into 
account the ‘whole’ Augustine, joining him on that same journey that was closest 
to his own heart. (pp. 156-157) 
 
 In consideration of the diversity and richness of the understanding of Augustine 
and his life history, this study argues that the case of Augustine’s conversion experience 
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illustrates well the complex and multi-dimensional process of religious change.  As noted 
earlier, Augustine’s conversion was not simply “a [crucial] single event” in his life, but 
“an ongoing process” in which multiple factors worked together simultaneously and 
cumulatively (see Rambo, 1989, p. 60, 1993, p. 5; Rambo & Farhadian, 1999, p. 24), 
requiring the continuing transformation and dedication of his whole life (McMahon, 2006, 
p. 152).  This case of Augustine’s conversion enables us to look at the influence of 
personal, social, cultural, and religious components on the dynamic process of religious 
change.  In this chapter, the main interdisciplinary question and six substantive and 
mutually-informing questions help us to investigate the impact of complicated and 
multiple factors on Augustine’s conversion process as well as to demonstrate the benefits 
of formulating an interdisciplinary approach to the process of his whole change of life. 
 
I. Presenting a Coherent Picture of Augustine’s 
Conversion Process 
 
This section of the chapter accomplishes an integrated account of Augustine’s 
narrative of transformation.  More specifically, it presents a reinterpretation of 
Augustine’s conversion through the critical and collaborative dialogue of the personal, 
social, cultural, and religious dimensions.  This means that by critically extending the 
contributions of the literature, it depicts a more coherent and integrated picture of how 
the complex and multiple factors involved in Augustine’s conversion are knit together. 
Indeed, Augustine’s lived experience of conversion illustrates well the lifelong 
process of human transformation.  In “The Dynamics of the Will in Augustine’s 
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Conversion,” Judith C. Stark (1990) characterizes Augustine’s conversion as a 
progression and summarizes it as follows: 
Many years of searching, growing, and struggling preceded Augustine’s 
conversion in the garden in Milan in 386.  Augustine himself considers his first 
reading of Cicero’s Hortensius when he was nineteen years old to have been a 
decisive moment in his years of struggle.  Many other important elements 
contributed to Augustine’s intellectual, moral, spiritual and psychological growth 
and development from age nineteen until his conversion to Christianity when he 
was thirty-one years old.  Among these important elements, the following 
certainly merit consideration: Manicheanism, skepticism, Stoicism, 
Neoplatonism, as well as the influence of important persons in his life, for 
example, Ambrose and Simplicianus.  The full story of both the persons and ideas 
that influenced Augustine is best revealed by Augustine himself in his 
Confessiones. (p. 45) 
 
While emphasizing the complexity and richness of Augustine’s conversion, this 
section of the chapter articulates how and why the young Augustine converted to 
Christianity in the summer of 386 and what specific experiences led him to conversion.  
In doing so, it sheds light on the symbiotic relation between Augustine’s inner journey 
toward encounter with God and his sense of solidarity with others within Christian 
communities in terms of knowing oneself, others, and the divine.  Moreover, it elaborates 
how Augustine had gradually reestablished his identity, worldview, and belief by way of 
his affective interpersonal bonds and his intensified affiliations with 
religious/philosophical groups, impacted by Neoplatonism and Christian monasticism of 
the late fourth and early fifth centuries. 
 The portrayal of an integrated reinterpretation of Augustine’s conversion is based 
on Rambo’s systemic stage model of religious conversion which includes context, crisis, 
quest, encounter, interaction, commitment, and consequences.  It consists of the 
following main themes: 1) the macro and micro context of Augustine’s time; 2) the 
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experience of psychological distress and crisis; 3) the quest for knowing himself and the 
divine; 4) encounters with significant others and participation in Christian communities; 
5) the experience of cultural change related to the Neoplatonic heritage and the Christian 
monastic movement; 6) the experience of divine intervention and grace; 7) the acceptance 
of Christian baptism and the experience of the vision of Ostia; and 8) engagement in the 
service of God and God’s people.1  These themes are inherently interwoven in 
Augustine’s evolving process of transformation.  They demonstrate that Augustine’s 
conversion occurred in the relational contexts of himself, others, and the divine; as such, 
it took place within the personal/familial, social, cultural, and religious contexts of his 
time.  This implies that Augustine was involved in a web of relationships; in this 
meaningful web, he had experienced persons in the moment, persons from the past, 
persons about whom he’d been told or had read, and a divine agent all acting (and 
responding) in an unfolding process. 
 Now I invite you to “play” together for establishing a more coherent picture of 
Augustine’s conversion process.  While reinterpreting Augustine’s narrative of 
transformation, we need to imagine that we are chanters participating in a choral 
performance.  In order to demonstrate effectively the talents of personal voices as well as 
to show successfully the richness and meaning of the hymn itself, each person has to 
respect other people’s voices while listening to one’s own voice within the spirit of 
harmony and balance.  Like the cooperative performance of the members of the choir, we 
                                                
1 The interdisciplinary questions play a crucial role of the connection—a “bridge” or “glue”—
between the main factors of Augustine’s conversion in order to overcome isolation from one another; that 
is, they are helpful and beneficial for coordinating a range of main factors which work together in the 
unfolding process of Augustine’s religious change. 
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need to respect another person’s unique account of Augustine’s lived experience, and 
thus integrate a range of various voices (“interpretations”) of Augustine’s conversion. 
 
A. Macro and Micro Context of Augustine’s Time 
 For the first stage of Augustine’s conversion process, this section of the chapter 
focuses on the specific context of his time in order to help us accomplish a 
comprehensive account of his religious change.  More specifically, the exploration of the 
initial stage of the process of Augustine’s conversion helps us to understand the basic 
background and motif of his transformation as well as to establish a more coherent and 
integrated picture of his religious change.  It is consonant with stage 1—context—of 
Rambo’s model of religious conversion (1993, pp. 20-43).  As Rambo emphasizes 
context in the formulation of his model of religious conversion to depict the ecology of 
the conversion process, this study begins with the description of macro and micro context 
of Augustine’s conversion.  Augustine was born in the province of Numidia, North 
Africa.  Although he had greatly influenced the construction of Western culture, 
Augustine had remained a North African.  This means that he had lived in the Roman 
world of North Africa during all of his seventy-six years of life, except five years in Italy. 
There is the macro context of Augustine’s conversion which includes the social, 
cultural, religious milieu of North Africa.  In Augustine’s day, North Africa was an 
important place within the Roman Empire.  At that time, by cultivating the fertile plains 
in the Northern coastal region, North Africans had played a crucial role in supplying a 
tremendous amount of grain and olive oil to Romans.  In that sense, Brown (2000) 
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describes the plains of grain and olive in North Africa: “By the third century A.D., the 
high plains and valleys of the plateau—the old Numidia—where Augustine was born, 
had been planted with grain, criss-crossed with roads, settled with towns.  Even farther 
south, beyond the Aures mountains, a chain of forts guarded the boundary between 
intensive cultivation and its absence, on the very edge of the Sahara” (p. 7).  More 
specifically, Harrison (2000) points out the link between the rich plains of North Africa 
and the life of Romans as follows: 
Augustine’s Africa lay at the heart of the Roman Empire.  Its northern coast 
bordered the Mediterranean and its roads led to seaports whose busy traffic 
ensured that the roads ultimately led to Rome.  The traffic was largely one-way 
however, for Rome depended upon the fertile plains of the coastal strip for its 
bread—at least two-thirds of its wheat supply came from Africa—which it 
exacted as part of the land tax, or annona.  Huge granaries dominated the ports, 
their importance evidenced by neighbouring Roman garrisons. (p. 117) 
 
According to Harrison, Rome controlled about 140,000 square miles of North 
West Africa which was divided originally into four, and later, under Diocletian’s reforms, 
eight provinces that consisted of about 650 towns.  Carthage, its capital city, was one of 
the biggest and busiest places in the Empire in which a lot of ships had continuously 
carried wheat and olive to the port of Italy (e.g., Ostia or Naples) for Rome (p. 117). 
 In the context of the movement of the Romanization of the Empire (especially the 
era of Caracalla’s edict [212 A.D.]), North African society was influenced by Rome’s 
distinctive culture and civilization at which point North Africans, especially those of the 
coastal region near Mediterranean Sea, were gradually civilized and 
Latinized/Romanized.  However, inland areas (which were away from the fertile olive 
and wheat plains of the coast) were still predominated by the traditional village culture; 
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that is, they were proportionately less Romanized than coastal areas.  In these inland 
areas, Punic was still spoken, as opposed to Latin, and rural traditions and beliefs were 
more persistent (p. 117; see Lancel, 2002, pp. 5-6). 
As such, the exploration of the African social and cultural background is essential 
for understanding Augustine, his conversion, and his thought, as Lancel (2002) points 
out: “A large part of what motivated Augustine as an adolescent and young man cannot 
be understood unless we are sufficiently aware of both the cultural formation of his deep-
rootedness in Africa and the social milieu into which he was born” (p. 5).  As a North 
African, Augustine was deeply influenced by the African life-style and culture.  In this 
sense, John H. McClanahan (1957) looks at how the traditional Roman-African 
temperament had affected the formation of Augustine’s personality and his thought: 
The African temperament manifested itself in various ways in the experience of 
Augustine.  A strong licentiousness was nourished in the culture.  Among some 
Roman remains in a North African city this inscription has been discovered: “To 
hunt, to bathe, to play, to laugh—this is to live.”  In his early life Augustine 
apparently acted in the spirit of this motto.  Vigor and intensity were a part of the 
North African environment.  These characteristics are reflected in Augustine’s 
style of writing, in his vivid memory, in his strong and energetic will.  The 
climatic influence in the African provinces seemed to nurture a hardness and 
coarseness of fibre in the people.  It was evident in ecclesiastical controversy.  T. 
A. Lacey attributes the brutality displayed by [the young] Augustine in his 
treatment of women to this influence. (pp. 25-26; see Brown, 2000, p. 7) 
 
 According to McClanahan, in the North Africa of Augustine’s time, many people 
had sought relief from the lethargy and decay of the age by becoming sensual materialists.  
These people were popularly impacted by the distortion of the Epicurean philosophy that 
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was heavily rooted in a motto—“Live and let live; tomorrow we die” (p. 28).2  This 
means that such cultural and philosophical movement (which was deeply related to the 
rigidity of North African society [e.g., the issue of social class]) had compelled many 
African people to be satisfied with a sensual pleasure based on the materialistic attitude 
or life-style. 
In contrast to the movement of the sensual materialists, there was a different 
movement in North African society and culture which was profoundly related to 
(Christian) monasticism.  This means that for McClanahan, while repudiating the 
voluptuous approach to life, Christian monasticism had represented a deep quest for 
moral earnestness and purity.  The movement of monasticism had challenged the sensual 
materialists to escape from the drag of carnal life, to reformulate their self-image and the 
goal of life in the newly monastic ideal, and to enter into the spiritual and monastic life in 
solitude and/or community (see pp. 29-31).  Indeed, the Christian monasticism of 
Augustine’s time was rooted in the Egyptian monasticism of the desert.  In this sense, 
Harmless (2004) states, 
Christian Egypt has long been regarded as the birthplace of monasticism.  That 
view…is only partially true.  Still, its desert monasteries and its sage monks 
would imbue Egyptian Christianity with a distinctive flavor, and by the mid-
fourth century would earn it international fame.  The writings and example of 
these desert Christians would influence monastic life for centuries, both in the 
Greek East and in the Latin West. (p. 17) 
 
                                                
2 At that time, many adolescent and young people were deeply affected by the movement of 
sensual pleasure and materialism in African society.  For example, Alypius (who was a student of 
Augustine) was seriously involved in the entertainment of worldly games rather than studying: “The 
whirlpool of Carthaginian morals, with their passion for empty public shows, sucked [Alypius] into the 
folly of the circus games” (conf. 6.7.11). 
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In particular, both the anachoritic monasticism of Antony—Christian living in 
solitude—and the cenobitic monasticism of Pachomius—Christian living in 
community—were crucial for fostering Christian monastic movements of Augustine’s 
time in the Greek East as well as in the Latin West (Harmless, 2004, pp. 57-100, 115-
141; Harrison, 2000, pp. 177-193; Knowles, 1977, pp. 9-36; Markus, 1990, pp. 157-177; 
Walker, 1970, pp. 125-126).3  
Indeed, the exploration of the religious context of North Africa in Augustine’s 
time is also essential for understanding Augustine, his conversion, and his religious 
identity.  Harrison (2000) portrays the condition of early Christianity in North Africa: 
We know, in fact, very little about early Christianity in Africa.  Our first real 
evidence is the account of the seven men and five women from Scilli, somewhere 
in Numidia, who were brought before the Proconsul Saturninus in Carthage, in 
AD 180, for ‘refusing to swear by the genius of the Emperor’ and who were 
subsequently martyred.  Towards the end of the second century Victor I (189-99) 
became the first African Bishop of Rome.  Of course, we also have the work and 
witness of Tertullian (c. 160-c. 225) during the early, unsystematic period of 
persecution, and later, that of Cyprian (d. 258) who, after ten eventful years as 
Bishop of Carthage, including the periods of systematic persecution by Imperial 
edict, was martyred under Valerian.  That Cyprian was able to assemble 85 
                                                
3 David Knowles (1977) in Christian Monasticism pays attention to the first ‘fathers of the desert’ 
who had established “the golden age” of early Egyptian monastic life (330-440 A.D.).  In doing so, he deals 
with the lives of Antony and Pachomius who had greatly influenced the development of early Christian 
monasticism.  First, Knowles depicts Antony’s hermit life in the desert as follows: “St Antony (251-356), 
after long years of solitary life and more than one move further into the desert, became in his later years a 
renowned master whose saintly life and wise counsel attracted innumerable disciples and visitors.  His 
fame grew with his long life and was prolonged by the biography written soon after his death by the great 
archbishop Athanasius of Alexandria.  This became not only a spiritual classic, but an exemplar for all 
subsequent hagiography for a thousand years, and contributed more than any other agency to the expansion 
of monastic life” (pp. 12-13).  Second, Knowles also portrays the community life of Pachomius as follows: 
“Pachomius (286-346) was a convert from paganism as a young man, and after some years spent as a 
hermit felt the call to provide monastic life for the many.  [As] an organizer and administrator of the 
highest ability, he created with no preceding model a monastic congregation which had all the elements that 
were to be gradually rediscovered and applied by western founders many centuries later…Chastity and 
poverty were presupposed, and to these Pachomius added obedience in its specific from as a condition of 
community life…The monasteries were small towns of a thousand or two thousand inhabitants; they were 
divided into houses of thirty or forty” (pp. 13-14). 
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bishops to meet in council at Carthage is some indication of the contemporary 
extent in Numidia and the Proconsular Province. (p. 119)4 
 
As such, the conversion of the Emperor Constantine in 312 A.D. was crucial for 
facilitating a great change of early Christianity which was deeply related to a shift from a 
persecuted religion to an officially approved religion within the Roman world.  More 
specifically, after his conversion to Christianity, the Emperor Constantine (who was “a 
friend of the Church”) had declared freedom of religious belief and worship and had 
tolerated Christianity.  This means that he had prohibited public persecution by imperial 
legislation, at which point he had eventually attempted to establish Christianity as an 
acceptable official religion for Roman society.  In line with Constantine’s new religious 
allegiance, throughout the course of the fourth and fifth centuries, the post-Constantinian 
emperors had kept their official attitude for protecting and supporting the Christianization 
of the Roman world, except the reign of Constantine’s pagan nephew Julian (361-3) 
(although after the reign of Constantine, the Roman Empire was politically split into the 
West and East).5  In particular, the Emperor Theodosius I had systematically attempted to 
establish Christianity as an imperial Roman religion, and to wipe out paganism by 
imperial law in 391 (see Brown, 1995, pp. 3-5, 2000, pp. 207-239; G. Clark, 2004, pp. 
                                                
4 In a related vein, Gillian Clark (2004) in Christianity and Roman Society explores the 
persecution of early Christians within the Roman Empire.  Clark writes, “Jesus died on a cross: a public, 
agonizing death, legally inflicted by a Roman provincial governor as the standard punishment for rebels.  
For almost three hundred years, his followers were also at risk of legally inflicted death, sometimes as a 
public spectacle.  Roman law allowed Christians to be burned alive or thrown to wild animals or 
inventively tortured” (p. 38); “Christians were executed because their refusal to worship the Roman gods 
entailed refusal to obey the Roman authorities, and because they aroused suspicions of anti-social 
behaviour” (p. 39; see pp. 40-59). 
 
5 In Authority and the Sacred: Aspects of the Christianisation of the Roman World, Peter Brown 
(1995) views Christianization as “knowledge of yet another world-wide category of persons whose deeds 
were open to the eye of an effective goddess of the post-Constantinian age” (p. 3). 
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93-100; Fredriksen, 2006, pp. 587-589; Knowles, 1977, pp. 11-12; MacMullen, 1984, pp. 
43-51, 86-101; Markus, 1990, pp. 125-135; Walker, 1970, pp. 99-102).6 
In the context of Constantine’s conversion to Christianity and subsequent 
emperors’ toleration of Christianity, the movement of Christianization was widespread 
and far-reaching in Roman society.  In this sense, Robert A. Markus (1990) in The End of 
Ancient Christianity pays attention to the process of the Christianization of the Roman 
world in the fourth and fifth centuries (especially the half century from about 380 to 
about 430) in which Roman society had reached a climax of dramatic socio-cultural and 
religious changes.  Markus notes, “These two centuries correspond roughly to the 
timespan of the Christian Roman Empire in the West.  The starting point…is the age of 
the large-scale christianisation of Roman society at the end of the fourth century and the 
beginning of the fifth: the age of Theodosius I, of Augustine of Hippo and their 
                                                
6 Knowles (1977) examines the correlation between the conversion of Constantine and the end of 
the persecution of Christians.  Knowles states, “For more than a century after Pentecost Christians formed 
small and fairly compact groups in cities and towns, regarded by others with distaste and suspicion, and 
when their numbers increased they were liable to persecution and spoliation, but these were far less 
universal and continuous than was later generally supposed.  They were nevertheless sufficiently exacting 
to restrict membership of the church to serious believers, and to make of martyrdom, the supreme sacrifice 
of life, the height of a Christian’s glory and his ideal of perfection.  Towards the middle of the third century, 
however, the threat of persecution had receded and the numbers of Christians had increased.  Through 
persecution was to recur under Decius (249-52) and Diocletian (284-305) in a form fiercer than ever before, 
this was in a sense a desperate measure, and was immediately followed by the conversion of Constantine 
and the swift transformation of the Christian church from a persecuted and fervent sect into a ruling and 
rapidly increasing body, favoured and directed by the emperor, membership of which was a material 
advantage” (pp. 11-12).  Likewise, G. Clark (2004) explores the link of Constantine’s conversion with his 
new religious allegiance.  Clark notes, “How did this transformation [of Christianity] happen, in less than a 
century?  There used to be an accepted narrative that went like this.  In 312 Constantine won a victory that 
gave him access to Rome, and ascribed it to the support of the Christian god.  He chose the Christian 
church as a support-base, perhaps because of his upbringing and his personal conviction, perhaps because it 
offered an empire-wide network of preachers and congregations.  Nobody could have predicted an openly 
Christian emperor, but Constantine, and his son and successor Constantinus II, so strengthened the position 
of the church that the traditional religion came to be seen as unacceptable…[However] Julian the apostate, 
successor of Constantius, was the only post-Constantinian emperor to renounce Christianity, and his brief 
reign (361-3) showed that a pagan revival was no longer possible” (p. 94). 
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contemporaries.  The end-point is the time, more or less, of the ‘end of the Western 
Empire’, its fragmentation into the barbarian kingdoms of Europe” (p. xiii). 
Following the widespread process of the Christianization of Roman society, the 
North African Church had moved from the age of systemic persecution by Imperial edict 
to the new era of the publicly accepted Christianization in the Roman world.  This means 
that North Africans had entered into the preeminent transition from paganism to 
Christianity.  In a related vein, Harrison states, 
The question of just how far the Roman Empire was ‘christianized’ in 
Augustine’s time is…not an easy or straightforward one to answer.  We have seen 
just how limited Christianity’s influence was in some instances, especially in 
respect of its place in the traditional Roman town.  In its organization, jurisdiction, 
municipal offices and even its sense of identity, coherence, and public events, the 
Church seems to have played but a marginal role.  Legislation against paganism 
seems to have done little but secularize what was once understood on the basis of 
ancient religious traditions, but not to have Christianized them…[As such] the 
Church…came to affirm its identity and self-understanding, its sense of the sacred 
and its place in relation to the world. (p. 140) 
 
Indeed, the process of Christianization was complex and difficult in the Roman 
world, including North Africa.  It was continuously challenged by serious religious 
conflicts between Christianity and paganism (although Christianity was in the condition 
of toleration and became a state religion of the Roman Empire).  As Harrison points out, 
“Even in Augustine’s day…it is difficult to know exactly why people became Christian 
or to estimate just how widespread it was, especially where, for reasons of class, 
language, culture or geography paganism, or the old cults of Saturn and Ceres still held 
sway in people’s minds (and were, indeed, sometimes syncretistically mixed up with 
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Christianity)” (p. 119).7  During the late fourth and early fifth centuries, political unrest, 
social upheaval, and religious conflicts had continuously challenged “the Christianity of 
Church communities and those who ministered to them” (Kreidler, 1990, p. 509; see 
Harrison, 2000, pp. 132-157). 
Along with the exploration of the macro context of Augustine’s time, let us look 
at the micro context which includes the personal and familial milieu of the early and 
adolescent Augustine.  Augustine (Aurelius Augustinus) was born at Thagaste, which 
was a Roman provincial town in North Africa (b. vita. 1.6; ep. 126.7; Possidius, v. Aug. 
1).8  Like other Roman towns, Thagaste had officially protected and supported the 
movement of Christianization (that sometimes had used “religious coercion” in order to 
proselytize people to Christianity), in which there were serious religious conflicts 
between Christianity and paganism in North Africa.9  Harrison (2000) depicts the town of 
                                                
7 In the same way, Brown (1995) pays attention to the religious conflict between Christianity and 
paganism in the fourth and fifth centuries.  Brown writes, “Put briefly: the notion that a relatively short 
period (from the conversion of Constantine, in 312, to the death of Theodosius II, in 450) witnessed the 
‘end of paganism’; the concomitant notion that the end of paganism was the natural consequence of a long-
prepared ‘triumph of monotheism’ in the Roman world; and the tendency to present the fourth century AD 
as period overshadowed by the conflict between Christianity and paganism—all this amounts to a 
‘representation’ of the religious history of the age that was first constructed by a brilliant generation of 
Christian historians, polemicists and preachers in the opening decades of the fifth century” (p. 4). 
 
8 Michael M. Gorman (1984) in “Aurelius Augustinus: The Testimony of the Oldest Manuscripts 
of Saint Augustine’s Works” contends that St. Augustine’s name was Aurelius Augustinus and that 
Aurelius is the gentilitial name (pp. 475-480).  In this way, Lancel (2002) states, “In Antiquity, one’s name, 
and firstly that taken from one’s father, the gentilitial or clan name, gave an initial indication.  The use of a 
forename that had never been truly distinctive had fallen into disuse, and in the two-name system that 
tended to become the rule for anyone with no great ancestry, Augustine’s family name was Aurelius.  This 
almost certainly dates the Romanization of his forebears at the latest to the era of Caracalla’s edict (212).  
In 196, the son of Septimius Severus had received from his father the glorious name of Marcus Aurelius, 
who himself had it from Antoninus!  Augustine’s family had thus been Roman, from a legal standpoint, for 
at least a century and a half, and culturally no doubt even longer” (p. 5; see p. 480). 
 
9 Under these circumstances of religious conflict, later Augustine had struggled to find true 
philosophy or religion shifting from Manichaeism, through skepticism and Neoplatonism, to finally 
Christianity.  In that sense, while looking at Augustine’s intellectual development and his spiritual journey 
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Thagaste as follows: “Augustine’s birthplace, the small, rather insignificant, and 
traditionally Berber town of Thagaste (modern Souk Ahras), in the [south-]eastern part of 
Numidia, had, like many provincial towns from the second century onwards, undergone a 
slow but sure process of Romanization in its legal, administrative, and social life” (p. 118, 
italics added).  The region of Thagaste consisted of fertile plains in which people had 
widely cultivated lots of grain and olive.  This rural environment of Augustine’s 
hometown had deeply affected the early and adolescent Augustine’s development, at 
which point the young Augustine was familiar with the landscape of the plains of olive 
and wheat.  As Brown (2000) points out, “Forests of olive-trees had come to cover the 
hillsides of south[-eastern] Numidia.  [The adolescent and young] Augustine could work 
all night in Africa, his lamp stocked with plentiful supplies of the coarse African oil: it 
was a comfort he would miss during his stay in Italy” (p. 8).  (At this point, we should 
note that Augustine’s conversion to Christianity in the summer of 386 occurred in the 
Milanese garden which consisted of olive and fig trees.) 
 In the context of Romanization, Augustine’s forebears had lived in the south-
eastern part of Numidia of North Africa (although we are unable to know exactly when 
and why his Roman ancestors came from Italy to North Africa) (see Brown, p. 8; Lancel, 
p. 5).  His father, Patricius, was a Roman-African pagan.  He was only baptized on his 
deathbed (conf. 2.3.6, 3.4.7, 9.9.22); he was an affective man, but authoritarian and hot-
tempered (9.9.19) (because he might have been deeply impacted by the African 
                                                                                                                                            
within the context of the rapid and widespread socio-cultural and religious changes, Brown (2000) writes, 
“Not only did Augustine live in an age of rapid and dramatic change; he himself was constantly changing” 
(p. ix; see Wills, 2004, p. 5). 
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temperament of sensual pleasure and materialism—“The hunt, the baths, play and 
laughter: that’s the life for me!” [Brown, p. 7]).  His mother, Monica, was a sincere and 
earnest Christian who was born in a Christian family (9.8.17).  She was friendly, but 
strong-willed (9.9.19-21).  Augustine had siblings, including at least a brother, Navigius 
(conf. 9.11.27; b. vita 12) and a sister, Perpetua (ep. 211.4; Possidius, v. Aug. 26; see 
Bonner, 2002; Bourke, 1945).  Indeed, Monica had dedicated herself to bring up her son, 
the child Augustine, in the Christian living of faith; that is, Augustine drank in the name 
of Christ with his mother’s milk, at which point her devotion to Augustine had played a 
crucial role in his later spiritual life (conf. 1.6.7, 1.11.17; Brown, 2000). 
 Augustine had superior academic talents through elementary training at Thagaste.  
He went to advanced school at a neighboring town, Madauros, in order to learn oratory.  
However, at the age of sixteen, Augustine was unable to study more and returned home 
due to the lack of his family funds (conf. 2.3.5).  In a related vein, while paying attention 
to Patricius and Monica’s strong ambition for their son’s worldly successful career or life, 
Brown (2000) states, 
To be a full member of a Roman town, Augustine had to be free and civilized: he 
did not have to be rich.  His father, Patricius, was a poor man, a tenuis municeps, 
a burgess of slender means.  Augustine will grow up in a hard, competitive world, 
among proud and impoverished gentlefolk.  A classical education was one of the 
only passports to success for such men; and he narrowly avoided losing even this.  
His early life will be overshadowed by the sacrifices his father made to give him 
this vital education: Patricius and his family had to go poorly-dressed; he had to 
scrape; for one disastrous year Augustine found himself condemned to give up his 
studies at a pleasant ‘university-town’ at Madaura (or Madauros: modern 
Mdaourouch) to run wild in primitive Thagaste. (p. 9)10 
                                                
 10 During his schooling, Augustine was seriously burdened with his parents’ expectations for him 
to acquire worldly honor (conf. 1.9.14, 1.19.30, 2.3.8).  In that sense, Leo C. Ferrari (1974) notes, 
“Considering the traumatic circumstances under which the sensitive infant was so early in life goaded on to 
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 During his adolescence (especially at the time of his return from Madauros to 
Thagaste), Augustine (who was influenced by the African temperament of sensual 
materialists) entered into the turbulent life in which he amused himself by seeking for the 
life of sensual pleasures (e. g., his pear-stealing with his friends [2.4.9-2.6.12]).  At the 
age of seventeen, Augustine came to Carthage in order to study continuously under the 
financial support of his relatives.  In his stay in Carthage, Augustine met and fell in love 
with a young lower-class (and Christian) woman.  He had lived with this woman, whose 
name is unknown, for fifteen years, although Garry Wills (1999) suggests her name as 
“Una” based on the words—unam habebam—“I lived with a woman” (conf. 4.2.2) (p. 16).  
As such, his son, Adeodatus was born in 371 (4.2.2).  During the study of rhetoric, 
Augustine read Cicero’s Hortensius which compelled him into an earnest inquiry for 
truth and philosophy (3.4.7-8; sol. 1.10.17).  In the context of seeking for intellectual and 
spiritual comfort, he was also involved in Manichaeism.  During nine years, the 
Manichee Augustine had taken refuge within the Manichean sect in order to articulate 
conveniently the existence of evil by positing a conflict between God (the cause of all 
good) and matter (the source of the evil) (3.6.10-3.7.14, 7.5.7). 
 After his study in Carthage, Augustine (who became a Manichee and a 
rhetorician) returned to Thagaste in 375.  At that time, Monica felt a deep discontent with 
her son because Augustine had an unlawful marriage and accepted Manichean dualism 
against Christian belief.  Here Augustine attempted to convert his Christian friends to 
                                                                                                                                            
seek worldly fame and wealth through his oratorical talents, it is the less surprising that [the newly 
converted Augustine] later so violently rejected all these worldly ambitions” (p. 5). 
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Manichaeism (3.11.19).  Especially, the Manichee Augustine mocked an unnamed friend, 
who was baptized before death because he gravely fell ill (4.4.7-9).  After hearing the 
death of his unnamed friend, Augustine was very ashamed and decided to depart his 
home town (4.7.12).  While reflecting on the death of his unnamed friend, Augustine later 
regretted mocking the baptism of his friend and emphasized the correlation of Christian 
baptism with the remission of sins and the rebirth for the newness of life in Christ (bapt. 
3.14.19, 6.25.46; epp. 23.4, 55.2.3; s. 213.9). 
 Augustine came again to Carthage in 376.  As a great scholar, he acquired striking 
success of teaching and became a winner in the oratorical contest of Carthage (conf. 4.2.3, 
4.3.5).  During this time, Augustine began to doubt the intellectual and moral adequacy of 
Manichaeism.  In particular, after meeting with Faustus, the Manichaean bishop, 
Augustine lost respect for Manichean cosmology because he was not able to satisfy his 
intellect and the religious issues which were disturbing him (5.3.3-5.7.13).  In the context 
of his intellectual and religious frustration within the Manichean sect (as well as his 
feeling of disenchantment which resulted in the rudeness of his students), Augustine 
decided to move to Rome, although Monica stood against her son’s going away to a 
distant place (5.8.14-15). 
 Augustine arrived in Rome in the fall of 383 (5.9.16).  He suffered from a serious 
illness, but did not attempt to receive any Christian ritual of baptism—“I still remained 
sick in my sacrilegious heart, for though in such great danger, I had no desire for 
[Christian] baptism” (5.9.16).  This means that the young Augustine was in a serious 
condition of completely turning away from God as well as the traditional Christian belief.  
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After recovering his health, Augustine became a professor of rhetoric in Rome.  In the 
context of the strong support of the Manichee Symmachus as well as the problematic 
economic condition related to the non-payment of tuition by students in Rome, Augustine 
decided to move to Milan, the Western capital of the Roman Empire, in order to acquire a 
new professorship (5.12.22). 
Apparently, the depiction of the macro and micro contexts of Augustine’s time is 
preeminent for making a better understanding of the background and initial stage of his 
ongoing journey of change.  Under the far-reaching movement of Christianization in the 
Roman world relevant to Constantine’s conversion to Christianity, Augustine had lived at 
a time of transition from a classical pagan past to a new Christian empire.  Augustine’s 
conversion occurred within specific contexts; that is, the personal/familial, social, cultural, 
and religious contexts of his time had profoundly affected the whole process of his 
transformation.  This study moves forward to show how Augustine had undergone his 
psychological distress and crisis related to his divided self in the mind as well as his 
relational problems with others/Other. 
 
B. The Experience of Psychological Distress and Crisis 
Consistent with the exploration of the macro and micro contexts of Augustine’s 
conversion, this section of the chapter describes the young Augustine’s psychological 
distress and crisis in the ongoing process of his transformation.  In doing so, it 
demonstrates how Augustine’s psychological distress and crisis was relevant to his inner 
division of the mind and his relational problems with others and the divine.  This section 
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is resonant with stage 2—crisis—of Rambo’s model of religious conversion (1993, pp. 
44-55).  As Rambo views the crisis stage as catalyst for human change, this study regards 
Augustine’s experience of psychological distress and crisis as the initial and crucial 
trigger of his transformation. 
The portrayal of Augustine’s psychological distress and crisis helps us to 
construct a more integrated account of the unfolding process of his change.  By way of 
Rome, Augustine, as a Manichee and a skeptic, came to Milan in the autumn of 384.  
Here Augustine had a strong desire for a worldly successful career or life and eventually 
became a municipal chair of rhetoric (conf. 5.13.23).  As Capps (2007a) portrays, “His 
father’s soul [of sensual pleasure and materialism] was now dominant in him” (p. 562).  
However, the young rhetorician Augustine had experienced a sense of the inner division 
in his mind which was deeply related to the sickness of the soul, as James (1902/1982) 
points out: “[He was] distracted by the struggle between the two souls in his breast, and 
ashamed of his own weakness of will…[in the condition of] the shackles of 
sensuality…Augustine’s psychological [distress and crisis] has given an account of the 
trouble of having a divided self” (pp. 171-172).11  Augustine himself confessed, 
The new will, which was beginning to be within me a will to serve you freely and 
to enjoy you, God, the only sure source of pleasure, was not yet strong enough to 
conquer my older will, which had the strength of old habit.  So my two wills, one 
old, the other new, one carnal, the other spiritual, were in conflict with one 
                                                
11 In this way, Robert J. O’Connell (1969) in St. Augustine’s Confessions: The Odyssey of Soul 
explores the opposed two wills of Augustine.  O’Connell’s writes, “The root of this inner division is a 
‘sickness of the mind’ which, through ‘supported by Truth, does not wholly rise up since it is heavily 
encumbered by habit’ (VIII, 21) and therefore neither ‘wills completely nor…refrains completely from 
willing’” (p. 97). 
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another, and their discord robbed my soul of all concentration. (conf. 8.5.10; see 
8.10.22-24)12 
 
 Augustine’s interior world was a battle-ground in which two deadly hostile 
selves—one actual and the other ideal—were at war (Capps, 2007a, pp. 560-562; see; 
O’Connell, 1969, pp. 96-98; Quinn, 2007, pp. 448-453).  This means that the restless 
Augustine had vigorously struggled “between the two souls” in his mind.  He did not do 
the good he wanted, but did the evil he did not want, as the Apostle Paul says: “I do not 
understand my own actions.  For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate” 
(Rom 7:15; see 7:19).  The more Augustine had sought for sensual pleasures and worldly 
honors, the deeper he (who was an “injured narcissist”) had undergone a sense of 
disconnection—shame experience—and a feeling of restlessness in his heart (see Capps, 
1983, 1985, 1990, 1993, 2004, 2007b; Dixon, 1999; Gay, 1986; Nino, 1990; Paffenroth, 
2003; Parsons, 1990). 
Importantly, there is an inherent link between the young Augustine’s 
psychological distress/crisis and his early traumatic injuries within the specific personal 
and familial contexts of his childhood.  In that sense, this study attempts to investigate the 
following two crucially life-effective events of Augustine in his early life (which were 
profoundly related to the formation of his personal and religious identity as well as his 
inner division of the mind): 1) Augustine’s experience of beatings at school and his 
parents’ mocking at his stripes/God’s silence about it; and 2) Augustine’s familial 
                                                
12 Augustine depicted his inner division of the mind as follows: “In the middle of that grand 
struggle in my inner house…I had vehemently stirred up with my soul in the intimate chamber of my heart, 
distressed not only in mind but in appearance” (conf. 8.8.19). 
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conflict related to the religious difference between his father (who was a pagan) and his 
mother (who was a Christian). 
 In the school life of his childhood, the boy Augustine was frequently beaten by 
teachers, although he was an able and competitive student at school (conf. 1.9.14-15).  In 
this time of Augustine, corporal punishment was widespread in schools, as Augustine 
himself stated: “This method [of corporal punishment] was approved by adults [in the 
Roman world], and many people living long before me had constructed the laborious 
courses which we were compelled to follow by an increase of the toil and sorrow” 
(1.9.14).  In the milieu of corporal punishment in schools, Augustine’s early experiences 
of beating were painful and unbearable for him.  Like other adults, Augustine’s parents 
had not paid attention to his difficult schooling which was rooted in his beating 
experiences.  Rather, they had critically mocked at his physical stripes—“My parents, 
who wished no evil to come upon me, used to laugh at my stripes, which were at that 
time a great and painful evil to me” (1.9.14).  In the context of his fear of being beaten as 
well as his feeling of being ignored, the boy Augustine had attempted to pray to God in 
order to receive God’s help.  This means that through God’s help, Augustine wanted to 
escape from his intolerable condition of beatings.  However, here the early Augustine had 
experienced God’s deep silence about his prayer because he was still beaten at school and 
because he was laughed by his parents at home: “O God, my God, ‘what miseries I 
experienced’ at this stage of my life…I was beaten…As a boy I began to pray to 
you…Though I was only a small child, there was great feeling when I pleaded with you 
that I might not be caned at school.  [However] you did not hear me” (1.9.14).  Later the 
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aged Augustine described his painful memory related to his traumatic experiences of his 
schooling as follows: 
Children are compelled, by dint of painful punishments, either to learn a craft or 
to acquire a literary education.  And the process of learning with its attendant 
punishment is so painful that children not infrequently prefer to endure the 
punishments designed to compel them to learn, rather than to submit to the 
process of learning.  In fact is there anyone who, faced with the choice between 
death and a second childhood, would not shrink in dread from the latter prospect 
and elect to die? (civ. Dei 21.14) 
 
 Significantly, there is a correlation of Augustine’s beating experiences in his 
childhood with the formation of his personality and his God representations.  Augustine’s 
traumatic injuries (“emphatic failures” or “internalized bad objects”) had negatively 
impacted the formation of his self-image as well as the formation of his representations of 
God in light of the interaction of a deep sense of self-reproach, inability to relate to 
others/Other, and suffering (Capps, 1985, p. 127, 1990, pp. 72-74, 2004, p. 136; Dixon, 
1999, pp. 54-57, 131-132; Dodds, 1927-1928/1990, p. 45; Ferrari, 1974, pp. 2-8).  More 
specifically, Augustine’s early traumatic experiences had compelled him to establish his 
low self-esteem as well as his deep sense of disconnection or isolation.  In that sense, 
while paying attention to the interrelatedness between Augustine’s early experiences of 
floggings and his enduring sense of shame in his life, Donald Capps (1990) states, 
The traumatic aspect of [Augustine’s childhood experiences of being beaten] was 
more related to shame than to guilt...The most painful feature of the beatings was 
not the physical pain inflicted by his teachers, but the mocking laughter of his 
parents when he reported the floggings to them.  The physical pain soon subsided, 
but he was never quite able to come to terms with his parents’ mockery, as he 
remained sensitive to ridicule throughout his life.  It was the ridicule he endured, 
more than the flogging itself, that sowed his “first seeds of disenchantment with 
the adult world.”  In other words, the trauma he experienced at the time was the 
trauma of shame. (p. 72) 
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 As such, the early and adolescent Augustine had negatively depicted himself as “a 
wretched boy” (1.19.30), “the lowest of the low” (1.19.30), “the most wicked slave of 
evil lusts” (4.16.30; see 2.2.4, 4.6.11), or “so great a sinner” (1.12.19).  At that time of his 
feeling of low self-esteem and his sense of negative self-image, Augustine’s early 
traumatic experiences had also compelled him to formulate the negative representations 
of God.  In that sense, Leo C. Ferrari (1974) in “The Boyhood Beatings of Augustine” 
writes, 
The irate schoolmaster of Augustine’s infancy…becomes the scourging God who 
purifies his soul through the many punishments of life.  In this regard it is to be 
noted that a favoured theme of the Confessions is that of the scourging God (p. 
7)…Again, there are grounds for arguing that the traumatic terror of his first 
floggings as a very young schoolboy contributed to an enduring sense of 
culpability and the formation of a temperament disposed to self-reproach and 
suffering.  It would seem that these characteristics can be found in his writings, as 
well as in his frequent use of the image of the scourging God. (p. 14) 
 
 Indeed, Augustine’s negative representations of God were inherently rooted in his 
experiences of God’s silence or indifference to his prayer in the context of his 
unendurable experiences of beatings.13  Now the adolescent and young Augustine had 
portrayed 1) God as scourging—“You, Lord, put pressure on me in my hidden depths 
with a severe mercy wielding the double whip of fear and shame” (8.11.25; see 1.12.19, 
2.2.4, 5.9.16, 6.6.9, 9.4.12); 2) God as mocking—“I aspired to honours, money, marriage, 
and you laughed at me” (6.6.9; see 4.1.1); 3) God as indifferent—“As a boy I began to 
pray to you…[but] you did not hear me…[when] adult people, including my 
parents…used to laugh at my stripes” (1.9.14; see 5.9.16); and 4) God as wrathful—“You 
                                                
 13 Capps (1990) notes, “When the [boy] Augustine first experienced flogging as an experience of 
shame…he felt, at best, God had abandoned him, and, at worst, was joining with his parents in mocking 
laughter…He had noted that God must be ‘laughing’ at him for asking questions for which there are 
presumably no answers” (p. 73). 
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beat me with heavy punishments…My stiff neck took me further and further away from 
you.  I loved my own ways, not yours” (3.3.5); “You had not yet forgiven me in Christ 
for any of them, nor had he by his cross delivered me from the hostile disposition towards 
you which I had contracted by my sins” (5.9.16; see 1.12.19, 2.2.4, 4.6.11, 8.7.18, 9.4.12). 
 Along with the exploration of the impact of the early Augustine’s traumatic 
experiences of beatings on the formation of his self-image and his representations of God, 
this study articulates how Augustine’s familial conflict (which was rooted in the religious 
difference between his pagan father and his Christian mother) had affected the formation 
of his personal and religious identity as well as his psychological distress and crisis.  
Indeed, there was no serious hostility between Augustine’s father (Patricius) and his 
mother (Monica) because she (who was mild and patient) had wisely acted to foster a 
good relationship with her husband as well as to reduce problems within the familial 
context (9.9.19-20, 9.13.37).14  Later Augustine recalled and described the tolerant 
attitude or suitable relation of his mother with his father as follows: 
                                                
 14 As discussed in chapter four, within Freud’s psychosexual framework of the Oedipus complex, 
most of the Freudian scholars of Augustine’s conversion (e.g., Kligerman [1957/1990]; Bakan [1965]; 
Dittes [1965]) contend that Augustine’s guilt feelings and neurotic behaviors were deeply related to the 
contrariety of having a pagan father and a Christian mother.  They have viewed the parental conflict in the 
familial milieu of the child Augustine as neurotic and pathological.  However, from a psychological and 
historical perspective, Daly (1978) asserts that Freudian scholars have not provided sufficient evidence of 
serious hostility between Augustine’s father and his mother (see Fredriksen, 1978; O’Meara, 2001; Rambo, 
1982).  While paying attention to Daly’s emphasis on no fundamental hostility between Patricius and 
Monica, we need to recognize that there were commonly “mixed marriages” in the Roman world of 
Augustine’s time like that of Patricius and Monica (Starnes, 1990, p. 166) and that there still existed the 
African temperament of sensual pleasures in North African society based on the materialistic life-style 
(conf. 6.16.26; McClanahan, 1957, pp. 25-28), although the far-reaching movement of Christian 
monasticism took place in the Roman world (Harmless, 2004; Harrison, 2000; Knowles, 1977; Markus, 
1990; Walker, 1970).  This means that the parental conflict of the child Augustine was deeply related to 
religious difference which was involved in their different personalities and worldviews within the socio-
cultural and philosophical context of the fourth and fifth centuries.  In that sense, the different religiosity or 
worldviews of Augustine’s parents was not simply a neurotic and pathological conflict within the 
psychosexual framework of his family, although this difference could be an intractable and problematic 
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She [Monica] tried to win him [Patricius] for you, speaking to him of you by her 
virtues through which you made her beautiful, so that her husband loved, 
respected and admired her.  She bore with his infidelities and never had any 
quarrel with her husband on this account…She knew that an angry husband 
should not be opposed, not merely by anything she did, but even by a word.  Once 
she saw that he had become calm and quiet, and that the occasion as opportune, 
she would explain the reason for her action, in case perhaps he had reacted 
without sufficient consideration. (9.9.19) 
 
 However, basically agreeing with Dodds’ and Capps’ views on the correlation of 
the origins of Augustine’s divided self with his family history,15 this study contends that 
to some extent, there was an inevitable familial conflict which was inherently related to 
the religious difference between the pagan Patricius and the Christian Monica, although 
Patricius had respected Monica’s faith and left the raising of the children to her (1.11.17).  
As such, Monica had undergone an uncomfortable religious conflict between her husband 
and herself, although it was not explicitly and vigorously within the context of the whole 
family.  Later Augustine recalled and described this religious conflict of his parents as 
follows: “At the end when her husband had reached the end of his life in time, she 
succeeded in gaining him for you.  After he was a baptized believer, she had no cause to 
                                                                                                                                            
issue within his specific familial context.  Here we need to remind that different religiosity and worldviews 
(which was profoundly related to many “mixed marriages”) were widespread in the North African society 
of Augustine’s time, although the movement of Christianization occurred in Roman society after the 
Emperor Constantine’s conversion to Christianity in 312.  As such, the religious difference or conflicting 
worldviews of Augustine’s parents had involved not only a problematically familial issue, but also an 
intractably socio-cultural and philosophical issue of the Roman world. 
 
 15 While confirming E. R. Dodds’ statement that “the origins of [Augustine’s] conflict are to be 
looked for in his family history” (1927-1928/1990, p. 44), Donald Capps (2007a) in “Augustine’s 
Confessions: The Story of a Divided Self and the Process of Its Unification” explores why the young 
Augustine’s self was disrupted.  In emphasizing the link of the young Augustine’s divided self with his 
early family context, Capps insists that the division of Augustine’s self “was due to the fact that he was 
raised by parents of very different personalities and conflicting worldviews” (p. 559).  In particular, Capps 
asserts that the religious difference of Augustine’s parents led to serious parental conflict which was crucial 
for the development of Augustine’s personality (pp. 559-561; see Dodds, 1927-1928/1990, pp. 44-45; 
Kligerman, 1957/1990, p. 98).  In a related vein, James (1902/1982) writes, “You all remember his 
[Augustine’s] half-pagan, half-Christian bringing up at [Thagaste]” (p. 171). 
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complain of behaviour which she had tolerated in one not yet a believer” (9.9.22, italics 
added).  As earlier noted, in the childhood of Augustine, Patricius (whose name was 
common in the Roman world) was a pagan; he was hot-tempered and licentious because 
he might have been more influenced by the African temperament of sensual pleasure and 
materialism than the movement of Christian monasticism.  Unlike Patricius, Monica 
(whose name was deeply related to a religious deity) was a devout Christian who might 
have been more affected by Christian monasticism than the licentious and material 
movement of North African society.  As Lancel (2002) points out, “Although his father’s 
name, Patricius, is one of the common-or-garden [variety] Latin names of the Late 
Empire, his mother’s, Monnica (Monica), which occurs particularly often in the region, is 
the diminutive of Monna, a well attested indigenous name which also belongs to a local 
deity whose cult is mentioned on an inscription at Thignica” (p. 5).  His mother, Monica, 
attempted to raise the child Augustine as a faithful Christian (conf. 1.6.7).  In the context 
of his Christian mother’s rearing of the child Augustine (as well as in the process of 
Christianization of the Roman world), Augustine began his life as a catechumen—“I was 
already signed with the sign of the cross and seasoned with salt from the time I came 
from my mother’s womb” (1.11.17; see Chadwick, 1991a; Bourke, 1945; Brown, 2000). 
 As such, the religious difference or conflict of Patricius and Monica (which was 
involved their different personalities and worldviews) had affected the formation of the 
early Augustine’s personality, his religious identify, and his mental development.  At this 
point, Capps (2007a) states, 
Augustine’s father, Patricius, a civil servant of the Roman state, was a sort of 
magistrate or tax collector-and a pagan.  The mother, Monica, later St. Monica, 
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was a devout Christian from a Christian family.  This religious difference led to 
intense parental conflict which was decisive for Augustine’s entire development 
(p. 559)…Augustine had the misfortune to be the fruit of this ill-assorted 
union…It was his tragic destiny to combine in a small and sickly body the 
warring souls of both his parents and a fastidious intellect which served each soul 
in turn. (p. 561; see Dodds, 1927-1928/1990, pp. 44-45) 
 
 The child Augustine might be deeply influenced by his father’s temperament of 
North African society which preferred to seek sensual pleasure within the materialistic 
life-style, at which point the adolescent and young Augustine had continuously tried to 
establish an external and worldly success as well as to achieve his gratification within his 
voluptuous life-style (“Epicurean pleasure” [conf. 6.16.26]).  As O’Meara (2001) says, 
“For the important first sixteen years of his life [Augustine] cannot have escaped 
altogether from the influence of his father” (p. 213; see Sun, 1998, p. 214).  (At this point, 
we are able to realize that the concubinage of the young Manichee and skeptic Augustine 
might be inherently connected to his North African temperament of sensual pleasure or 
materialism [4.2.2, 6.15.25].)  Meanwhile, the child Augustine might also be impacted by 
his mother’s raising or life-style of Christian faith which was centered in the quest for 
moral earnestness and purity, as Quinn (2007) points out: “The seeds [of Christian faith] 
may have been implanted as part of the Christian teaching gathered from Monica’s 
informal instructions” (p. 327; see Sun, 1998, p. 214).  In this way, we are able to 
recognize that Monica’s child-rearing and her expectation for his son within the Christian 
faith had later deeply affected both the young Augustine’s spiritual change in the 
Milanese garden in 386 and the new convert Augustine’s living in Christian faith for the 
rest of his life. 
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 Influenced by his father’s temperament of sensual pleasure and materialistic life-
style as well as his mother’s life-style of moral earnestness and purity, the adolescent and 
young Augustine had continuously involved his inner struggles between the licentious 
life and the moral/ascetic life.  This means that Augustine was conflicted between the 
dissonant and fragmented life-styles of carnal pleasure and moral purity.  More 
specifically, Augustine (who was “a slave of lust” [6.15.25]) had vigorously attempted to 
satisfy his desires of sensual pleasure (by using concubinage—1) his first concubine 
[4.2.2]; his second concubine [6.15.25]) and worldly ambitions (e.g., a victory of a poetry 
competition at the theatre [4.2.3]; a desire of higher position of the Empire [6.15.25]).  At 
the same time, he had earnestly attempted to seek for the philosophical and religious truth 
or the Truth (e.g., the reading of Cicero’s Hortensius in Carthage [3.4.7-8]; the learning 
of Neoplatonism in Milan [7.10.16]).  In the summer of 386, here Augustine had 
seriously experienced his division of the will; that is, he was involved in the worst 
fragmentation or split of the self, at which point he had felt a sense of deep estrangement 
or restlessness of the heart. 
 In the context of his psychological distress and crisis, Augustine had also 
undergone relationship problems with others; namely, he had felt a lack of ability to 
relate with others, as later he recalled and described: “I was on the way to the 
underworld, bearing all the evils I had committed against you, against myself, and against 
others” (5.9.16); “all positions are uncomfortable” (6.16.26).  Indeed, at the time of his 
relationship problems with himself and the divine, the adolescent and young Augustine 
had experienced disruptions of relationships with other people, including his critical 
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mocking at the Christian baptism of his unnamed friend (4.4.7-9), his trouble with 
Monica due to his Manichean belief and his concubinage (3.11.19), his dissatisfaction of 
the academic meeting with Faustus (5.3.3-5.7.13), the separations from his students in 
Carthage (5.8.14) and Rome (5.12.22), and no delight or interest of dialogues with his 
friends—“In my somber state I did not consider from what fountain came the flow of 
delightful conversation with friends’’ (6.16.26). 
 Consistent with his above relational problems with others, now Augustine had 
undergone another serious disruption of the relationship with his “unlawful” wife.  More 
specifically, at the time of his inner division of the will, Augustine had struggled with the 
issue of the dismissal of his unmarried wife (“a long-term partner”) because she was a 
hindrance to his legitimate marriage with a woman of a higher class as well as to his 
ambitions for worldly fame and money.  After arriving in Milan, his mother, Monica 
(who had supported her son, Augustine, to be a worldly successful man within both the 
condition of the poor economy and the condition of the absence of her husband [conf. 
3.4.7]) had persuaded Augustine to discharge his unlawful wife, as Elizabeth A. Clark 
(1999) points out: “Monica was eager for her son to undertake a [legitimate] marriage 
suitable to his career ambitions” (p. 68).  In the condition of his mother’s demand of 
discharge, the young rhetorician Augustine had finally dismissed his son’s mother (who 
had lived for fifteen years [371-386]) in order to undertake a marriage with a young noble 
woman for achieving a higher status in the Empire (e.g., a governor of the province).  As 
such, Augustine’s unlawful wife (whose name was unknown) returned to North Africa, 
vowing never to live with another man again—continence—and leaving their son with 
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Augustine (6.15.25), as Brown (2000) states: “This nameless woman [came back] to 
Africa…In all probability she had been a good Catholic throughout her life with 
Augustine; and, by this vow, she intended either to become eligible for baptism, or to be 
re-admitted to the Eucharist” (p. 80; see p. 52; Chadwick, 1986, pp. 15-16; O’Donnell, 
1992, II, pp. 383-385).  Apparently, the departure of his beloved woman had compelled 
Augustine to enter into the depths of agony and misery, as Asiedu (2003) points out: 
“When his concubine departs [Augustine] tries to soften the blow by seeking the embrace 
of another woman.  Instead what he discovers is a misery much deeper and more 
intolerable” (p. 304).  Later the mature adult Augustine recalled that he had dearly loved 
his unmarried wife, and that he underwent psychological distress and existential abyss 
due to his separation with his woman, although he (who was “not a lover of [lawful] 
marriage”) began to live with her in the condition of “a slave of lust.”  More specifically, 
Augustine stated, “In those years I had a woman [in Carthage].  She was not my partner 
in what is called lawful marriage.  I had found her in my state of wandering desire and 
lack of prudence.  Nevertheless, she was the only girl for me, and I was faithful to her 
(4.2.2)…[Now] my heart which was deeply attached was cut and wounded, and left a 
trail of blood…She left with me the natural son I had by her…I was unhappy, incapable 
of following a woman’s example [of continence]” (6.15.25). 
Basically agreeing with Garry Wills’ argument (1999) that Augustine did love his 
woman to whom he had been faithful for so long,16 this study contends that Augustine’s 
                                                
 16 In Desire and Delight: A New Reading of Augustine’s Confessions, Margaret R. Miles (1992) 
contends that Augustine did not love his long-term companion.  In that sense, Miles portrays Augustine’s 
woman as a concubine who had lived with him for satisfying his sexual desires.  She notes, “The pseudo 
nourishment of the habit of concupiscence [of Augustine] is nothing but the gratification of a repetition 
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disruption of relationship with his unlawful wife was crucial and fatal because his inner 
division or restlessness of the heart grew worse.  As F. B. A. Asiedu (2003) states, “The 
concubine makes a vow to God to live a life of continence…[At least] Augustine does 
not get reconciled to…his concubine until the day of his conversion in 386 when…he 
embraces continence” (p. 304).  Augustine himself was entirely silent about the name of 
his unlawful wife in his whole life, including the period of his writing of the Confessions, 
(although he might know her name).  Augustine’s deep silence about her name or her 
being itself was inherently related to his sense of disconnection and estrangement—the 
peak of shame experience—namely, his deep silence was involved in his deep agony and 
pain for a long time.  This means that Augustine’s inner conflict of the mind as well as 
his relational problem with others were culminated at the time of his dismissal of the 
unlawful wife in order to marry an aristocratic heiress for gaining his worldly honor.  As 
Eric Plumer (2003) points out, “[Augustine’s] pain over her dismissal was very great and 
did not heal over time, but instead turned into ‘a cold despair’” (p. 105).17 
                                                                                                                                            
compulsion” (p. 29; see pp. 27-28).  In that sense, Miles (1982) has diagnosed Augustine’s continuous 
sexual desires as addiction in which he was enslaved—“It is fashionable to smile at Augustine’s adolescent 
behavior as normal teenage behavior, but this is to ignore his own evaluation of sex as dominating, 
dictating, and ordering his life.  Even if he had supplied us with many more concrete details of his sexual 
activity, we could not make a more accurate evaluation from the vantage point of our ‘objectivity’ than the 
evaluation of Augustine himself, who found himself unfree in the pursuit of sex.  Very simply, Augustine 
knew himself to be an addict” (p. 358).  Unlike Miles, Wills (1999) suggests that Augustine was faithful for 
his beloved woman; namely, he had loved her.  Wills depicts this woman as not simply a concubine for 
Augustine’s sexual gratification, but as a partner of Augustine himself (who had continuously influenced 
his life time) (pp. 16-18, 41-42; see Plumer, 2003, pp. 104-105; Vaught, 2003, p. 152). 
 
 17 Like Plumer, Carl G. Vaught (2003) in The Journey toward God focuses on the relation between 
Augustine’s discharge of his unnamed woman and his deep agony and agitation: “Augustine must face one 
of the most traumatic experiences of his life: his mother tears his mistress from him because she is an 
impediment to his marriage, and his heart that continues to cling to her is torn and wounded until it bleeds.  
The mistress goes back to North Africa, vowing never to live with another man and leaving their son with 
Augustine (6.15.25).  As we read these lines, we cannot fail to notice the radical asymmetry between men 
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Significantly, the young Augustine’s experience of separation from his beloved 
woman had compelled him to look at the inner division in his mind or his existential 
predicament in his life.  At the same time, it had led him to realize his lack of ability to 
love others as well as his ceaseless desires for achieving worldly fame in the Roman 
world.  Moreover, it had stirred Augustine to pay attention to his lack of power to be 
continent as well as his unnamed woman’s ability to enter into the life of celibacy 
(6.11.20-6.15.25; see Asiedu, pp. 304-306; Plumer, pp. 104-105; Quinn, pp. 326-327; 
Starnes, pp. 158-159; Vaught, 2003, pp. 152-153).  In this way, Asiedu (2003) in 
“Following the Example of a Woman: Augustine’s Conversion to Christianity in 386” 
shows well the impact of Augustine’s unnamed woman’s vow of continence to “the 
Christian God” on the process of his religious change as follows: 
[Augustine’s unnamed woman’s] desire for continence may have been an attempt 
to give divinity to her hopelessness: converting her shame in a declared act of 
renunciation that would lend to her life a “divine” or religious purpose (p. 
304)…Since Augustine recognized his concubine’s vow to continence as an 
example he was too weak and unhappy to follow at the time, his later acceptance 
of that way of life should be acknowledged as a witness to the influence of his 
concubine on the choice he came to make, The Confessions, after all, makes an 
implicit claim as a meta-narrative of conversion…By recounting this episode, 
Augustine offers a veiled tribute to a woman whose decision to commit herself to 
a life of continence prompted Augustine’s journey down that road.  By 
recognizing the mother of Adeodatus, the woman with whom he was in the habit 
of sleeping, as “flesh of his flesh” Augustine the catechumen came to see in 
sexual renunciation the only credible embodiment of his possible conversion to 
Christianity. (p. 305)18 
                                                                                                                                            
and women in the late Roman Empire, and the suffering women undergo so the careers of the men they 
love will flourish” (p. 152, italics added). 
 
18 Significantly, while paying attention to the implications of the vow of Augustine’s unnamed 
woman in the process of his transformation, Asiedu (2003) repudiates a dualistic view of two women—
Augustine’s unnamed woman and his mother, Monica—which emphasizes the link between Augustine’s 
dismissal of the concubine and his “surrender to Monica”: 1) Augustine’s unnamed woman was a pagan, at 
which point she had continuously interrupted Augustine to become a Christian; in contrast, 2) Augustine’s 
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mother was a Christian, at which point she had discharged this unnamed woman in Milan in order to help 
his son, to be a Christian.  This means that Asiedu rejects the description of two women in Augustine’s 
lifetime (especially his conversion experience) from a point of view of “juxtaposition” and contradiction.  
While acknowledging the role of Monica in Augustine’s conversion to Christianity, Asiedu emphasizes the 
role of the mother of Adeodatus in his transformation (see pp. 295-306). 
In this study, I basically follow Asiedu’s view of two important women in Augustine conversion 
and his life.  As such, I agree with view on the positive role of Monica in Augustine’s transformation (see 
Burrell, 1970, pp. 340-342; Elledge, 1988, pp. 76-86; Fenn, 1986, p. 81).  In that sense, this study attempts 
to articulate how the Christian mother Monica had deeply affected his son’s conversion to Christianity in 
386.  However, like Asiedu, I am unable to agree with the above dualistic view—Monica was a Christian 
and Augustine’s concubine was a pagan because this juxtaposed and contradictory view on two women 
might portray Augustine’s unnamed woman as a symbol of evil and might depict Monica as a symbol of 
good.  This implies that this dualistic view might have (too negatively) described Augustine’s unnamed 
woman as a serious obstacle to Augustine of becoming Christian, at which point Augustine (who was a 
religious victim for a long time) made a proper decision to dismiss his woman in order to return to his 
mother’s true religion, Christianity.  As such, I suggest paying attention to Garry Wills’ statement (1999) 
that the adolescent and young Augustine (who was a Manichee) had interrupted the Christian life of his 
unlawful wife.  Wills writes, “Una was a Catholic (p. 16)…[Augustine’s] treatment of Una would justify 
the self-condemning language Augustine uses.  He was not merely persuading Una to live with him, but to 
make a break with her church (and, no doubt, her Catholic parents).  Augustine would later reproach 
himself bitterly for trying to persuade a dear friend to give up Catholicism” (p. 17).  Although Wills’ 
argument could be controversial, I am easily unable to reject his view that the young Augustine might have 
persuaded his unlawful wife in order to let her turn away from the traditional Christian faith and later the 
mature Christian Augustine might regret his behavior.  In order to make a richer and more accurate 
evaluation of Wills’ statement, we need to recognize that the young Augustine (who was a Manichee and 
an able scholar of rhetoric) had continuously attempted to convert his Christian friends, including his 
unnamed friend, to Manichaeism—“I had turned him away from the true [Christian] faith” (conf. 4.4.7; see 
4.4.8-9), although Monica was angry at Augustine for his anti-Christian behaviors—“For my mother, your 
faithful servant, wept for me before you more than mothers weep when lamenting their dead children” 
(3.11.19; see Bourke, 1945, pp. 23-24). 
In consideration of Wills’ view on the Manichee Augustine’s anti-Christian position against his 
unnamed woman, I also suggest reminding that after the dismissal of his concubine, Augustine had another 
concubine (6.15.25); at the same time, Augustine had waited for his lawful marriage with a young 
aristocratic heiress.  As such, I raise some questions as follows: “Who was a Christian?  Augustine’s 
another concubine or his young fiancée?”; “What was the real cause of Augustine’s dismissal of his first 
concubine?”; “Was Augustine’s first concubine (who was Adeodatus’ mother) really an obstacle to the 
process of becoming a Christian?”; “Who was actually the victim at the time of dismissal?  Augustine or 
Adeodatus’ mother?”  Now we have no accurate evidence that Augustine’s second concubine and his 
young noble fiancée were Christians (although Starnes [1990] tends to depict Augustine’s young fiancée as 
a Christian [pp. 159, 166]).  We need to look at Augustine’s own depiction that many high-class people of 
the late Empire were pagans rather than Christians (8.2.3).  Following above questions, I cast a doubt on 
the view that Augustine’s first woman was a just pagan, as well as view that Augustine was a victim.  We 
need to pay attention that Augustine dismissed, primarily and explicitly, Adeodatus’ mother because she 
was not an impediment to Christianity but an impediment to his lawful marriage for his worldly fame and 
money—“she was a hindrance to my [socially acceptable] marriage” (6.15.25, italics added).  As such, 
Adeodatus mother could be a “victim of [Augustine’s] pursuit of a more advantage marriage” (Miles, 1992, 
p. 27) and “an obscure victim of the…principles [of the concubinage of the Christian Church] and great 
snobbery of the Milanese” (Brown, 2000, p. 52; see Hippolytus, apost. const. 16.23; Leo I, ep. 167). 
 Honestly, I (who have lived with my wife for fifteen years and who have two children) have 
experienced pain and difficulty for understanding the theme of Augustine’s discharge of his “unlawful” 
wife, although unlawful wives were normally dismissed in the late Roman world—“Neither Augustine nor 
Monica was snobbishly cold or cruel in the dismissal of his concubine.  Because of her inferior social 
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At the time of his psychological distress and crisis as well as his relational 
problems with others (especially with his unlawful wife), the young rhetorician 
Augustine was unable to discover a resting place on earth.  He noted, “That was inward, 
                                                                                                                                            
station, she simply could not hope to marry him.  At that time…women did not expect, let alone campaign 
for, equality of rights with respect to marriage.  Once Augustine decided upon a suitable marriage, he was 
compelled to separate from his beloved concubine” (Quinn, 2007, p. 326; see E. A. Clark, 1999, p. 68; 
O’Meara, 2001, pp. 123-124).  I suggest looking at Eric Plumer’s argument (2003) as follows: “Attempts 
have been made to cast Augustine’s dismissal of her in a less offensive light, noting that common-low 
wives were normally dismissed in Roman society in order that socially acceptable marriages could be 
entered into.  But while such arguments may be valid, they have left most modern readers dissatisfied” (p. 
105).  Indeed, I am sorry to hear the silent cry of “a helpless, unnamed woman” who belonged to the low-
class in the Roman world and who lived in the social and cultural milieu of concubinage of the late Roman 
Empire (see Asiedu, 2003, pp. 295-306; Plumer, 2003, pp. 104-105; Vaught, 2003, pp. 152-153).  My view 
is that the theme of Augustine’s dismissal of his unmarried wife involved a sad yet precious (love) story 
between the young Augustine and his lover.  In this sense, the young Augustine’s woman was not merely a 
concubine but a lover, although he began to live with her in order to satisfy his sexual desires.  Basically, I 
agree with some scholars’ view on Augustine’s unnamed woman that she was a Christian (see Brown, 2000, 
p. 80; Finn, 1997, p. 216; Wills, 1999, pp. 16-18, 41-42).  As noted earlier, there was a far-reaching 
movement of Romanization in the Empire of Augustine’s time; as such, Christianity became the official 
religion of the Roman world.  This means that there was a strong process of Christianization in North 
African society.  In this official movement of Christianization, Augustine’s woman might have become a 
Christian.  In particular, we need to pay attention to Augustine’s own description about his separation with 
her as follows: “She had returned to Africa vowing that she would never go with another man…I was 
unhappy, incapable of following a woman’s example of [continence]” (conf. 6.15.25).  This depiction of 
Augustine gives us a hint or an insight that his woman was not simply a pagan, but a Christian.  Moreover, 
it leads us to recognize that at the time of the painful separation, Augustine’s unlawful wife made a 
decision to enter into the life of celibacy and asceticism based on the movement of Christian monasticism.  
If Augustine’s woman had been more influenced by the African temperament of sensual pleasure than the 
(Christian) monastic movement, she might have preferred to enter into the life of licentiousness and 
materialism than the life of continence. 
 Here I am also sorry to look at the deep silence of Augustine about her name (which was 
profoundly rooted in his own deep existential abyss).  However, I suggest that the unnamed woman’s life of 
continence might have influenced Augustine’s spiritual transformation.  That is, her life of continence had 
challenged the young rhetorician Augustine to look at his own deep division of the mind as well as to 
reconstruct the purpose and meaning of his life (conf. 6.16.26).  Indeed, after his conversion to Christianity, 
like his unnamed lover, the newly converted Augustine decided to engage in the Christian life of asceticism 
and celibacy, and dedicated himself in the service of God and others for the rest of his life.  Later 
Augustine (who was a mature bishop) had urged the newly baptized not to imitate those who had lived in 
concubinage (s. 221.4.4).  Here Augustine was strict for the married who had taken a concubine—“That’s 
why I’ve got this to say to you, my brothers, my sons, those of you that have wives, don’t go looking for 
anything else; those of you who haven’t, and wish to marry, keep yourselves chaste for them, just as you 
want them to come chaste to you” (s. 224.3; see Quinn, 2007, p. 336).  In the newly transformed context of 
Augustine’s life of the service of God and others as well as his woman’s life of continence, the story of the 
young Augustine and his woman has challenged us to join a new Christian living or spiritual marriage in 
Christian faith in Christ (see conf. 8.11.25-27; Possidius, v. Aug. 2).  As such, (I would like to conclude 
that) now the story of Augustine and his unlawful wife could be our own story for the life of Christian 
pilgrimage across cultures and times in light of interaction of joy in encounter, pain in separation, and 
silence in longing/remembering. 
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while I was still externals.  It was not in a place; but I was fixing my attention on things 
contained in space, and [yet] I found no place to rest in, nor did those external things 
receive me so that I could say ‘It is enough and it is well’” (conf. 7.7.11; see 8.12.28); 
“The only thing left to it was a mute trembling, and as if it were facing death it was 
terrified of being restrained from the treadmill of habit by which it suffered ‘sickness 
unto death’ (John 11: 4)” (8.7.18); “Alas, alas, how long-drawn-out is my exile!  I have 
gone so far away from you.  My pilgrimage is so wearisome!  I have not yet arrived in 
that homeland where I shall live untroubled by any evil…Why am I not yet there?” (en. 
Ps. 119.6).  This study moves forward to look at how Augustine’s psychological crisis 
and distress triggered him to enter into his search for knowing himself and the divine. 
 
C. The Quest for Knowing Himself and the Divine 
 Consistent with the depiction of Augustine’s psychological distress and crisis, 
this section examines his quest for knowing himself and knowing the divine in the 
ongoing process of his conversion.  It is relevant to stage 3—quest—of Rambo’s model 
of religious conversion (1993, pp. 56-65).  Rambo pays attention to the quest stage in 
order to articulate the active search of the potential convert who seeks resolutions to his 
or her problems and strives to discover meaning, purpose, and transcendence in life.  In 
line with Rambo, this study attempts to elucidate how Augustine had deeply responded to 
his experiences of the inner division of the mind and his relational problems with 
others/the divine in order to establish a more valid and meaningful life.  As such, 
question 1 asks how Augustine’s psychological crises had affected his earnest quests for 
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knowing himself and the divine.19  This question is helpful for exploring Augustine’s 
inquiry to know himself and the divine resonant with his psychological distress and 
existential restlessness in light of the interaction of the experience of the self and the 
experience of the divine.  More specifically, while establishing a coherent and integrated 
picture of Augustine’s conversion process, it guides us to look at the correlation of the 
adolescent and young Augustine’s psychological distress and crisis with his early 
traumatic injuries within the specific personal and familial contexts of his childhood as 
well as the correlation of Augustine’s inner division of the mind (“the sick soul”) with his 
struggles to find or experience himself in relation to the divine. 
 During the peak of his sense of inner division and his relational problems with 
others (especially his disruption with the unnamed woman), the restless Augustine had 
seriously attempted to rethink the goal and meaning of his life (6.16.26; see Quinn, 2007, 
pp. 327-330).  More specifically, after realizing that he could not find the resting place on 
earth (7.7.11), Augustine had moved into his inner world to know himself and to know 
the divine.  This means that Augustine’s psychological crisis and existential abyss had 
affected himself to recollect and reflect upon his life history.  That is, he had attempted to 
think about what the real problem is in his life as well as to recognize the roots of his 
inner conflict, at which point he was able to open his mind to feel the inward divine 
location.  Here Augustine had entered into a movement for remedying his inner 
incompleteness and for reducing his inner discord, as James (1902/1982) points out: 
                                                
19 Question 1 is deeply rooted in the collaborative dialogue between the factor of the experience of 
psychological distress and crisis (e.g., conf. 7.7.11, 8.5.10, 8.12.28; en. Ps. 119.6) and the factor of the 
quest for knowing himself and the divine (e.g., conf. 7.10.16, 9.1.1; sol. 1.2.7, 2.1.1; ord. 2.18.47). 
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Augustine [began to flow into] inner unity and peace…The process of unification 
[of his divided self might] come gradually, or it [might] occur abruptly; it [might] 
come through altered feelings, or through altered powers of action; or it [might] 
come through new intellectual insights, or through experiences which we shall 
later have to designate as ‘mystical.’ (p. 175) 
 
Indeed, Augustine’s active search for the meaning in life and his yearning for 
knowing himself and the divine stirred him to open himself to the divine, namely, to 
disclose/confess his sense of hopelessness and powerlessness (i.e., his painful condition 
of “tragic estrangement”) to God.  As Capps (2007a) states, “His mother’s soul [for 
seeking the life of moral earnestness and spiritual purity] began its works in him” (p. 563).  
Now Augustine had no reason to hide himself from God (see Capps, 1983), as he recalled 
and described: “Before you I lay my heart and my memory.  At that time you were 
dealing with me in your hidden secret providence, and you were putting my shameful 
errors before your face” (conf. 5.6.11).  As such, the young Augustine had gradually 
perceived God, not outside of himself, but within himself: “I was walking through 
darkness and ‘a slippery place’ (Ps. 34:6).  I was seeking for you outside myself, and I 
failed to find ‘the God of my heart’ (Ps. 72:26)” (6.1.1); “You were more inward than my 
most inward part and higher than the highest element within me” (3.6.11). 
Moreover, Augustine’s interior journey toward union with God has led him to 
recognize his crucial and fundamental problem in his life which was profoundly rooted in 
his turning away from God (5.9.16, 7.10.16).  More specifically, during his inner 
struggles to himself and the divine, Augustine found himself far from God—“the ground 
of being”—at which point he realized that the primary cause of both his inner division 
(and his relational problems with others) was deeply derived from his disconnection with 
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the ground of Being.  As Vaught (2004) points out, “Augustine’s basic problem [was] the 
distortion of the will that [led] away from God” (p. 82).  Augustine himself noted, “For 
wherever the human soul turns itself, other than to you, it is fixed in sorrows, even if it is 
fixed upon beautiful things external to you and external to itself, which would 
nevertheless be nothing if they did not have their being from you” (4.10.15); “How 
fearful a fate for ‘the rash soul’ (Isa. 3:9) which nursed the hope that after it had departed 
from you, it would find something better!” (6.16.26).  As such, here Augustine needed to 
turn from his worldly ambitions/honors to God—the ground of Being; that is, he needed 
to shift from the life of sensual materialism (“Epicurean pleasure” [6.16.26]) to the life of 
asceticism and celibacy (e.g., 9.1.1-9.2.4).  This means that the young Augustine needed 
to accept God’s presence in the depth of his soul and his life as well as to create a new 
way of living in light of the interplay between the soul and the ground of its existence.  In 
this way, Plumer (2003) writes, “Augustine’s despair was so unbearable that he would 
gladly have allowed himself to be ‘sucked still deeper into the whirlpool of carnal lusts’ 
in order to escape it, but he could not...His growing sense of powerlessness and 
hopelessness was being used by God to prepare his heart to receive grace.  Augustine was 
slowly coming to the realization that he faced utter loss unless he surrendered his life to 
God unconditionally” (p. 105). 
At the time of his earnest quest for meaning in life and for knowing himself and 
the divine, Augustine began to enter into the transformative process of unifying his 
divided self (“twice born”).  That is, he began to shift from the state of storm, stress, and 
inconsistency to the state of firmness, stability, and equilibrium (Capps, 2007a; Elledge, 
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1988; James, 1902/1982).  As such, Augustine was involved in a movement for 
overcoming his sense of shame as well as for healing his narcissistic injuries in the 
process of self-disclosure or self-becoming; he had gradually re-established empathic 
relationships with others and the divine which indicated a sign of developmental and 
progressive maturity (Capps, 1983, 1985, 1990, 1993, 2004, 2007b; Dixon, 1999; Gay, 
1986; Nino, 1990; Paffenroth, 2003; Parsons, 1990).  Indeed, the young Augustine had 
greatly moved into the painful yet meaningful process of his interior transformation from 
the divided self to the integration of the self which was deeply related to his profound 
experience with the divine/God (“a More”), as Elledge (1988) states: “The process of 
conversion takes Augustine from restraint through renunciation and release into a 
repossession which includes an escape hatch, i.e., from the closed embrace of mundane 
attachments into God’s open one that neither empties itself nor ceases by its openness to 
embrace” (pp. 81-82; see conf. 8.12.28-29; Capps, 1983, 1985, 1990, 2007a, 2007b; 
Dixon, 1999; James, 1902/1982; Gay, 1986; Nino, 1990; Parsons, 1990). 
 Apparently, as discussed in question 1, there is an intimate connection between 
Augustine’s experiences of psychological distress and his yearning for knowing himself 
and the divine.  That is, the restless Augustine (who had felt a sense of dividedness and 
who had suffered from “sickness unto death”) was unable to discover a safe resting place 
on earth, and thus he had begun to recollect his own life as well as to enter into his inner 
world to know (or experience) himself and the divine.  In this way, the depiction of 
Augustine’s search for the knowledge of the self and the knowledge of the divine is 
crucial for understanding how Augustine had moved toward to resolve his psychological 
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crisis and existential predicament, to overcome his isolated and selfish life-style, and to 
establish newly the purpose and meaning of his life.  This study shifts to examine how 
the active seeker Augustine was involved in encounters with significant other people and 
affiliations with Christian communities in light of the experience of the self and the 
experience of others. 
 
D. Encounters with Significant Others and  
Participation in Christian Communities 
 
In consideration of Augustine’s quest for knowing himself and the divine as well 
as his search for meaning in life, this section of the chapter explores his encounters with 
significant others and his participation in Christian communities in the process of his 
transformation.  It is consonant with stage 4—encounter—of Rambo’s model of religious 
conversion, while it gradually involves stage 5—interaction (1993, pp. 66-101, 102-123).  
While describing the encounter stage as the initial contact between the advocate and the 
potential convert (who relate mutually and dialectically to one another), Rambo pays 
attention to the interaction stage—the matrix of change—in which they engage in a more 
intensive and extended exchange/interchange within the religious community.  In line 
with Rambo, while acknowledging the correlation of Augustine’s quest for the divine 
with his quest for others, this section focuses on the influence of others’ conversion 
stories on Augustine’s own conversion narrative in light of the metaphor of the ongoing-
containing Korean/Chinese box of stories of conversion (“a story within a story”); it also 
pays attention to the impact of his affective bonds and intensive interactions with other 
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people as well as his engagement in the newly alternative community (i.e., the Milanese 
cathedral) on the process of his transformation. 
In this way, question 2 asks how Augustine’s interior journey for union with God 
and his search for community with others were knit together in the process of his 
conversion.20  This question is valid for recognizing that Augustine’s turning toward the 
divine is deeply interwoven with his turning toward others.  More specifically, while 
achieving a coherent and integrated picture of Augustine’s narrative of transformation, 
this question guides us to pay attention to the correlation of the experience of the self 
with the experience of the divine as well as the correlation of Augustine’s quest for the 
divine and his quest for others in the Christian community.  Importantly, the young 
Augustine began to establish good and suitable relationships with himself and with God.  
At the same time, now Augustine also began to rebuild his relationships with other 
persons (e.g., his fellow-African Ponticianus [8.6.14-15] or his spiritual mentor 
Simplicianus [8.2.3-5]) in the Christian community.  Along with question 2, question 3 
asks how other people in the Christian community had provided love, support, and 
belonging to fulfill Augustine’s psychological needs and to make up for his frustration 
with his deprivations in the social and cultural conditions of his time.21  As an active 
seeker for knowing himself and the divine, the young Augustine had intensively 
                                                
 20 Question 2 is related to the collaborative dialogue between the factor of the quest for knowing 
himself and the divine and the factor of encounters with significant others (e.g., Ambrose [conf. 5.13.23-
5.14.25, 6.3.3-4, 9.6.14]; Simplicianus [8.2.3-5, 8.5.10]; Ponticianus [8.6.14-15, 8.7.16-18]; Alypius 
[8.6.14-15, 8.8.19, 8.11.27, 8.12.30]; Monica [6.2.2, 9.7.15, 9.10.23-26]). 
 
 21 Question 3 is primarily relevant to the collaborative conversation between the factor of intimate 
interactions with other people and the factor of participation in Christian communities (e.g., 5.13.23-
5.14.25, 9.6.14). 
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participated in Christian communities, while he was intimately related to significant other 
people.  As such, this question 3 encourages us to look at the interaction between the 
experience of the self and the experience of others in the complex process of Augustine’s 
“resocialization” or institutionalization.  Particularly, it provides an insight into 
investigating how significant other persons had affected Augustine to overcome his 
dualistic materialism (i.e., the Manichean belief [3.7.2, 3.7.12]) and his skeptic thinking 
in the Academy (5.14.25), at which point they supported Augustine to feel a sense of 
belongingness or solidarity and to find a new way of life in the Christian community. 
 During the depths of his existential struggles to know himself and the divine as 
well as to reconstruct purpose and meaning in life, Augustine was related to and was 
influenced by significant others.  Augustine’s interior journey for union with God was not 
simply an alienated experience of a person; namely, it did not occur “in a vacuum.”  
Rather, his ontological and spiritual journey for the Truth was interwoven with the 
specific philosophical and socio-cultural conditions of his time, at which point his 
intellectual and spiritual odyssey was deeply connected to his intensive interactions with 
other persons and his participation in Christian communities.  At this point, Kreidler 
(1990) states, “Augustine’s conversion [did] not remain the isolated experience of an 
individual.  It took place within an ecclesial community and was subsequently lived out 
in a religious community which Augustine understood to model the larger Church.  
[Augustine’s] experiences of friendship and even various forms of community predate[d] 
his conversion to Christianity” (p. 515). 
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 Paradoxically and gracefully, here Augustine (who was a young rhetorician and an 
active seeker) had experienced loving (“good-enough”) care and support from significant 
persons (especially Ambrose, Simplicianus, Ponticianus, Alypius, and Monica) within the 
Christian community (as well as he had undergone the divine grace and intervention into 
his life), when he was in the unbearable and intractable conditions of his sickness of the 
soul and his relational problem with others (e.g., his unlawful wife [6.15.25]).  While 
engaging in the Milanese circle of the Neoplatonists, the young Augustine had met 
Bishop Ambrose of Milan who was a former governor of a Roman province with a 
powerful personality and great integrity as well as a Christian Neoplatonist.  Here 
Ambrose had welcomed the rhetorician Augustine’s visit to his church, although he 
might have known that Augustine was still a Manichee and a skeptic and that he just 
began to study Neoplatonism within the Milanese intellectual circle.  Later Augustine 
recalled their meeting and confessed, 
I came to Milan to Ambrose the bishop, known throughout the world as among 
the best of men, devout in your worship…I was led to him by you, unaware that 
through him, in full awareness, I might be led to you.  That ‘man of God’ (2 Kgs. 
1: 9) received me like a father and expressed pleasure at my coming with a 
kindness most fitting in a bishop. (5.13.23) 
 
 In the context of Ambrose’s hospitality, Augustine had regularly participated in 
the worship service in the Milanese cathedral and had heard the sermons of Ambrose.  
Augustine had discovered himself becoming interested in the content as well as the 
rhetoric technique of his sermons.  This means that through Ambrose’s gifted 
interpretations of the Christian Scriptures, Augustine had learned a new way of reading 
the Bible; that is, he began to realize the great depth of Christian faith and living (conf. 
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5.13.23-5.14.25; see 6.3.3-4; Bourke, 1945, pp. 50-51; Brown, 2000, pp. 74-77; 
O’Donnell, 2005, pp. 54-55; O’Meara, 2001, pp. 109-124).  As noted earlier, the 
adolescent Augustine previously thought that the literary quality of the early Latin 
version of the Bible was unsophisticated and “unworthy” compared to the Latin classics 
(especially Cicero’s Hortensius) (3.5.9).  However, here the young Augustine came to 
believe that Christianity, with its doctrines of creation, fall, and redemption, possessed a 
much more compelling explanation of evil and good than anything he had found among 
the Manichees or elsewhere, as later he stated: 
My pleasure was in the charm of [Bishop Ambrose’s] language [of sermons].  It 
was more learned than that of Faustus [the Manichean bishop], but less witty and 
entertaining, as far as the manner of his speaking went.  But in content there could 
be no comparison.  Through Manichee deceits Faustus wandered astray.  
Ambrose taught the sound doctrine of salvation.  From sinners such as I was at 
that time, salvation is far distant.  Nevertheless, gradually, though I did not realize 
it, I was drawing closer. (5.13.23) 
 
 Indeed, Bishop Ambrose had affected Augustine to resolve his intellectual 
problem of conceiving of the divine as a corporeal being, at which point he had stirred 
Augustine to become a Christian.  Especially, Ambrose’s sermons (which reflected 
Christianized Neoplatonism) had inspired the rhetorician Augustine to have a positive 
attitude towards the Bible; his sermons had challenged Augustine to make interior 
journey for union with the Truth in light of the relation between God and the soul.  As 
Cary (2003) points out, “That is why Bishop Ambrose understands Scripture so much 
better than young Augustine: Ambrose teaches the spirit rather than the letter of 
Scripture, because he knows the incorporeal realities” (p. 122; see Lancel, 2002, pp. 82, 
85; O’Connell, 1969, pp. 64-65; Vaught, 2004, pp. 57, 139, 146).  As such, the young 
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Augustine had a strong resolution to give up his membership of the Manichean sect—“in 
the fluctuating state of total suspense of judgement I decided I must leave the Manichees” 
(5.14.25), at which point he had newly engaged in the Milanese cathedral—“the 
resocialization into an alternative community”—for fostering his new quest for the Truth.  
Now Augustine decided to become again a catechumen in the Milanese cathedral, 
although he remained skeptical about the possibility of finding any truth and although he 
had still hesitated to become a faithful Christian—“At that period of my 
skepticism…I…refused to entrust the healing of my soul’s sickness.  I therefore decided 
for the time being to be a catechumen in the Catholic Church” (5.14.25). 
 During the period of Augustine’s interactions with Ambrose as well as his 
participation in or his affiliation with the Milanese cathedral, Bishop Ambrose had 
strongly attempted to keep the Nicene faith based on the Creed of the Council of Nicaea 
in 325.22  This means that Ambrose had struggled to defend the church against the Roman 
army during the time of religious controversy against the Arians.  At that time, the Arian 
Justina (who was the wife of Valentinian I) came to Milan with her son Valentinian II in 
371; she had participated in a vehement and lengthy struggle against Ambrose in January 
386.  In the condition of the aid of the Empress Justina and the Roman army, the Arians 
demanded the surrender of Ambrose for permitting Arian worship service within 
basilicas.  However, Bishop Ambrose made no compromise with the Arians.  Ambrose 
and his flock (including Augustine’s mother) had tried to prevent military force from 
                                                
22 The Council of Nicaea emphasized the unity of substance between Christ and the Father.  This 
Council of Nicaea confirmed that the Son was eternal, “begotten, not made”, and “of one essence 
(homoousion) with the Father” (Walker, 1970, pp. 76, 107-111). 
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confiscating any Churches for the Arian Goths to use at Easter 386, as later Augustine 
stated: “Only a year or a little more had passed since Justina, mother of the young king 
Valentinian, was persecuting your servant Ambrose in the interest of her heresy.23  She 
had been led into error by the Arians.  The devout congregation kept continual guard in 
the Church, ready to die with their bishop, your servant.  There my mother, your 
handmaid, was a leader in keeping anxious watch and lived in prayer” (conf. 9.7.15; see 
Bourke, 1945; Brown, 2000; Walker, 1970).  In that sense, it is fair to assume that Bishop 
Ambrose and Monica’s struggles to defend the Church against the Arians might have 
challenged the young Augustine who had deeply indulged his desires for sensual 
pleasures and worldly ambitions (although he was not engaged in the provocative 
movement to protect the Milanese churches).  This means that Ambrose and Monica’s 
desperate dedication to the church had enabled Augustine to reflect on his life history—
“Who am I and what am I?” (9.1.1)—and to ponder the becoming of a Christian as well 
as the meaning of Christian friendships in the specific human conditions.24 
                                                
23 Justina, the Arian wife of Valentinian I, came to Milan with her son Valentinian II in 371, and 
engaged in a lengthy struggle against Ambrose in January 386.  She demanded the surrender of Ambrose 
for permitting Arian worship service within basilicas.  Ambrose arranged for his people to provide a 
permanent sit-in to prevent military force from confiscating any Churches for the Arian Goths to use at 
Easter 386 (Brown, pp. 71-72; Chadwick, 1991a, p. 164). 
 
 24 In line with Bishop Ambrose, later Augustine had supported the Creed of the Council of Nicaea 
in 325.  He had refuted Eastern remains of subordinationism that the Father is the sole source of all and that 
the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone.  Augustine had fully developed his understanding of God in 
terms of God’s trinitarian nature—“God one in three and three in one” (Una trinitas et trina unitas) (conf. 
12.7.7; 13.11.12).  In other words, he had formulated his concept of the Trinity—the Father, the Son, and 
the Holy Spirit—through his debates with the Arians (e.g., Maximinus, the Arian bishop, in Hippo in 428).  
Following the traditional Nicene faith, here Augustine had continuously emphasized the same unity of 
substance and the same quality of the Trinity—“The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, of one and the same 
substance, God the creator, the Omnipotent Trinity, work indivisibly” (Trin. 4.21.30); “the Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit, one God, alone, great, omnipotent, good, just, merciful, Creator of all things visible and 
invisible” (Trin. 7.6.12; see 6.3.4-6.7.9). 
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 At the time of the summer of 386, the catechumen Augustine still held back from 
seeking Christian baptism, although he had regularly participated in the worship services 
of the Milanese cathedral.  This means that Augustine was still in the condition of his 
inner division of the mind, that is, he had struggled to achieve a safe resting place for his 
soul, although he was intellectually convinced of the truth of Christianity (based on his 
learning of the doctrines of Christian Neoplatonism).  In doing so, as Ambrose once had 
done, Augustine put himself in the hands of Simplicianus in order to consult his spiritual 
mentor about his troubles—“So I visited Simplicianus, father to the then bishop Ambrose 
in the receiving grace…I told him the story of my wanderings in error” (8.2.3).25  
Simplicianus was a convert from Paganism to Christianity.  Now Simplicianus, as a 
senior priest and a Christian Platonist, had been a humble servant of Christ for many 
years.  In doing so, Simplicianus baptized Ambrose (who was the provincial governor, 
but was suddenly nominated to be a bishop of the Milanese cathedral) and became a 
spiritual father for Ambrose—“Ambrose truly loved him as one loves a father” (conf. 
8.2.3; see Bourke, 1945, pp. 44, 83; Chadwick, 1991a, pp. 133-134; Vaught, 2004, p. 72; 
Walker, 1970, pp. 128-129).  Throughout his meetings with Augustine, Simplicianus 
illustrated how he had shifted from paganism to Christianity; then he advised Augustine 
how to deal with his existential predicament and spiritual abyss as well as how to follow 
Christ’s example of humility.  In particular, Simplicianus had encouraged the intellect 
Augustine to read the letters of the Apostle Paul (Vaught, 2004; Wills, 1999).  Later 
                                                
 25 In emphasizing Augustine’s visit to Simplicianus, Vaught (2004) writes, “What [the young 
Augustine] needs…is a spiritual adviser, who can respond to his existential predicament and can help him 
move beyond his conversion to Neoplatonism to the transformation of his will” (p. 72). 
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Simplicianus’ appropriate recommendation of reading the letters of Paul would prove 
essential for Augustine’s spiritual change in the Milanese garden in 386. 
 In the context of Augustine’s endless quest to know himself and to know the 
divine as well as his struggling to read the Bible and to learn about the basic themes of 
Christian faith, Simplicianus told Augustine about his old friend Victorinus’ conversion 
story who became a role model of Christian humility through dedication to Jesus Christ 
(conf. 8.2.3-5, 8.5.10; see O’Brein, 1978; Vaught, 2004).  Marius Victorinus, as a pagan 
Neoplatonist, was a famous professor of rhetoric at Rome.  Victorinus wrote books on 
grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic; he translated some books of the Platonists which had 
affected Augustine’s intellectual transformation, as Augustine himself stated: “Victorinus 
was extremely learned and most expert in all the liberal disciplines…I had read some 
books of the Platonists, which had been translated into Latin by Victorinus” (8.2.3).  
Before his conversion to Christianity, Victorinus was an ardent believer of the traditional 
Roman cults—“Until [Victorinus] was of advanced years, he was a worshipper of idols 
and took part in sacrilegious rites.  At that time almost all the Roman nobility was 
enthusiastic for the cult of Osiris and Monstrous gods of every kind and Anubis the 
barking dog, Monsters who once bore arms against Neptune and Venus and against 
Minerva, gods that Rome once conquered but then implored for aid.  The old Victorinus 
had defended these cults for many years with a voice terrifying to opponents” (8.2.3).  
Later, Victorinus, who was an aged man and learned in all the liberal sciences, had read 
the Holy Scriptures and Christian literature (which was profoundly related to Christian 
conversion).  After his intensive readings, the old Victorinus made a decision to convert 
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to Christian faith, at which point he received the sacrament of baptism within the 
Christian community in 355, as Augustine noted: 
After his reading [of the Holy Scriptures and Christian books], [Victorinus] began 
to feel a longing and drank in courage.  He was afraid he would be ‘denied’ by 
Christ ‘before the holy angels’ (Luke 12: 9)…He became ashamed of the 
emptiness of those [sacrilegious] rites and felt respect for the truth.  Suddenly and 
unexpectedly he said to Simplicianus (as he told me): ‘Let us go to the Church; I 
want to become a Christian.’  [Simplicianus was unable to contain himself or joy 
and went with him.]  Not long after he had received his instructions in the first 
mysteries, he gave in his name for baptism that he might be reborn, to the 
amazement of Rome and the joy of the Church. (8.2.4) 
 
 At the time of his conversion to Christianity and his rebirth through Christian 
baptism, Victorinus wanted to confess, explicitly and publicly, his Christian faith before 
the former fellow pagans as well as before the church members, although it was not an 
easy task for him in the context of the reign of the emperor Julian.  His public confession 
of Christian faith might have compelled his former fellow pagans to turn away from their 
traditional religious beliefs and cults, that is, to convert to Christianity.  Now it might also 
have enabled his fellow Christians to share his transformative story of conversion and to 
join together in his joy in faith in Christ: 
[Victorinus] preferred to make profession of his salvation before the holy 
congregation.  For there was no salvation in the rhetoric which he had taught; yet 
his profession of that had been public.  How much less should he be afraid in 
proclaiming your word, when he used to feel no fear in using his own words 
before crowds of frenzied pagans.  When he mounted the steps to affirm the 
confession of faith, there was a murmur of delighted talk as all the people who 
knew him spoke his name to one another…A suppressed sound came from the 
lips of all as they rejoiced, ‘Victorinus, Victorinus!’  As soon as they saw him, 
they suddenly murmured in exaltation and equally suddenly were silent in 
concentration to hear him.  He proclaimed his unfeigned faith with ringing 
assurance.  All of them wanted to clap him to their hearts, and the hands with 
which they embraced him were their love and their joy. (8.2.5) 
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 After his public confession of Christian faith, Victorinus resigned his 
professorship in Rome because the edict of the emperor Julian was “promulgated 
forbidding Christians to teach literature and rhetoric” (8.5.10).  Here Victorinus 
welcomed Julian’s edict; namely, he preferred to give up “the school of loquacious 
chattering” (8.5.10).  As O’Brien (1978), Matter (1990) and Van Fleteren (1990) point 
out, this story of Victorinus’ conversion had enabled Augustine to pay attention to his 
state of bondage of the will, especially his inner division, which now he had struggled to 
resolve; further, it had stimulated in the rhetorician Augustine’s heart a desire to imitate 
his example of humility—“As soon as your servant Simplicianus told me this story about 
Victorinus, I was ardent to follow his example” (conf. 8.5.10; see 8.5.11-12). 
 During the period of Augustine’s intimate interactions with his spiritual mentor 
Simplicianus, Augustine (and Alypius) received a surprise visit at home from Ponticianus 
who was a baptized African Christian and a servant of the emperor.  Ponticianus was 
amazed and glad because he realized that Augustine had read the Epistles of Paul—“By 
chance [Ponticianus] noticed a book on top of a gaming table which lay before us.  He 
picked it up, opened it, and discovered, much to his astonishment, that it was the apostle 
Paul…I had indicated to him that those scriptures were the subject of deep study for me” 
(8.6.14, italics added).  Ponticianus had paid attention that the young Augustine had 
vehemently struggled to overcome his existential predicament and spiritual abyss.  As 
such, he was moved to tell Augustine (and Alypius) about the existence of a monastery in 
Milan under the care and support of Bishop Ambrose (8.6.15).  In particular, as 
Simplicianus told Augustine about his friend Victorinus’ conversion story, here 
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Ponticianus also told Augustine (and Alypius) about the life story of Antony the Egyptian 
monk, who was a pioneer of desert monasticism, as well as the conversion story of his 
own friends, who were members of the emperor’s court that the rhetorician Augustine 
aspired to join (8.6.14-15).  More specifically, Ponticianus told Augustine (and Alypius) 
how his two friends had been affected by the ascetic life of Antony.  Ponticianus’ two 
friends went to Trier with the royal court.  One day, while wandering in the gardens 
adjacent to the city walls, they arrived at “a certain house where there lived some of 
[God’s] servants, poor in spirit: ‘of such is the kingdom of heaven’ (Matt. 5:3)” (8.6.15).  
They discovered a book, The Life of Antony, and read it.  Ponticianus’ two friends’ 
reading of the life of Antony had compelled them to abandon their high positions of the 
imperial court as well as to move into the monastic community, as later Augustine stated: 
[Ponticianus’ two friends] found there a book in which was written the Life of 
Antony.  One of them began to read it.  He was amazed and set on fire, and during 
his reading began to think of taking up this way of life and of leaving his secular 
post in the civil service to be your servant…Suddenly he was filled with holy love 
and sobering shame.  Angry with himself, he turned his eyes on his friend and 
said to him: ‘Tell me, I beg of you, what do we hope to achieve with all our 
labours?  What is our aim in life?...As for myself, I have broken away from our 
[worldly] ambition, and have decided to serve God, and I propose to start doing 
that from this hour in this place.  If it costs you too much to follow my example, 
do not turn against me.’  His friend replied that he would join him and be 
associated with him for such great reward and for so great a service. (8.6.15) 
 
 Influenced by Ponticianus’ two friends’ example of humility and asceticism, their 
two affianced women had decided to commit to the life of celibacy—“Both had fiancées.  
When later their fiancées heard this, they also dedicated their virginity to you” (8.6.15).  
As such, there Ponticianus had also decided to become a Christian, at which point he was 
baptized in the Christian church, although he had not participated in the Christian 
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monastic community (“‘flocks’ [greges] of monastic saints”) in which his two friends 
(and their fiancées) were involved.  After hearing the life story of Antony as well as the 
conversion story of Ponticianus’ two friends (and their two fiancées), Augustine was 
surprised because (Alypius and) he had never heard of them (8.6.14.-15).  Now the young 
Augustine had reflected on his life history, as later he confessed: “While [Ponticianus] 
was speaking, Lord, you turned my attention back to myself” (8.7.16).  Indeed, Augustine 
had realized that after reading Cicero’s Hortensius at the age of nineteen, he had made 
little progress in resolving his intellectual and spiritual quest for wisdom or the Truth, 
although he had engaged in the sequence of the religious and philosophical groups of 
Manichaeism, astrology, skepticism, and Neoplatonism (8.7.17; see 3.4.7-8).  As such, 
the rhetorician Augustine had felt a deep sense of shame—“I felt for myself in 
comparison with them” (8.7.17).  He was angry with himself who did not completely 
abandon his desire for worldly ambition and who had still hesitated to become a Christian, 
as later he stated: 
The day had now come when I stood naked to myself, and my conscience 
complained against me: ‘Where is your tongue?  You [as a skeptic] were saying 
that, because the truth is uncertain, you do not want to abandon the burden of 
futility.  But look, it is certain now, and the burden still presses on you.  Yet 
wings are won by the freer shoulders of men who have not been exhausted by 
their searching and have not taken ten years or more to meditate on these matters.’ 
This is how I was gnawing at my inner self.  I was violently overcome by a 
fearful sense of shame during the time that Ponticianus was telling his story.  
When he had ended his talk and settled the matter for which he came, he went 
home and I was left to myself. (8.7.18, italics added) 
 
 Like Ambrose and Simplicianus, Ponticianus had played a crucial role in the 
process of Augustine’s spiritual transformation in terms of interactions with companions 
and a network of Christian friendships.  That is, Ponticianus had guided the rhetorician 
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Augustine to become a Christian; he had encouraged Augustine to engage in a turning 
toward God and to embrace the humility of the cross in the light of the radical 
reorientation of the will (see Matter, 1990; O’Brien, 1978; Vaught, 2004; Wills, 2004).  
Like the conversion story of Victorinus, the ascetic life of Antony and the conversion 
story of Ponticianus’ two friends (and their fiancées) had profoundly challenged the 
young Augustine to commit himself to serve God and to imitate their life-style of 
asceticism and celibacy.26 In that sense, while paying to the accretive and accelerative 
force of others’ conversion stories toward the climax of Augustine’s own conversion, 
Elledge (1988) writes, 
Conversion narratives prefigure this conversion [of Augustine] and mirror some 
features of Augustine’s unreformed life:…Antony’s, Victorinus’, which 
                                                
 26 I would like to suggest paying attention to the correlation between Augustine’s description—“a 
book [of the Apostle Paul] on top of a gaming table” (8.6.14)—and his inner change of the mind.  It is fair 
to assume that while employing the metaphor of the “gaming table” and the book of Paul in Confessions 
8.6.14, here Augustine had tacitly expressed his inner state of division which was deeply related to his 
opposed two wills or desires in his mind.  Symbolically, the term the gaming table indicates Augustine’s 
endless desire—“a blind and rash enthusiasm for empty games” (6.7.12)—to achieve worldly honors and to 
satisfy sexual pleasures; in contrast, the term the book of the Apostle Paul points to his vehement desire to 
be continent and to become a Christian.  As noted earlier, Augustine’s desire of sensual pleasure and 
worldly ambition was deeply influenced by the personality and life-style of his father Patricius which was 
inherently related to the African temperament of sensual materialism of Augustine’s time.  Augustine’s 
another desire of the life of asceticism and celibacy was profoundly affected by the personality and 
religiosity of his mother Monica which was inherently related to the movement of early Christian 
monasticism within African society.  In this way, I raise important questions: “How can we effectively 
Augustine’s own description—“a book [of the Apostle Paul] on top of a gaming table” (8.6.14)?” “What is 
the implication of Augustine’s description?”  In order to understand better Augustine’s description of “a 
book [of Paul] on top of a gaming table,” I suggest supposing that there was Augustine’s another hidden 
description such as a book of the Apostle Paul under the gaming table.  It is fair to assume that as a 
Manichee and a skeptic, Augustine had lived in the condition of the dominant impact of his father—a book 
of the Apostle Paul under the gaming table—at which point Augustine had more pursued the life of sensual 
pleasure and worldly success than the life of moral earnestness and purity (see Capps, 2007a, pp. 562-563; 
O’Meara, 2001, p. 213; Sun, 1998, p. 214).  However, during and after his intimate interactions with 
significant others (i.e., Ambrose; Simplicianus; Ponticianus; Alypius) and his participation in the newly 
alternative community (i.e., the Milanese cathedral) as well as his hearing the conversion stories of other 
persons (i.e., the conversion stories of Victorinus, Antony, and Ponticianus’ two friends) and his reading of 
the Bible, here the young Augustine was involved in the condition of the dominant influence of his 
mother—a book of the Apostle Paul on top of the gaming table—at which point Augustine had more 
pursued the life of moral earnestness and purity than the life of sensual pleasure and worldly success (see 
Capps, 2007a, pp. 563-564; Quinn, 2007, p. 327; Sun, 1998, p. 214). 
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Augustine wishes “with fervour to imitate,” and Ponticianus’ story of his two 
friends’ conversions.  These dramatic, even melodramatic, emotionally charged 
accounts would naturally appeal to Augustine the rhetorician, skilled in the arts of 
persuasive composition.  But they also amaze and instruct the indecisive, 
embattled man, and almost certainly function as motivating precedents, as 
authorized models to imitate, especially those that involve human as well as 
divine bondings. (p. 82) 
 
 During Augustine’s journey to know himself and to know the divine as well as his 
interactions with others and his participation in the Christian community, Alypius was 
together with Augustine.  Especially, at the time of Ponticianus’ visit to Augustine, 
Alypius was present with him (e.g., 8.6.14-15).  As such, after hearing the life of Antony 
and the conversion story of Ponticianus’ two friends and their fiancées, Augustine had 
shared with Alypius his feelings of inner division and restlessness.  As one of 
Ponticianus’ two friends had asked the other friend how to resolve his inner disturbance 
of becoming a servant of God at Trier—“What do we hope to achieve with all our labours 
[for the emperor]?  What is our aim in life?” (8.6.15), Augustine had also asked Alypius 
how to handle with his turbulent hesitation of becoming a Christian: 
In the middle of that grand struggle in my inner house, which I had vehemently 
stirred up with my soul in the intimate chamber of my heart, distressed not only in 
mind but in appearance, I turned on Alypius and cried out: ‘What is wrong with 
us?  What is this that you have heard?...Do we feel no shame at making not even 
an attempt to follow’ (8.8.19)…This debate in my heart was a struggle of myself 
against myself.  Alypius stood quite still at my side, and waited in silence for the 
outcome of my unprecedented state of agitation. (8.11.27) 
 
 The presence of Alypius was crucial for Augustine and his spiritual change 
because Alypius was not only a witness of Augustine’s conversion process, but also a 
faithful companion who had supported, implicitly and explicitly, his friend Augustine in 
overcoming his existential predicament and spiritual abyss (8.8.19, 8.11.27, 8.12.28-30).  
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As Martin (2003) points out, “In the garden of Milan, at the precise moment of 
Augustine’s deepest spiritual crisis, we…find close at hand his dearest friend Alypius” 
(p. 46).  Alypius was a pupil of Augustine in Carthage (6.7.11) and became a Manichee 
with Augustine (6.7.12).  Alypius accompanied his professor, Augustine, to Rome and 
then to Milan—“I found Alypius at Rome.  He attached himself to me with the strongest 
bond and was to accompany me to Milan” (6.10.16).  Later Alypius became the closest 
friend of Augustine.27  Indeed, Augustine’s intimate interactions with Alypius had 
tremendously affected his spiritual change in 386 and his ongoing transformation for the 
rest of his life, as Wills (2004) states: “Augustine is setting up a network of friendships 
that will correspond to the network of friendship exemplified in Pontician’s immediately 
following and crucial account of the four friends (and their two affianced women) in 
Trier” (p. 117).  As noted earlier, the adolescent Augustine was involved in pear-stealing 
with his peer group which he later regarded as a senseless and sinful act based on the 
“worldly friendship” (conf. 2.5.10-2.9.17).  However, through his properly developed 
relationships with Alypius, here the young Augustine began to enter into the newly 
established community which was based on Christian friendship and faith in Christ.  In 
that sense, the intimate relationship between Augustine and Alypius could be a 
preeminent role model of Christian friendship. 
                                                
27 Surprisingly, Alypius was present in the crucially life-changing events of Augustine: for 
example, Augustine’s meeting with Ponticianus (8.6.14-15), his conversion to Christianity in the Milanese 
garden (8.12.28-30), his experience of Christian baptism in Milan (9.6.14), his Christian philosophical 
community at Cassiciacum (9.4.8) and in Rome, his lay Christian community at Thagaste, his Christian 
monastery at Hippo Regius, his pastoral ministry at Hippo, and his vehement and endless debates with the 
Manichees, Donatists, Arians, and Pelagians in North Africa (see Possidius, v. Aug. 11; Bonner, 2002, pp. 
113-114; Bourke, 1945, pp. 126-128; Brown, 2000, pp. 136-137; Fitzgerald, 1999, pp. 16-17). 
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 As emphasized in question 2 and 3, in the process of Augustine’s conversion, 
there is a close link between his interactions with others, his participations in the 
Christian community, and his spiritual change in the Milanese garden in summer of 386.  
In the context of Augustine’s inner division of the mind (“the deeper predicament of the 
bondage of the will”) as well as his endless quest for knowing himself and the divine, 
significant persons—Ambrose, Simplicianus, Ponticianus, Alypius, and Monica—had 
played a preeminent role of “drumbeat” leading up to Augustine’s own conversion to 
Christianity in the Milanese garden as well as fostering his participation in the Christian 
community.  More specifically, they had affected the rhetorician Augustine to overcome 
his desire of worldly honor and sensual materialism which was related to the dualistic 
Manichean belief [3.7.12] and the Epicurean philosophy of pleasure [6.16.26] as well as 
to fulfill his need for belongingness or Christian friendship.  They had also stirred the 
intellect Augustine to move from the Manichean group or the (skeptic) Academy to the 
alternative Christian community (i.e., the Milanese cathedral) in light of resocialization 
and institutionalization within the Christian community.  In this way, the interlocking 
stories of conversion of Victorinus, Antony, Ponticianus’ two friends (and their fiancées) 
had challenged Augustine to rethink the goal of life, to become a Christian, and to follow 
their example of humility and celibacy, as Wills (2004) states: “All the stories of 
conversion in this book [Confessions] are either intended by their tellers, or by God in 
providentially putting them in Augustine’s way, to shape a journey into and through the 
garden of ‘conversion’” (p. 112).  This study moves to deal with how the young 
Augustine had gradually experienced intellectual and cultural changes which resulted in 
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the reformation of his personal and religious identity, worldview, and belief within the 
specific social and cultural milieu of his time. 
 
E. The Experience of Cultural Change Related to the Neoplatonic Heritage 
and the Christian Monastic Movement 
 
 Along with the description of Augustine’s encounters with significant others and 
his affiliations with Christian communities, this section of the chapter delves into his 
experience of philosophical and cultural changes related to the Neoplatonic heritage and 
the Christian monastic movement in the late fourth century.  It is relevant to stage 5—
interaction—of Rambo’s model of conversion, while it gradually involves stage 6—
commitment (1993, pp. 124-141).  Rambo views the commitment stage as the 
consummation and consolidation of transformation in which the (potential) convert 
embarks on a series of actions that solidify a new spiritual orientation and incorporate its 
meaning into daily life.  While acknowledging Augustine’s continuous interactions with 
other people (especially Christian Neoplatonists) and participation in the 
religious/philosophical group, this section examines the correlation between Augustine’s 
experience of cultural renewal/revitalization and his life change.  In doing so, it 
articulates the influence of Neoplatonism and Christian monasticism on the ongoing 
process of his intellectual and spiritual transformation. 
 As such, question 4 asks how Augustine had gradually reshaped his (personal and 
religious) identity, worldview, and belief through his ongoing interactions with others, 
through his participation in Christian communities, and through his experiences of 
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cultural change.28  In the conditions of his experiences of loving care and support from 
others as well as his affiliations with the Milanese cathedral and the Milanese group of 
intellects, the young Augustine had undergone his philosophical and cultural changes 
which had been deeply affected by the Neoplatonic heritage and the Christian monastic 
movement of his time.  In this way, this question is beneficial for discussing the 
interrelatedness between the experience of the self and the experience of others in the 
process of Augustine’s transformation as well as the interrelatedness between 
Augustine’s quest for the divine and his quest for community.  More specifically, while 
paying attention to the dynamic process of his cultural renewal and revitalization, this 
question helps us to deal with how the young Augustine had experienced intellectual and 
cultural transformation which resulted in the reformation of his personal and religious 
identity, worldview, and belief within the specific philosophical and socio-cultural milieu 
of the late fourth and early fifth centuries. 
 Around the same time of his intimate interactions with other people and his 
participation in the Christian community (i.e., the Milanese cathedral), the rhetorician 
Augustine was engaged in the “Milanese circle” of the intellects in which some members 
were Christians (e.g., Ambrose or Simplicianus) and others were pagans.  Within this 
intellectual circle of Milan, Augustine had read some books of the Neoplatonists 
(especially those of Plotinus and Porphry).29  Through his readings of Neoplatonic books, 
                                                
28 Question 4 focuses on the factor of the experience of cultural change related to the impact of 
Neoplatonism and the Christian monastic movement, while acknowledging the factors of interactions with 
others and participation in Christian communities. 
 
 29 Van Fleteren (1999) in “Ascent of the Soul” contends that “Plotinus’s treatise on Beauty, 
Enneads 1.6, and Porphyry’s De regressu animae were among the books which Augustine read at that time.  
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he had learned about Neoplatonic themes or doctrines (e.g., the sovereign good, the 
origin of evil, the ascent of the soul towards God to the point of ecstasy, the celestial 
fatherland, the liberation achieved by the death of the body, and the perpetual life of the 
Blessed) (Brown, 2000; Harrison, 2006; Lancel, 2002; O’Donnell, 2005; O’Meara, 2001). 
 The young Augustine had searched for knowing who he was in relation to the 
divine as well as for knowing who God was for him in light of interplay between God 
and the soul.  This means that he had sought for his cognitive satisfaction of Truth which 
was related to the Christian Neoplatonic concept of the ascent of the soul to the One or 
the return of the soul to the Origin (“Plotinian ecstasies” [Plotinus, enn. 1.6.8])—“Beauty 
seen not by the eye of the flesh, but only by inward discernment” (conf. 6.16.26).  
Augustine had depicted his intellectual and spiritual journey toward God as follows: 
I entered and with my soul’s eye, such as it was, saw above that same eye of my 
soul the immutable light higher than my mind—not the light of every day, 
obvious to anyone, nor a larger version of the same kind which would, as it were, 
have given out a much brighter light and filled everything with its magnitude…It 
transcended my mind, not in the way that oil floats on water, nor as heaven is 
above earth.  It was superior because it made me, and I was inferior because I was 
made by it…When I first came to know you, you raised me up to make me see 
that what I saw is Being, and that I who saw am not yet Being.  And you gave a 
shock to the weakness of my sight by the strong radiance of your rays, and I 
trembled with love and awe.  And I found myself far from you ‘in the region of 
dissimilarity’, and heard…your voice from on high. (conf. 7.10.16; see 9.1.1, 
10.7.11; sol. 1.2.7; 1.12.20, 2.1.1, ord. 2.18.47) 
  
 Indeed, Augustine’s readings of the books of Neoplatonists as well as his 
encounters with Christian Neoplatonists had deeply affected his intellectual and spiritual 
transformation in light of the submission of intellect (Cary, 1999, 2000, 2003; Lancel, 
                                                                                                                                            
These books lit ‘an incredible fire’ within the young rhetor (c. Acad. 2.2.5)” (p. 64; see Chadwick, 1986, 
pp. 17-24; Harrison, 2000, p. 13, 2006, pp. 27-28; O’Meara, pp, 127-128, 131, 152-153). 
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2002; O’Meara, 2001).  This means that Christian Neoplatonism had stimulated the 
Manichee and skeptic Augustine to reconstruct his conceiving of the divine nature from 
the material and divisible being—“God [is] confined within a corporeal form” (3.7.12)—
to the incorporeal and indivisible/spiritual being—“God is a Spirit (John 4:24), not a 
figure whose limbs have length and breadth and who has a mass” (3.7.12; see 7.20.26).  
In doing so, it had also stirred the intellect Augustine to be convinced that the divine is 
not stretched out or poured out part-by-part in space, but is present as a whole 
everywhere (7.1.2, 7.5.7; see ep. 118.23; Plotinus, enn. 6.4.1-6.5.12).30  Furthermore, 
Christian Neoplatonism had enabled Augustine to reestablish his understanding of evil 
from a real existence to no substance or an absence of Good (privatio boni)—“Evil has 
no existence except as a privation of good” (3.7.12); “As you did not make all things 
equal, all things are good in the sense that taken individually they are good, and all things 
taken together are very good.  For our God has made ‘all things very good’ (Gen. 1: 31)” 
(7.12.18; see 7.5.7; civ. Dei 14.11; c. Jul. imp. 3.206).  Indeed, Augustine’s new concept 
of the divine and his new understanding of the nature of good and evil had greatly 
stimulated him to make his inner spiritual journey toward union with the Truth. 
In the conditions of his struggles with his interior journey for the divine and his 
intimate interactions with others as well as his readings of the books of the Neoplatonists 
                                                
30 The Manichee Augustine had undergone the intellectual and philosophical problem of 
conceiving of God as taking up space: “God is present everywhere, young Augustine knows, but how?  His 
materialistic heart can only imagine God as spread out through all the places in the universe, like water 
filling a sponge.  But that means one part of God must be in one place, and another part in another place, 
and more of him in an elephant than in a sparrow” (Cary, 2003, p. 109).  However, after understanding the 
nature of divine omnipresence, Augustine realized that his return to the divine is not a physical journey 
through space—“One does not go far away from you or return to you by walking or by any movement 
through space” (conf. 1.18.28). 
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and his reformation of his view on the divine and the origin of evil, here the young 
Augustine (who became a catechumen) had been affected by the public sermons of 
Ambrose, at which point Augustine’s attitude to the Bible was positively changed.  At 
that time, Augustine had also received a strong recommendation from his spiritual mentor, 
Simplicianus, for reading the Christian Scriptures, especially the Epistles of the Apostle 
Paul.  As such, the young Augustine had (re)-read the Bible.  While reading the Bible, 
Augustine had gradually discovered the specific and crucial difference between the Holy 
Scriptures and the Neoplatonic books (although he was deeply influenced by the themes 
of Neoplatonism which had helped the intellect Augustine to reestablish his view on the 
nature of the divine as well as the nature of good and evil).  In particular, Augustine had 
realized that the pagan Neoplatonists (e.g., Porphyry) had viewed Christ as an excellent 
man; that is, they had not accepted any virtue of the divine nature of Christ, but had 
emphasized the virtue of his human nature: “[For Porphyry] Christ is represented by an 
imaginary portrait of another person” (civ. Dei 10.27).  At that time, influenced by pagan 
Neoplatonism, the intellect Augustine had also thought that Christ was simply a wise man, 
as later he stated, “[Before my reading of the Bible] I had a different notion, since I 
thought of Christ, my Lord only as a man of excellent wisdom which none could equal” 
(conf. 7.19.25).  However, after his reading of the Bible, Augustine had recognized that 
unlike Paul’s letters, the books of the Neoplatonists did not contain the Christian belief or 
message which is profoundly related to the Christian concept of the Incarnate Christ—
“The Word made flesh (John 14:6)” (conf. 7.18.24)—who is a mediator between God and 
humanity and who is a perfect example of humility (civ. Dei 10.27-29; Bonner, 1990, p. 
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165; Cary, 2003, p. 120; Harrison, 2000, pp. 30-38, 2006, pp. 32-33; O’Connell, 1969, pp. 
79-80; O’Meara, 2001, pp. 139-141).  As later he stated, 
These philosophers [e.g., Plotinus or Porphyry]…were without Christ’s saving 
name (conf. 5.16.25)…Who will deliver him from this body of death except your 
grace through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom. 7: 24), who is your coeternal Son, 
whom you ‘created in the beginning of your ways’ (Prov. 8: 22)…None of this is 
in the Platonist books.  Those pages do not contain the face of this devotion, tears 
of confession, your sacrifice, a troubled spirit, a contrite and humble spirit (Ps. 50: 
19), the salvation of your people, the espoused city (Rev. 21: 5), the guarantee of 
your Holy Spirit (2 Cor. 5: 5), the cup of our redemption.  In the Platonic books 
no one sings: ‘Surely my soul will be submissive to God?  From him is my 
salvation; he is also my God and my savior who upholds me; I shall not be moved 
any more’ (Ps. 61: 2-3). (conf. 7.21.27; see 7.18.24, 7.20.26)31 
 
At the time of his readings of the Bible and his realization of the key difference 
between the books of Neoplatonism and Christian Scriptures, the young Augustine had 
learned the early Christian monasticism.  There is interrelatedness between the Christian 
monastic movement and the social and cultural milieu of the fourth century in the West.  
After the Emperor Constantine’s conversion to Christianity in 312, persecution came to 
end in the Roman world; as such, Christian asceticism gradually held to replace 
martyrdom.  In the widespread context of the growth of Christian monasticism, here the 
young Augustine had heard from his Christian fellow-African, Ponticianus, about the 
Milanese monastery which was under the guidance of Bishop Ambrose (8.6.15) as well 
                                                
31 In a related vein, O’Meara (2001) writes, “The Neo-Platonists, observing that the mass of men 
were incapable of raising themselves to a life of purgation and intellectual contemplation, supposed that 
there must be some Mediator between the Father and mankind, some commanding authority, some 
universal way of the soul’s deliverance.  They examined the claims of Christ, whom they judged to be an 
excellent man, but whom they rejected because of his birth of a virgin and death on a cross, and because 
Christianity, they felt, was destined to be wiped out in the persecutions that it encountered” (p. 139).  In 
emphasizing the relation between Augustine’s reading of the Bible and his transformation, O’Meara (2001) 
notes, “The first description of his conversion by Augustine is brief to the point of obscurity.  It describes 
three separate stages in that conversion: the reading of Neo-Platonists books, the comparing of their 
teaching with that of the Scriptures and especially of St. Paul, and finally his consultation of St. Paul in 
obedience to the command tolle lege” (p. 191; see pp. 155-158; Cary, 2000, p. 31, 2003, pp. 119-120; 
Harrison, 2000, pp. 88-93; Lancel, 2002, pp. 87-88; O’Donnell, 1992, III, p. 3). 
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as the early Christian monastic movement—the ascetic life of the Egyptian Antony who 
was the architect of the desert monasticism (which is called “anchoritic monasticism”) 
(8.6.14-15, 8.12.29).  In doing so, Augustine had also heard about the life of asceticism 
and celibacy of Ponticianus’ two friends and their fiancées (who were influenced by the 
life of Antony the Egyptian monk) (8.6.15, 8.7.17). 
Indeed, Christian monastic movements, especially the Antonian tradition of the 
life of asceticism, had played a crucial role in Augustine’s spiritual transformation in the 
garden of Milan in 386, as Harrison (2000) states: “Ponticianus’ words [of Christian 
monastic movements]…gave [the young Augustine] an appalling vision of his own 
vileness from which he could not escape except by heeding them and suffering their 
judgement upon his own situation.  [They compelled] Augustine…to embrace the 
celibate, ascetic life” (p. 179).  Specifically, these monastic movements had encouraged 
Augustine to overcome his vacillation of becoming a Christian—“the turbulent 
hesitations of his heart”—and to stand humbly before God—“the humble Incarnate 
Christ”—in the Milanese garden.  This means that they had stimulated Augustine to 
become a servant of God (“a monk”) and to engage in the renunciation of the worldly 
ambition and the life of asceticism and celibacy in the Christian monastic community (E. 
A. Clark, 1999; Harrison, 2000; Lawless, 1987; Van Bavel, 1986; Zumkeller, 1986).  
Later Augustine’s encounter with the anchoritic monasticism of Antony had profoundly 
affected him to enter into the celibate and acetic life in community at Cassiciacum and 
then in Rome (“the revitalized commitment to a faith”), although Augustine himself had 
preferred to pursue the life of the community rather than the life of the hermit. 
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Apparently, Augustine’s learning of Christian Neoplatonism and Christian 
monasticism had led him to move from the life of sensual pleasure and worldly ambition 
to the life of moral earnestness and purity.  In doing so, Augustine’s reading of the Bible 
and his learning of Christian faith and living in the Christian community had helped him 
to overcome the Epicurean philosophy of pleasure.32  More specifically, although 
Augustine had been influenced by the predominant pleasure-motif in Epicurus, he had 
eventually rejected the Epicurean way of life because Epicurus had denied any divine 
intervention into or concern in human affairs and because Epicurus had refused to believe 
in the life of the soul after death and God’s future judgment,33 as later Augustine noted: 
Nothing kept me from an even deeper whirlpool of erotic indulgence [based on 
Epicurus’ philosophy of pleasure] except fear of death and of your coming 
judgement…To my mind Epicurus would have been awarded the palm of victory, 
had I not believed that after death the life of the soul remains with the 
consequences of our acts, a belief which Epicurus rejected; and I asked: If we 
were immortal and lived in unending bodily pleasure, with no fear of losing it, 
why should we not be happy?  What else should we seeking for?...For I was so 
submerged and blinded that I could not think of the light of moral goodness and 
                                                
 32 While exploring the impact of Epicurus’ philosophy of pleasure on the skeptic Augustine, Colin 
Starnes (1990) states, “Epicurus’ doctrine was a determined worldliness.  All things were composed of 
matter—of atoms and the void—including the human soul, which was simply annihilated in the dissolution 
of its material elements once they were no longer held together by the body.  Sense-perception, produced 
by images streaming off the surface of things, passing through the senses and imprinting on the soul, was 
true and indubitable…The truth or falsity of opinion was determined by experience.  Good and evil were 
simply pleasure and pain—although by pleasure Epicurus meant the pleasures of the entire person and an 
entire life, both bodily and mental.  He understood pleasure as the absence of pain since, on his view, it 
consists chiefly in the satisfaction of a need and thus the removal of pain” (p. 160). 
 
 33 Quinn (2007) writes, “Epicurus labored to demolish two underpinnings of belief in an afterlife 
that torments the mind: the arbitrament of the gods and the imperishability of the soul.  First, the gods are 
serenely indifferent to the hurly-burly of events below.  Second, at death the body decomposes into atoms, 
and the soul, made up of fine atoms, also disintegrates (indeed the soul decomposes prior to bodily 
dissolution” (p. 328); “What especially restrained Augustine from a wilder plunge into sexual gratification 
was fear of death as hooked up with fear of [God’s] judgment with its threat of inexorable retribution” (p. 
327).  Along the same line, while paying attention to Augustine’s unmatched or opposite stance between 
the Epicurean life of pleasure and the fear of death, Starnes (1990) notes, “Fear of death and of God’s 
future judgement made it impossible for Augustine to find any rest and contentment in the world, and this 
was just as much the logical conclusion of his skepticism as was the other side” (p. 161). 
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of a beauty to be embraced for its own sake—beauty seen not by the eye of the 
flesh, but only by inward discernment. (conf. 6.16.26)34 
 
Consistent with his departure from the Epicurean life of sensual pleasure, the 
young Augustine began to enter into his spiritual journey toward union with the divine, at 
which point he was engaged in the process of becoming a Christian in light of shift from 
the eye of the body to the eye of the soul.  At this point, Quinn (2007) notes, “Epicurus’ 
goods are strictly accessible only to the eye of the body whereas these goods [of Christian 
Neoplatonism] are seen within, by the eye of the soul (p. 329)...Loosing him from all ties 
of temptation to the garden of Epicurus, God would bear him up in the garden of Milan 
(8.12.28-9), then later bear him up to shoulder all the grinding labors of the priestly 
vocation mapped out for him” (p. 330, italics added; see Plumer, 2003, p. 105; Starnes, 
1990, pp. 160-162; Vaught, 2003, pp. 153-154). 
Indeed, as discussed in question 4, in the process of Augustine’s conversion, there 
is a correlation between his interactions with others, his participation in the Christian 
community, and his cultural changes.  In the contexts of his struggles to know himself 
and the divine and to reconstruct purpose and meaning in life as well as his affective 
bonds with significant others and his affiliations with the Milanese cathedral/the 
Milanese intellectual group, Augustine’s learning of both Christian Neoplatonism and 
early Christian monasticism had played an important role in facilitating his intellectual 
                                                
 34 According to Starnes, in antiquity, Epicurus had earned “an undeserved reputation as a hedonist 
who sought only pleasure” and who emphasized exclusively worldly view (p. 160).  Likewise, Quinn 
(2007) contends that the life of dedication for others (“self-giving in friendship”) is meaningless in the 
Epicurean way of sensual pleasure.  In that sense, Roman intellects had generally interpreted Epicurus as 
one who would prefer “to be a pig satisfied than Socrates dissatisfied,” although Epicurus himself never 
proposed pursuit of pleasure in a brutish manner (p. 329).  Quinn asserts that in line with this tradition, 
Horace regarded Epicurus as “a leader or member of a herd of pigs”; later Augustine depicted Epicurus as 
“a pig wallowing in the sty of the flesh” (p. 329; see en. Ps. 73.25). 
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and spiritual change.  In the dynamic process of his transformation and 
acculturation/cultural revitalization, the young Augustine had newly reconstructed his 
view of the divine nature and the origin of evil; through his reading of the Bible, he had 
recognized the Christian concept of “the humble Incarnate Christ” (who had later 
compelled the young philosopher Augustine to look at his own “intellectual pride” in 
which he had understood “himself as the source of his wisdom”).  Further, Augustine had 
learned about the early Christian monastic movements which had greatly encouraged him 
to overcome his sensual pleasure and worldly ambition as well as to follow the example 
of humility and celibacy.  This study shifts to elucidate how Augustine’s encounter with 
God had deeply affected his conversion to Christianity in the Milanese garden in the 
summer of 386. 
 
F. The Experience of Divine Intervention and Grace 
 
 Along with the depiction of Augustine’s philosophical and cultural changes, this 
section of the chapter explores his experience of the transforming power of God’s grace 
in the Milanese garden in the summer of 386.  While corresponding to the commitment 
stage and interlocking with other stages of Rambo’s model of religious change, it moves 
into stage 7—consequences—which is regarded as the cumulative effects of the 
conversion process over time (1993, pp. 142-164).35  While acknowledging Augustine’s 
intensified interactions with others within the Christian community and his reformation 
of (personal and religious) identity, worldview, and belief within social and cultural 
                                                
 35 Rambo’s term consequence refers to not simply a static phenomenon or result of conversion 
(event), but an ongoing engagement in the transformational life of the convert.  In the stage of 
consequences, the convert is able to enter into the lifelong process of changing for the rest of one’s life. 
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milieu of his time, this section pays attention to the inherent link between Augustine’s 
experience of God and his spiritual change.  Specifically, it elucidates the divine 
intervention and grace into Augustine’s life through the word of God in the Milanese 
garden. 
As such, question 5 asks how Augustine’s interpersonal relationships, his God 
representations, and his encounters with God were bound together in his conversion 
process.36  In the cumulative and consummated contexts of his interior journey for union 
with the divine, his newly established relationships with others, his commitment to the 
Christian community, and his philosophical and cultural changes through learning 
Christian Neoplatonism and Christian monasticism, the young Augustine had 
experienced divine intervention; that is, he felt the initiating activity of God’s loving 
grace (by way of the word of God) in the garden of Milan (conf. 8.12.28-29).  In this way, 
while achieving a coherent and integrated picture of Augustine’s narrative of 
transformation, this question is valid for investigating the interaction between the 
experience of the self and the experience of the divine in the process of Augustine’s 
spiritual change as well as the interaction between Augustine’s search for the divine and 
his search for others.  More specifically, this question encourages us to recognize the 
correlation of human relationships, God representations, and the experiences of the divine 
in the dynamic process of Augustine’s transformation.  In doing so, it leads us to pay 
attention to the impact of the transforming power of God’s grace on Augustine’s spiritual 
                                                
36 Question 5 focuses on the factor of the encounter with God, while acknowledging the factors of 
the experience of psychological distress and crisis, interactions with others, participation in Christian 
communities, and the experience of cultural change. 
 436 
change in terms of the encounter with God and the healing of the divided self/will.  It also 
provides us an insight into how the word of God had affected Augustine’s conversion to 
Christianity in terms of divine voice, Scripture, and conversion. 
 During the depths of his existential predicament and spiritual darkness, the young 
Augustine (who had hesitated to become a Christian [8.1.1-2, 8.8.19-8.11.27]) had 
confronted himself and God in the Milanese garden in the late summer of 386 (8.12.28-
30).  Although he had experienced his intellectual transformation of the divine nature and 
the origin of evil, Augustine had still struggled to find a resting place for his soul.37  This 
means that he had still experienced inner turmoil which was rooted in the division of his 
soul/will—“I was deeply disturbed in spirit, angry with indignation and distress that I was 
not entering into my pact and covenant with you, my God, when all my bones (Ps. 34:10) 
were crying out that I should enter into it and were exalting it to heaven with praises” 
(8.8.19).38  In the condition of his restlessness of the heart and his inner struggle to 
experience God, Augustine rushed into the garden, as he stated: “Our lodging had a 
garden…The tumult of my heart [due to my divided will] took me out into the garden 
where no one could interfere with the burning struggle with myself in which I was 
engaged, until the matter could be settled” (8.8.19).  (Alypius also went to the garden, 
namely, he was present while Augustine was struggling to overcome his existential 
                                                
 37 Vaught (2004) states, “Augustine’s intellect no longer separate him from God; for he has 
abandoned the Manichean dualists who worship creatures rather than the creator and has encountered the 
eternal Word through whom God creates all things by participating in the Neoplatonic 
vision…Nevertheless, Augustine remains separated from God because of his incapacity to orient his will 
toward the one who creates the world and who dies to self him free” (p. 70). 
 
 38 In consideration of the distorted will of Augustine, Starnes (1990) writes, “If the desire for love 
and for enough money to be at ease moved Augustine towards marriage, his equally strong desire to devote 
himself wholly to the search for Wisdom led in the opposite direction.  The two could not be reconciled” 
(p. 159). 
 437 
predicament and to seek for the union with God.)39  Here Augustine had paid attention to 
his vacillation of becoming a Christian in his mind, although he had felt a strong desire to 
devote himself wholly to the search for the Truth as well as to be continent, as later he 
recalled: 
In my temporal life everything was in a state of uncertainty, and my heart needed 
to be purified from the old leaven (1 Cor. 5:7f.).  I was attracted to the way, the 
Saviour himself, but was still reluctant to go along its narrow paths (8.1.1)…And 
now I had discovered the good pearl [which might refer to the humble Incarnate 
Christ who is mediator between the Creator and the created and who is a perfect 
example of humility].  To buy it I had to sell all that I had; and I hesitated (Matt. 
13:46) (8.1.2)…I prayed you for chastity and said: ‘Grant me chastity and 
continence, but not yet’ (8.7.17)…I was [still] hesitating whether to die to death 
and to live to life. (8.9.25, italics added) 
 
 At this time of the culmination of his hesitation, Augustine had greatly 
experienced the divine intervention into the internal warfare of his mind.  This means that 
Lady Continence (who might be a messenger of God—“the light of moral goodness and 
of a beauty”—for guiding Augustine into the life of moral earnestness and purity) had 
greatly visited his restless heart.  Lady Continence had strongly encouraged Augustine to 
overcome his hesitation and to commit himself to the life of celibacy, as later Augustine 
recalled and confessed: 
To receive and embrace me she [Lady Continence] stretched out pious hands, 
filled with numerous good examples for me to follow.  There were large numbers 
of boys and girls, a multitude of all ages, young adults and grave widows and 
elderly virgins.  In every one of them was Continence herself, in no sense barren 
                                                
 39 Later Augustine described the presence of his friend Alypius in the garden: “So I went out into 
the garden.  Alypius followed me step after step.  Although he was present, I felt no intrusion on my 
solitude…We sat down as far as we could from the buildings” (conf. 8.8.19); “[The] debate in my heart was 
a struggle of myself against myself.  Alypius stood quite still at my side, and waited in silence for the 
outcome of my unprecedented state of agitation” (8.11.27); “To pour it all out with the accompanying 
groans, I got up from beside Alypius (solitude seemed to me more appropriate for the business of weeping), 
and I moved further away to ensure that even his presence put no inhibition upon me” (8.7.28; see Martin, 
2003, p. 46; Vaught, 2004, p. 79). 
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but ‘the fruitful mother of children’ (Ps. 112:9), the joys born of you, Lord, her 
husband.  And she smiled on me with a smile of encouragement as if to say: ‘Are 
you incapable of doing what these men and women have done?  Do you think 
them capable of achieving this by their own resources and not by the Lord their 
God?  Their Lord God gave me to them.  Why are you relying on yourself, only to 
find yourself unreliable?  Cast yourself upon him, do not be afraid.  He will not 
withdraw himself so that you fall.  Make the leap without anxiety; he will catch 
you and heal you’…‘Stop your ears to your impure members on earth and mortify 
them’ (Col. 3:5). (8.11.27, italics added) 
 
 While facing a divine intervention through Lady Continence’s request for a life of 
celibacy, the young Augustine’s inner tension mounted and became unbearable.  He 
threw himself down “under a certain tree” which could be a fig (or olive) tree.  He let his 
tears flow freely, and bitterly cried, “How long, O Lord?  How long, Lord, will you be 
angry to the uttermost?  Do not be mindful of our old iniquities (Ps. 6:4)….How long is it 
to be?  Tomorrow, tomorrow.  Why not now?  Why not an end to my impure life in this 
very hour” (8.12.28).  When he was saying this and weeping in the agony of his heart, 
Augustine heard a childlike voice chanting from a neighboring house, “Pick up and read, 
pick up and read”—Tolle lege, Tolle lege! (8.12.29).  He took this as a divine command 
because he remembered the conversion story of Antony, who was wholly turned toward 
the life of asceticism by the reading of a specific verse of the Bible.40  As later Augustine 
stated, “For I had heard how Antony happened to be present the gospel reading, and took 
it as an admonition addressed to himself when the words were read: ‘Go, sell all you have, 
                                                
40 While articulating the correlation between Antony’s reading of the Bible and his transformation, 
Knowles (1977) states, “The place was lower Egypt, and the time a year in the last decades of the third 
century; more precisely, an Egyptian church in AD 271.  Antony, son of well-to-do Egyptian peasants, 
heard the words of Jesus read by a priest: ‘If you will be perfect go, sell all thou hast and give to the poor, 
and come, follow me’.  He fulfilled the three-fold command and began to live alone, dedicating himself to a 
life of prayer and manual work.  No doubt individuals had acted in a similar way before.  Antony differed 
from them both in the determination and sanctity of a long life, and in his gift for inspiring and guiding 
others, the stream of imitators that soon became a flood, begging Antony to tell them the secret of his life” 
(p. 10). 
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give to the poor, and you shall have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me’ (Matt. 
19:21)” (8.12.29).  After hearing the voice of God for demanding the reading of the Bible, 
Augustine hurried back to the place where his friend, Alypius, was sitting in the garden.  
He opened one of the Apostle Paul’s letters and his eyes fell on the words: “Let us live 
honorably as in the day, not in reveling and drunkenness, not in debauchery and 
licentiousness, not in quarreling and jealousy.  Instead, put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and 
make no provision for the flesh, to gratify its desires” (Rom 13:13-14, italics added).  
Here the young Augustine had felt the divine indwelling and intervention through the 
word of God (8.12.29).  As Froehlich (2004) points out, “He had experienced God as the 
master rhetorician in the garden scene where the divine Word had moved him through the 
chant of a child and the words of the Apostle Paul” (p. 9).  Like the case of Antony, 
through a specific verse of the Bible, God had intervened to transfigure Augustine.  
Specifically, the word of God hit the heart of Augustine.  The Bible had interpreted the 
rhetorician Augustine through the activity of God’s Spirit rather than the teacher of 
rhetoric interpreting the Bible.41  This means that the word of God had urged Augustine 
to look at his wounded soul—his distorted will—which was primarily rooted in his 
                                                
41 There is a debate on the issue of the dominant role of Antony or Paul in Augustine’s conversion.  
In emphasizing the influence of Antony the Egyptian monk on Augustine’s spiritual change, E. Ann Matter 
(1990) writes, “Paul and Luke are minor elements of the narrative structure compared to the influence of 
Matthew and Antony” (p. 25; see p. 24).  Meanwhile, in line with Fredriksen (1986) and Ferrari (1980), 
Judith C. Stark (1990) focuses on the impact of the Apostle Paul on Augustine’s transformation in the 
Milanese garden—“Augustine’s language is strongly reminiscent of Paul’s description of the inner conflict 
of the will” (p. 50).  While acknowledging the contributions of the previous studies, this study suggests that 
the role of Antony and the role of Paul in Augustine’s conversion process were not separate but interwoven, 
that is, both Antony and Paul had deeply affected Augustine’s spiritual change and his thought.  We need to 
remind that the life of Antony had triggered Augustine to become a servant of God and to establish a new 
way of the monastic life, and that the Epistles of Paul had affected Augustine to recognize the key 
difference between the pagan Neoplatonism and Christianity (i.e., the Christian belief of the humble 
Incarnate Christ) and to experience God’s intervention and God’s transforming power (by means of Rom 
13-14) in the depths of his divided soul. 
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falling away from the ground of Being.  This word of God had also triggered the young 
philosopher Augustine to see his intellectual pride (i.e., his dependency on his own 
wisdom and virtue) as well as his vacillation to stand humbly before God (8.12.29).42 
 Apparently, God’s interaction with Augustine through the Christian Scriptures 
had played an eminent role in Augustine’s transformation in the Milanese garden in light 
of the correlation between hearing the voice of God and reading a biblical text (Froehlich, 
2004; Quinn, 2007; TeSelle, 1970/2002).  More specifically, at the time of divine 
intervention through the word of God, here Augustine had opened his mind to hear the 
inward divine locution.  He had accepted the presence of God in the depths of his soul, at 
which point he had felt the healing power of God’s loving grace in his heart—“As I 
became unhappier, you came closer.  Your right hand was by me, already prepared to 
snatch me out of the filth (Jer. 28: 13), and to clean me up” (6.16.26).  In the midst of his 
experiences of divine presence and divine transfiguring power, the young rhetorician 
Augustine confessed his restlessness and powerlessness (i.e., his painful condition of the 
divided self/will) in light of the interaction of the soul and the ground of Being.  
Augustine had gradually recognized that God was nearer to him than he was to himself.  
Through his encounter with the divine, he became reconciled to himself and to God and 
placed himself in the hands of God.  While reconstructing new relationships with himself 
and with God, Augustine’s soul began to flow, to merge into God and was purified and 
                                                
42 In the Confessions, Augustine frequently applied and adapted the story of the prodigal son (Lk 
15:11-24) and the story of the lost ship (Lk 15:1-7) to himself: “I travelled away from you into a far 
country to dissipate my substance on meretricious lusts (Lk 15:13)” (conf. 4.16.30); “I have gone astray 
like a sheep that is lost.  But on the shoulders of my shepherd, who built you, I hope to be carried back to 
you (Lk 15: 4)” (12.15.21).  By using the parables of the prodigal son and the lost ship, here Augustine 
recalled and confessed that in spite of his hesitation to become a Christian, God, as a loving Parent, had 
continuously waited for him. 
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transformed by the fire of God’s love.  This means that God’s merciful hands had 
touched his wounded soul and healed his distorted will.43  As such, Augustine had 
overcome his deep sense of existential isolation and shame (i.e., the sickness of the soul); 
namely, he had experienced his interior transformation from the division of the self (i.e., 
the split of the will) to the integration of the self (i.e., the transformation of the will)—
“God breaks the bonds of sexual [pleasure and worldly fame] and sets him free the 
deeper bondage of the will” (Vaught, 2004, p. 68).44  Now Augustine had felt peace in 
mind—“At once, with the last words of this sentence, it was as if a light of relief from all 
anxiety flooded into my heart.  All the shadows of doubt were dispelled” (8.12.29).  He 
had finally found the safe resting place for his soul in relation to God, as later he recalled 
and confessed: “Love is the soul’s weight” (pondus meum amor meus ) (13.9.10); “I have 
loved your beauty and the place of the habitation of the glory of my Lord (Ps. 25:7-9)” 
(12.15.21). 
                                                
 43 In this way, Paul Tillich (1968) claims that “[Augustine’s] sin is primarily and basically the 
power of turning away from God.  For this reason, no moral remedy is possible.  Only one remedy is 
adequate—a return to God.  This, of course, is possible only in the power of God, a power which man 
under the conditions of existence has lost” (p. 160). 
 
 44 Influenced by James (1902/1982), Stark (1990) views Augustine’s conversion as a resolution 
of the divided will (“the sickness of the soul”).  Stark writes, “From the vortex of the conflict of the will, 
here in Augustine personified by his old loves versus the vision of continence, the will has suddenly 
converged into wholeness in the choice of a new life over against the old.  The conflict of the will ten is 
resolved in the very act of choosing.  Deliberation and hesitation cease in that instant, once the whole will 
resolves upon a particular choice.  This process became apparent to Augustine in his experience of 
conversion” (p. 56).  While paying attention to the correlation between God’s grace and Augustine’s 
spiritual change, Stark states, “In the final analysis, philosophical examination alone will not completely 
elucidate Augustine’s conversion experience without reference to the workings of grace in this central 
experience in his life…In Confessiones VIII Augustine is clear that God’s initiative is what ultimately 
counts in his conversion…An important feature of Augustine’s acceptance of God’s invitation was his 
realization that he could not save himself…Letting go of the effort to save himself and trusting in the 
mystery of God’s care for him was what lay before Augustine at the moment of his conversion…Through 
the fragmentation and division of his will, Augustine emerged, with God’s help, to wholeness and health.  
He was finally able to reject his old loves and whole-heartedly embrace the new, living out his commitment 
in a life of service and dedication to the Christian community of his own day” (p. 58). 
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While exploring the complexity and richness of Augustine’s narrative conversion, 
we are able to recognize that the coherent and multiple factors had worked together in the 
unfolding process of his transformation.  More specifically, in the interactive and 
cumulative conditions of his psychological distress and existential abyss, his quest to 
know himself and the divine, his affective bonds with others, his participation in the 
Milanese cathedral and the philosophical group, his cultural changes impacted by 
Neoplatonism and Christian monasticism, and his encounters with the divine by way of 
the messenger of God (“Lady Continence”) and the word of God, the young Augustine 
was converted to Christianity in the Milanese garden in the summer of 386.45  Augustine 
had humbly cast himself upon the Incarnate Christ (i.e., “the good pearl”) who had 
mediated the chasm between God and Augustine himself and who had encouraged 
Augustine to participate in the Christian life of incarnation, death, and resurrection, as 
Vaught (2004) points out: “[Augustine’s] putting on Christ is not only a way of 
embracing the incarnation and sharing the crucifixion, but also a way of participating in 
the resurrection” (p. 98).  In the state of his embrace with the humble Incarnate Christ, 
Augustine became a Christian, namely, became a newly created being of faith in Christ.46 
                                                
             45 Later Augustine was very familiar with the mystery of grace.  He continuously emphasized the 
relation between the transforming power of God’s grace and Christian conversion: “We have separated 
ourselves from You, and if You do not turn us around, we will never be converted” (en. Ps. 79.4). 
 
 46 Along the same line, Kreidler (1990) emphasizes the link of Augustine’s acceptance of the 
humble Incarnate Christ with his transformation as follows: “Augustine views his own conversion 
experience as two tiered.  Not only is he asking to be healed of the works of the flesh, which inhibit the 
search for truth, but he is also asking to be healed of intellectual pride, the mark of the Stoic wise man and 
the Platonist philosopher.  The conversion process is a movement away from the intellectual pride of the 
philosophers who saw themselves as the source of their own wisdom and virtue to an experience of the 
humility of the Incarnate Christ as model and healer.  Thus Christ in his humanity redefines the wise man 
of the ancients, and humility as the new wisdom becomes the fundamental virtue of the Christian” (pp. 510-
511). 
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While looking at the process of Augustine’s lived experience of conversion, we 
are also able to realize that his representations of God were positively changed.  More 
specifically, along with his experiences of loving (“good-enough”) care and support by 
other persons within the Christian community and his philosophical and cultural changes 
(resulted in his reconstruction of identity, worldview, divine nature, and belief) as well as 
his experiences of the transforming power of divine grace and his acceptance of divine 
intervention into his life, here Augustine had gradually reformulated the representations 
of God.  As discussed earlier, in the context of his experiences of traumatic injuries (conf. 
1.9.14-15), the early and adolescent Augustine had formulated his negative self-image as 
well as his negative representations of God as scourging (8.11.25), mocking (6.6.9), 
indifferent (1.9.14), and wrathful (3.3.5) in terms of a sense of self-reproach, inability to 
relate to others/Other, and suffering.  Consistent with the formation of his negative 
representations of God, later the adolescent and young Augustine (who was influenced by 
the Manichean dualistic materialism) had improperly understood God as corporeal and 
divisible (3.7.12). 
However, in the midst of his existential predicament, Augustine had experienced 
loving care and support from significant others, including his spiritual father Ambrose 
(5.13.23-5.14.25) and his spiritual mentor Simplicianus (8.2.3-5, 8.5.10).  In the midst of 
intellectual disruption in the Manichean materialistic dualism and skeptic thinking, he 
had undergone his philosophical and cultural changes through his learning of Christian 
Neoplatonism (conf. 7.12.18, 7.18.24, 7.20.26, 7.21.27; civ. Dei 10.27-29, 14.11) and 
Christian monasticism (conf. 8.6.14-15, 8.7.17, 8.12.29).  In the midst of spiritual abyss, 
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he had encountered God in the Milanese garden.  Unlike his early experience of God 
(who might be in silence to his traumatic situation [1.9.14]), here Augustine had felt 
God’s presence in his heart, that is, he had experienced the initiating activity of God’s 
loving grace (8.12.28-30).  This implies that the young Augustine had finally overcome 
his deep sense of disconnection or isolation, namely, he had re-constructed his proper 
relationships with himself, others, and the divine.  Through these loving relationships, he 
had undergone progressive restoration and healing in which his negative God 
representations were transformed into positive God representations. 
Here Augustine had reformulated his representations of God as follows: 1) God as 
loving—“My God, in my thanksgiving I want to recall and confess your mercies over me.  
Let my bones be penetrated by your love” (8.1.1); “You pierced my heart with the arrow 
of your love” (9.2.3; see 6.5.7, 6.6.9, 7.8.12, 8.12.30, 10.1.1, 10.6.8, 10.27.38, 10.28.39, 
10.29.40, 12.15.21), 2) God as present—“You were with me” (10.27.38); “As I became 
unhappier, you came closer.  Your right hand was by me, already prepared to snatch me 
out of the filth (Jer. 28: 13)…You are present, liberating [me] from miserable errors, and 
you put [me] on your way, bringing comfort and saying: ‘Run, I will carry you, and I will 
see you through to the end, and there I will carry you’ (Isa. 46: 4)” (6.16.26; see 5.9.16, 
10.6.8), 3) God as healing—“Your scalpel cut to the quick of the wound, so that I should 
leave all these ambitions and be converted to you, who are ‘above all things’ (Rom. 9: 5) 
and without whom all things are nothing, and that by conversion I should be healed” 
(6.6.9); “Your right hand had regard to the depth of my dead condition, and from the 
bottom of my heart had drawn out a trough of corruption” (9.1.1; see 7.8.12, 9.2.3, 9.4.12, 
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10.28.39, 10.29.40), and 4) God as incorporeal and indivisible—“After reading the books 
of the Platonists and learning from them to seek for immaterial truth, I turned my 
attention to your invisible nature understood through the things which are made” 
(7.20.26); “With all my heart I believe you to be incorruptible, immune from injuries, and 
unchangeable” (7.1.1; see 3.7.12, 7.1.2, 7.5.7, 7.10.16).  Later Augustine’s reformation of 
his God representations had played an important role in developing a better Christian 
living in solitude and community which was related to his continuous spiritual journey 
for union with God, his participation in the Christian monastic community, and his 
pastoral ministry for others in the Christian church in light of the experiences of self, 
others, and the divine.47 
At the time of his experience of the transformation of his representations of God, 
the garden experience in Milan had enabled Augustine to make a new resolution for 
reconstructing the rest of his lifetime.  Augustine decided both to give up his ambitions 
for a successful life in this world and to stand firmly upon the rule of Christian faith 
(which his mother Monica had dreamed about [3.11.19-21]).  That means that Augustine 
resigned his professorship of rhetoric and renounced his upcoming legal marriage with a 
young rich heiress meant to acquire a higher status in Roman society.  As such, he was 
involved in the life of “serving God” (servire Deo), at which point he had engaged in the 
life of celibacy and asceticism in his Christian community (conf. 8.12.30; see Possidius, v. 
                                                
 47 Kreidler (1990) explores the interrelatedness between Augustine’s acceptance of the humility of 
the Incarnate Christ and his experience of healing.  While characterizing the Incarnate Christ as the Healer, 
she discusses “Augustine’s use of the image of Christus Medicus or Christ the Healer, a term well known in 
North African Christianity as early as the days of Tertullian and Cyprian.  [Later] Augustine often used the 
image in his sermons, probably because it would have been both appealing and familiar to his 
congregation” (p. 510). 
 446 
Aug. 2; Bonner, 2002; Bourke, 1945; Brown, 2000; Harrison, 2006; Lancel, 2002; Wills, 
1999). 
 While acknowledging the process of Augustine’s spiritual change in the garden of 
Milan, we are able to recognize how Augustine’s conversion had affected Alypius’ 
conversion and how the word of God had influenced Alypius’ transformation in the same 
garden.  As noted above, Alypius (who was a Manichee) was together with Augustine in 
the garden.  Here Alypius was a witness for Augustine’s existential struggle to search for 
union with God as well as his spiritual change through divine inspiration from the 
Christian Scriptures.  Just as a specific Scriptural text (i.e., Rom 13:13-14) had 
profoundly affected Augustine’s transformation and his life of celibacy and asceticism, a 
specific verse of the Bible had impacted Alypius’ spiritual change.  Following the 
example of Augustine, Alypius had read the same book of the Apostle Paul’s letters, 
especially Romans 14:1—“Welcome those who are weak in faith, but not for the purpose 
of quarreling over opinions.”  Similar to the case of the adolescent and young Augustine, 
influenced by both the African temperament of sensual pleasure and the Manichean 
dualistic materialism, Alypius seriously indulged in the desire to enjoy worldly 
pleasures—“The whirlpool of Carthaginian morals, with their passion for empty public 
shows, sucked [Alypius] into the folly of the circus games…He was miserably involved 
in that [desire of pleasure]” (6.7.11).  However, while Alypius was reading the 
authoritative word of the Christian Scriptures, God was deeply communicating with him 
in the garden of Milan.  Through his experiences of divine interjection into his life, here 
Alypius had completely overcome his early rash enthusiasm for empty games and was 
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converted to Christianity in the summer of 386 (8.12.30).  Furthermore, following 
Augustine, he had also committed himself to the life of celibacy and asceticism in the 
Christian community—“Alypius applied this [word of God—Rom 14:1—] to himself, 
and he made that known to me.  He was given confidence by this admonition.  Without 
any agony of hesitation he joined me in making a good resolution and affirmation of 
intention, entirely congruent with his moral principles” (8.12.30; see Quinn, 2007, pp. 
458-459; TeSelle, 2002, p. 42; Vaught, 2004, p. 101). 
 While looking at the conversion experiences of Augustine and Alypius, we are 
also able to discover the correlation between Augustine’s spiritual change and Monica’s 
transformation.  More specifically, after their experiences of conversion through God’s 
grace by the word of God, Augustine and Alypius went to Monica, and told her what had 
happened in the garden.  While sharing their transformative stories, she was filled with 
joy.  Monica had earnestly praised God for helping her accomplish more than she could 
ever expect, as later Augustine stated: “She exulted, feeling it to be a triumph, and 
blessed you who ‘are powerful to do more than we ask or think’ (Eph. 3:20).  She saw 
that you had granted her far more than she had long been praying for in her unhappy and 
tearful groans” (8.12.30).  Moreover, Monica had humbly accepted God’s calling for the 
newly converted Augustine who had decided to dedicate himself to the life of continence 
and asceticism as well as the life of the service of the Christian community (8.12.30).  At 
this point, Vaught (2004) portrays the transformation of Monica, 
Monica is “converted” when she hears about the conversion of her son, turning 
her back on the worldly ambitions she entertains for her son, and accepting the 
fact that Augustine has now become God’s son in a richer way than she could 
have ever imagined.  Earlier Monica has wanted marriage, legitimate 
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grandchildren, and professional success for Augustine, together with his 
conversion to Christianity.  Now she is “converted” when she becomes willing to 
accept Augustine’s Christian conversion to the exclusion of everything else. (p. 
102) 
 
 Indeed, Augustine’s conversion, Alypius’ conversion, and Monica’s 
transformation were essential for establishing the new Christian community in faith in 
Christ.  Surprisingly, Augustine’s own conversion to Christianity had affected Alypius’ 
conversion and Monica’s transformation, much like the transforming stories of 
Victorinus, Antony, and Ponticianus’ two friends had influenced Augustine’s own 
spiritual change.  Now his conversion experience had triggered him to participate in the 
life of asceticism and celibacy.  Moreover, it had urged them (i.e., Augustine, Alypius, 
and Monica) to engage in Christian living in solitude and community, much like 
Ponticianus’ two friends and their fiancées were involved in Christian monastic life. 
Consequently, as emphasized in question 5, Augustine’s conversion to 
Christianity was not simply an isolated experience of a person.  Rather, it had occurred 
while developing relationships with himself, others, and the divine.  More specifically, it 
could happen in the complex contexts of his struggle to know himself and the divine, his 
interactions with others, his participation in the Christian community, his philosophical 
and cultural changes, and his deep encounter with God.  Through his conversion to 
Christianity in the Milanese garden, Augustine had found a new way of Christian life in 
solitude and community which was profoundly rooted in the interaction between faith in 
Christ and Christian friendship.48  This study moves to investigate how Augustine’s 
                                                
48 In this vein, while articulating the correlation between Augustine’s conversion, Christian 
friendship, and the establishment of the new community, Vaught (2004) writes, “Friendship is a crucial 
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conversion to Christianity was inherently related to his baptism in the Milanese cathedral 
as well as how his conversion to Christianity had affected his monastic life and his 
pastoral ministry in light of the dynamic interplay of God, self, and community. 
 
G. The Acceptance of Christian Baptism and  
the Experience of the Vision of Ostia 
 
 Along with Augustine’s experience of God’s intervention and grace in the 
Milanese garden, this section describes his acceptance of the sacrament of Christian 
baptism and his engagement in the vision of Ostia with Monica.  While continuously 
corresponding to other stages of Rambo’s model of conversion, it is deeply relevant to 
stage 7—consequences.  In consideration of the continuous effects of Augustine’s 
converting process, this section pays attention to his ongoing transformation for the rest 
of his life.  More specifically, it elaborates the impact of Milanese baptismal liturgy on 
Augustine’s spiritual change and the influence of Ostia experience on his formation of 
the Christian community. 
 As such, question 6 asks how Augustine’s relationships with himself, others, and 
the divine were related to human development and spiritual maturity.49  After his garden 
experience, Augustine had engaged in the movement of the continuing transformation for 
                                                                                                                                            
thread that runs throughout the Confessions.  It begins in adolescence, appears in a negative form in the 
pear-stealing episode, and contracts into the frozen isolation of an adolescent waste-land.  Now friendship 
resurfaces, generating an imagistic relation that grounds a new kind of community.  Friendship of this kind 
presupposes that those who have stood alone before God stand together.  The pear stealing episode leads 
from a positive community of friends to a negative community of isolated individuals.  By contrast, 
conversion leads from individuating experiences with God to a community that not only holds its members 
apart, but also binds them together” (p. 103; see pp. 79, 101). 
 
49 Question 6 is primarily related to the collaborative dialogue of factors such as the quest for 
knowing himself and the divine, interactions with others, and participation in Christian communities. 
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the rest of his lifetime.  In this way, this question is suitable for discussing the unfolding 
process of Augustine’s change—“converting” or “continued conversion”—which was 
related to his earnest search for connection and negotiating disconnection and 
reconnection with himself, others, and the divine.  In doing so, it provides us insights into 
how the ritual performance of Christian baptism (i.e., the Milanese baptismal liturgy) had 
impacted Augustine’s transformation (which was deeply related to the metaphor of 
spiritual death and rebirth) as well as how Augustine’s Ostia vision with Monica had 
affected the construction of Christian life in solitude and community. 
 The young Augustine became a Christian in the summer of 386, but his life of 
conversion did not “end in the garden in Milan” (see Wills, 2004, p. 6).  After his garden 
experience, Augustine came to Cassiciacum for retreat with his family (e.g., his mother, 
Monica; his son, Adeodatus; his brother, Navigius) and his friends (e.g., Alypius) in the 
fall of 386 (9.2.2-3).  Here Augustine and his followers had established a Christian 
philosophical community—“a community of learned celibates”—which was financially 
supported by his friend, Verecundus.50  This Verecundus had provided his country villa at 
Cassiciacum in order to help Augustine and his followers achieve their intellectual and 
spiritual journey toward God and community, although Verecundus could not join this 
group of celibacy due to the status of his married life (9.3.5-6).  While citing Verecundus 
an example of Christian friendship, later Augustine remembered Verecundus’ kindness 
                                                
 50 Wills (2004) insists that for Augustine, Christian life “was not a matter of his single salvation but 
of a philosophical discipline jointly pursued with others” (p. 118).  Augustine did “finally bring together 
the partners he needed to pursue the Christian life in community” at Cassisciacum, Thagaste, and Hippo (p. 
118; see pp. 117, 119). 
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and his support for the Cassiciacum community and was sorry to hear Verecundus’ 
sudden death; as such, he prayed to God for the soul of Verecundus: 
Most generously he offered us hospitality at his expense for as long as were 
there…For when we were absent during our stay in Rome, he was taken ill in 
body, and in his sickness departed this life a baptized Christian...We would have 
felt tortured by unbearable pain if, in thinking of our friend’s outstanding 
humanity to us, we could not have numbered him among your flock…Faithful to 
your promises, in return for Verecundus’ country estate at Cassiciacum where we 
rested in you from the heart of the world, you rewarded him with the loveliness of 
your evergreen paradise. (9.3.5, italics added)51 
 
 During the time at Cassiciacum, Augustine had suffered from a serious disease in 
his lungs—“I lost the power to speak, it came into my heart to beg all my friends present 
to pray for me to you, God of health of both soul and body.  I wrote this on a wax tablet 
and gave it to them to read.  As soon as we fell on our knees in the spirit of supplication, 
the pain vanished…I had experienced nothing like it in all my life” (9.4.12).  After 
recovering his health, Augustine (who was a Christianized Neoplatonist) resigned his 
professorship of rhetoric of Milan—“Redeemed by you, I was not now going to return to 
putting my skills up for sale” (9.2.2); “I no longer had the interest in money which 
ordinarily enabled me to endure a heavy work-load” (9.2.4; see 9.4.7)—and participated 
in Christian philosophical discussions with his fellows (9.4.7).  In particular, he had made 
the important decision to be baptized.  Augustine wrote a letter to Bishop Ambrose to 
receive permission for Christian baptism in the Milanese cathedral (9.5.13). 
 Having been encouraged by Ambrose for his baptism, Augustine came back to 
Milan.  After accepting the order of the catechumen in the Milanese cathedral, he had 
                                                
 51 Augustine stated, “In your gift we find our rest.  There are you our joy.  Our rest is our peace” 
(13.9.10). 
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engaged in the baptismal liturgy on March 10, 387.  This means that Augustine began his 
Lenten catechumenate, which consisted of 1) enrollment and fast, 2) instruction, 3) 
scrutinies, 4) the creed, 5) holy week, and 6) the vigil.  After completing the Lenten 
catechumenate, Augustine was engaged in the Milanese baptismal liturgy, which was 
composed of 1) the opening ceremony, 2) the anointing, 3) renunciation and profession, 
4) consecration of the waters, 5) immersion, 6) anointing and foot washing, and 7) the 
white garment and the sealing.  At the Easter vigil service April 24-25, 387, Augustine 
was finally baptized by Bishop Ambrose with his son Adeodatus and his friend Alypius 
(conf. 9.6.14; Fenn, 1986; Finn, 1990, 1997; Harmless, 1995; Wright, 2001). 
 While writing the Confessions, Augustine did not explicitly depict the ritual 
process of Christian baptism in the Milanese cathedral (because he might have respected 
the tradition of the secrecy of the early Christian church which had cloaked both baptism 
and Eucharist) (Harmless, 1999, pp. 84-85).  As such, we are able to reconstruct 
Augustine’s engagement in the Milanese baptismal liturgy by using Ambrose’s two 
mystagogical catecheses, The Sacraments and The Mysteries: 
[Augustine and the other newly baptized] entered the baptistery itself…The[se] 
candidates probably stripped at this point and were anointed, perhaps over the 
whole body.  They formally renounced the devil and then turned to the east and 
proclaimed allegiance to Christ (De mysteriis 2.7)…Bishop [Ambrose] 
consecrated the water in the font with prayer and the sign of the cross.52 After this, 
                                                
52 Harmless (1995) contends that Ambrose used an epigram with a chiastic rhyme scheme in order 
to help the neophytes to remember the ritual meaning of the water of the holy font (which related to 
cleaning the sin of the baptismal candidate through a burial with Christ): 
Uidisti      You see  
aquam,      the water, 
sed non aqua omnis sanat,   but not all water heals; 
sed aqua sanat    but water heals  
quae habit gratiam    that has the grace 
Christi.     of Christ. 
Aliud est elementum,    One is an element, 
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candidates descended one by one into the water: “You were asked: ‘Do you 
believe in God the Father almighty?’ You said: ‘I do believe,’ and you 
dipped…Again you were asked: ‘Do you believe in our Lord Jesus Christ and in 
his cross?’ You said: ‘I do believe,’ and you dipped…A third time you were 
asked: ‘Do you believe also in the Holy Spirit?’ You said: ‘I do believe,’ you 
dipped a third time” (sacr. 2.20)…When candidates came up from the font, they 
were anointed again, this time with chrism poured on the head.  After this, in a 
rite unique to Milan, candidates’ feet were washed by the bishop.  They were then 
clothed in new white robes.  There followed a consignation, in which the bishop 
invoked the Holy Spirit, praying for the seven gifts mentioned in Isaiah 11:2, and 
the candidates were signed with the cross, most likely using chrism…After 
baptism the newly baptized were led back to the assembled faithful and would 
participate for the first time in the liturgy of the Eucharist.  Each day during 
Easter week, Augustine and the other newly baptized would have come to the 
basilica in their white robes and received a form of instruction known as 
mystagogy, that is, the “teaching of the mysteries.” (p. 85) 
 
Through the sacrament of Christian baptism, Augustine was transfigured.  The 
baptized Augustine had entered into the process of dying and beginning anew which was 
rooted in a sharing of the death and resurrection of Christ.  This means that the holy 
waters of baptism had enabled Augustine to be recreated and to be anew.  The old 
Augustine died and was buried; now the new one was reborn and was risen.  As such, 
Augustine was delivered from evil, reconciled with God, enlightened by the Spirit, and 
incorporated into the body of Christ, the Church.  The newly baptized Augustine was 
welcomed as a member of the Christian church.  He celebrated his first Eucharist with 
others who was baptized.  Finally, Augustine became fully Christian, as later he recalled 
and confessed: 
We were baptized, and disquiet about our past life vanished from us.  During 
those days I found an insatiable and amazing delight in considering the profundity 
of your purpose for the salvation of the human race.  How I wept during your 
                                                                                                                                            
aliud consecratio,    the other, a consecration. 
aliud opus,     the one [is] a work, 
aliud operatio.     the other, the worker (p. 101; see Ambrose, sacr. 1.15). 
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hymns and songs!  I was deeply moved by the music of the sweet chants of your 
Church.  The sounds flowed into my ears and the truth was distilled into my heart.  
This caused the feelings of devotion to overflow.  Tears ran, and it was good for 
me to have that experience (conf. 9.6.14)…The Church at Milan had begun only a 
short time before to employ this method of mutual comfort and exhortation.  The 
brothers used to sing together with both heart and voice in a state of high 
enthusiasm. (9.7.15; see 9.7.16, italics added) 
 
Indeed, the Milanese baptismal liturgy had affected Augustine’s transformation 
and his reorganization of the rest of his life.  During the rite of his baptism, Augustine 
had heard the singing of the church members.  He was deeply astonished because he 
already knew the origin of the custom of singing in the Milan cathedral.  Here Augustine 
could remember that Bishop Ambrose (who had kept the Creed of the Council of Nicaea) 
had encouraged his congregation to sing the sacred songs (in which some were composed 
by himself) within the basilica, while he and his flock (including Monica) had struggled 
to defend their church against the Arians (who had been aided by the Empress Justina and 
the Roman Army [9.7.15]) (see Bourke, 1945, p. 83).53  As such, these hymns and songs 
of the church members had challenged the baptized Augustine to rethink the goal and 
meaning of his life and to follow the examples of the life of humility for Christ and 
dedication to the church, as later he stated: 
You pierced my heart with the arrow of your love…The examples given by your 
servants whom you had transformed from black to shining white and from death 
to life, crowded in upon my thoughts.  They burnt away and destroyed my heavy 
sluggishness, preventing me from being dragged down to low things.  They set 
me on fire with such force that every breath of opposition from any ‘deceitful 
                                                
53 Later Augustine described the impact of the hymns and songs on the congregation in 
the Milanese cathedral (who were against the Arians) as follows: “That was the time when the 
decision was taken to introduce hymns and psalms sung after the custom of the eastern Churches, 
to prevent the people from succumbing to depression and exhaustion.  From that time to this day 
the practice has been retained and many, indeed almost all your flocks, in other parts of the world 
have imitated it” (9.7.15, italics added). 
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tongue’ (Ps. 119: 2f) had the power not to dampen my zeal but to inflame it the 
more. (9.2.3) 
 
In the Confessions, Augustine had portrayed his long existential and spiritual 
odyssey to become a baptized Christian as well as a member of the church community.  
There were four main events of Augustine’s life in the Confessions related to the theme 
of Christian baptism: 1) Monica’s decision to postpone the boy Augustine’s baptism after 
the recovery of his physical health at Thagaste (1.11.17-18); 2) the Manichee Augustine’s 
mocking of the Christian baptism of his unnamed friend at Thagaste (4.4.7-9); 3) the 
Manichee and skeptic Augustine’s lack of desire for Christian baptism in spite of his 
serious physical illness at Rome (5.9.16); 4) Augustine’s own baptism with Adeodatus 
and Alypius by Bishop Ambrose of Milan (9.6.14).  Based on his transforming 
experience through the Milanese baptismal liturgy, later Augustine had considered 
baptism both the sacrament of the remission of sins and the rebirth for the newness of 
life.54  
There is an analogous relation between the stories of conversion and the stories of 
Christian baptism in terms of conversion-baptism.  Consistent with the portrayal of his 
own odyssey for Christian baptism, Augustine had also illustrated others’ baptisms which 
were deeply related to their conversions to Christianity.  In that sense, as O’Brien (1978) 
describes Augustine’s conversion within others’ conversion stories, Wright (2001) 
portrays Augustine’s baptism within others’ baptisms.  While paying attention to the 
correlation of others’ experiences of Christian baptism with Augustine’s own experience 
                                                
 54 Augustine noted, “I know…one baptism consecrated and sealed with the name of the Father, 
and the Son, and the Holy Ghost” (ep. 23.4); “Inasmuch as water, sanctified by the prayer of the priest in 
the Church, washes away sins, just so much does it multiply sins when infected…with the words of 
heretics” (bapt. 6.25.46; see s. 213.9; f. et op. 20.36). 
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of the baptismal rite, Wright (2001) states, “All the other mentions of baptism in the 
Confessions relate to what I will call, if only by convenient shorthand, believer’s baptism 
or perhaps better conversion-baptism:  Monnica’s hope for Augustine (6.13.23), the 
famously public baptism of Victorinus, ‘an infant born at your font’ (8.2.3-5), 
Verecundus’ death-bed conversion and baptism (9.3.5), that of Nebridius (9.3.6), of 
Alypius with Augustine himself and his son Adeodatus (9.6.14), of Evodius (9.8.17), of 
Patricius his father (9.10.22), and even it seems of Monnica herself (9.13.34)” (pp. 290-
291).  These stories of baptism (including the case of Augustine) help us recognize how 
Christian baptismal liturgy had affected the transformation of the baptized and how it had 
stimulated the newly baptized to become a member of the community, namely, to enter 
into the movement to formulate or reformulate the Christian community.55 
During and after his conversion to Christianity and his Christian baptism, 
Augustine had learned “how to love properly” or relate to himself, others, and the divine 
(see Paffenroth, 2003, pp. 146-152).  More specifically, Augustine became reconciled to 
himself by entering into the unifying process of his divided self or distorted will.  He 
became reconciled to God by putting himself on the humble Incarnate Christ.  As he had 
                                                
55 In the Confessions, Augustine had also depicted the impact of his own experience of Christian 
baptism on the spiritual changes of other persons by using the case of Nebridius.  As Augustine’s 
conversion to Christianity had influenced Alypius’ conversion to Christianity (8.12.28-30), his baptism had 
affected Nebridius’ baptism.  When Nebridius joined the Cassiciacum community, he was a highly intellect, 
but was not yet Christian (conf. 9.3.6, 9.4.7).  However, Augustine’s transformation through the Milanese 
baptismal liturgy had triggered him to imitate the life of humility and asceticism.  Nebridius was finally 
baptized and became a servant of the Christian community, as later Augustine noted: “He had fallen into 
that ditch of pernicious [Manichee] error which taught him to believe that the flesh of your Son, the truth, 
was illusory.  Nevertheless he had emerged from that to the attitude that, though not yet initiated into any of 
the sacraments of your Church, he was an ardent seeker after truth.  Soon after my conversion and 
regeneration by your baptism, he too became a baptized Catholic believer.  He was serving you in perfect 
chastity and continence among his own people in Africa, and through him his entire household became 
Christian” (9.3.6). 
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greatly recovered his relationships with himself and with the divine, now Augustine had 
reformulated, implicitly or explicitly, his relationships with others.  For example, he 
became reconciled to his unnamed woman—Adeodatus’ mother (who returned Africa, 
vowing never to live with another man [6.15.25]) by following her example of the life of 
continence; he became reconciled to his unnamed friend (who was baptized on his 
deathbed and was angry at Augustine’s mocking at his baptism [4.4.7-9]) by receiving his 
own Christian baptism in the Milanese cathedral (see Asiedu, 2003, pp. 303-304); further, 
he became reconciled to his mother Monica (who was disappointed in her son’s 
involvement in the Manichean sect and had long prayed for his conversion to Christianity 
[3.11.19-3.12.21]) by abandoning his Manichean belief and by becoming a faithful 
Christian within the church community. 
Not long after his baptism, Augustine decided to go back to North Africa with his 
followers in order to establish a new Christian community (i.e., a lay monastic 
community, as later he noted: “‘You make people to live in a house in unanimity’ (Ps. 
67:7)…We were together and by a holy decision resolved to live together.  We looked for 
a place where we could be of most use in your service; all of us agreed on a move back to 
Africa” (9.8.17).  After departing from Cassiciacum, they came to Ostia on the Tiber in 
order to rest for their long voyage to North Africa. 
During their stay at Ostia, Augustine and Monica talked about their spiritual 
journey toward union with God, as it related to issue of the eternal life of the saints.  At 
the time of their conversation about Christian life for the glory of God, they were 
profoundly immersed into themselves (as Augustine himself entered into his own mind to 
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know himself and the divine in the Milanese garden).  Through their inner spiritual 
journey toward the existence of Being, they had experienced the divine presence in their 
hearts and the divine intervention into their lives.  Here Augustine and Monica had not 
undergone simply an isolated experience, but a shared mystical experience of union with 
God, as later Augustine described: 
The conversation led us towards the conclusion that the pleasure of the bodily 
senses…is seen by comparison with the life of eternity to be not even worth 
considering.  Our minds were lifted up by step we climbed beyond all corporeal 
objects…We ascended even further by internal reflection and dialogue and 
wonder at your works, and we entered into our own minds.  We moved up beyond 
them so as to attain to the region of inexhaustible abundance where you feed 
Israel eternally with truth for food.  There life is the wisdom by which all 
creatures come into being, both things which were and which will 
be…Furthermore, in this wisdom there is no past and future, but only being, since 
it is eternal. (9.10.24) 
 
 On that day when they had their spiritual conversation, Augustine and Monica 
agreed with each other that this world with all its delights became worthless to them.  
Monica said to Augustine: 
My son, as for myself, I now find no pleasure in this life…My hope in this world 
is already fulfilled.  The one reason why I wanted to stay longer in this life was 
my desire to see you a Catholic Christian before I die.  My God has granted this in 
a way more than I had hoped.  For I see you despising this world’s success to 
become his servant. (9.10.26) 
 
Indeed, Augustine’s description of a shared experience at Ostia was crucial for 
understanding his living in solitude and community.56  As discussed earlier, the young 
                                                
56 While viewing the Ostia experience as “a shared experience,” McGinn and McGinn (2003) 
writes, “All through the Confessions Augustine emphasizes that no one is damned alone and no one is 
saved alone.  Our fallen nature comes to us from Adam, and sinfulness is always compounded in our 
solidarity with others; it is through Christ and our participation in his Body that a more true, but still partial, 
experience of God can be attained in this life.  In comparison with the Milan account, the Ostia experience 
is presented in language that is more social in context, more affective in rhetoric, and more complex in its 
appeal to transformed interior sensation” (pp. 155-156; see Vaught, 2004, p. 128 ). 
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philosopher Augustine had learned the Neoplatonic method of meditation such as the 
ascent of the soul toward the One or the return of the soul to the Origin.  As such, here 
Augustine had portrayed his Ostia experience by using this Neoplatonic method of 
meditation.  However, through his experiences of Christian conversion and baptism, he 
had gradually overcome the Plotinian concept of individualism—“the flight of the alone 
to the Alone” which tended to overemphasize the isolated individual’s philosophical and 
spiritual inquiry for the truth.  Now Augustine had recognized the importance of the life 
of community or solidarity in faith in Christ, acknowledging the importance of the life of 
solitude or prayer of the person.  Later his recognition of the importance of Christian 
living in Christian friendship and Christian living in contemplation had led him to 
integrate his pastoral ministry with his monastic life at Hippo Regius. 
 After the shared Ostia experience, Monica fell ill and died (9.8.17, 9.11.27-28).  
During her long spiritual journey, she was involved in the life of continence after the 
death of her husband (9.13.37).  In doing so, she had sacrificed herself for her son and 
had prayed for his turning away from Manichaeism to Christianity (3.11.19-3.12.21).  
Especially, Monica committed herself to God and God’s church; she had struggled to 
defend the Milanese cathedral against the Arians (9.7.15).  After her son’s conversion and 
baptism, she had dedicated herself to care for the newly established Christian community 
(i.e., the Cassiciacum community); namely, she had played an preeminent role of spiritual 
mother in the community in light of faith in Christ and Christian friendship, as later 
Augustine recalled: “My mother stayed close by us in the clothing of a woman but with a 
virile faith, an older woman’s serenity, a mother’s love, and a Christian devotion 
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(9.4.8)...Lord—by your gift you allow me to speak for your servants, for before her 
falling asleep we were bound together in community in you after receiving the grace of 
baptism—she exercised care for everybody as if they were all her children.  She served us 
as if she was a daughter to all of us” (9.9.22, italics added).  As such, Augustine and his 
fellows had bitterly lamented the death of their spiritual mother, Monica, and had prayed 
for her soul to rest in peace (9.11.27-9.12.32).  Later Augustine had remembered 
Monica’s whole life of humility for Christ and dedication for others (see 9.8.17-9.13.37).  
Influenced by Monica, Augustine had sincerely attempted to follow her example of 
humility and dedication within his integrated Christian life of solitude and community. 
Apparently, during Augustine’s unfolding process of transformation, there is 
close relation between his experience of divine intervention and grace in the Milanese 
garden, his acceptance of the Milanese baptismal liturgy, and his Ostia vision with 
Monica.  In the interactive and consummated conditions of his experiences of 
psychological crisis and existential predicament, his inquiry to know himself and the 
divine, his intensified interactions with others, his affiliations with the Christian 
community and the philosophical group, his intellectual and cultural changes, and his 
encounter with God in the Milanese garden, the convert Augustine was continuously 
involved in the ongoing transformational process of spiritual life and dedication for the 
rest of his lifetime.  As such, he had participated in the Milanese baptismal liturgy in 
which he had undergone the spiritual death and rebirth; namely, he publicly became a 
member of the Christian community.  After his baptism, he was engaged in the vision of 
Ostia with Monica in which they had shared the mystic experiences of divine grace and 
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intervention into their life of pilgrimage.  This study shifts to look at how Augustine’s 
turning toward God (i.e., his life in contemplation) was inherently related to his turning 
toward others (i.e., his life in social engagement) in light of the interaction of God, self, 
and community. 
 
H. Engagement in the Service of God and God’s People 
Along with the description of Augustine’s acceptance of Christian baptism and 
his experience of the Ostia vision, this section investigates his engagement of the service 
of God and service of others.  While interrelating to other stages of Rambo’s model of 
conversion, it is consonant with the stage of consequences.  In this way, this section 
focuses on Augustine’s ongoing spiritual journey of transformation (“converting”) and 
dedication; that is, it articulates how the mature Augustine was involved in his monastic 
life and his pastoral ministry in light of the symbiotic interplay between love of God and 
love of neighbor.  As such, question 6 is continuously beneficial for discussing the 
interrelated link between Augustine’s relationships with himself, others, and the divine, 
and his mental development and spiritual maturity. 
In the conditions of the unexpected death of Monica at the seaport of Ostia (as 
well as the political and social disturbance in the Empire),57 Augustine and his fellows 
changed their plans to journey to North Africa.  They went to Rome in 387 and remained 
                                                
57 Peter Brown (2000) contends that Augustine and his fellows were unable to return to Africa 
because of the blockade of the ports of Rome: “As the party made for the sea, the distant civil war, which 
had overshadowed the public life of Milan for years, finally reached Italy.  The fleet of the usurper, 
Maximus, a general who had been in command at Caernarvon, was blockading the harbours of Rome; the 
Emperor Theodosius, a pious Galician general who ruled in Constantinople, was preparing to crush his 
rival.  Because of this blockade, the little group of Africans was brought to a halt in Ostia” (p. 121). 
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there for a year.  During his stay in Rome, he had participated in philosophical and 
religious discussions with his fellows.  In particular, here Augustine had learned the 
Pachomian tradition of early Christian monasticism, as he had already learned the 
Antonian tradition of the ascetic/solitary life through Ponticianus’ account of the life of 
Antony (Possidius, v. Aug. 3, 5; E. A. Clark, 1999; Harrison, 2000; Lawless, 1987; Van 
Bavel, 1986; Zumkeller, 1986).   As discussed earlier, the Pachomian tradition of the 
monastic life had been founded and developed by Pachomius the Egypt monk who had 
pursued to live together with other monks in organized communities in Upper Egypt 
(“the Pachomian Koinonia”) and composed the first known monastic rule (Harmless, 
2004; Schaff, 1950; Zumkeller, 1986).  In that sense, the Pachomian tradition of 
monasticism had greatly emphasized the life of the community of the cenobites (e.g., 
9.2.2-3; Possidius, v. Aug. 3, 5) rather than the life of the solitary hermitage of the desert 
anchorites (e.g., 8.6.14-15)—in order to overcome the risk of indulging in the isolated life 
of the individual or individuals.  While visiting a number of monasteries in Rome, 
Augustine was deeply moved into the hallmarks of the Christian monastic life which 
consisted of shared possessions, chastity, and holiness.  As such, he had learned the 
organized skills of the community and practices of Eastern monasticism (based on the 
Pachomian tradition) which included the pattern of communal prayer, reading the 
Scriptures, manual labor, the authority structure, the common life and sharing possessions, 
fasting, or clothing.  Later Augustine’s learning of both Antonian anchoritism and 
Pachomian cenobitism had enabled him to establish a more developed Christian monastic 
movement in the Latin West, which had effectively integrated the Christian living in 
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solitude and the Christian living in community in light of the interaction of contemplation 
and action.  (In this way, we are able to recognize that the early desert spirituality of 
Egypt was crucial for the formation and development of Christian monasticism in the 
Latin West.) 
After learning the Pachomian tradition of Christian monasticism in Rome, 
Augustine returned to North Africa with his fellows in 388.  By way of Carthage, he 
arrived at his home town, Thagaste.  Here Augustine had founded a lay Christian 
community with his fellows—the “servants of God” (serui dei)—in which he had kept a 
form of shared life with other members and had continued his studies and meditation.  As 
later his biographer Possidius stated: 
When [Augustine] had received the grace of God, he determined, with others of 
his neighbors and friends who served God with him, to return to Africa to his own 
home and lands to which he came and in which he was settled for almost three 
years.  He now gave up these possessions and began to live with those who had 
also consecrated themselves to God, in fastings and prayers and good works, 
meditating day and night in the Law of the Lord. (Possidius, v. Aug. 3; see ep. 
126.7; s. 355.2)58 
 
Consistent with his ongoing process of becoming a servant of God through the 
monastic way of life, Augustine came to Hippo Regius in 391 in order to recruit the 
members of his community of Thagaste as well as to look for a new place to establish a 
monastic community.  While participating in the worship service of the Hippo cathedral, 
Augustine was unexpectedly ordained as a priest under the pressure of the old and Greek-
                                                
58 Zumkeller (1986) portrays the Thagaste community as follows: “Here in Tagaste something of 
the spirit of the cenobitism of the Eastern monasteries was revived.  And yet Augustine immediately 
introduced new aspects to this form of living.  Manual labor was no longer the companions’ sole 
occupation.  Possidius describes Augustine’s curriculum: study, teaching, and writing.  From the beginning, 
Augustine devoted much time to study, viewing as his special vocation the reconciling of the Church’s 
asceticism with scientific knowledge and literature” (p. 25; see pp. 24-32). 
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speaking Bishop Valerius (who had long sought for an young and Latin-speaking 
assistant for him) and his congregation (although he had strongly resisted against this 
appointment) (s. 355.2; Possidius, v. Aug. 4).  However, after accepting Valerius and his 
congregation’s demand as a divine calling, Augustine moved from Thagaste to Hippo 
Regius with his friends.  At that time, much like Bishop Ambrose of Milan had 
encouraged the rhetorician Augustine to become a Christian, here Bishop Valerius of 
Hippo had encouraged the priest Augustine to perform, successfully and effectively, his 
ecclesiastical obligation for church members.  In doing so, he had also helped Augustine 
to rebuild the lay Christian monastery with his fellows in a garden of the cathedral.  
While receiving Valerius’ support, Augustine became a famous preacher and an 
influential leader in the African Church (v. Aug. 5).  In 395, he became the auxiliary 
bishop of Hippo Regius; after the death of Valerius in 396, Augustine succeeded him (v. 
Aug. 8; Bonner, 2002; Bourke, 1945; Brown, 2000).  Surprisingly, we are able to realize 
that like Simplicianus and Ambrose of Milan, Bishop Valerius had deeply influenced 
Augustine in fostering his ongoing spiritual transformation which was deeply related to 
his involvement into his monastic life [i.e., prayer] and pastoral ministry [i.e., social 
engagement] in the context of the North African Church. 
As a monk and a priest/bishop, Augustine had reformulated his Christian 
monasteries which were based on the spirit and actions of the apostolic community at 
Jerusalem as described in Acts 4:31-35, while remembering the importance of the 
heritage of the early Christian monastic movements (i.e., the Antonian tradition of the 
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ascetic/solitary life and the Pachomian tradition of the communal life).  In that sense, 
later Possidius described as follows: 
[Augustine] established a monastery within the church and began to live with the 
servants of God according to the manner and rule instituted by the holy apostles.  
The principal rule of this society was that no one should possess anything of his 
own, but that all things should be held in common and be distributed to each one 
as he had need, as Augustine had formerly done after he returned to his native 
home from across the sea. (v. Aug. 5) 
 
Along with the establishment of the lay monastery, Augustine had also founded 
the clerics’ monastery (monasterium clericorum) at the “house of the Bishop” as well as 
monasteries for women at Hippo Regius.  In order to reorganize and manage these lay, 
clerical, and women’s monasteries, Augustine had made the monastic Rule around 397 in 
which all members of the community had attempted to live together in unity and to have 
‘one heart and soul’ directed towards God (reg. 1.2; see Harrison, 2000; Lawless, 1987, 
1999; Zumkeller, 1986). 
Importantly, Augustine’s ongoing transformative process of spiritual life was 
involved in not only turning toward God, but also turning toward neighbors (Canning, 
1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1993; Clark, 1990, 1999, 2000; Martin, 2003, 2005; McGinn & 
McGinn, 2003).  This means that while participating in the life of Christian monastery, 
Augustine had also engaged in the life of pastoral ministry for others, including his 
church members.  Augustine’s concept of the monastic ideal and life was rooted in 
“Christian love” (caritas) in which community members had intended to engage in “the 
service of love” of God and neighbor.59  In that sense, as a monk and a bishop, Augustine 
                                                
59 In consideration of the “the practice of love” of God and neighbor within Augustine’s monastic 
communities at Hippo, Tarsicius J. Van Bavel (1986) writes, “The first community of Jerusalem plays the 
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had sought to integrate the seemingly disparate but mutually enriching dimensions of 
Christian living—contemplation and action, as he noted: 
As for the three kinds of life, the life of [sanctified] leisure [or contemplation], the 
life of action, and the combination of the two, anyone, to be sure, might spend his 
life in any of these ways without detriment to his faith, and might thus attain to 
the everlasting rewards.  What does matter is the answers to those questions: 
What does a man possess as a result of his love of truth?  And what does he pay 
out in response to the obligations of Christian love?  For no one ought to be so 
leisured as to take no thought in that [sanctified] leisure for the interest of his 
neighbour, nor so active as to feel no need for the contemplation of God. (civ. Dei 
19.19) 
 
Based on the primacy of love of God and neighbor in the Bible (e.g., Mt 22:37-
40), Augustine constantly confronted the following issue during his lifetime: To what 
extent can “the inner life of the spirit” (i.e., a life of prayer/solitude) be harmonized with 
“an active apostolate and the performance of charitable works” (i.e., a life of 
community/social engagement)?60  Indeed, Augustine had struggled to reconcile his early 
and continuing preference for the contemplative life with the many ecclesiastical duties 
surrounding his priesthood, and later, his episcopacy (see ep. 10.1-3, 21.1-6, 48.1-4; 
Torchia, 1999).  In doing so, he was involved in the vigorous and difficult debates with 
the Manichees, the Donastists, the Arians, and the Pelagians in order to defend the North 
African Church from paganism/heresy.  In that sense, Kreider (1999) points out, 
North Africa was a hard world.  As a bishop, Augustine was involved in struggles 
with religious rivals—especially “schismatic” Donatists and pagans.  These 
                                                                                                                                            
role of an ancient dream which becomes an ideal for the present and for the future.  We could characterize 
the Rule of Augustine as a call to the evangelical equality of all people.  It voices the Christian demand to 
bring all men and women into full community” (p. 8; see p. 7). 
 
60 For Augustine, there are two opposite kinds of love: 1) caritas (amor Dei) refers to a God-
centered love in which one is subject to God and is turned toward the neighbor; 2) cupiditas (amor 
sui/mundi) indicates a self-centered love in which one seeks one’s private interest and one looks arrogantly 
to domination against others (Gn. litt. 11.15.19-20; civ. Dei 14.28; Van Bavel, 1999, p. 510). 
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struggles at times also involved him in contests with local power brokers for 
influence and dominance.  So before long Augustine became an active participant 
in the Christianization, by favor, fiat, and force, of North Africans and their 
society. (p. 55) 
 
During the long time of his debates, Augustine had dedicated himself to establish 
more proper Christian guidelines and beliefs (which were deeply related to the themes of 
1) God and soul, 2) sin and God’s grace, 3) creation, time, and eternity, 4) the unity of the 
love of God and neighbor, and 5) the Christian church and baptism) in order to lead 
God’s people into a better Christian living within the specific historical and socio-cultural 
context.61  Until his last ecclesiastical struggle for protecting his flock and church in the 
midst of the siege of Hippo Regius by the Vandals in 430, Augustine had successfully 
committed himself to the service of God and the service of others (v. Aug. 29, 30, 31). 
Apparently, as emphasized in question 6, Augustine’s converting experience did 
not refer to the alienated withdrawal from the world.  Rather, it was continuously 
involved in the loving relationships with himself, others, and the divine.  This means that 
it had compelled him to move into the healing and transforming process through his life; 
as such, it had led him to engage in the integrated Christian life of solitude and 
community in the specific social, cultural, and religious context of his time.  Indeed, 
within his newly reconstructed relationships, Augustine could actually dedicate himself 
                                                
61 Clark (1999) insists that “while his [Augustine’s] spirituality includes a longing for mystical 
union with God, it is firmly rooted in the biblical command to love one’s neighbor” (p. 815).  In that sense, 
for Augustine, transformation into greater likeness to the Trinity by loving God and neighbor (conf. 
13.22.32) became his goal of spiritual life.  Rather than an escape from the material world, the centrality of 
the “Word made flesh” made his spirituality to be a concrete application of the Gospel to life in the worlds.  
During his lifetime, Augustine had continuously engaged in “union with God, communion with his 
neighbors, and [pastoral] ministry to those in need of spiritual and material assistance” (pp. 814-815). 
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to the loving service of God and neighbor in light of the mutual interaction of God, self, 
and community. 
 
In summary, Augustine was converted to Christianity in the Milanese garden in 
the summer of 386.  His conversion experience was a complicated and multi-layered 
process of existential and spiritual change which brought the total reorientation and 
transformation of his life, affected by the interaction of personal, social, cultural, and 
religious components.  This study has attempted to portray a more coherent and 
integrated picture of his conversion process by using the main interdisciplinary question 
and the six substantive and mutually-informing questions.  In doing so, it has articulated 
what happened in his lifelong process of change (“converting”) and dedication in which 
multi factors had worked simultaneously and cumulatively (much like a range of various 
voices in the choir had interacted with one another within the spirit of harmony and 
balance). 
 Augustine was born in North Africa of the Roman world in which Christianity 
became an official religion after Constantine’s conversion to Christianity in 312.  This 
means that the process of Christianization was widespread and far-reaching in the Roman 
world, including his hometown, Thagaste.  Along with Christianization, there were 
serious religious conflicts between Christianity and paganism in North Africa.  In this 
context, there were two disparate yet powerful movements: 1) sensual pleasure and 
materialism and 2) moral earnestness and purity in North African society.  Augustine’s 
father Patricius (who was a pagan) might have been more influenced by the former 
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movement, but his mother Monica (who was an ardent Christian) might have been more 
affected by the latter movement.  Although there was no serious hostility between 
Patricius and Monica within the familial context, their different personalities and 
religiosity had deeply influenced the formation of the early and adolescent Augustine’s 
personality, worldview, and belief.  During his early school life, the boy Augustine had 
experienced traumatic injuries through his experiences of beatings from school teachers, 
his parents’ laughing at his stripes, and God’s silence about it.  In the context of his 
experiences of traumatic injuries, Augustine had negatively formulated his self-images 
and his representations of God (as scourging, marking, and indifferent). 
Before his conversion, the Manichee and skeptic Augustine had accomplished a 
successful, worldly career (i.e., a municipal chair of rhetoric in Milan).  However, he had 
experienced psychological distress and crisis which were rooted to his sense of inner 
division, isolation, and restlessness in his mind (the sickness of the soul).  Augustine’s 
sense of inner conflict was deeply related to his experiences of early traumatic injuries 
and his two opposed desires—1) the desire for sensual pleasure and materialism (i.e., the 
life of seeking for licentiousness and worldly fame) and 2) the desire for moral 
earnestness and purity (i.e., the life of searching for the Truth)—which were rooted in his 
parents’ different personalities, worldviews, and religiosity.  As such, the young 
rhetorician Augustine had also undergone serious relational problems with others/Other, 
including his mother Monica, his unnamed friend (the baptized Christian), and his 
unnamed woman (Adeodatus’ mother).  In the context of his psychological crisis and 
distress and his relational problems, he was not able to find the resting place on earth. 
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 Importantly, Augustine’s experiences of psychological crisis and existential abyss 
had triggered him to move into his inner world to know himself and to know the divine.  
Here the restless Augustine had begun to recollect and reflect on his life history.  In doing 
so, he had attempted to recognize the root of his inner conflict and the cause of his life 
problem, at which point he was able to open his mind in order to hear the inward divine 
voice.  This means that he had gradually moved into the process of unifying his divided 
self which was related to his deep experience with the divine/God (“a More”). 
During his quest for knowing himself and the divine and his struggle for re-
establishing purpose and meaning in life, the young Augustine was related to and 
influenced by significant others.  Here Augustine (who was a rhetorician and an active 
seeker) had experienced loving care and support from other persons (especially Ambrose, 
Simplicianus, Ponticianus, Alypius, and Monica) within the Christian community.  While 
receiving the hospitality of Bishop Ambrose, Augustine had regularly participated in the 
worship service in the Milanese cathedral and had heard the sermons of Ambrose.  
Through Ambrose’s gifted interpretations of the Bible, Augustine had learned a new way 
of reading the Christian Scriptures and had begun to recognize the great depth of 
Christian faith and living.  In particular, Ambrose’s sermons (which had reflected 
Christianized Neoplatonism) had encouraged the young Augustine to embark on an 
interior journey toward union with God.  As such, Augustine had eventually made a 
decision to depart from the Manichean sect and to become a catechumen within an 
alternative community (i.e., the Milanese cathedral). 
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Along with his interactions with Ambrose and his participation in the Christian 
community, Augustine had met Simplicianus.  Simplicianus had advised Augustine to 
deal with his existential predicament and his spiritual abyss as well as to read the Epistles 
of the Apostle Paul.  In particular, he told Augustine about the conversion story of his old 
friend Victorinus who was a famous professor of rhetoric in Rome.  Before his 
conversion to Christianity, Victorinus ardently believed in the traditional Roman cults.  
However, after reading the Christian Scriptures, he put himself on the humble Incarnate 
Christ and then publicly received Christian baptism, despite knowing that his public 
confession of Christian faith would cause him to lose his professorship of rhetor by the 
edict of the emperor Julian.  The conversion story of Victorinus had compelled Augustine 
to look at his state of bondage of the will and his hesitation of becoming a baptized 
Christian. 
During his intimate interactions with Ambrose and Simplicianus, Augustine (and 
Alypius) received a visit from Ponticianus.  Ponticianus had told them about the life story 
of Antony the Egyptian desert monk and the conversion story of his two friends.  
Influenced by the life of Antony, these two friends of Ponticianus were converted to 
Christianity at Trier.  After resigning their higher positions in the imperial court, they had 
dedicated themselves to the life of asceticism and celibacy.  Following the example of 
Ponticianus’ two friends, their two fiancées had also devoted to the life of continence.  As 
such, Ponticianus had also decided to become a baptized Christian, although he was not 
involved in the Christian monastic community.  After hearing the life of Antony as well 
as the conversion stories of Ponticianus’ two friends and their fiancées, the rhetorician 
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Augustine was ashamed of himself because he had still remained in the desire for worldly 
fame and because he had still vacillated to become a Christian. 
Indeed, these significant persons had played a preeminent role in the process of 
Augustine’s spiritual change in light of the interaction with companions and a network of 
Christian friendships.  More specifically, Augustine’s intensive interactions with others 
and his participation in the Christian community (i.e., the Milanese cathedral) had helped 
him to overcome his dualistic materialism and his skeptic thinking in the Academy as 
well as to fulfill his (psychological) needs (e.g., a sense of belonging and solidarity) and 
to discover a new way of Christian living in community.  In doing so, the interlocking 
conversion stories of Victorinus, Antony, and Ponticianus’ two friends (and their 
fiancées) had challenged the young Augustine to look at his state of existential 
predicament and spiritual abyss (which was related to his wounded soul and his desire of 
worldly ambition) and to imitate their example of humility in faith in Christ. 
While fostering his affective bonds and intimate interactions with other people 
and his intensified affiliations with Christian communities, the intellect Augustine had 
gradually experienced philosophical and cultural changes which had been profoundly 
influenced by the Neoplatonic heritage and the Christian monastic movements of his time.  
In the context of his participation in the Milanese group of intellects and his encounters 
with Christian Neoplatonists (e.g., Ambrose and Simplicianus), Augustine had read the 
books of the Neoplatonists (especially those of Plotinus and Porphyry) and had learned 
about the important Neoplatonic themes, including the ascent of the soul toward the 
One/the return to the Origin.  Through his readings of Neoplatonic books and his 
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meetings with Christian Neoplatonists, the Manichee and skeptic Augustine had 
reconstructed his conceiving of the divine nature (from the corporeal and divisible being 
to the incorporeal and invisible being) as well as his understanding of evil (from a real 
existence to no substance or an absence of good).  Augustine’s reformulation of his view 
on the nature of the divine and the nature of good and evil had deeply challenged him to 
move into his interior journey toward union with the divine in terms of the dynamic 
interaction of God and soul. 
 In the conditions of his struggles with an inner journey toward the divine and his 
intimate interactions with others as well as his readings of the books of the Neoplatonists 
and his reconstruction of his view on divine nature and the origin of evil, the intellect 
Augustine had (re)-read the Bible.  Through reading the Bible, Augustine had found the 
crucial difference between the Holy Scriptures and the Neoplatonic books.  More 
specifically, he had realized that Pagan Neoplatonists (e.g., Porphyry) had viewed Christ 
as a wise man, while emphasizing the virtue of the human nature of Christ rather than the 
virtue of his divine nature.  In particular, he had recognized that unlike the letters of the 
Apostle Paul, the books of the Neoplatonists did not include the Christian concept of the 
Incarnate Christ who is a mediator between God and the human and who is a perfect 
example of humility.  (We are able to realize that before his conversion to Christianity, 
Augustine—the young philosopher—had understood Christ as an excellent man, at which 
point he had indulged in intellectual pride, regarding himself as a source of wisdom and 
virtue.) 
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 At the time of his readings of the Bible and his recognition of the key difference 
between Neoplatonic books and Christian Scriptures, the young Augustine was greatly 
aware of the early Christian monasticism.  As noted above, he had heard from 
Ponticianus about the early Christian monastic movement, especially the acetic life of the 
Egyptian Antony who was a founder of desert monasticism.  As Ponticianus’ two friends 
were influenced by the life of Antony, here Augustine had been affected by the Antonian 
tradition of the life of asceticism.  More specifically, Augustine’s encounter with the 
anchoritic monasticism of Antony had stimulated Augustine to move from the life of 
sensual pleasure and worldly ambition to the life of moral earnestness and purity.  It had 
also challenged Augustine to stand humbly before God in the garden of Milan, to become 
a servant of God (“a monk”), and to follow the example of humility and celibacy. 
Consistent with his inner journey toward union with the divine, his newly 
reconstructed relationships with others, his commitment to the Christian community, and 
his philosophical and cultural changes by learning Christian Neoplatonism and Christian 
monasticism, the young Augustine had faced himself and God in the Milanese garden of 
386.  He had still struggled to find the resting place for his soul, although he had already 
undergone intellectual transformation about the nature of the divine and the nature of 
good and evil.  In this context, Augustine’s inner tension had mounted and became 
unbearable, and he rushed into the garden.  Here Augustine had experienced the divine 
intervention into his restless mind by means of God’s messenger, Lady Continence.  
While showing many examples of humility and celibacy, Lady Continence had urged 
Augustine to overcome his hesitation and to commit himself to the life of asceticism and 
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celibacy.  In a state of his weeping bitterly under a tree and his struggling to make a 
decision, Augustine had heard the divine voice—Tolle lege, Tolle lege!—which sounded 
like the chanting of the neighboring child.  While remembering the case of Antony (who 
had read Mt 19:21 and was transfigured), Augustine had read the book of the Apostle 
Paul (especially Rom 13:13-14).  While reading a specific verse of the Christian 
Scriptures, Augustine had felt the presence of God in his heart and had accepted the 
transforming power of God’s grace in his wounded soul.  Through his encounter with the 
divine by means of the word of God, he cast himself in the merciful hands of God and 
became reconciled to himself and to God.  This reconciliation had enabled him to 
overcome his deep sense of existential isolation (i.e., the sickness of the soul), that is, to 
move in the interior transformation from the division of the self (i.e., the split of the will) 
to the integration of the self (i.e., the transformation of the will).  During his progressive 
restoration and healing, his early negative God representations were changed into positive 
God representations as loving, present, and caring.  As such, he had discovered the safe 
resting place for his soul in relation to God.  Finally, the young Augustine put himself on 
the humble Incarnate Christ and had engaged in the renunciation of the worldly ambition 
and the life of asceticism and celibacy. 
Indeed, Augustine’s conversion to Christianity was crucial for accomplishing the 
new Christian community in light of the interaction of faith in Christ and Christian 
friendship.  Augustine’s own conversion in the Milanese garden had influenced Alypius’ 
conversion and Monica’s transformation, just as the conversion stories of Victorinus, 
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Antony, and Ponticianus’ two friends had affected his own spiritual change.62  After his 
conversion, the newly converted Augustine had retreated with his family and his friends 
at Cassiciacum where they had lived together.  Augustine and his followers were 
involved in the life of asceticism and celibacy, as Ponticianus’ two friends and their 
fiancées were engaged in Christian monastic life in faith in Christ.  At the Easter Vigil in 
387, Augustine was baptized with Adeodatus and Alypius by Bishop Ambrose in the 
Milanese cathedral.  The baptized Augustine had moved into the process of dying and 
beginning anew—the Christian life of death and resurrection in Christ.  He publicly 
became a member of Christian community.  Through his baptismal liturgy of the 
Milanese cathedral, Augustine had formed his new relationship with God, and then he 
had felt a sense of belonging and a new responsibility for others (e.g., the Milanese 
church members who had struggled to protect his church against the Arians; the 
Cassiciacum community members who had accompanied him on his spiritual journey). 
In the context of his experiences of Christian conversion and baptism, Augustine 
was motivated to keep an ongoing spiritual journey of transformation (“converting”) 
which was deeply related to his establishment of Christian monasteries and his pastoral 
ministry.63  After his baptism, by way of Ostia (in which he had shared the mystical 
experience with Monica), Augustine went to Rome in 387.  Here he had learned the 
                                                
62 Asiedu (2003) asserts, “The Confessions…makes an implicit claim as a meta-narrative of 
conversion.  It is not only Augustine’s story but the stories of Victorinus, Ponticianus, the two courtiers at 
Trier, Antony of Egypt, Monnica, and as I am inclined to think, the mother of Adeodatus.  There are as 
many kinds of conversion narratives in the Confessions as there are people who are converted.  To avert 
that any one of these conversion stories is the most fitting representation of Christian conversion in the 
Confessions is simply misleading” (p. 305). 
 
63 In this way, Kreider (1999) states, “[Augustine’s] conversion involved change not just of 
[personal] belief but also of belonging and behavior [in the community]” (p. xv; see p. 109). 
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Pachomian tradition of Christian monasticism which had emphasized the life of the 
community of the cenobites.  After learning in Rome, Augustine returned to North Africa 
in 388.  As a layperson, Augustine had founded the Christian lay community in his 
hometown, Thagaste.  Later Augustine (who became a monk-priest/bishop) had also 
established the lay monastery in the garden of the cathedral (391), the clerical monastery 
at “the house of the Bishop” (395/6), and monasteries for women at Hippo Regius.  At 
the time of his engagement in monastic life, Augustine was associated with the 
fulfillment of his ecclesiastical duties in the cathedral of Hippo.  This means that he had 
attempted to integrate his monastic life with his pastoral ministry in the context of the 
North African Church in light of the correlation of Christian living in solitude and 
Christian living in community.  During his ongoing spiritual journey of transformation, 
Augustine had truly dedicated himself to the life of becoming a servant of the humble 
Incarnate Christ as well as becoming a humble Christian for God’s people. 
 
II. Proposing a Holistic Pattern of the Conversion 
Process from the Confessions 
 
Following the above reinterpretation of Augustine’s conversion process, this 
section of the chapter additionally provides a holistic pattern of the conversion process 
from the Confessions.  The Confessions is a book of the pilgrim who requires strong 
solidarity and friendship from his fellows and his readers going through the common 
struggle to answer the same crucial question that Augustine put to himself (Dixon, 1999; 
Gay, 1986; Kotze, 2004; McMahon, 2006; Nino, 1990; O’Meara, 2001; TeSelle, 1986; 
Vaught, 2004).  In a related vein, Martin (2003) states, 
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Augustine saw himself as a pilgrim and seeker, called, stimulated and guided by 
the Word.  His intent was to invite others to make the journey and thus we are 
meant to share with him the adventures, the joys, the sorrows, the learnings, the 
demands that came to him during the actual course of his spiritual journey as our 
own invitation admonition, to enter upon the path of Christ.  Thus, to be faithful 
to Augustine, the story of the Augustinian tradition cannot simply be about him, 
but likewise about the Christ-journey he proposes for all of us. (p. 14; see pp. 156-
157) 
 
While paying attention to both the personal dimension and the universal 
dimension of religious change,64 this study generalizes Augustine’s narrative of 
transformation within the modern Christian community in light of a movement from 
one’s personal story of conversion to a universal story of conversion in the religious 
community.  As Van Fleteren (1990) points out the theme of the generalization of 
Augustine’s conversion, 
Augustine—not to mention ourselves—has a well-known tendency to universalize 
on his own experience.  In the Confessiones and elsewhere, he exhibits a 
conversion mentality, a mentality which undoubtedly arises out of his own 
experience.  He is inclined to wish for others what he himself had experienced.  
His own conversion served in his mind as a kind of paradigm for all mankind (pp. 
66-67)…By coming to a greater understanding of his conversion to Christianity, 
we may come to a better understanding of ourselves. (p. 73; see Paffenroth, 2003, 
pp. 144, 146) 
 
As noted earlier, scholars have provided various paradigms of Augustine’s 
conversion process from the Confessions (Hay, 2001; McGinn & McGinn, 2003; Nino, 
1990; Sisemore, 2001).  However, previous studies have tended to articulate the pattern 
of the conversion experience as founded in the Confessions from the perspective of one 
theoretical discipline.  In a more specific and extended vein, using Rambo’s 
                                                
64 In a related vein, Schlauch (1995) points out both the uniqueness and the universal of human 
experience (of religiosity) by using the following well-known maxim—“All persons are in some ways like 
all other persons, in some way like some other persons, in some ways like no other person” (p. 13). 
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interdisciplinary framework, this study suggests an interdisciplinary and multi-layered 
pattern to elaborate the complex and interrelated factors of Augustine’s conversion 
process.  This pattern can be valid for experiencing and reflecting on religious conversion 
in both the academic field and the Christian community.65 
 
A. The Expression of One’s Restless Feelings in 
Psychological Crisis and Spiritual Darkness 
 
The pattern of the conversion process from the Confessions begins with the 
description of the specific context of the young Augustine in which he had experienced 
psychological crisis and spiritual darkness.  In the summer of 386 in Milan, Augustine 
had seriously undergone a sense of the divided self within his psychological distress as 
well as a feeling of restlessness within his deep spiritual abyss (the soul’s “falling to 
pieces”).  Moreover, at the time of his experience of the inner division of the mind, 
Augustine had also experienced relationship problems due to his inability to love other 
persons (e.g., his dismissal of his unmarried wife—“his long-term partner”—for his 
worldly ambitions [conf. 6.15.25]).  In this context of his experiences of both the inner 
conflict of the mind and the relational problems with others, Augustine confessed,  
“My two wills, one old, the other new, one carnal, the other spiritual, were in conflict 
with one another, and their discord robbed my soul of all concentration” (8.5.10); that is, 
                                                
65 During the writing of my dissertation, as a student in the fields of pastoral psychology and 
spirituality and a pastor in the Christian community, I have struggled with how I can relocate more 
effectively and practically the conversion narrative of St. Augustine within the context of pastoral care and 
ministry (and the field of the academy)—in order to facilitate a better understanding of the conversion 
stories of the church members as well as to enhance the experiences of religious conversion within the 
Christian community.  To do so, I would like to characterize the pattern of conversion experience as 
described in the Confessions, while respecting Rambo’s interdisciplinary approach to religious conversion.  
As such, in this study, the key themes of the pattern of conversion experience from the Confessions are 
deeply related to the key elements of Rambo’s model of religious change. 
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“in my own case…the self which willed to serve was identical with the self which was 
unwilling.  It was I.  I was neither wholly willing nor wholly unwilling.  So I was in 
conflict with myself and was dissociated from myself.  The dissociation came about 
against my will” (8.10.22; see 8.10.23-24; Rom 7:15, 19).  As such, he argued, “My 
pilgrimage is so wearisome!  I have not yet arrived in that homeland where I shall live 
untroubled by any evil…Why am I not yet there?” (en. Ps. 119.6).  Importantly, 
Augustine’s experiences of psychological crisis and spiritual darkness had compelled him 
to think about what was the real problem in his life as well as what was the real cause of 
his inner distortion of the will and feeling of restlessness in his heart.  Indeed, 
Augustine’s confrontation with his deep existential predicament and his spiritual abyss 
had stirred him to enter into an earnest quest for knowing himself and knowing the divine. 
Clearly, the theme of Augustine’s expression of his restless feelings guides us to 
realize that one’s sense of dividedness and restlessness in a psychological crisis and 
spiritual darkness is not a simply negative symptom of fragmentation or estrangement, 
but a positive opportunity to deeply recollect and reflect upon one’s life; that is, it 
compels oneself to acknowledge the roots of one’s inner conflict at which point one is 
able to open one’s mind to hear the inward divine locution. 
 
B. Entrance into One’s Inwardness with the Divine 
 The restless Augustine (who had suffered from “sickness unto death”) had entered 
into his inner world to know himself and the divine (7.10.16) after realizing that he was 
not able to find a resting place on earth (7.7.11, 8.5.10).  In Soliloquies, Augustine 
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described his yearning for the knowledge of the self and the knowledge of the divine as 
follows: 
Augustine: There, I have prayed to God. 
Reason: What then do you wish to know?  
Augustine: All the things for which I prayed.  
Reason: Summarize them briefly.  
Augustine: I want to know God and the soul. 
Reason: Nothing more?  
Augustine: Nothing whatsoever. (sol. 1.2.7; see 2.1.1, ord. 2.18.47) 
 
Here Augustine wanted to know who he was in relation to the divine and to know 
who God was for him in light of the interaction between God and the soul (see conf. 
9.1.1).  In other words, he had quested for meaning in life as well as his cognitive 
satisfaction of the Truth.  In consideration of the concept of the ascent of the soul to God 
(the return of the soul to the Origin), Augustine accounted for his intellectual and 
spiritual apprehension of God and the soul as follows: 
By the Platonic books I was admonished to return into myself…I entered and with 
my soul’s eye…saw above that same eye of my soul the immutable light higher 
than my mind (7.10.16).  What then do I love when I love my God?  Who is he 
who is higher than the highest element in my soul?  Through my soul I will 
ascend to him.  I will rise above the force by which I am bonded to the body and 
fill its frame with vitality. (10.7.11) 
 
During his inner struggles, both in experiencing himself and experiencing the 
divine, Augustine had gradually discovered that he was far away from God (“the ground 
of being”), at which point he had recognized that the primary cause of both his inner 
division (and his relational problem with others) was deeply derived from his 
disconnection with the ground of Being (4.10.15; see Vaught, 2004, p. 82).  This means 
that Augustine needed to accept God’s presence in the depth of his soul and his life 
(rather than his worldly ambitions). 
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 Significantly, this theme of Augustine’s interior journey toward union with God 
gives us an insight that one needs to move into one’s inner world to know oneself and the 
divine, if one is to quiet the restlessness of one’s heart (“the soul’s sickness”).  One’s 
interior journey toward encounter with God enables oneself to realize the central problem 
of one’s life which is deeply related to one’s turning away from God.  This implies that 
one needs to turn toward God as well as to create a new way of living in light of the 
interplay between the soul and the ground of its existence. 
 
 C. The Confession of One’s Powerlessness to the Divine 
During his interior journey toward union with God, Augustine made a decision to 
open himself to the divine and confessed his powerlessness (i.e., his painful condition of 
fragmentation—“tragic estrangement”) to God in terms of the relation between the soul 
and the ground of being.  Here Augustine had no reason “to hide himself from God” as 
well as “to hide God from himself” (see Capps, 1983, pp. 267-268); as such, he wrote, 
Lord my God, judge of my conscience, is my memory correct?  Before you I lay 
my heart and my memory.  At that time you were dealing with me in your hidden 
secret providence, and you were putting my shameful errors before your face (Ps. 
49: 21) so that I would see and hate them. (conf. 5.6.11; see 10.1.1) 
 
Augustine began to put himself within the presence of God—“O God of hosts, 
turn [me] and show [me] your face, and [I] shall be safe” (4.10.15; see Ps. 79:8)—at 
which point he accepted the divine intervention and grace into his mind and his life—
“Augustine allows himself to be thought by God” (McMahon, 2003, p. 218, italics in the 
original; see Burrell, 1970; Starnes, 1990; TeSelle, 1986, 2002; Vaught, 2004).  Now 
Augustine discovered a resting place in relation to the ground of Being.  Augustine 
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confessed, “You stir [me] to take pleasure in praising you, because you have made [me] 
for yourself, and [my] heart is restless until it rests in you” (conf. 1.1.1).  After disclosing 
his hopeless condition and achieving the resting place within the divine presence, 
Augustine remarkably moved himself to be related to the divine (and others).  He 
accounted for his conviction of the divine indwelling and his dialogue with God: “Your 
right hand had regard to the depth of my dead condition, and from the bottom of my heart 
had drawn out a trough of corruption…Already my mind was free of ‘the biting cares’ of 
place-seeking, of desire for gain, of wallowing in self-indulgence, of scratching the itch 
of lust.  And I was now talking with you, Lord my God, my radiance, my wealth, and my 
salvation” (9.1.1).  This implies that Augustine entered into the process of interior 
transformation from the divided self to the integration of the self in relation to his 
profound experience with the divine (8.12.28-29; see James, 1902/1982, pp. 171-174). 
Importantly, the theme of Augustine’s confession of his powerlessness before 
God leads us to recognize the importance of one’s fundamental openness to God’s 
presence in order to achieve a permanent resting place (in one’s heart and life), as the 
Apostle Paul says: “I will boast all the more gladly of my weaknesses, so that the power 
of Christ may dwell in me” (2 Cor 12:9; see Phil 4:13).  Within this safe resting place of 
the divine, one can overcome a sense of inner isolation and then one begins to recover a 
sense of relationships with the divine and others. 
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D. The Experience of Loving Care and Support from 
Other People in the Christian Community 
 
 During the period of the depths of his ontological struggle to know himself and 
the divine, Augustine was related to and influenced by other persons (e.g., Ambrose [conf. 
5.13.23-5.14.25, 9.6.14]; Simplicianus [8.2.3-5]; Ponticianus [8.6.14-15]; Alypius 
[8.11.27]; Monica [6.2.2, 9.7.15, 9.10.23-26]; Augustine’s unmarried wife [6.15.25]).  In 
other words, Augustine had experienced loving care and support from these persons 
within Christian communities.  These significant persons had affected Augustine to 
overcome his dualistic materialism (i.e., the Manichean belief [3.7.2, 3.7.12]) and his 
skeptic thinking in the Academy (5.14.25) as well as to fulfill his (psychological) needs 
(e.g., a sense of belongingness) and to find a new way of life in the Christian community.  
In doing so, Simplicianus (who was a spiritual father of Bishop Ambrose of Milan and a 
Christian Neoplatonist) told the conversion story of his friend Victorinus at Rome (8.2.3-
5); Ponticianus (who was a fellow African Christian and a high court official of the 
Empire) visited Augustine (and Alypius) and he accounted for the conversion stories of 
his two friends at Trier (who were influenced by the ascetic life of Antony the Egyptian 
monk) (8.6.13-15).  Clearly, Augustine’s intimate interactions with significant others in 
the Christian communities helped him to make up for his frustration with his deprivations 
in the social and cultural conditions of his time as well as to foster a new ability to live 
together with others in the community in light of interpersonal bonds and a web of 
Christian friendships (Kreider, 1999; Kreidler, 1990; Meeks, 1993; Vaught, 2004; Wills, 
1999, 2004).  The conversion stories of other persons (“a story within a story”) 
challenged Augustine to overcome his isolated life-style, to be converted to Christianity, 
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and to follow their example of humility in faith in Christ (Matter, 1990; O’Brien, 1978; 
Van Fleteren, 1990). 
 Significantly, the theme of Augustine’s experiences of loving care and support 
from other people in Christian communities provides us with an insight insofar as the 
experience of the self is deeply related to the experience of others.  In other words, one’s 
psychological development and spiritual maturity are deeply affected by one’s continuous 
intimate relationships with other members of the Christian community.  Through 
intensive interactions with significant others and through affiliations with religious 
groups (a process of “resocialization” or “institutionalization”), one becomes a new 
member of an alternate community.  Here one can overcome a sense of disconnection 
with (the divine and) others and then one can engage in Christian living in community. 
 
E. Confrontation with Philosophical and Cultural Changes Resulting in the 
Reconstruction of Personal (and Religious) Identity, Worldview, and Belief 
 
Along with his intensive interactions with others and his participation in Christian 
communities, the young Augustine had confronted philosophical and cultural changes 
that were profoundly rooted in the Neoplatonic heritage and the Christian monastic 
movement of the late fourth century.  That is, Augustine had gradually reconstructed his 
personal and religious identity, worldview, and belief through his readings of the 
Platonist books (conf. 7.9.14-17.23) and his encounters with Christian Neoplatonists (e.g., 
Ambrose [5.13.23-5.14.25] and Simplicianus [8.2.3-5]) as well as through his learning of 
the early Christian monastic movements at Milan and then in Rome (including the 
Antonian tradition of the ascetic/solitary life [8.6.14-15] and the Pachomian tradition of 
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the community life [Possidius, v. Aug. 3, 5]) and his practices of the monastic life at 
Thagaste and then Hippo Regius.  Clearly, Christian Neoplatonism helped Augustine to 
reformulate his view on the divine nature from the material and divisible being to the 
immaterial and indivisible being (as well as his concept of evil from a “substance” to “a 
privation of good”); namely, to make his inner spiritual journey for union with God (in 
light of knowing God and the soul) (conf. 3.7.12, 7.1.1-2, 7.5.7, 7.10.16, 7.20.26; c. ep. 
Man. 15.20; see Ayres & Barnes, 1999; Cary, 1999, 2000, 2003; Chadwick, 1986; 
Kenney, 2002; Kevane, 1986; Lancel, 2002; Markus, 1999; McMahon, 2006; O’Meara, 
2001).  Furthermore, it compelled Augustine to acknowledge the Christian concept of the 
Incarnate Christ (who is a mediator between the human and the divine and who is a 
perfect example of humility).  In doing so, the early Christian monastic movements had 
challenged the new convert Augustine to enter into the life of celibacy within the 
Christian philosophical community at Cassiciacum and then in Rome.  Moreover, these 
movements (especially Antonian anchoritism and Pachomian cenobitism) had affected 
Augustine to become a servant of God (“a monk”), at which point the lay-monk 
Augustine established a monastery/lay Christian community at Thagaste in North Africa, 
and then the priest/bishop-monk Augustine found the lay and clerical monasteries at 
Hippo Regius in light of the mutual interaction of Christian life in solitude and Christian 
life in community (E. A. Clark, 1999; Harrison, 2000; Lawless, 1987; Van Bavel, 1986; 
Zumkeller, 1986). 
The theme of Augustine’s reconstruction of personal/religious identity, worldview, 
and belief (which was influenced by the Neoplatonic heritage and the Christian monastic 
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movement in the late fourth century) shows the impact of institutional and cultural-
philosophical forces on the process of human transformation.  This implies that one’s 
intellectual development and spiritual maturity do not exist “in a vacuum.”  Rather, they 
are inherently related to the specific context of one’s philosophical and cultural changes 
which results in the reformation of one’s personal and religious identity, worldview, and 
belief (a process of “acculturation” or “cultural revitalization”). 
 
F. The Experience of the Transformation of the God representation 
Augustine’s God representations had evolved throughout his lifetime.  There is an 
inherent link of the transformation of the young (and adult) Augustine’s God 
representations with his interpersonal relationships within the Christian communities, and 
his experiences of the philosophical and cultural changes of his time, and his encounters 
with the divine intervention and grace in the midst of his existential predicament and 
spiritual abyss.  The aged Augustine revealed the process of the formation and 
reformation of his own God representations in his works (especially the Confessions), 
while reflecting on his lifetime before God and his readers, including his community 
members (conf. 10.1.1, 10.4.4; retr. 2.6.1).  Augustine’s early traumatic injuries 
(“emphatic failure” or “internalized bad objects” [conf. 1.9.14-15; civ. Dei 21.14]) had 
negatively affected the construction of his self-image which was relevant to his sense of 
low self-esteem (conf. 1.12.19, 1.19.30, 2.2.4, 4.6.11, 4.16.30).  While disclosing his 
negative self-image, the child and young Augustine had characterized his representations 
of God as harsh (1.12.19, 2.2.4), discarding (1.9.14, 5.9.16), vindictive (6.6.9, 9.4.12), 
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laughing (4.1.1, 6.6.9), and material/corruptible (“being a bodily thing”)—“God [is] 
confined within a corporeal form” (3.7.12). 
However, during his intimate interactions with other persons, his participation in 
Christian communities, his learning about Christian Neoplatonism and Christian 
monasticism of the fourth century, and his experiences of the loving grace of the divine, 
Augustine had gradually experienced philosophical and cultural changes (which were 
related to his transformation/change of his personal and religious identity, worldview, 
and belief), at which point his negative God representations were changed into the 
positive God representations.  This means that Augustine began to re-create his 
relationships with himself, others, and the divine by entering into the process of 
restoration and healing.  Now Augustine had positively re-characterized his 
representations of God as follows: 1) God as merciful—“But you, Lord ‘abide for 
eternity and you will not be angry with us for ever’ (Ecclus.18:1; Ps. 84:6).  You have 
mercy on dust and ashes, and it has pleased you to restore my deformities in your sight 
(Ps. 18:15)” (7.8.12); 2) God as encouraging—“With your word you pierced my heart, 
and I loved you…there is a light I love, and a food, and a kind of embrace when I love 
my God—a light, voice, odour, food, embrace of my inner man, where my soul is floodlit 
by light which space cannot contain…and where there is a bound of union that no satiety 
can part” (10.6.8); 3) God as restoring—“I do not hide my wounds.  You are the 
physician, I am the patient.  You are pitiful, I am the object of the pity” (10.28.39); and 4) 
God as incorporeal and incorruptible—“God is a Spirit (John 4:24), not a figure whose 
limbs have length and breadth and who has a mass” (3.7.12; see c. ep. Man. 15.20). 
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Significantly, the theme of Augustine’s transformation of his God representations 
leads us to realize that one’s God representations have evolved throughout one’s life span, 
influenced by the complex and rich interplay of the person with personal, social, cultural, 
and religious forces (Rizzuto, 1979; Spero, 1992; Spiro, 1982).  In doing so, it guides us 
to be aware that the formation and reformation of one’s representations of God have 
affected and have been affected by one’s relationships with oneself, others, and the divine 
(within the specific social and cultural contexts).  In that sense, one’s recovery of the 
positive representations of God is essential for making a better Christian living in which 
one involves mental health, good friendship, and spiritual awakening. 
 
G. The Re-Creation of One’s Loving Relationships with 
Oneself, Others, and the Divine 
 
Consistent with his long struggles with his sense of inner division, his interior 
quest for knowing himself and the divine, his honest confession of powerlessness to God, 
his intensive interactions with others within the Christian communities, his philosophical 
and cultural changes in the context of the influence of the Neoplatonic heritage and the 
Christian monastic movement of the fourth century, his experience of the reformation of 
his God representations, now the young Augustine converted to Christianity in the 
Milanese garden in 386; that is, he made a decision to be a servant of God and to enter 
into the life of asceticism and celibacy.  In other words, Augustine made a resolution to 
engage in the renunciation of his worldly ambition for a successful career, then 
committed himself to the service of God and to the service of God’s people in light of 
Christian life in solitude and community.  Indeed, before his conversion to Christianity 
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(especially the time of his existential predicament and spiritual abyss), the Manichee and 
skeptic Augustine was in the midst of relational problems, as he noted: “I was on the way 
[in which] I had committed against you, against myself, and against others” (5.9.16).  
However, (during and) after his conversion to Christianity, he had earnestly attempted to 
re-create his (empathic) relationships with himself, others, and the divine in light of the 
reciprocity of the love of God and neighbor. 
Clearly, through his conversion experience, Augustine was involved in “the 
process of dying and beginning anew” (11.7.9).  This means that Augustine entered into 
the process of progressive restoration, that is, he had experienced healing of his whole 
being—“When I shall have adhered (Ps. 72: 28) to you with the whole of myself, I shall 
never have ‘pain and toil’ (Ps. 89: 10), and my entire life will be full of you” (10.28.39; 
see 5.1.1, 6.6.9, 10.6.10, 13.22.32; Phil 4:13; Canning, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1993; 
Clark, 1990, 1999, 2000; Martin, 2003, 2005).  Within his loving relationships with 
himself, others, and the divine, the new convert Augustine had “restored strength and true 
courage” in order to serve God and God’s children for the rest of his life.  In particular, as 
a monk-priest/bishop, Augustine had founded the lay and clerical monasteries at Hippo as 
well as he had served the cathedral of Hippo and had taken care of the members of the 
church community (especially the poor).  He had kept a balance between the life of 
contemplation and the life of church ministry in light of the interaction between his 
monastery and his church (civ. Dei 19.19; conf. 12.25.35, 13.22.32; Trin. 6.5.7; see Mt 
22:37-40).  Augustine made the monastic Rule in which all members of the community 
had attempted to become ‘one heart and soul’ directed towards God (reg. 1.2).  He had 
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earnestly participated in continuous and difficult debates with the Manicheans, the 
Donatists, the Arians, and the Pelagians in order to protect both God’s people and the 
North African Church from paganism/heresy as well as to establish more appropriate 
Christian guidelines and doctrines for a better Christian living in the specific historical 
and social context.  Until his last ecclesiastical struggle for defending his flock and 
church in the midst of the blockade of Hippo by the Vandal army, Augustine had 
successfully lived in “the service of love” of God and God’s people (Possidius, v. Aug. 29, 
30, 31). 
Importantly, the theme of Augustine’s re-creation of loving relationships with 
himself, others, and the divine guides us to recognize that one’s conversion experience is 
not simply a “once and for all event,” but an ongoing process of change in one’s whole 
lifetime.  One’s conversion experience does not refer to the isolated withdrawal from the 
world.  Rather, it stirs one to enter into the healing process of relationships with oneself, 
others, and the divine; that is, it encourages one to engage in the cooperative and 
integrated life of solitude and community in the specific cultural and social context of 
one’s time.  Indeed, within one’s renewed relationships, one can actually and 
continuously commit oneself to the loving service of God and neighbor in light of the 
experiences of the self, others, and the divine, as Augustine points out: 
What do I want?  What do I desire?  What do I burn for?  Why am I sitting here?  
Why do I live?  There’s only one reason: so that we may live together with Christ.  
This is my intense desire, this my honor, this my richness, this my joy, this my 
glory…I DO NOT WANT TO BE SAVED WITHOUT YOU—quid autem volo?  
Quid desidero?  Quid cupio?  Quare hic sedeo?  Quare vivo?  Nisi hac intentione, 
ut cum Christo simul vivamus.  Cupiditas mea ista est, honor meus iste est, 
possessio mea ista est, gaudium meum hoc est, gloria mea ista est…NOLO 
SALVUS ESSE SINE VOBIS. (s. 17.2, quoted in Martin, 2003, pp. 159-160) 
 492 
 
In conclusion, I present a more holistic and multi-dimensional pattern of 
Augustine’s conversion process for experiencing and reflecting on religious conversion in 
both the academy and the Christian community.  In other words, by using Rambo’s 
interdisciplinary framework of religious change, I characterize more effectively and 
practically the pattern of conversion experience as described in the Confessions (and 
other works of Augustine).  As such, I intend to universalize Augustine’s conversion 
within the Christian community in order to understand better not only Augustine’s 
conversion narrative, but also our own conversion stories within the pastoral care 
situations and various historical and social/cultural contexts.  This integrative and multi-
dimensional pattern helps us to pay attention to the importance 1) to express one’s 
restless feelings in psychological crisis and spiritual darkness, 2) to enter into one’s 
inwardness with the divine, 3) to confess one’s powerlessness to the divine, 4) to 
experience loving care and support from other people in the Christian community, 5) to 
confront with philosophical and cultural changes resulting in the reconstruction of 
personal and religious identity, worldview, and belief, 6) to experience the transformation 
of the God representation, and 7) to re-create one’s loving relationships with oneself, 
others, and the divine. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation established an integrated perception of the complexity and 
richness of religious conversion from an interdisciplinary perspective.  It employed the 
systemic stage model of conversion proposed by Lewis Rambo (1993) in order to 
articulate how personal, social, cultural, and religious components had impacted the 
unfolding process of Augustine’s change.  While examining the complicated and multi-
layered process of Augustine’s conversion, this study integrated religious and social 
science perspectives to understand his lifelong transformation as well as to demonstrate 
the benefits of coordinating a range of approaches in the study of his conversion. 
This interdisciplinary study demonstrated that Augustine’s conversion experience 
was engaged in the interactive and cumulative contexts of his experience of 
psychological distress and existential predicament, his inquiry to know himself and the 
divine, his interpersonal bonds with others, his affiliations with the Christian community, 
his philosophical and cultural changes, and his encounter with the divine, his acceptance 
of Christian baptism, his experience of the vision of Ostia, and his engagement in the 
service of God and others.  Following the integrated understanding of Augustine’s 
conversion, this study additionally proposed a holistic and multi-dimensional pattern of 
the conversion process as found in the Confessions (and other works of Augustine). 
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The coherent and rich portrayal of Augustine’s narrative of transformation enables 
us to appreciate that Augustine’s conversion was involved in an evolving process of his 
lived experience of change in which multiple factors interacted with and reinforced one 
another, calling for the continuous transformation and commitment of his whole life in 
light of the experiences of the self, others, and the divine.  The findings of this study 
provide some significant implications for scholars of conversion, for pastoral caregivers 
in the Christian community, and for future researchers of religious change. 
 
I. Implications for Scholars of Religious Conversion 
In line with Rambo’s approach to conversion, this dissertation contributes to the 
literature by enhancing the interdisciplinary study of religious change.  As such, this 
study provides insights for scholars of conversion (especially those of Augustine’s 
conversion experience) by fostering effectively the integrated understanding of the 
complex phenomenon of religious conversion through the reinterpretation of the process 
of Augustine’s narrative of change. 
The findings of this study, first of all, help scholars to recognize that the 
interdisciplinary approach to religious change is a good tool for achieving a more rich 
and accurate perception of human transformation by way of a collaborative dialogue 
among religious and social science studies of conversion, as Rambo (1993) points out: 
“For conversion to be understood in all its richness and complexity, the disciplines of 
anthropology, sociology, psychology, and religious studies must all be taken into 
account” (p. 7).  More specifically, this interdisciplinary study is able to become a bridge 
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or mediator among various disciplines—especially psychology, sociology, anthropology, 
and religious studies—in order to enhance the respect of another unique account 
(“voice”) of the conversion narrative, to overcome indifferent and juxtaposed stances 
from one discipline to another, and thus to facilitate a more critical and mutually-
informing conversation of religious change.  In this way, this study encourages scholars 
of conversion (who have neglected the social scientific interpretation of human 
transformation) to pay attention to the personal, familial, socio-cultural, and 
philosophical issues/forces in the process of human change; it also encourages academics 
in the social sciences (who have ignored the religious factor [e.g., the divine intervention 
and grace] in the process of religious change) to respect the role of the divine in one’s 
lived experience of change. 
As such, this study challenges scholars to enter together into the meaningful and 
valid work of coordinating a range of approaches to the study of conversion as well as to 
share together the benefits of constructing an interdisciplinary approach to religious 
change.  That is, it enables them to achieve an insight into depicting a more coherent and 
integrated picture of how the complicated and multiple factors involved in the conversion 
narrative are knit together (as if the members of an orchestra perform together in a spirit 
of harmony and balance in order to show successfully the richness and meaning of a song 
itself).1 
                                                
1 During his lifetime, Augustine had continuously opened his mind to establish his theological 
reflections and answers to his existential predicaments and philosophical questions in the historical and 
social/cultural context.  Although Augustine had paid attention to the priority of faith—“faith precedes 
reason (crede ut intelligas) because unless you believe, you will not understand” (see ench. 5)—from the 
time of his garden experience until his death, he had continuously struggled with keeping a balance 
between faith (fides) and reason (ratio), and between the transformation of the will and the transformation 
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II. Implications for Pastoral Caregivers in the Christian Community 
This dissertation contributes by applying, critically and practically, Rambo’s 
(theoretical) model of religious conversion within the context of pastoral care and 
ministry in order to understand better not only the conversion narrative of Augustine, but 
also the conversion stories of members of the Christian community.  In doing so, this 
study has characterized and advanced the pattern of Augustine’s conversion as described 
in the Confessions (and his other works).  As such, it provides implications for pastoral 
caregivers in the Christian community who have helped persons to cope efficiently with 
their psychological crisis, existential predicament, and spiritual abyss as well as to re-
establish their relationships with themselves, others, and the divine.  Indeed, in the 
context of pastoral ministry, many Christian pastoral caregivers (who might be only 
theologically-oriented to understand religious conversion) have tended to be unaware of 
(or to ignore) the influence of personal, social, and cultural factors on the process of 
                                                                                                                                            
of the knowledge (see Cushman, 1950, p. 271; Quinn, 2007, p. 390; Ramirez, 1982, pp. 123, 131; Van 
Fleteren, 1973, pp. 70-71).  In other words, he knew well the benefits of cooperation of the Christian life of 
believing (credere)/experiencing and the Christian life of knowing (scire)/understanding.  In a related vein, 
H. Richard Niebuhr (2001) in Christ and Culture views Augustine as the “theologian of cultural 
transformation by Christ” who had involved a continuous dialogue between the Christian gospel and 
culture of his time (e.g., the Neoplatonic heritage in the Roman society of the late fourth and early fifth 
centuries) (pp. 207-208).  While paying attention to the theme of Augustine and the conversion of culture, 
Niebuhr writes, “[Augustine’s] Neo-Platonist philosophy connects him with cultural Christianity” (p. 207); 
“The Roman rhetorician [Augustine] becomes a Christian preacher, who not only puts into the service of 
Christ the training in language and literature given him by his society, but, by virtue of the freedom and 
illumination received from the gospel, uses that language with a new brilliance and brings a new liberty 
into that literary tradition.  The Neo-Platonist [Augustine] not only adds to his wisdom about spiritual 
reality the knowledge of the incarnation which no philosopher had taught him, but this wisdom is 
humanized, given new depth and direction, made productive of new insights, by the realization that the 
Word has become flesh and has borne the sins of the spirit” (p. 208).  As such, while agreeing with 
Niebuhr’s idea of Augustine as a “transformer of culture,” I would like to contend that in the case of 
Augustine, his own earnest attempt to integrate the life of knowing and the life of believing (in light of 
mutual interaction of his intellectual knowledge of Neoplatonism and his Christian faith of God) challenges, 
paradoxically and effectively, the modern scholars of conversion (as well as the pastoral caregivers of the 
Christian community) to recognize the importance of the interdisciplinary approach to religious 
experiences within specific human conditions. 
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human transformation, as Rambo points out: “Religious people…consider this 
[sacred/religious] dimension [e.g., the divine grace] absolutely essential to the whole 
process of human transformation; other factors are subordinate to it” (p. 10). 
Broadly, Rambo’s interdisciplinary approach to religious conversion is deeply 
rooted in the critical correlational method in that it facilitates an essentially equal 
conversation among various disciplines.  Along with this line, this interdisciplinary study 
of (the pattern of) Augustine’s conversion is placed in the critical correlational method.  
As such, it is also relevant to (or is inspired by) a practical theological approach to 
pastoral care and ministry, which leads caregivers to engage in the experience of and 
reflection on Augustine’s transformational process within the faith community.  In A 
Fundamental Practical Theology: Descriptive and Strategic Proposals, Don S. Browning 
(1991) defines fundamental practical theology as “critical reflection on the church’s 
dialogue with Christian sources and other communities of experience and interpretation 
with the aim of guiding its action toward social and individual transformation” (p. 36).  
By using Tillich’s term “method of correlation,”2 Browning remakes a “revised 
correlation method” for promoting a critical dialogue between traditional Christian 
resources and human science resources (p. 71).  Browning’s revised correlational method 
involves a movement of practice to theory to practice.  Browning’s practice-theory-
practice model begins with practices, proceeds to identification of the theory implicit in 
the practices, and, in interdisciplinary conversation with that theory, moves back or 
                                                
2 In Systematic Theology, Paul Tillich defines the “method of correlation” as a way of uniting 
Christian message and human situation.  The method of correlation provides theological answers for the 
existential questions arising in human situations (1951, pp. 8, 60). 
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modifies the practices in which they are involved.  Browning emphasizes the role of 
practice as prior to theory, and is clear in overcoming the notion that practical theology is 
the application of theory to concrete situations (the theory-practice model).3  Based on 
practice-theory-practice movement, Browning’s revised correlational method involves an 
interdisciplinary movement for bringing theological texts and Christian traditions into 
critical conversation with sources from other disciplines (psychology, sociology, ethics, 
etc).4  His method calls on the Christian community to relate to and critically reflect on 
various “interpretations” of human experiences in order to assess the “relative adequacy” 
of any given interpretation for moral guidance in a pluralistic world.  As such, it leads 
persons (Christian or not) to better understand particular human situations, and to make 
better actions in pastoral care situations. 
While acknowledging the critical correlational method within Browning’s 
practical theological framework, this interdisciplinary study of the pattern of Augustine’s 
conversion process gives the members of the community an insight into a need for 
appropriate pastoral care and ministry in various historical and social/cultural contexts.  
In doing so, it helps us to recognize the importance of correlating questions and answers 
from interpretations of Christian faith with questions and answers from other 
interpretations of ordinary human experience.  More specifically, this study guides 
                                                
3 Traditionally, practical theology has been conceived as theological reflection on the tasks of the 
ordained ministers and leaders of the church for preaching, teaching, liturgy, and counseling.  The 
traditional type of theological reflection involves a movement from theory to practice, originating in 
theological ideas and concepts which are then applied to practical aspects of ministry (Hiltner, 2000; 
Schleiermacher, 1830/1966). 
 
4 Browning’s method includes five levels to establish moral guidance in pastoral care situations: 
the visional, obligational, tendency-need, environmental-social, and rule-role levels.  These five levels 
involve the interdisciplinary and critical conversation in conjunction with theological, psychological, 
ethical, social, cultural, and behavioral dimensions. 
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pastoral caregivers to enter into collaborative dialogue between traditional Christian 
resources and modern human science resources, between practice and theory, between 
the church and the university, and between the sacred and the secular; as such, it provides 
an insight into promoting a mutual and critical correlation between the Christian tradition 
and the contemporary situation. 
In a more critical and integrative way, the major findings of this study of 
Augustine’s conversion (as discussed in chapter five) help pastoral caregivers of the 
religious community to foster an ability for critically integrating religious and social 
science perspectives for a better understanding of religious conversion, and to recognize 
how the complicated and multiple factors involved in religious change are knit together.  
More specifically, this study leads pastoral caregivers to attend to the interrelated link 
between one’s spiritual journey toward God and one’s sense of belonging with others 
within Christian communities in light of knowing/experiencing oneself, others, and the 
divine.  It also leads them to look at how one has gradually reshaped one’s identity, 
worldview, and belief through intimate interactions with other people and through 
participation in religious groups, influenced by the specific social and cultural conditions 
of one’s time. 
In emphasizing the value of the integrated conversation between traditional 
Christian and human science resources, this study leads pastoral caregivers to be aware of 
the importance of (re)-establishing one’s connections with the divine and others within 
the process of one’s transformation.  In this vein, scholars have paid attention to the 
inherent link between the recovery/development of one’s relationships with God/others 
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and the experience of one’s change/healing in the various conditions of pastoral care or 
spiritual direction.  Influenced by Browning,5 John Patton (1993) in Pastoral Care in 
Context: An Introduction to Pastoral Care describes pastoral care as “a ministry of the 
Christian community” in order to broaden the focus of pastoral care beyond the 
individual pastor to the larger group of cares within the Christian community (pp. 6, 15).  
In the emphasis on pastoral care within the interrelatedness of the community members, 
Patton defines pastoral care as “the person-to-person response that grows out of 
participation in a caring community and which seeks to enable persons to give and 
receive care and to experience community” (p. 27).  While presenting the communal 
contextual paradigm of pastoral care, Patton argues that the central act of pastoral care is 
not so much problem solving, but “hearing and remembering in relationship” (p. 40; see 
pp. 15-37).  At this point, for Patton, the effective way in pastoral care is not critical 
judgment, but mutual understanding of one another in a web of relationships.  In line with 
Browning and Patton, Chris R. Schlauch (1995) in Faithful Companioning: How 
Pastoral Counseling Heals insists that pastoral (clinical) care is a kind of collaborative 
conversation in which both the pastoral caregiver and the troubled person engage in 
healing relationships.  More specifically, in this collaborative conversation, the pastoral 
caregiver faithfully companions and collaboratively translates with the troubled person 
                                                
5 In Religious Ethics and Pastoral Care, Browning (1983) depicts pastoral care as a kind of 
critical theological reflection which involves the broad work of the whole congregation rather than the 
work of the ordained pastor.  While emphasizing the link of doing pastoral care with Christian ethics 
(“practical moral thinking”), Browning contends that pastoral care brings a critical dialogue between 
traditional Christian resources and human science resources for guiding individual and social 
transformation.  This means that the church community needs to rethink its practices of care not only by 
reflection on Christian tradition, but also by conversation between the secular world and religious world.  
Through the broad work of the congregation, pastoral care occurs on the street, in the hospital, in the 
funeral, and in many other situations (see Browning’s “Introduction to Pastoral Counseling” [1993, p. 5]). 
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(“faithful companioning”); that is, through empathy, the caregiver introspects as if the 
caregiver is the troubled in order to feel together the inner experience of the other;6 as 
such, both are involved in the process of experiencing and reflecting, practicing and 
theorizing, together.  For Schlauch, there are varieties of suffering and varieties of 
healing experience, as there are varieties of religious experience and varieties of human 
situation.  Schlauch asserts that healing is not simply the absence of something (e.g., the 
symptoms of depression).  Rather, healing as a process lies in faithful companioning and 
loving relationships between the caregiver and the troubled (and between the divine and 
the believer).  Schlauch writes, “Given that the self is intersecting-overlapping and that a 
self is in relationships and is relationships, healing the self is healing relationships” 
(p.131).  That is, “healing involves gaining contact, making connections, and restoring 
relationships with others and oneself” as well as with the divine (p. 141).  In a related 
vein, Margaret Guenther (1992) in Holy Listening: The Art of Spiritual Direction 
elucidates spiritual direction within loving relationships in terms of listening to and 
sharing the stories of spiritual pilgrimage.  Guenther contends that the purpose of spiritual 
direction is “to help people discover how to define themselves in relation not only to the 
world [the neighbor], but also to God” (p. 69).  From a feminist perspective, Guenther 
describes the context of spiritual direction as “holy listening.”  For Guenther, holy 
listening refers to not “domination and submission” in the hierarchical structure, but 
hospitality, friendship, and intimacy in the mutual relationship.  While describing herself 
                                                
6 Schlauch (1995) contends that the introspective-empathic attitude includes the following 
polarities: 1) self-experience, 2) conserving-companioning, 3) subject-object, 4) separate-connected, 5) 
surface-depth, 6) doubting-believing, and 7) sinful-righteous (pp. 89-103). 
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as an “amateur” spiritual director, Guenther presents the metaphor of hospitality to and 
welcoming the stranger which is cheerful and valid for making a safe place or space for 
the directee as well as for listening to and sharing the story of the other.  For Guenther, 
both ordinary persons, the director and the directee, are able to join together in inviting 
God into their space: “Here we are, you and I, and I hope a third, Christ, is in our midst” 
(p. 15).  Holy listening grows with the light of God’s unseen presence. 
Corresponding with the literature of pastoral care and spiritual direction, this 
interdisciplinary study contributes by enhancing the formation and reformation of one’s 
relationships with the divine and with other community members in the specific contexts 
of pastoral care or spiritual direction.  In doing so, this study encourages the members of 
the faith community to reconstruct their religious tradition in a wider world of experience 
and meaning.  It helps persons to understand themselves in relation to God as well as in 
relation to the self and others.7  As such, this study guides us to pay attention to the 
inherent link between the self, suffering, and healing, between psychological 
development and spiritual maturity, between the transcendent and the immanent, between 
the interior and the exterior, between the sacred and the secular, and between the human 
yearning for holiness (“spiritual awakening”) and the human yearning for belongingness 
(“living human web”). 
Importantly, this interdisciplinary study provides an insight into re-describing (or 
re-locating) Augustine’s conversion experience within the modern Christian community 
                                                
7 In this vein, Michael St. Clair (1994) in Human Relationships and the Experience of God insists 
that “relationships with God and a community can help the individual move outside of the world and 
beyond a self-centered view of the world and transcend the boundaries of the self” (p. 80). 
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in light of “universalizing Augustine’s story” of conversion.  In the Confessions, 
Augustine disclosed his spiritual journey toward God and invited his fellows and readers 
into sharing his lived experience of change.  In this way, Augustine described the goal of 
his Confessions: “The thirteen books of my Confessions, whether they refer to my evil or 
good, praise the just and good God, and stimulate the heart and mind of man [the human 
reader] to approach unto Him [God]” (retr. 2.6.1; see conf. 10.1.1).  While emphasizing 
spiritual friendships between Augustine and his readers as well as between Augustine and 
the divine, McMahon (2006) writes, 
Augustine aimed to befriend his readers in God.  The Confessions directly enacts 
Augustine the narrator’s intimacy with God and catches readers up into his prayer.  
It thereby brings readers into intimacy with the narrator’s life and mind.  Some 
readers accept this intimacy and grow into it; others find Augustine 
unsympathetic and resist.  In any event, the Confessions labors to establish 
relationship between Augustine and his readers.  The narrator does not say so, and 
the author cannot.  Nevertheless, the long history of responses to the Confessions 
shows how successful Augustine has been at creating a sense of intimacy with his 
readers. (p. 129) 
 
In this way, this study encourages Christian believers to enter into a creative and 
critical conversation between Augustine’s conversion story in the late fourth century and 
our own conversion stories in the twenty-first century.  As Capps (1983) points out, 
For the more one reads autobiography [which is inherently related to ‘the 
metaphor of the self in the process of becoming’], the more one is inclined to 
believe Carl Rogers’ axiom, “What is most personal is most general.”  Or as 
Frederick Buechner puts it in his recent autobiography, “My assumption is that 
the story of one of us is in some measure the story of us all.”  Autobiography 
enables an author to struggle with the question: “What is becoming of me?”  But, 
in the final analysis, we read autobiography because we want to know: “What is 
becoming of us?” (p. 272)8 
                                                
8 In the same vein, Kliever (1986) writes, “Autobiography and history come together in my story, 
that my struggle with the autobiographical question: ‘What is becoming of me?’ is in the final analysis our 
struggle with his historical question: ‘What is becoming of us?’” (p. 113; see Kevane, 1986, p. 82; Martin, 
2003, pp. 14, 156-157; Nino, 1990, p. 8; Paffenroth, 2003, p. 144). 
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This study helps the members of the Christian community to look at the inherent 
link of Augustine’s story of spiritual journey with our own stories of spiritual pilgrimage 
in various pastoral care situations in light of the continuity of conversion in the Christian 
community.  In the case of Augustine, he had struggled with the process of self-
becoming: “What[/How] is becoming of me?”  Through a critical and integrative 
dialogue between Augustine’s transforming narrative and our own transforming stories, 
we Christian believers can establish our own existential question for a more mature 
spiritual journey—“What[/How] is becoming of us” in our own historical and 
social/cultural milieu?  As such, this creative and integrative conversation enables us to 
realize both the personal dimension and the universal dimension of religious conversion, 
which are separate yet mutually-informing, in the process of human transformation in 
light of a movement from Augustine’s personal story of conversion to a universal story of 
conversion in the community. 
 More importantly, by commending a creative conversation between Augustine’s 
conversion narrative and our own conversion stories, this interdisciplinary study guides 
the members of the Christian community to appreciate that Christian conversion 
experience does not occur in isolation (“in a vacuum”), but in relational contexts of 
oneself, others, and God; as such, it takes place within historical and social/cultural 
contexts.  This implies that Christian conversion does not mean withdrawing from the 
world, but rather engaging in both the service of God and the service of others, as Karl 
Rahner (1979) states: “[Christian conversion] is love for the neighbor, because only in 
conjunction with this can God really be loved, and without that love no one really knows 
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with genuine personal knowledge who God is” (p. 206; see Barclay, 1975; Callen, 2001; 
Gutierrez, 1978; Marquardt, 1998; Morris, 1981; Nissiotis, 1967; Witherup, 1994).9  In 
that sense, this study leads Christian believers not only to achieve a better understanding 
of Augustine’s conversion, but also to imitate (or engage in) his life, which was 
interwoven by the cooperative life of solitude and community in light of the interaction of 
the love of God and the love of neighbor.  Especially when re-describing Augustine’s 
lived experience of change within our life of pilgrimage, he has encouraged us to join the 
Christian spiritual journey; as such, he has given a new direction to Christian ideals of 
living in terms of the interplay of prayer (contemplation of God in his monastic life) and 
social engagement (action for others in his pastoral ministry) (see civ. Dei 19.19; Canning, 
1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1993; Clark, 1990, 1999, 2000; Martin, 2003, 2005; McGinn & 
McGinn, 2003).  In this way, while emphasizing the interrelatedness between a servant of 
“the humble Incarnate Christ” and a “humble Christian” for others in light of the personal 
transformation and the network of Christian friendships, Kreidler (1990) writes, 
Augustine of Hippo’s pastoral practice is directly related to his experience of 
conversion.  That is, Augustine’s pastoral practice flowed directly from his own 
experience of the humble Christ of the Gospel manifested in, and in relationship 
to Christ’s body the Church.  Specifically, Augustine’s appropriation of the Christ 
of Scripture was the foundation of his understanding of conversion both for 
himself and for the community…Augustine knew that any theology of ministry 
                                                
 9 In this way, while acknowledging the value of Christian life in solitude, Claire E. Wolfteich 
(2001) in American Catholics through the Twentieth Century: Spirituality, Lay Experience, and Public Life 
pays attention to the value of Christian life in community: “[Christian] spirituality must be studied in 
historical and cultural context.  Spirituality is ‘an experience rooted in a particular community’s history’” 
(pp. 8-9).  As such, Wolfteich emphasizes the interrelation between personal faith and public work: “At the 
core of the struggle over spirituality is a wrestling with private and public meaning” (p. 2).  Along this line, 
Kenneth Leech (1989) in Spirituality and Pastoral Care states, “In order for the truth of Scripture to enter 
into dialogue, struggle, and conflict with contemporary reality…there needs to be a twofold process: 
grappling with the Word of God, and grappling with the issues in our world, in our neighborhood, in our 
personal lives” (p. 14). 
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was the result of identification with the humble Incarnate Christ and his 
identification with his brothers and sisters…in the process of conversion. (p. 510) 
 
While paying attention to Augustine’s transforming life of relationships with 
himself, others, and the divine during his lifetime, this interdisciplinary study challenges 
us to (re)-recognize that Christian conversion experience is usually involved in an 
ongoing process of religious change which inherently requires the continuing change—
“converting”—and dedication of the person’s whole life in terms of the reciprocity of 
turning toward God and turning toward others.  In other words, Augustine’s converting 
life story of relationships encourages us to involve the integrated life of contemplation 
(the transformation of the self) and action (the transformation of the community/world) 
within various historical and social/cultural conditions.  Indeed, along with our web of 
transforming relationships, Christian believers are able to commit, continuously and 
actually, ourselves to the loving service of God and neighbor in light of our experiences 
of the self, others, and the divine. 
 
III. Recommendations for Future Research 
This dissertation has actively and critically engaged in the interdisciplinary study 
of religious conversion.  As such, it encourages future researchers to establish more 
interdisciplinary studies of religious conversion, that is, to integrate critically the 
religious and human science perspectives as well as to portray a more coherent and 
integrated picture of how personal, social, cultural, and religious components interact 
with one another in the process of religious change.  In emphasizing the need for the 
interdisciplinary study of conversion, this study strongly recommends Rambo’s 
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interdisciplinary approach to religious change for future researchers because his method 
guides them, effectively and successfully, to make (and share) more merits of 
coordinating a range of perspectives in the study of conversion. 
The present study has reflected on how to use Rambo’s model of religious 
conversion more creatively and practically in order to relocate Augustine’s conversion 
experience within the contemporary Christian community in terms of universalizing the 
story of religious conversion.  In that sense, the present study of the holistic and multi-
dimensional pattern as described in the Confessions (and other works of Augustine) is an 
attempt to better understand both Augustine’s conversion story and our own conversion 
narratives in various pastoral care situations.  As such, it contributes by guiding the 
members of the Christian community to realize the correlation between Augustine’s 
narrative of spiritual journey and our own stories of spiritual pilgrimage in various 
historical and social/cultural contexts.  Moreover, this interdisciplinary study also 
contributes by enhancing a mutual and critical correlation between the Christian tradition 
and the contemporary situation, at which point it stirs us to engage in a creative and 
integrative dialogue between traditional Christian and modern human science resources. 
While paying attention to movement from the discontinuity of one’s solitary story 
of conversion to the continuity of a universal story of conversion in the community, this 
dissertation primarily uses the case of St. Augustine and, additionally, the cases of other 
persons’ conversion experiences (e.g., the conversion of Alypius) from the Confessions in 
order to explore the process of religious change.  As such, this study encourages us to 
understand the transformation of a person in the context of the Christian community 
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(“one’s journey from unbelief to faith”).  In that sense, it contributes by attempting to 
universalize (or generalize) Augustine’s story of conversion in the religious group in light 
of a movement from the personal to the universal narrative of transformation (see Capps, 
1983, 2004; Kliever, 1986; Martin, 2003; Nino, 1990; Paffenroth, 2003; Van Fleteren, 
1990). 
This study did not attempt to use other various conversion stories within the 
context of different cultures and different times in order to achieve a richer and more 
appropriate perception of the complex phenomenon of religious change as well as to 
universalize effectively the story of conversion.  For this reason, I hope that future 
researchers will do more to compare the differences and similarities of a variety of 
conversion experiences in various human conditions (e.g., the conversion stories of the 
early Egyptian monk [e.g., Antony] and the modern American monk [e.g., Thomas 
Merton], or the conversion narratives of the Christian Platonist in the West [e.g., 
Augustine] and the Christian Confucianist in the East [e.g., Chai Choon Kim]).  
Moreover, there is a need for continued examination of the conversion process of entire 
religious groups as well as the conversion process of individuals in other religious or non-
religious environments. 
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